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INTRODUCTION
 
The increasing indebtedness of adults across the globe is not headline-grabbing 
news these days. Likewise, most readers would not find it surprising that many 
marginalised people, not least those designated as underemployed or unemployed, 
have become increasingly reliant on costly payday loans, credit cards and 
microfinance loans to pay for basic subsistence needs. The fact that student loans 
in the United States have surpassed $1 trillion1 and are now higher than all other 
types of consumer credit (save mortgage debt) is considered by many observers to 
be an unfortunate, yet indispensable part of obtaining gainful employment after 
graduating high school. Paradoxically, debt has become the last hope for avoiding, 
reducing, or at least delaying the pain of marginalisation. 
That these statements do not invoke amazement and curiosity attests to the power 
of the societal structures and processes that have normalised, disciplined and 
naturalised the reality of pervasive debt, or what I refer to here as debtfare. In what 
follows, I attempt to interrupt the dominant narrative of debtfare by revealing how 
and why the increasing reliance of the working poor on expensive forms of privately 
created money (what is conventionally termed ‘consumer credit’) is a social 
construction that has been facilitated and reproduced by states and capitalists in the 
neoliberal era. Briefly, neoliberalism refers to contested, contradictory and complex 
processes carried out at various scales (global, national, local) by capitalist states 
through rhetorical and regulative means. These neoliberal processes are not only 
guided by the preference for market-led, but also entail disciplinary and ideological 
dimensions (Gill, 1995; Fine, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner et al., 2010). 
Since the 1990s, the types of credit available to those living near or below the 
poverty line have expanded. Traditional pawnshops and loan sharks now compete 
with a variety of products designed to serve the under-banked. Lending to the 
poor has become big business and is now integrated into mainstream financial 
institutions as opposed to operating on the fringes of the economy (Karger, 2005). 
2 Introduction 
This shift has been referred to by Michael Hudson (1996) as the ‘poverty industry’ 
and by Ananya Roy (2010) as ‘poverty capital’.2 Complementary to, but analytically 
and thematically distinct from, the work of Hudson and Roy, this book explores 
specific components of the poverty industry, including a focus on the credit card, 
student loan and payday loan industries in the United States and on the 
microfinance and housing finance industries in Mexico. 
The decision to focus on the United States and Mexico as the primary sites of 
analysis is driven by a desire not only to examine the particularities of the poverty 
industry in both a developed and developing world context, but also to explore 
the cross-cutting relational factors of the industry writ large. Although the United 
States was not the first country to embrace neoliberalisation – that dubious honour 
belongs to Chile under the Pinochet regime – the combination of its geopolitical 
significance (e.g., financial and military power) and the fervour with which the 
state has implemented and defended neoliberalism has thrown the articulations of 
debtfarism and the poverty industry into stark relief. Because of its geographical 
proximity to, and thus particular historical relationship with, the United States, 
Mexico represents fertile ground to study the coercive and ideological features of 
the poverty industry in the context of a middle-income country. Through these 
two case studies, I illustrate the broader power structures and strategies involved 
in the creation and reproduction of the poverty industry as well as the roles of 
money, the surplus population and debtfarism therein. Debtfarism and the poverty 
industry are certainly not exclusive to these two countries and the theoretical 
framework of this book is intended to provide a launching pad for the pursuit of 
future studies in different national as well as scalar contexts. The increasing 
dominance of credit and the new modes of governance embodied in debtfare are 
salient, yet undertheorised and understudied, features of neoliberalism. This book 
takes a modest first step in that direction. 
To deconstruct the poverty industry in the United States and Mexico, I employ 
a Marxian lens to complement debates about consumer credit in the wider 
financialisation, microfinance and consumer studies literature. The approach is three­
fold. First, I interrogate the role of money in the poverty industry by locating the 
roots of its power within the wider dynamics of capital accumulation. This allows 
me to dispel powerful tropes that normalise and depoliticise debtfare, such as 
‘financial inclusion’ (usually applied in the context of the global South) and the 
‘democratisation of credit’ (used in the context of the global North). I am guided 
here by a few simple questions: What constitutes ‘the financial’ into which the 
poor are urged to voluntary join? What does the democratisation of privately created 
money backed by the state (otherwise known as ‘credit’) imply, and who benefits 
from the expansion of the monetised relations of debt? 
Having interrogated the role of money, I move on to reconceptualise the targets 
of the poverty industry: that is, underemployed and unemployed workers, or what 
Marx refers to as the surplus population (Marx, 1990). In doing so, I ask why the 
poverty industry focuses on surplus workers and consider the consequences of their 
inclusion into ‘the financial’. Simultaneously, I interrogate the underlying causes 
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of the poverty of the surplus population in contemporary capitalism. The third 
and final feature of this study is the exploration and theorisation of the role played 
by neoliberal states in the facilitation and reproduction of the poverty industry. 
Here, I am specifically concerned with capturing and explaining debtfare. 
As other writers have insisted, the multifaceted and dynamic nature of 
neoliberalism has yielded specific forms of state intervention to enable the 
mediation, discipline and normalisation of various social tensions relating to the 
poor. Jamie Peck (2001), for instance, has drawn on the concept of the ‘workfare’ 
state to analyse the commodification and coercive nature of social welfare 
programmes. Loïc Wacquant (2009, 2010), on the other hand, has coined the term 
‘prisonfare’ to capture the criminalisation of poverty as a way of disciplining the 
poor. Prisonfare and workfare states are not standalone neoliberal states. Instead, 
they reflect important and overlapping features of neoliberalism that occur in specific 
temporal and spatial contexts of capital accumulation. In this same vein, I propose 
that debtfare is a component of neoliberal state intervention that has emerged to 
mediate, normalise and discipline the monetised relations that inhabit the poverty 
industry. 
Paralleling the neoliberal insistence that there is no alternative to market-based 
growth, the rhetorical and regulative features of debtfarism encourage widespread 
reliance on credit to augment and/or replace the living wage or government benefit 
cheque. In doing so, debtfarism assists in the recreation of the Gramscian illusion 
of ‘one class, one society’, while foregoing a material compromise with workers 
(Gramsci, 1971). This compromise does not entail public support for a living wage 
or social protection from the market. Instead, in the neoliberal era, the pact has 
been rearticulated in terms of safeguarding market freedoms and equality in order 
to ensure that all consumers – regardless of their income or lack thereof – may 
benefit from standards of fairness, competition, transparency and accountability. 
The ‘benefits’ of debtfarism are continually framed by what Marx (2005) refers to 
as the illusion of the ‘community of money’, a term characterising capitalist society 
as one based on ‘individualism and concepts of liberty, freedom and equality backed 
by laws of private property, rights to appropriation and freedom of contract’ (Harvey 
1989: 168). This illusion is further bolstered, for instance, by the seeming neutrality 
of the legal obligation of debt and claims of consumer protection. 
As focal points, money, the surplus population and debtfare are inseparable 
elements in my analysis of the poverty industry. Together, they inform the 
following three arguments that run through the length of the book. First, the poverty 
industry is neither natural nor inevitable. It is constructed and reproduced by 
powerful capitalist interests and the rhetorical and regulatory features of neoliberal 
states – in particular, debtfarism. The various aspects of the poverty industry studied 
in Part II and Part III of this book reveal that the poverty industry is a product 
of past attempts to overcome barriers to the expansion of capital accumulation. 
Credit-led accumulation is a specific trend in the attempt to overcome those barriers. 
The second strand of my thesis is that surplus workers are not only important 
sources for the expansion and intensification of credit-led accumulation, but they 
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also represent a necessary condition and vital feature of capital accumulation 
(Marx, 1990; Clarke, 1994). As discussed in Chapter 2, the surplus population is 
not a self-reproducing, naturalised feature of capitalism but rather a highly dynamic 
social relation. As a social relation, the surplus population must be constructed and 
reconstructed, both biologically and as labour power. By this I mean two things. 
First, the surplus workers need to be able to reproduce themselves through the 
acquisition of basic subsistence requirements, including food, shelter, clothing and 
healthcare (Katz, 2001; Bakker and Gill, 2003; Peterson, 2003; LeBaron and 
Roberts, 2010). Second, and more broadly, the social reproduction of surplus 
population hinges on the ability to impose the basic imperative of capitalism: to 
earn a living based on market-dependence in such a manner that it appears as a 
natural and inevitable aspect of life, or as the ordinary run of things (Marx, 1990; de 
Angelis, 2007). 
The third and final strand of my thesis is that the social power of money, 
reinforced by the debtfare state’s rhetorical and regulative framings, assists in 
distorting the exploitative, unequal and disciplinary nature of the loan. Here the 
loan is seen as a voluntary exchange of equivalents between two consenting 
parties, where class-based power and exploitation are less visible and less politicised 
than in a wage-labour/employer relation. The debt relation, which lies at the heart 
of the poverty industry, is also disciplinary in nature, which facilitates the social 
reproduction of the surplus population as a category of labour power. 
In their capacity as debtors, surplus labourers are compelled to continually search 
for work to meet the repayment schedule of their loans (Harvey, 1989). It is because 
of the social power of money in capitalism that the social reproduction of labour 
power in the poverty industry becomes relatively less politicised and explicitly 
exploitative vis-à-vis primary forms of exploitation through wage-labour. Creditor-
debtor relations, on the other hand, are captured by what Marx referred to as 
secondary forms of exploitation by which he means the modification of workers’ 
income through interest rates, late fees and so forth. Aside from extracting interest-
and fee-based revenue, secondary forms of exploitation serve not only to distort 
class-based power, but also to impose market discipline over surplus workers. This 
does not imply that struggles and tensions are absent in secondary forms of 
exploitation; but rather that these monetised relations of debt assume different 
expressions and, due to debtfarist state strategies, often articulate themselves in the 
realm of exchange in the form of consumer protection and/or the democratisation 
of credit. As I maintain below and throughout the book, power relations and 
paradoxes entailed in secondary forms of exploitation can neither be made legible 
nor understood solely in the realm of exchange. 
Given the significance of money as the foundational plank in my analysis, its 
mystical powers must be problematised. Despite being so obviously central to any 
understanding of debt, money remains largely ignored in the existing literature. In 
what follows, I query the reasons for this neglect and explain why filling this gap 
is essential to a more complete understanding of the emergence, expansion and 
reproduction of the poverty industry. 
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Money 
Money is simultaneously everything and nothing, everywhere but nowhere 
in particular, a means that poses as an end, the profoundest and most 
complete of all centralizing forces in a society where it facilitates the greatest 
dispersion, a representation that appears quite divorced from whatever it is 
supposed to represent. It is a real or concrete abstraction that exists external to 
us and exercises real power over us. 
– David Harvey, The Urban Experience, 1989: 167 
Money organises every aspect of our lives. Everyone needs money to meet basic 
reproductive needs such as food, clothing and shelter. Yet money is also secretive 
and individualising. As Brett Williams (2004: 55) observes: 
I know a lot more about my friends’ sex lives than I do about their finances 
. . . The one thing they will never permit to be known about them, to any 
friend, the only thing that cannot be discussed, is how much money they 
have in the bank . . . Therefore, we have no joint knowledge of how we 
are dealing with the money issues in our lives; each of us faces the problem 
alone. 
The individualising, isolating and enigmatic aspects of money, captured by 
Williams’ observation, can make people feel personally responsible when they do 
not have enough money to meet rent or mortgage payments, student loan pay ments, 
childcare expenses, health care costs and/or groceries bills – to the point where 
anxiety, fear and helplessness begin to invade and poison their daily lives. The lack 
of money, which often results in a state of indebtedness, also serves to intensify socio­
economic inequalities while masking the underlying reasons for them. These features 
of money described by Williams are neither neutral nor phenomena that have emerged 
from a naturally evolving economy. They are instead historical social constructions 
that express particular relations of class-based power in capitalist society. 
Why start with money, one might ask? 
Money is not only one of the most commonplace features in our everyday lives, 
it remains one of the most illusive, especially as concerns the deconstruction and 
denaturalisation of debt.3 So, what is money? At the surface level, the immediate 
response to this question may seem straightforward enough. If we rely on the 
conventional economic understanding, money is a unit of account, a store of value 
and a medium of exchange. These economic meanings of money are pervasive 
and taken as common-sense facts. The problem is that few scholars writing in the 
areas of consumer credit and financialisation have attempted to move beyond 
this conventional definition. In practice, while political economists have defined 
the financial system as constituting both the monetary and credit systems, the latter 
has generally become the sole focus, resulting in money being taken as a given. 
6 Introduction 
There has been a failure to interrogate the social power of money with the aim 
of denaturalising its predominant economic meaning and presence in neoliberalism. 
As discussed above, neoliberalism generally refers to the post-1980 temporal frame 
that has been marked by credit-led accumulation and neoliberal state interventions 
supporting a ‘pro-corporate, freer-trading, “market order”’ (Peck, 2010: 9). Moreover, 
few academic treatments have sought to understand the intrinsic yet tension-ridden 
social nature of money. Scholars have instead been content to explore the social 
and cultural dimensions of money by uncritically grafting their analyses onto existing 
economic meanings (Zelizer, 1997; cf. Ingham, 2001, 2004). From this perspective, 
credit and money are seen as things or objects upon which either actors bestow 
social and cultural meanings, such as respect for contracts, subjectivities, trust and 
risk/uncertainty or become embedded in social and cultural networks (Granovetter, 
1985; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Calder, 1999; Francois, 2006; Wennerlind, 2011). 
Lost is why and how the capitalist mode of production and exchange facilitate the 
illusion of the power of things over people, particularly the working poor. 
These oversights represent a major obstacle to explaining the origins of power, 
transformation and social reproduction of the monetised relations of debt in the 
poverty industry. As a corrective, I employ a historical materialist framework to 
locate the origins of social power of money in the wider context of the dynamics 
of capital accumulation. A more detailed survey of the existing literature reveals 
what makes this approach distinct. 
The contemporary sources from which we can begin to search for theorisa­
tions of money are few and far between. A theory of money is conspicuous in its 
absence in the otherwise rich and informative debates about consumer society 
(Calder, 1999; Burton, 2008), financial inclusion and poverty capital such as 
microfinance (Rankin, 2001; Roy, 2010) and financialisation (Martin, 2002; 
Peterson, 2003; Langley, 2008; Montgomerie, 2009, 2010; Krippner, 2011). To 
be fair, the work of these scholars is not driven by the same set of questions as the 
present study and many of their insights into the subjective understandings and 
representations of consumer credit have, as I discuss below, helped to make sense 
of the social context in which money operates. However, the question remains as 
to why scholars avoid a theoretical interrogation of money. 
Some of the reasons offered for this avoidance relate to the very traits that make 
it so important to place money at the heart of our investigation from the start. 
David Harvey opens his discussion of money in The Urban Experience by quoting 
the French writer, Émile Zola, noting that money ‘is very difficult to write a novel 
about’ because ‘it is cold, glacial, devoid of interest’. Harvey (1989) goes on to 
suggest that Marx’s lengthy studies on the topic of money ‘make for dull reading’. 
In her comprehensive survey of consumer culture, Dawn Burton (2008: 29, 
my emphasis) points out that ‘the cultural independence and power of money remains 
largely unquestioned’ in the literature, particularly with regard to consumer credit 
and its role in consumption. As Burton notes, the lack of academic attention paid 
to the role of credit is accompanied by a dearth of in-depth accounts of the cultural 
aspects of credit, namely the role of trust and risk in credit relationships (Burton, 
Introduction 7 
2008; Francois, 2006). It is useful to reflect briefly on the reasons given by Burton 
for this absence. 
First, Burton notes that the discussion of credit and by extension finance and 
financial services, has long been the province of economists. Unfamiliar literature 
that uses different theoretical approaches and research techniques can be off-putting, 
especially to scholars who are keen to pursue broader social trends. Burton’s second 
reason for the lack of attention to credit mirrors Harvey’s (1989) reflection on the 
understudied social power of money: it is dull. For Burton (2008: 31), we need 
to recognise ‘the lack of glamour, fun and frivolity of credit compared to other 
areas of consumption . . . Consumers often find dealing with their finances a rather 
dull business and researchers may feel the same, too’. 
A third factor explaining why so little attention is given to credit concerns its 
invisibility. Lendol Calder (1999) argues, for instance, that consumer credit has 
few material artefacts that can be read as text and thus be studied and researched 
over time. As illustrated by Williams’ (2004) observation above, money is 
considered a private affair and is often not spoken about in public – or private, 
for that matter. Secrecy as a barrier to the study of credit is clearly a pertinent 
consid eration (Calder, 1999:13–14; Simmel, 2004; Burton, 2008). Issues of con ­
fiden tiality governing the acquisition and use of credit by consumers are also 
important obstacles in its study (Calder, 1999: 13). 
These are all important and valid points. Theories of money and applied finance 
can seem dull, foreign and private. By leaving these issues unexplored, however, 
the literature fails to challenge the assumption that money and credit is a natural 
state of affairs. A historical materialist approach, by contrast, allows us to see how 
these factors are socially constructed in the wider context of the dynamics of and 
relations of power inherent to, capital accumulation. We need to recognise that 
the neglect of the theoretical contemplation of money in the neoliberal era is a 
reflection of the mysterious character and power of money itself. As such, the 
deconstruction of money and its connection to credit has not been adequately 
answered in the literature on financialisation, which has been over-populated 
by Foucauldian and other post-structuralist analyses that miss the mark in terms 
of questioning power and its origins. Instead of theorising the social power of 
money, many theorists of consumer debt have embraced the economic meaning 
of money and then proceed to complement this treatment by focusing on how 
ordinary people, social networks and institutions fuse social and cultural meanings 
onto economistic understandings of money and credit. In doing so, they naturalise 
the social power inherent to money and its ability to neutralise, individualise, level 
and normalise highly exploitative and unequal relations of power between people 
in capitalism. 
I take seriously Viviana Zelizer’s (1997: 6) suggestion that ‘the task of social 
theory is to explain the uncontested revolutionary power of money’. However, I 
take Zelizer’s impetus in a different direction in order to provide a more complete 
explanation of power, social transformation, the social reproduction of capitalism 
and the role of the poverty industry therein. 
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In the first three chapters of Debtfare, I set up a theoretical framework that allows 
the reader to grasp what the revolutionary power of money means with regard to 
the poverty industry. Specifically, I address where the power comes from, who or 
what possesses it, over whom it is wielded and why. I argue that it is precisely the 
mediation, neutralisation and legitimisation of this power that fuels neoliberal-led 
capitalism and more specifically, credit-led accumulation. At its core, this power 
conceals and thus renders as natural the exploitative and unequal social relations 
inherent to debt. The social power of money, which is rooted in the capitalist 
mode of production and exchange, is a class-based phenomenon that possesses 
both temporal and spatial dimensions (Harvey, 1999). This social power is, 
moreover, deeply intertwined with, and dependent on, capitalist states. In the 
neoliberal era, where privately created money (credit) dominates, debtfare is the 
prevailing trope. 
Contentions of Marx on money 
There is far from a consensus on the theoretical utility of Marx’s theory of money 
in neoliberal capitalism. For economic geographers Andrew Leyshon and Nigel 
Thrift, who have studied money and credit intensively (from both a Marxist and 
post-structuralist perspective), there are several limits to a Marxian analysis that 
weaken its explanatory power, particularly with respect to the rapid growth of credit 
in the form of what Leyshon and Thrift (1997) refer to as virtual money. Due to 
changes in the landscape of money, these authors suggest that the Marxian approach 
needs to be, at the very least, augmented. 
All theories require constant reassessing, updating and fine-tuning, if they are 
to adequately capture the changing nature of social reality that they are designed 
explain. All too often, however, Marxists have failed to question and thus push 
forward their frameworks. On the other hand, many scholars have been too quick 
to dismiss Marx and Marxian accounts on money based on weak charges of 
economic reductionism and productivism (Langley 2008). In our efforts to move 
Marxian theorisations of money and credit forward, it is useful to engage with 
Leyshon and Thrift’s criticisms, as this will ultimately serve to clarify and deepen 
the historical materialist framework that informs this study. 
Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift identify four areas in need of revision in 
what they refer to as the Marxian ‘model’ of money. It should be noted that the 
primary target of this critique is the Marxist scholar, David Harvey. The first aspect 
of Marxian theory that requires modification is the tendency to derive the 
importance of money in relation to capitalist production. For Leyshon and Thrift, 
this position is anachronistic, as productive capital has become delinked from the 
financial system. The way in which this alleged rupture is to be interpreted and 
explained is crucial to an analysis of money. In short, a key weakness of Marx’s 
theorisation of money is that it is outdated. As Leyshon and Thrift (1997: 55) note, 
‘all of these drawbacks come from the historically specific nature of Marx’s account 
of money’. 
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The second change required, according to Leyshon and Thrift (1997: 56), is 
the role of the state. Marxian theory, they suggest, does not view the state as a 
major actor in the financial system. Yet, the state is a constant and constitutive 
feature of the contemporary financial system. Similarly, the third area in need of 
attention in Marxian analyses of money relates to what Leyshon and Thrift (1997: 
56) see as the inability of Marxist theory to make sense of the proliferation of credit 
and its numerous forms: ‘As national and then international markets for credit have 
grown and coalesced, as the value of speculation has increased and as large-scale 
movements of money have taken place, so the Marxian model is increasingly 
revealed as inadequate.’ 
The fourth weakness is the lack of attention given to the manner in which the 
financial system sustains itself, despite continual crises and increasing risks and 
complexity. Leyshon and Thrift (1997: 56) suggest that the reproduction of the 
financial system is partly due to ‘numerous, cross-cutting regulatory systems based 
upon networks of trust as well as coercion and censure’. For these authors, the 
history of regulation is vital to explaining the maintenance of the financial system. 
Leyshon and Thrift are correct to suggest that the Marxian theorisation of money 
needs updating, particularly with regard to our study of the poverty industry. 
However, we need not leave Marx to attend to these limits, given that the core 
of historical materialism continues to offer the most powerful explanatory frame­
work available to rigorously challenge and deconstruct the dominant economistic 
account of money. Instead, we can work within the Marxian framework to 
update and strengthen as well as to contest and clarify the weaknesses identified 
by Leyshon and Thrift while advancing the three major planks that comprise 
the historical materialist approach used in this book: the social power of money, 
the reproduction of the surplus population and debtfare states. 
While making important contributions in their own right, Leyshon and Thrift 
(and many other authors discussed above) are content with relegating the econ ­
omistic understanding of money and by extension credit, to the economists while 
focusing on the social and cultural factors of the financial system. Separating 
the discussion of money from the dynamics of capital accumulation makes it 
impossible to understand these relations of power in their historical context and 
thus explain social change. Moreover, vacating the economic forms to study the 
cultural and social features of credit merely grants economists exclusive and 
unfettered control over this realm. Given that the charge of economic determinism 
with regard to Marx’s work by Leyshon and Thrift underpins many of the studies 
on consumer credit, it is helpful to ponder briefly on the meaning of this critique. 
With their charge of economic determinism (1997: xv), Leyshon and Thrift 
incorrectly suggest that the Marxian model makes a clear distinction between 
the economic sphere (in which money is often confined) and other spheres of 
life such as the social and cultural onto which the economic sphere is too often 
unproblematically mapped. Drawing on Timothy Mitchell (2008: 1117), this 
critique of economic determinism is somewhat curious, given that ‘the economy’ 
as an object of power and knowledge is a relatively recent product of socio-technical 
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practice that emerged in the mid-twentieth century. Leaving this anachronism aside, 
the solution to the alleged claims of Marx’s economic determinism is to retain an 
economic meaning of money and embed it into social and cultural networks of 
power and trust (cf. Granovetter, 1985). 
In Chapter 1, I show that this critique is misguided, since it falsely conflates 
materialism with economism. In so doing, this critique fails to recognise that Marx’s 
historical materialist method is driven by a rigorous attempt at deconstructing the 
view that commodities, including money, are social relations that assume specific 
forms, roles and powers in capitalist society. Marx begins Capital, for instance, by 
trying to understand historically how and why money appears as a thing, yet possesses 
very real social power over human beings in capitalist society (Marx, 1990, chs 
1–3). In so doing, Marx is concerned with explaining how the capitalist market 
system and money disguise real social relations through the exchange of things 
(Harvey, 2010a). Understanding money as a social relation within the wider 
processes of the capitalist mode of exchange and production (as opposed to ‘the 
economy’) is thus very different from Leyshon and Thrift’s Marxian rendition that 
‘money is a form of social interaction’ (1997: 55–6). Put more succinctly, only a 
Marxian approach to money will allow us to effectively ‘Occupy Economics’. 
To set the book on a course guided by historical materialism, my analysis begins 
and builds on a Marxian treatment of money to understand the relations of power 
and paradoxes inherent to the poverty industry. In contemporary capitalist societies, 
we witness the expanding legal rights of creditors supported by the increasingly 
disciplinary and coercive powers of states. These features assist capitalists in 
recouping the principal amount and interest of their loan – at any cost, including 
facilitating the manipulation of the time in which they are able to extract interest 
from the original outlay through such strategies as asset-backed securitisation. This 
raises key questions about how we should analyse and explain the production and 
reproduction of these essential trends in contemporary capitalist societies, 
particularly as it affects the surplus population. In, what follows, I demonstrate that 
a Marxian approach still offers the richest answer to these questions as it allows us 
to fully grasp the inner workings of capitalism. And, in particular, a key feature of 
contemporary forms of credit-led accumulation: ‘The perpetual tendency to try 
to realise value without producing it’ (Harvey, 1974: 254; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; 
Lapavitsas, 2013). I return to this conundrum in Chapter 2. 
Structure of the book 
This book is organised into three main parts. Part I lays out the theoretical 
framework by discussing the significance of money (Chapter 1), credit (Chapter 2) 
and debtfare states (Chapter 3). Parts II and III draw on several cases of the 
poverty industry in the United States and Mexico, respectively. 
The first three chapters that comprise Part I of Debtfare offer a theoretical 
framework through which we can deconstruct and denaturalise the monetised 
relations that constitute the poverty industry. The focus of Chapter 1 is the 
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demystification of money from a Marxian perspective. The main argument of this 
chapter is that while money assumes its appearance as a neutral object or thing, 
this is a constructivist illusion. To move beyond this fetishism, it is essential that 
we contextualise and understand the role of money in the wider dynamics of capital 
accumulation. The two interlinked objectives of this chapter are to problematise 
economistic treatments of money and to lay a foundation for the further theorisa ­
tion of credit in Chapter 2. Chapter 1 covers necessary conceptual building blocks 
for a more potent understanding of debt and the monetised relations of power 
therein, whereas Chapter 2 outlines and explains the power and paradoxes of 
credit. 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrate why a Marxian theory of money remains the most 
powerful explanatory framework for theorisations of consumer credit and debt 
relations. I develop this argument by, first, discussing how credit is a special form 
of money and thereby assumes similar social powers. In contrast with money, 
however, credit plays a different role in capital accumulation. As privately created 
money, that is money manufactured by capitalists, credit serves to absorb the 
contradictions in the dynamics of capital accumulation. I then posit that a Marxist 
framework allows us to grasp the nature and role of credit as part of the wider and 
tension-ridden processes of capital accumulation. It is within these tensions that I 
begin to theorise the ‘silent compulsions’ (Marx, 2005) and structural violence that 
makes the surplus population dependent on the high cost credit that lies at the 
heart of the poverty industry. 
Chapter 3, which comprises the final chapter in Part I of this book, examines 
the role of neoliberal states in facilitating the construction, expansion and 
reproduction of the poverty industry. The analytical construction of my approach 
to the poverty industry in the United States and Mexico emerges from and is rooted 
in, the social power of credit within the dynamics of capital accumulation. Put 
another way, my understanding of the capitalist state is a materialist one. I use this 
approach to discuss the regulatory and rhetorical meanings of neoliberalisation before 
elaborating four of its relevant features: monetarism, corporate welfarism, 
workfarism and what I refer to as debtfarism. 
Before continuing, a caveat is in order. To my mind, capitalist states play an 
integral and inseparable role in mediating and facilitating the social power of both 
money and credit money. For the purpose of clarity, however, I have decided to 
keep these elements artificially separated in the more abstract discussion that 
comprises Part I of Debtfare. These elements are, however, brought together in the 
more concrete analyses of debtfarism and the poverty industry in Parts II and III 
of the book. 
Part II of the book opens with a Preface, ‘Debtfarism and the Making of the 
Poverty Industry’, which elaborates on the rationale behind the three case studies 
used to illustrate the poverty industry in the United States – the credit card industry 
(Chapter 4), the student loan industry (Chapter 5) and the payday loan industry 
(Chapter 6). The Preface also sets out to explain the significance of the United 
States to the understanding of the poverty industry writ large. The Preface then 
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briefly historicises the so-called democratisation of credit in the United States and 
highlights the importance of the consumer protection trope to the expansion and 
normalisation of the poverty industry. 
The Preface to Part III, ‘Debtfarism, Development and Dispossession’ justifies 
and elaborates on the significance of the three chapters that comprise the final section 
and brings the argument in this section in line with the overall aim of the book: 
namely, to understand the capitalist nature of power and the paradoxes therein, 
which both constitute and reproduce the poverty industry. The three chapters in 
this section cover the politics of universalising financial inclusion in the global South 
(Chapter 7) and case studies on two important features of the poverty industry in 
Mexico – the microfinance industry (Chapter 8) and housing finance (Chapter 9). 
The book concludes by summarising the argument that has sought to reveal 
and explain the complex and contradictory roles played by debtfarism and the social 
power of money in the construction of the poverty industry in the United States 
and in Mexico. It bears repeating that these case studies could not have been 
conceived without the analytical framing afforded by a historical materialist inquiry 
into money and capitalist states. It is my hope that readers will find this theoretical 
approach useful and applicable to other forms of consumer credit as well as other 
aspects of the changing configuration of class relations in neoliberal capitalism. 
Indeed, relations of power that have become increasingly defined by the social 
power of money. 
Notes 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all sums in this book are in US dollars. 
2 Since my analysis explores more than the microfinance industry, I draw on Hudson’s 
term ‘poverty industry’; however, my core concerns, analytical framing, and case studies 
differ from his discussion. 
3 As will become clear in the next two chapters, a Marxian understanding of money 
deconstructs money as a social relation first, before moving to a theorisation of credit 
(Mandel, 1968; de Brunhoff, 1976; Marx, 1990, 2005; Clarke, 1994; Bonefeld and 
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The main objective here is to demystify money from a Marxian perspective, or, 
what is the same thing, a historical materialist approach. The central argument of 
this chapter is that money can be viewed as a social relation of power only if it is 
contextualised within the wider dynamics of capital accumulation. To this end, 
I have organised the chapter into four main sections. Section One sets out to 
distinguish between economism (or economic determinism) – with which Marxian 
theory is conventionally but incorrectly charged – and a historical materialist method 
of deconstruction. This discussion provides the platform for Section Two, which 
is aimed at demystifying money as an economic category or thing by drawing on 
the tools of historical materialism. Section Three elaborates on how inequality and 
exploitation become distorted in the illusions of equality, freedom and democracy 
that define capitalist society, or what Marx (2005) refers to as the community of 
money. Section Four summarises the argument and provides concluding remarks. 
Economism versus historical materialism 
We begin our analysis of money with the first charge made by Leyshon and Thrift 
(1997) regarding the Marxian tendency toward economism. Readers will recall 
from the introductory chapter that economism refers to the reduction of all 
social and cultural dimensions of life to the economy. Many authors have levied 
a similar charge against Marx and Marxian approaches in order to hurriedly 
discredit the vastly complex and rich theory of historical materialism. For many 
non-Marxian scholars, the corrective to this alleged weakness in Marx has been 
to accept the standard economic understanding of money and credit, while 
animating it with social relations and moving away from charges of economism 
by emphasising the primacy of the social and cultural dimensions of finance. 
I maintain, however, that Leyshon and Thrift’s first critique is based on a 
fundamental misreading of Marx. This charge, upon which the rest of the four 
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criticisms are based, rests on a problematic reading of Capital (and David Harvey’s 
work, in turn) as an economic text rather than as a materialist critique of classical 
political economy (Clarke, 1991; Holloway and Picciotto, 1991). As such, Leyshon 
and Thrift conflate economism with materialism. The difference between the two 
starting analytical points is not only significant for the study of money and its role 
in the social relations of debt, but also impedes our ability to break with the world 
of appearances at the beginning of our analysis (Clarke, 1978). 
For Marx, it is important to deconstruct the appearances or illusions of capitalist 
society, or what he refers to as ‘fetishism’. We discuss this term in more detail 
below. Suffice it to say here that fetishised appearances of money and credit as 
natural objects, while quite real to all of us, are important for Marx because they 
hide the relations of domination and exploitation that characterise capitalism. As 
we will see, Marx deconstructs economic categories such as the commodity and 
money, for instance, to reveal their inner social content. It is, therefore, imprecise 
to charge Marx with economism. 
For Marx, materialism describes the way societies fulfil their wants and needs.1 
Or, as Harvey (1989: 8) plainly states: ‘We need to eat in order to live, think, 
argue, raise children, fight, enjoy ourselves,’ and so on. The manner in which all 
societies throughout history have accomplished this is based on its mode of 
production. The way in which the capitalist mode of production is organised masks 
social relations of power. This veil or disguise is what Marx refers to as fetishism. 
It is important to stress that while fetishism has different meanings in other 
academic traditions, it takes on a specific sense in Marx’s work (Harvey, 1999, 
2010a and b; Marx, 2005). 
Fetishism is an illusion that is constructed, yet also real. As Marx suggests in his 
historical materialist method, because fetishism is a social construction, it can also 
be dismantled. David Harvey’s classic example of fetishism in capitalism is enduring 
and reveals, once again, why his method of historical materialism is a corrective 
to economism rather than an extension of it. Harvey begins by asking readers to 
trace back where their dinner came from in order to become aware of the many 
people involved in even the simplest of meals. Despite the presence of these people, 
we consume our meals without knowing anything about them. We know nothing 
of the conditions of their lives and labour, their joys, discontents and aspirations 
– all of which remain concealed from us and subordinated to the prices we pay 
for commodities. For Harvey (1989: 8), ‘this masking arises because our social 
relations with those who contribute to our daily sustenance are hidden behind the 
exchange of things in the market place’. Marx’s objective in Capital and his 
materialist method is to demystify the fetishism of commodities in the market and 
to build a theory of how commodities are produced, traded and consumed in order 
to comprehend the technical conditions and social relations that put food on the 
table. Money, of course, is central to commodity fetishism and therefore the critique 
of money is intrinsic to the critique of the fetishised relationships that underscore 
capitalism (Marx, 1990, 2005). 
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Marx’s method is not intrinsically economistic in nature: it does not seek to 
understand the capitalist mode of production as an economic realm divorced from 
social considerations. Marxian theory is concerned with understanding how a 
particular type of social relation gives rise to the power of things over people. As 
such, it seeks to demystify capitalist society as a naturally occurring and harmonious 
set of market relations and reveal it as a mode of production marked by silent 
compulsions and unequal and exploitative relations. Marx devised his historical 
materialist method to expose and deconstruct economistic representations of 
capitalist markets as the embodiment of natural harmony in which buyers and sellers 
voluntarily meet to exchange goods and services. In doing so, Marx sought to reveal 
that perfectly functioning markets and the invisible hand of rational, competitive 
and self-interested individuals would not produce an outcome beneficial to all, but 
would instead make the capital class incredibly wealthy while relatively impover­
ishing the workers and everyone else (Harvey, 1999; 2010a; Marx, 1990, 2005). 
If we fail to employ a historical materialist approach to our investigation of debt, 
we are left with an economist’s view of money and credit in capitalist society – 
upon which we can construct only complementary, fetishised understandings. What 
is lost, both analytically and politically, is the ability to understand how and why 
the social power of money continues (with assistance from states) to promote the 
illusion of the equality of exchange. This is critical given the extent to which the 
neoliberal era is marked by privately created money generated by capitalists and 
extended at very high rates of interest to the surplus population. 
Demystifying money 
Following Marx, this section will reveal that it is impossible to demystify money 
as an economic category and thus grasp its social power, by remaining exclusively 
in the sphere of exchange, i.e., the realm in which consumer credit is largely studied 
in the financialisation and consumer credit literature. For Marx, the primary reason 
for this is that one cannot break through the money fetish in the realm of exchange 
because this sphere operates on the fetishised principle of equivalence. This latter 
principle, upon which the price system rests, implies that ‘the circulation of 
commodities requires the exchange of equivalents’ (Marx, 1990: 160, quoted in 
Harvey, 1999). For Marx (1990: 168–9), the power of the money fetish in the 
realm of exchange is its ability to conceal ‘the social character of private labour 
and the social relations between individual workers, by making those relations appear 
as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly’. Seen from 
this angle, the power of money dissolves previous social ties and dependencies 
evident in pre-capitalist communities by becoming the real community (Marx, 2005: 
224–5). The community of money, moreover, is characterised ‘by individualism 
and certain conceptions of liberty, freedom and equality backed by laws of private 
property, rights to appropriation and freedom of contract’ (Marx, 2005; Harvey, 
1989: 168). It is therefore difficult to grasp the social power of money by beginning 
with the sphere of exchange. 
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Marx (1990) begins his demystification of money by identifying a basic assump ­
tion that was taken for granted by political economists of his time: Why does one 
commodity (money) operate as an impartial numéraire, so that the relative values 
of all other commodities can be unequivocally expressed as a price? By interrogating 
these observations, Marx is interested in revealing how and why capitalist social 
relations are constructed (and reconstructed). As Harvey suggests, ‘money is not 
established arbitrarily or out of mere convention. The money commodity is 
produced in the course of history by a specific social process – participation in acts 
of exchange’ (Harvey, 1999: 10). 
The revolutionary power of money lies in the fact that, as a commodity, it becomes 
the direct incarnation of all human labour. In capitalism, Marx notes that people 
relate to each other in their social process of production in a purely atomistic 
way. Their own relations of production therefore assume a material shape 
that is independent of their control and their conscious individual action. 
This situation is evident by the fact that the products of human labour 
universally take on the form of commodities. The riddle of the money fetish 
is therefore the riddle of the commodity fetish. 
(Marx, 1990: 187; see also Mandel, 1968; de Brunhoff, 1976) 
For Marx, the key to solving this puzzle is not to grasp that ‘money is a commodity’, 
but rather to discover ‘how, why and by what means a commodity becomes money’ 
(Marx, 1990: 183). To tackle this conundrum, Marx urges us to go beyond the 
sphere of exchange – characterised by illusions of individuality, equality and 
freedom – in order to understand its connection to the sphere of production, where 
class relations of inequality become apparent (Marx, 1990). In contrast with other 
treatments to money in capitalism (Zelizer, 1997; Simmel, 2004; Ingham, 2004), 
Marx begins his analysis by exploring the circulation of capital (as opposed to money) 
and the class relations implied therein, which is implied in Marx’s inquiry into 
how a commodity becomes money (Harvey, 1989). This analytical move reveals, 
as Harvey suggests (1989: 169), ‘a deep tension between the individual and equality 
that the possession of money implies and the class relations experienced in the 
making of that money’. Marx sought to break through the fetishism of money by 
developing a labour theory of value. It is to an outline of this theory that we now 
turn our attention. 
Labour theory of value 
To understand how a commodity becomes money, Marx identifies three types of 
value inherent in all commodities: use-value, exchange-value and value (Marx, 
1990). Use-value describes the usefulness of a commodity. Without someone 
needing or wanting a particular commodity (social validity), it cannot enter into 
the exchange process. The exchange-value, as noted above, is allegedly based on 
the principal of equivalents. The exchange-value of a commodity is not inherent 
to it, e.g., a pacific salmon does not swim around with a price on its tail any more 
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than a coffee bean emerges with a price on its husk. As such, the exchange-value 
(represented by prices) of our salmon or coffee bean implies that a commodity is 
exchangeable for something else and that something else is revealed only when 
the commodity is exchanged. An exchange-value must therefore be commensurable 
to something and reducible to a third thing. For Marx, this commensurability is 
not found in use-value, but instead in the fact that all commodities are products 
of human labour. Up to this point, Marx’s argument parallels classical political 
economist, David Ricardo (Itoh and Lapavitsas, 1999). 
According to Ricardo, the exchange-value of a commodity (price) is determined 
by the actual labour time involved in producing the commodity. Marx departs 
from Ricardo’s theory of value on the basis that the type of human labour that is 
embodied in commodities cannot represent the actual time taken to produce the 
commodity, as the longer it takes to produce a commodity, the more valuable it 
would be. For instance, why would you pay more for salmon that took a fisherman 
longer to catch, when you could get the same fish at half the price from a more 
efficient and/or skilled fisherman? Indeed, if time were the true measurement of 
exchange-value, commodities produced by unskilful or lazy workers would 
therefore be more valuable than other commodities. 
To overcome this problem – and thereby distinguish his approach from those 
of the classical liberal political economists of his time – Marx added to the concept 
of concrete labour a second type of human labour present in all commodities: abstract 
labour. Unlike the heterogeneous nature of concrete labour (e.g., tailoring, spinning 
and weaving), abstract labour captures the homogenous aspects of human labour 
that forms the value of commodities (Marx, 1990: 137). Put another way, the 
commonality of all different forms of concrete labour is human labour in general. 
To anticipate the narrative somewhat, it is important to note that Marx uses the 
distinction between concrete and abstract labour to understand grasp how the 
appearance of commodities as things posses value. Marx (1990: 142), for instance, 
stresses that abstract human labour creates value but is not itself value. Abstract 
labour becomes value in its coagulated state, in objective form (money). ‘The value 
of the linen as a congealed mass of human labour can be expressed only as an 
“objectivity” [. . .], a thing which is materially different from the linen itself and 
yet common to the linen and all other commodities’. 
It follows from the above discussion that Marx’s understanding of value and its 
measurement, is defined by abstract human labour, which he refers to as socially 
necessary labour time. Socially necessary labour time refers to ‘the labour-time 
required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production normal 
for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour 
prevalent in that society’ (Marx, 1990: 129). Socially necessary labour time is deter ­
mined by a wide range of circumstances such as the workers’ average degree of 
skill, science and its technological application and so forth (Marx, 1990). Socially 
necessary labour time is, therefore, highly dynamic as well as spatially and temporally 
specific; definitions of what is ‘normal’ and ‘average’ are also, socially constructed 
by relations of power in capitalist mode of production (Harvey, 1999). 
20 Theorising money, credit and debtfare states 
Marx’s construction of value is vital to understanding what is necessarily concealed 
by money in its role in exchange-values under capitalism and thereby debunk its 
natural state, which is, of course, implied when theorists ‘just assume’ money. 
Although value is immaterial (abstract), it is objective (or, concrete). As Harvey 
explains, value is a social relation, which you cannot actually see, touch, or feel 
directly. Yet, this value has an objective presence in that it is represented by money 
as a measure of value. Money is, therefore, not simply a commodity, but also a 
symbol or tangible, quantitative expression of value (socially necessary labour time) 
embodied in price. This monetary representation in the form of prices ‘makes value 
(socially necessary labour time) the regulator of exchange relations. On this view, 
prices, which are the quantitative expression of exchange-value, are ‘the money-
name of the labour objectified in a commodity’ (Marx, 1990: 195). ‘Since money 
does not reveal what has been transformed into it, everything, commodity or not, 
is convertible into money. Everything becomes saleable and purchasable’ – this 
ability to hang a price tag on everything and everyone on the planet is a defining 
feature of the commodification process (Marx, 1990: 229). 
Value as socially necessary labour time and its quantitative expression in 
monetary terms (i.e., prices), is historically specific to the capitalist mode of 
production. Extracting value from workers is not a natural state of affairs, however. 
As we will see in the rest of the book, value as socially necessary labour time must 
instead be reproduced through coercive and ideological means on a continual basis 
in order to ensure the expansion of value, or, what is the same thing, capital 
accumulation. What exactly does money conceal? This question is important, if 
we are to explain and understand the power relations involved in debt as well as 
their reproduction through state and class relations. Marx’s labour theory of value 
provides us with the answers. 
The expansion of value, or capital accumulation (for which money is a material 
expression), involves complex social processes that are based on inequality, as well 
as exploitation. Indeed, the augmentation of exchange values is the primary goal 
of capitalists. The increase of value involves a transformation of money into 
commodities and back into money plus profit. As Marx (1990: 153–5) notes: ‘It 
is under the form of money that value begins and ends and begins again, every act 
of its own spontaneous generation . . . Value therefore now becomes value in 
process, money in process and, as such, capital.’ Capital can be formed by converting 
money and use-values and putting them into circulation in order to make money, 
to produce surplus value. 
The capitalist form of circulation rests upon (and produces) an inequality 
because capitalists possess more money (values) at the end of the process than they 
did at the beginning. A problem arises here, however. Values are established by 
an exchange process, which, as we saw above, rests on the principle of equivalence. 
How then can capitalists realise an inequality (i.e., profit, or, using Marxian 
symbols, M1) through an exchange process, which presupposes equivalence? This 
query cannot be addressed in the realm of exchange. It is only through the violation 
of the principle of equivalence (by cheating, robbery, fraud, forced exchanges, 
robbery and the like) that capitalists can make a profit. The same holds true for 
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interest-generating exchanges. By charging welfare recipients 300 percent interest 
for a $200 payday loan, payday lenders extract interest to the detriment of the welfare 
recipient, a process I detail more fully in Chapter 6. Seen from this angle, the rule 
of equivalence in exchange is in no way offended even though surplus value is 
produced. In Marxist theory, exploitation refers to the excess of value that labourers 
embed in commodities relative to the value the labourers require for their own 
social reproduction (Clarke, 1994; Harvey, 1999). Drawing on Marx, this type of 
exploitation, which occurs in the realm of production, is referred to in this book 
as primary exploitation. 
The labour theory of value reveals several important points for understanding 
the social power in money. First and foremost, it unveils the meaning and necessity 
of the money fetish, especially with regard to the illusion of the principal of 
equivalents. As Marx argues, nature does not produce money, any more than it 
produces a rate of exchange or a banker (Marx, 2005: 239). As we saw with the 
creation of wage-labour, money does not emerge from a naturally evolving market: 
‘The money commodity is produced in the course of history by a specific social 
process – participation in acts of exchange’ (Harvey, 1999: 10). Monetary-based 
exchange in capitalist society has led to a situation in which producers relate to 
each other by way of the products they exchange rather than directly as social beings. 
Social relationships are therefore expressed as relationships between things 
(fetishism), while the things themselves exchange according to their value, which 
is measured in terms of abstract labour (Harvey, 1999: 17). As such, the realm of 
exchange does not reveal the inherent nature of capitalism. As Harvey (1999: 17, 
my emphasis) citing Marx (1990), notes: 
The act of exchange tells us nothing about the conditions of labour of the 
producers, for example and keeps us in a state of ignorance concerning our 
social relations as these are mediated by the market system. We respond solely 
to the prices of quantities of use values. But this also suggests that, when we 
exchange things, ‘we imply the existence of value . . . without being aware 
of it’. The existence of money – the form of value – conceals the social meaning of 
value itself. ‘Value does not stalk about with a label describing what it is.’ 
Too many analyses of financialisation tend to begin and end their discussions 
by locating money in the realm of exchange, which hides the class character of 
the social relations in the capitalist mode of production. As I noted in the 
Introductory Chapter, this assumption leads to the charge from Leyshon and Thrift 
(1997) that the significance of money cannot be understood via production. Yet, 
it is only by situating money in the capitalist mode of production that we are able 
to defetishise money as a social relation. More specifically, it is only by taking this 
step that we are able to see how and why money which serves as a commodity 
and as a symbol of value (price) and thereby learn the origins of its power and 
change (Clarke, 1994; Marx, 2005). 
Grasping money as an expression of value necessitates that we understand its 
role in the realm of production, where, for instance, there are ‘entirely different 
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processes that go on in which this apparent individuality, equality and liberty 
disappear’ because ‘exchange-value already in itself implies a silent compulsion over 
the individual’ (Harvey, 1999: 28). This is not easily visible in the realm of exchange, 
but this does not mean that exploitation and inequality are not present in this sphere. 
We explore these secondary forms of exploitation in the next chapter where I analyse 
the social power of credit money. 
Marx’s community of money 
Marx’s strategy of defetishising money is aimed at critiquing the assumption of 
classical political economists that values are a self-evident, natural and universal 
truth. As Marx notes, classical political economists only begin to reflect on money 
‘after the events [production of value] have taken place and therefore with the 
results of the process of development ready at hand’. On this view, the value of 
money is determined by the price of commodities. This perspective cannot grasp 
what money distorts in capitalist society. ‘It is however precisely this finished form 
of the world of commodities – the money form – which conceals the social character 
of private labour and the social relations between individual workers, by making 
those relations appear as relations between material objects, instead of revealing 
them plainly’ (Marx, 1990: 168–9). 
The ability of money to conceal inequality and exploitation through its role as 
the universal equivalent bestows money with revolutionary powers to conceal the 
power relations involved in the production and exchange of commodities. ‘Just as 
in money every quantitative difference between commodities is extinguished, so 
too for its part, as a radical leveller, it extinguishes all distinctions’ (Marx, 1990: 
229–30). As the ultimate objectifier – ‘a god among commodities’ – money is not 
only able to largely obliterate subjective connections between objects and 
individuals, but also reduce personal relations to the ‘cash nexus’ (Zelizer, 1997: 
7). As Simmel (1978: 325 quoted in Harvey, 1989: 166) points out, money ‘becomes 
the frightful leveller – it hollows out the core of things, their specific values and 
their uniqueness and incomparability in a way which is beyond repair. They all 
float with the same specific gravity in the constantly moving stream of money’. 
It bears repeating here that Marx’s understanding of money cannot be understood 
in isolation from the capitalist mode of production and exchange. This is an important 
point to keep in mind in our study of the poverty industry because money assumes 
a particular quality in capitalist societies as opposed to pre-capitalist societies 
thereby entailing historically distinct articulations of power and roles with regard 
to debt (cf. Mauss, 1967; Graeber, 2011). In capitalism, money is ‘a material 
representative of general wealth, as individualised exchange value, money must be 
the direct object, aim and product of general labour, the labour of all individuals. 
Labour must directly produce exchange-value, i.e., money. When labour is wage 
labour and its direct aim is money, then general wealth is posited as its aim and 
object. Where money is not itself the community, it must dissolve the community’ 
(Marx, 2005: 224). In the expansion of capital accumulation, money appears more 
as a ‘power external to and independent of the producers’ and moreover ‘the power 
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which each individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth 
exists in him as the owner of exchange values, of money’ (Harvey, 1989: 167). Seen 
from this view, ‘money becomes the mediator and regulator of all relations between 
individuals; it becomes the abstract and universal measure of social wealth and the 
concrete means of expression of social power’. Money, Marx re-emphasises, 
dissolves the community and in doing so ‘becomes the real community’ (2005: 225). 
This is an important point to keep in mind, as the power of money is further 
accentuated in the contemporary period of credit-led accumulation (Chapter 2). 
Due to its role as the universal equivalent in the production process, the 
community of money destroys bonds of personal dependency and replaces it with 
‘objective dependency relations’ between individuals who relate to each other 
through market prices and money and commodity transactions (Marx, 1990: 229). 
As Harvey (1989: 175) puts it, ‘money in our pockets represents our objective 
bond to the community of money as well as our social power with respect to it’. 
Individuals are now governed by concrete abstractions (e.g., prices, interest rates, 
credit ratings, etc.) whereas previously they depended on one another. The 
increased dependency on concrete abstractions also imply that class-based power 
is less visible and direct than, for example, in primary forms of exploitation in which 
workers and capitalist confront one another. In Chapter 2, I, following Marx, 
designate these forms of exploitation as secondary forms of exploitation by which 
I mean that workers’ income have been modified through consumer credit. 
The community of money in capitalism possesses certain meanings, which have 
been succinctly captured by Harvey (1989: 168): 
The community of money is strongly marked by individualism and certain 
conceptions of liberty, freedom and equality backed by laws of private 
property, rights to appropriation and freedom of contract. Such personal 
freedoms and liberties exist, of course, in the midst of an ‘objective bondage’ 
[Simmel, 1978: 300] defined through mutual dependency within the social 
division of labour and a money economy. 
Freedom (i.e., independence from the will of others) is significant in understanding 
the social reproduction of capitalism. As Harvey notes, ‘The owners of money are 
free (with constraints) to choose how, when, where and with whom to use that 
money to satisfy their needs, wants and fancies; yet they cannot escape the fact 
that this freedom is embodied in the objective relations of money (1989: 168). 
Marx’s attempt to demystify money as the universal equivalent reveals that the 
liberal concept of freedom of the market is not freedom at all; but instead, a 
constructed fetishism or an illusion. Harvey (2010a: 42) summarises the fetishised 
notion of freedom in this regard well: 
Under capitalism, individuals surrender to the discipline of abstract forces 
(such as the hidden hand of the market made much of by Adam Smith) that 
effectively govern their relations and choices. I can make something beautiful 
and take it to market, but if I don’t manage to exchange it then it has no 
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value. Furthermore, I won’t have enough money to buy commodities to 
live. In short, if we are to eat, then we have no choice (silent compulsions) 
but to sell our labour on the market (Marx and Engels, 1974). 
It is worth repeating that the community of money, while real, is a fetishised 
view of capitalist society. The appearance of the community of money is vital to 
socially reproduce the inequality and exploitation that underpins capitalism and 
especially its contemporary forms of credit-led accumulation. Part of this 
reproduction, is undertaken by scholars, policy-makers and journalists of finance, 
who not only continually treat money as a ‘thing in itself’ but also artificially separate 
the spheres of exchange and production, which can be seen in the dichotomous 
view of the ‘real’ economy (production) and financial markets (exchange). These 
popular assumptions and representations (falsely) exemplify the realm of exchange 
as embodying equality, freedom and democracy, as is evident in the wider financial 
inclusion and democratisation of credit agendas promoted by what I refer to as 
debtfare states. As I discuss in Chapter 3, a key site of the reproduction of the 
community of money is the capitalist state and, in particular its neoliberal forms 
of governance such as debtfarism. For now, it is important to emphasise that the 
social power of money, and by extension the community of money, also possesses 
important temporal and spatial attributes. 
As a commodity, money appears as an external object capable of becoming the 
private property of an individual, which, in turn, suggests that its social power 
becomes the private power of private persons (Marx, 1990: 229–30). The social 
power that attaches to money is without limit. The accumulation of money as 
unlimited social power is an essential feature of the capitalist mode of production. 
This is, particularly true in the contemporary, neoliberal period and credit-led 
accumulation (Harvey, 1999; see also Clarke, 1988; Bonefeld and Holloway, 1995). 
Once money, as the universal equivalent of all commodities, becomes the 
representation of all socially necessary labour time, the potential for further 
accumulation are limitless (Harvey, 1989, 1999). And, with this accumulation of 
wealth, comes the accumulation of social power. This social (class) power inherent 
in the very existence of money as a mediator of commodity exchange radically 
transforms and fixes the meanings of space and time in social life, particularly as 
these relate to debt and credit relations (Harvey, 1989: 165). 
The spatial and temporal dimensions that form part of the social power of money 
in capitalism are integral to understanding the social reproduction of the community 
of money. As many authors, including Marx, have demonstrated, space and time 
are not only important features inherent to the processes of capital accumulation, 
but also assume particular expressions of power therein (Marx, 1990; Thompson, 
1991; Lefebvre, 1991b). As Harvey notes (1989: 165), ‘the very existence of money 
as a mediator of commodity exchange radically transforms and fixes the meanings 
of space and time in social life’. Harvey’s work is particularly useful in understanding 
the spatial and temporal dimensions within the community of money (Harvey, 
1989, 1999). For Harvey, capitalists, who possess money, also possess the power 
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of social control along temporal and spatial lines. ‘Money can thus be used to 
command time (including that of others) and space, while command over time 
and space can easily be parlayed back into command over money’ (Harvey, 1989: 
186). 
Money functions as a store of value and hence social power. It therefore 
allows individuals to choose between present and future satisfactions and even allows 
consumption to be moved forward in time through borrowing (Harvey, 1989: 
173). The construction of time as a measurable, calculable and objective magnitude 
was essential for organising wage labour, but has also had powerful consequences 
for the credit system. As Harvey (1989: 187) observes: ‘Those who can afford to 
wait always have an advantage over those who cannot.’ Similar to time, space is 
integral to the community of money. Money facilitates transactions ‘over otherwise 
inaccessible distances, an inclusion of the most diverse persons in the same project, 
an interaction and therefore unification of people’ into the community of money 
(Harvey, 1989: 176). 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I sought to demystify the common economistic understanding of 
money as a thing. In doing so, I discussed how Marx’s concept of historical 
materialism moves our understanding of money beyond economism. I demon ­
strated that a rigorous understanding of the social power inherent to money in 
capitalism must be, first, understood in the sphere of production, as opposed to 
the realm of exchange. I revealed that the Marxian approach provides a powerful 
framework for understanding the social power of money, given its role as the 
universal equivalent in the capitalist mode of production. In contrast to non-Marxist 
sociological accounts that seek to represent money as a social relation by virtue of 
the fact that people interact with it and assign meaning to it, Marx exposes the 
unequal and exploitative social power concealed by and reproduced in, the 
community of money (Marx, 1990, Chs. 1–3; cf. Zelizer, 1997; Ingham, 2004). 
Indeed, much of the literature on financialisation and consumer society stops 
at the realm of exchange without venturing into the wider capitalist relations of 
production and by extension, accumulation. This is the root of their explanatory 
weakness in grasping the origins of social transformation, the social power of money 
and the social reproduction of credit in neoliberal capitalism. A related issue 
in theorising finance as a separate entity from the social relations of capitalist 
production is the over-emphasis on finance and its tendencies toward greed-driven 
speculation, as the primary source of crises and immiseration in contemporary times. 
While financial speculation and predatory forms of consumer credit have played 
important and detrimental roles in destabilising societies and dispossessing hundreds 
of millions of people, there are deeper structural factors involved in neoliberal 
capitalism that have helped to legitimate, reproduce and stoke the dominance of 
interest-generating income over productive-based profit since the early 1980s. The 
silent compulsions identified here will help us to theorise more completely the 
1 
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machinations and paradoxes involved in the social transformation and reproduction 
of credit-led capitalism from the ground up and therewith lift the veil off of the 
attributes of democracy, equality and freedom imbued in the social power of money. 
Note 
Unlike other forms of social coordination, the capitalist mode of production is based on 
the exchange of commodities for profit, which can occur only through the unequal and 
exploitative relations of class power. As I discuss later in the chapter, these hierarchical 
and uneven social relations upon which our societies are based and reproduced, albeit 
in spatially and temporally differentiated ways, is masked by the social power of money 
and the community of money more generally. 
2 
THE POWER AND PARADOXES 
OF CREDIT 
In this chapter, I build on the Marxian conceptualisation of the social power of 
money in such a way so as to facilitate a more complete understanding of credit 
and its extension to the surplus population. The argument I develop here has two 
interrelated parts. On the one hand, I suggest that the Marxian theory of money 
remains the most powerful explanatory framework for theorisations of consumer 
credit.1 There are at least two reasons for this. First, a Marxian perspective draws 
our attention to the fact that credit is a special form of money and thereby assumes 
social powers similar to money. Unlike money, however, credit plays a different 
role in capital accumulation. As privately created money – that is, money that is 
manufactured by capitalists – credit serves to absorb the contradictions in the 
dynamics of capital accumulation. Second, a Marxist framework allows us to grasp 
the nature and role of credit as part of the wider and tension-ridden processes of 
capital accumulation (Harvey, 1999). 
On the other hand and building on this particular Marxian perspective of credit, 
I suggest that the nature of consumer credit to low-income workers and the 
subsequent expansion of the poverty industry can be explained in the following 
manner: A key and recurrent issue wracking contemporary forms of capital 
accumulation has been the over-accumulation problem. The latter refers to the 
lack of profitable investment sites and thus a surplus of money, combined with 
the increasing rise of the relative surplus population (Harvey, 1999, 2003). Since 
the 1990s, a dominant strategy employed by capitalists to absorb the tensions of 
over-accumulation has been the creation and extension of credit money to low-
income workers in exchange for high rates of interest as well as commissions and 
fees. In this book, I refer to this social phenomenon as credit-led accumulation. 
Since credit is a form of money, or, more precisely, privately created money, it 
shares similar illusions to money in terms of freedom, democracy and equality. As 
we will see later in the book, these fetishisms are embodied in the dominant tropes 
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of the poverty industry such as the democratisation of credit trope, which is 
dominant in the United States (see Part II) and the financial inclusion rhetoric, 
which prevails in the global development project (see Part III). 
Armed with a historical materialist approach laid out in Chapter 1, we are able 
to pierce this fetishised surface to grasp that consumer credit is not only infused 
with class-based power, but also structural violence and silent compulsions. We 
can also see that solutions based on credit money are inherently paradoxical in 
nature. Marx warns us that credit acts only to heighten these tensions, which, in 
turn, spurs the continual drive for increasingly more speculative strategies such 
as asset-backed securitisation (or, ABS). Briefly, ABS, which played a large role in 
the 2007–2008 US sub-prime mortgage crisis, transforms illiquid assets (such as 
sub-prime home mortgages) into tradeable, interest-bearing securities (stocks and 
bonds) that are then sold to investors (Elul, 2005). In this sense, a Marxian theory 
of money is essential to understand the expansion of the poverty industry as well 
as to explain the role of consumer credit in socially reproducing marginality. 
The argument in this chapter is developed in five main sections. Section One 
identifies two key reasons for the theoretical gaps in our knowledge about credit. 
It then goes on to explain why a Marxian conceptualisation of money and credit 
in capital accumulation remains a powerful explanatory framework, particularly 
with regard to some of the key questions driving this book. The subsequent three 
sections elaborate on key points of a Marxian framework of credit. Section Two 
examines various tensions of money and thus its limits, in facilitating the expansion 
of value (capital accumulation). Section Three analyses the nature and role of credit 
money as a response to the tensions in capital accumulation by elaborating on its 
similarities and its differences regarding money. In my efforts to connect consumer 
credit to capital accumulation in order to explain the expansion of the poverty 
industry, Section Four explores how and why capitalists have employed consumer 
credit to exploit this ever-growing reserve of labour power in neoliberalism. In 
doing so, this section serves to bring together money, credit money and the dynamics 
of capital accumulation to begin to problematise the tensions and exploitative 
relations in the poverty industry. Section Five provides a summary of the argument 
advanced here. 
Limits to theorising credit 
There are at least two analytical weaknesses in both Marxist and non-Marxist 
scholarship that have hindered rigorous explanations of credit in the contemporary 
neoliberal era. On the one hand, authors draw on a fetishised understanding of 
money and, by extension, credit (Martin, 2002; Schwartz, 2009). Seen from the 
perspective of our discussion in Chapter 1, both money and credit are taken as 
given and treated as things or objects, devoid of social power and disconnected 
from the conflict-ridden processes of capital accumulation. On the other hand, 
there has been a lack of precision regarding the similarities and differences between 
credit and money. More often than not, both are subsumed under financialisation. 
The power and paradoxes of credit 29 
As discussed in the Introduction, it has been convention among many scholars of 
political economy to define the financial system as constituting both the monetary 
and credit systems; yet money is pushed aside such that credit – or more often 
than not, finance – becomes the primary, if not sole, focus. In these analyses, credit 
appears simply as a resource (thing) to which people, businesses and governments 
have access – at the discretion of and at a cost established by, others (Germain, 
1997: 17). 
It follows from this that the emphasis in many discussions tends to focus on 
the credit system – or, what is often referred to in the literature as the financial 
system. This system is seen to be comprised of supporting social networks, 
institutions and regulatory systems (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997, 1999; cf. Mitchell, 
2008; Granovetter, 1985) that animate and influence fetishised understandings of 
credit with subjectivities and performativity (de Goede, 2005; MacKenzie, 2006; 
Froud et al., 2007; Marron, 2007; Langley, 2008). My point of contention with 
these analyses is that they end where they should begin. They should not assume 
credit ‘just is’, but instead should try to grasp its very existence as a social construct 
in the context of capitalist society. This is necessary in order to understand that 
the relations of power underpinning credit cannot be separated from the wider 
dynamics of capital accumulation, which includes both consumption (exchange) 
and production (Harvey, 1999; Fine, 2002). 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that post-structuralist perspectives are unhelp­
ful in the study of credit. As we explore the machinations of the social repro­
duction of credit and its impact on the working poor, analyses of the cultural 
dimensions of credit (e.g., constructions of trust, uncertainty, subjectivities, etc.) 
add another layer of explanatory rigour to the fetishised appearances of credit. 
The point is that a deeper analysis of the roots of power and social reproduction 
cannot be understood by treating credit in economistic terms. We need to grasp 
that credit is privately created money and, like money, is therefore a social relation 
of power. Before elaborating on credit in this way, however, it is helpful to define 
what I understand by social reproduction. 
Briefly, social reproduction refers to the various aspects of (re)constructing 
capitalist society. These include: biological reproduction, reproduction of the 
labour force and reproduction of provisioning and caring needs (Katz, 2001; Bakker 
and Gill, 2003). The ongoing commodification of these social relations and the 
disciplinary machinations therein, demands that social reproduction be continually 
reconstructed in order to veil the silent compulsions of the social power of money 
in the form of credit. Moreover, the regulatory features of credit cannot be a 
secondary consideration; this is why the following chapter, which discusses debtfare 
states, tackles issues such as the role and nature of regulation regarding consumer 
credit. 
To put it another way, there exists more below the surface of the credit system 
than a historical assemblage of regulatory structures, institutions and networks of 
actors, as is so often depicted in the scholarly literature on financialisation and 
consumer credit. The origins of power, social transformation and reproduction 
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need to be located in the materiality of capitalist society and the tensions therein 
(see Chapter 1). 
To transcend the surface appearances regarding consumer credit, a Marxian 
theory of money remains the most rigorous basis upon which to build. It allows 
us to address basic, yet vital, questions that many scholars writing on financialisa ­
tion have neglected: Why did credit emerge? Why do certain people possess such 
immense power to deny and/or provide access to credit? And how is this 
legitimated? 
By posing the above questions, I am interested not only in understanding why 
the economically vulnerable have become increasingly dependent on high-priced 
consumer credit, but also in identifying the social machinations involved in 
recreating – that is, normalising, depoliticising and legitimating – the social 
necessities that compel the working poor to depend on credit as opposed to living 
wages. My objective is to challenge the institutional tropes and practices upheld 
by states and international development organisations (e.g., World Bank, IMF, G­
20) that assume financial inclusion and the democratisation of credit to be the most 
efficient method of assisting the poor in the neoliberal era. The point here is that 
existing analyses of financialisation do not permit us to look deeply and critically 
at what actually constitutes ‘the financial’ as in the case of financial inclusion, or 
‘credit’ in the case of the democratisation of credit, which the poor are invited to 
voluntarily enter (while being structurally coerced to do so). The six case studies 
in this book clearly reveal the structural violence and silent compulsions inherent 
to ‘the financial’ as it relates to the poverty industry. 
The second limit in existing approaches to consumer credit has been the 
preference given to the primacy of the realm of exchange over production in 
attempts to make sense of the proliferation and social reproduction of the 
dominance of credit (otherwise referred to in the literature as financialisation or 
finance-led capitalism). This inevitably leads to the separation of what is often 
referred to as the ‘real’ economy (production) from the financial economy. This 
bifurcation distorts the intrinsic connection between money and credit money, on 
the one hand and the social power of money and credit money to the wider 
processes of capital accumulation, on the other. It also results in a neglect of 
interrogations into how and why the dominance of credit money is constantly 
recreated and represented as natural, despite the inherent contradiction and social 
consequences involved in attempting to realise value without producing it (see 
Chapter 1). 
It cannot be stressed enough that my usage of the word processes in conjunction 
with capital accumulation implies that the latter is not a static object but instead a 
complex, highly contradictory, anarchic and dynamic series of actions that are neither 
inevitable nor natural. I do not employ the fashionable terms financialisation or 
financialised capitalism in this book for the very reason that these terms serve to 
facilitate the conceptual imprecision around money, credit and the financial system. 
The latter, as I understand it, is essentially, albeit not exclusively, comprised of 
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money and credit money as well as institutional and class-based networks. We 
investigate some of these features in the next chapter and in the several case studies 
that follow. For now, it is helpful to understand the role and limits of money in 
the wider processes of capital accumulation. 
The role and tensions of money in capital accumulation 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the nature and role of money (i.e., real money as in 
the money commodity or state-backed legal tender) cannot be grasped by remaining 
in the sphere of exchange, largely because of the illusion of equality, democracy 
and freedom facilitated in this realm. The primary reason for this is the ability of 
money to embody yet conceal the presumed equality of exchange surrounding 
labour power. Instead, Marx argues that to comprehend the revolutionary power 
of money, it is necessary to enter the realm of production to see how and why 
money becomes the direct incarnation of all human labour and thereby serves to 
distort the inequality and exploitative relations involved in creating surplus value, 
or what Marx refers to as the money fetish (de Brunhof, 1976; Marx, 1976; 
Rodolsky, 1977). As a commodity, money appears as an external object or thing 
that is capable of becoming the private property of individuals, who in turn can 
wield social power over others. In capitalism, this power is class-based: the owners 
of the means of production (capitalists) have been able to accumulate the vast 
majority of money. As Marx notes, the accumulation of money is unlimited 
social power (Clarke, 1988; Harvey, 1999; Marx, 2005). This power has grown 
exponentially and unevenly in the neoliberal era (Harvey, 2007). 
For money to maintain its social power as the universal equivalent, it needs to 
function as a trusted store of value. This is an extremely important point to keep 
in mind, as it forms a basic tension in capital accumulation. It bears repeating, 
however, that while money has a use-value, it does not have intrinsic value (i.e., 
price). The preservation of the quality of money is difficult to maintain given the 
inherent tensions in capital accumulation. In Chapter 3, I explain how the power 
of capitalist states and the role of monetarist forms of intervention become crucial 
in this regard (Clarke, 1988; Bonefeld and Holloway, 1995; Harvey, 1999; 
Krippner, 2011; Panitch and Gindin, 2012). 
Before turning to key tensions in capital accumulation, it is useful to stress that 
the drive to accumulate surplus value (profit) is the primary engine that powers 
growth under capitalism (Marx, 1976; Harvey, 2001). An abbreviated version of 
the accumulation process in formulaic version may be regarded as: M-C-M1, where 
M is money, C is a commodity produced by labour using means of production 
and M1 is profit. Marx rejected the bourgeois economists’ position that growth 
under capitalism is harmonious in nature; this position holds true in terms of the 
credit system. Instead, he suggested that due to internal tensions in capitalist society 
crises will often result from structural barriers to the accumulation of (surplus) value 
(Clarke, 1994; Harvey, 2001; Fine, 2010). 
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Three tensions that crop up in accumulation processes are features that capitalism 
presupposes and depends upon (Harvey, 1999, 2001). First, capitalism does not 
only require free labour, it also necessitates the presence of an excess labour force, 
or what Marx refers to as an industrial reserve army, or surplus population. The 
reserve army facilitates the expansion of capitalist production. To illustrate this point, 
I draw on a standard expression of the expansion of value (or, what is referred to 
as surplus value, or profit) in the circulation process of capital: 
M → C [LP + MP] . . . P . . . C1 → M1 
Where M stands for money; C and C1 for commodities; LP for labour power; MP 
for the means of production, including machinery, energy inputs, raw materials 
and partially finished products; P for production; and M1 for profit (Harvey, 1989: 
18). To illustrate, a capitalist purchases labour, or LP (coffee pickers) and machinery 
(MP) to harvest, process and mill (P) coffee berries for $1,000 (M). This same 
capitalist then sells the finished product, namely: coffee beans (C1) to coffee houses 
for $2,000 (M1). Seen from this angle, there must be regulations in place to increase 
the supply of labour (liberal migration policies), if the price of coffee is particularly 
lucrative. On the other hand, regulatory mechanisms must also exist that can decrease 
the supply of labour when coffee prices tumble. These mechanisms would allow 
for unemployment and/or the introduction of labour-reducing technology aimed 
at increasing both the quantity and quality of coffee harvested. Expressed differently, 
strategies must be in place either to bring down wages below value (a point I return 
to below) or to increase the productivity of the workers who remain employed. 
Second and related, for the expansion of production to occur, a capitalist must be 
able to purchase the necessary means of production, e.g., machines, raw materials, etc. 
Third, there needs to be a market to absorb the increasing quantities of commodities 
produced. People have to need and want coffee (use-value), or at least be encouraged 
to want and need coffee through the advertising industry. If uses for coffee cannot be 
found, or if an effective demand (backed by the ability to pay) is not present, then the 
conditions for capital accumulation disappear (Harvey, 2001: 238–9). 
Each of these three tensions presents a potential obstacle to capital accumula ­
tion that stands to precipitate a crisis (Harvey, 2001: 239). In Marxian theory, a 
fundamental stressor that underpins all of these tensions is the tendency to over-
accumulate capital (Mandel, 1968; Amin, 1974; Clarke, 1988, 1994; Bonefeld and 
Holloway, 1995; Harvey, 1999, 2003). While Marx’s general laws of capital 
accumulation are complex and highly dynamic, it suffices here to note that the 
over-accumulation of capital refers to a situation in which there is a surplus of 
capital relative to profitable opportunities to employ that capital. This is sometimes 
accompanied by surpluses of labour (Harvey, 2001; Charnock et al., 2014). As 
Harvey (2001: 240) argues, 
The various manifestations of crises in the capitalist system – chronic 
unemployment and underemployment, capital surpluses and lack of invest ­
ment opportunities, falling rates of profit, lack of effective demand in the 
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market and so on – can, therefore, be traced to the basic tendency to over ­
accumulation. 
The absence of profitable investment sites, for instance, increases tension on the 
store of value of money (Clarke, 1988, 1994). As we will see in the next section, 
the role of credit money plays a vital function in smoothing the tensions of capital 
accumulation. As a form of money, it also wields immense power – most of which 
is privately held. 
Credit money in capital accumulation: swindler and prophet 
The process by which banks create money is so simple that the mind is repelled. 
– John Kenneth Galbraith, 1974, quoted in Stanford, 2008: 194 
The generalisation of a form of ‘money of account’, or what Marx refers to as 
credit money, is designed to alleviate the tensions inherent in capital accumulation 
(Clarke, 1994; Marx, 2005). Credit money originated in privately contracted bills 
of exchange and notes of credit, which took on the social form (and powers) of 
money as soon as they begin to circulate as means of payment (Mandel 1968; 
Harvey, 1999; Lapavitsas, 2013). Credit serves to ease the strain placed on physical 
money as store of value, since the quantity of credit money can either be increased 
or reduced, depending on the required levels needed for circulation. Thus, it 
facilitates the reproduction of the accumulation process as a whole (Harvey, 1999: 
245). This point can be illustrated by returning to the example of coffee production. 
To deal with the three points of tension mentioned earlier, our coffee capitalist will 
have to hoard (save) enough money to purchase the necessary equipment and the cost 
of labour and to bridge the time until the return of value through production is realised. 
Even if the coffee capitalist has been able to do this, they will inevitably require more 
money to deal with the inherent stresses of capital accumulation, including: replacing 
inefficient technology, absorbing price fluctuations, dealing with a drop in demand, 
and so forth. The ability of our coffee capitalist to access credit money becomes 
vital to the smooth flow of attempts to expand value. This example of the significance 
of credit money to lubricate the wheels of capital accumulation makes an important 
point: credit money is a necessary condition to deal with the periodic tensions emerging 
in capital accumulation (Mandel, 1968; Harvey, 1999, 2001). 
According to Marx, credit money exists as a lever for expanded reproduction 
as it realises the internal relation of production and circulation without this internal 
relation having been performed in real terms (Marx, 1991; Bonefeld, 1995: 189). 
In doing so, credit money establishes continuity between money tied in production 
and exchange, where there was none before (Harvey, 2001: 245). However, credit 
money also accelerates the violent outbreaks of the underlying tensions in capital 
accumulation (Marx, 1991: 572). As Marx (1991: 572–3) observes: 
The credit system has a dual character immanent in it: on the one hand it 
develops the motive of capitalist production, enrichment by the exploitation 
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of others’ labour, into the purest and most colossal system of gambling and 
swindling and restricts ever more the already small number of the exploiters 
of social wealth; on the other hand however it constitutes the form of 
transition towards a new mode of production. It is this dual character . . . 
of swindler and prophet. 
In what follows, I discuss the role played by credit money in resolving a key tension 
associated with over-accumulated capital: the constant fluctuations of the size and 
composition of what Marx refers to as the relative surplus population; that is, the 
target group for creditors. Before turning to this discussion, however, it is important 
to parse out the similarities and differences between money and credit money, as 
well as highlight two types of credit money. This exercise will help to deepen our 
conceptualisation of consumer credit, as it assists in our understanding of social 
power and the tensions inherent in credit money itself. 
Money and credit money: similarities and differences 
As noted above, credit is similar to money in that both are incarnations of social 
power, including spatial and temporal dimensions (see Chapter 1). Like money, 
credit money asserts itself as a universal equivalent, which has the capacity to expand 
abstract wealth independently of exploitation (Clarke, 1994; Bonefeld, 1995). Credit 
money therefore also serves to destroy personal bonds of dependency and replace 
them with ‘objective dependency relations’ through which individuals relate to 
each other through things – most notably, market prices, e.g., interest rates, fees 
and late penalties as well as credit-rating scores. The free license given by states to 
capitalists to privately create money (credit) also facilitates the (re-)construction of 
the community of money (Marx, 2005). 
The monetisation of social relationships (i.e., the relations between things), which 
underpins the community of money, is reproduced in consumer credit, too. The 
relationships between capitalists and workers, for instance, are converted, through 
the credit system, into relations between debtor and creditor. The latter relations 
are mediated by formalised abstractions (e.g., interest rates, late fees) as opposed to 
direct forms of domination between employer and employee. I pick up on this 
form of social power inherent to consumer credit below. For now, it is useful to 
identify three core differences between money and credit money. 
The role of credit money in the processes of capital accumulation is distinct 
from money in at least three essential ways – all of which serve to heighten the 
tensions of capital accumulation as opposed to absorbing them. First, unlike other 
forms of money, such as cash, ‘no matter how far afield a privately contracted bill 
of exchange may circulate, it must always return to its place of origin for 
redemption’ (Harvey, 1999: 245–6). Second, unlike other forms of money, which 
are issued by the state, credit money is privately created money that can serve a 
social purpose when put into circulation. When the original debt is paid off, 
however, the credit money disappears from circulation. As such, credit money is 
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continually being created and destroyed through the actions of private individuals 
(capitalists), as they seek to deal with the stresses in capital accumulation. Third, 
credit money entails what Marx refers to as fictitious value – an imaginary compo­
nent – whereas ‘real’ money is tied directly to a money commodity, as discussed 
in Chapter 1 (Harvey, 1999: 267). The fictitious value in credit money also presents 
a potential source of crisis to capital accumulation, as it opens up a gap between 
itself and money, whose quality needs to be preserved at all costs. 
Two types of credit money: fictitious capital and the 
money-form of revenue 
It is vital here to distinguish between two broad types of credit money: fictitious 
capital and the money-form of revenue (Harvey, 1999). The latter type of money 
credit captures the forms of non-collateralised forms of consumer credit that we 
investigate in this book, e.g., payday loans, student loans, credit cards and so forth. 
It is also a type of consumer credit that Marx did not theorise, largely because 
consumer credit was not well developed in his day. In this sense, Leyshon and 
Thrift (1997) are correct that the Marxian understanding of money (or money credit, 
more specifically) requires updating. However, this does not mean that we need 
to reject the building blocks offered by Marx and theorists such as Harvey (1999). 
A Marxian theory of money and capital accumulation is an essential analytical 
foundation upon which to build our conceptual renovations. 
In what follows, we should keep in mind that an important distinction between 
fictitious capital and the money-form of revenue (consumer credit) parallels the 
difference between money and capital. This becomes clearer as we proceed with 
our analysis. Suffice it to say here that, on Marx’s insistence, Harvey urges us to 
avoid blurring money with capital, as there is a palpable difference between the 
circulation of money as capital (fictitious capital) and its circulation as mere money 
(the money-form of revenue). The distinction is also important in terms of 
consumer credit. The latter usually involves money circulating as money. It extracts 
interest and fees, not profit, which is extractable only in the realm of production. 
As such money circulating as credit involves different forms of exploitation 
(secondary forms) and relations of domination (creditor and debtor), but also engages 
and creates different tensions in the wider processes of capital accumulation. 
Fictitious capital 
The first of the two broad categories of credit money is fictitious capital. While 
both forms of credit money entail fictitious value, fictitious capital is implied 
whenever credit money is loaned out as capital, i.e., enters into the sphere of 
production. When credit money circulates as fictitious capital it is destined to 
enter the production process and create surplus value, or what becomes profit (e.g., 
M-C-M1). 
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Fictitious in the context of Marxian theory does not mean that this form of 
credit money is not real. What Marx means is that this form of credit money does 
not entail value in itself. Instead, fictitious capital is a claim exercised by credit 
money over a share of future surplus value (profit), as opposed to existing 
commodities. Put another way, fictitious capital is implied whenever credit is 
extended in advance, in expectation of future labour as counter-value; that is, the 
extraction of surplus value through primary forms of exploitation (Harvey, 1999: 
266). For Marx, government debt (e.g., government bonds) and land are the ultimate 
expressions of fictitious value. They have no inherent value, yet they can assume 
a price. These forms of fictitious capital are not yet real capital, as they have not 
extracted surplus value through the primary exploitation of labour (i.e., in the realm 
of production). They are, instead, debt claims. Our discussion of Mexican housing 
finance in Chapter 9 reveals the tensions inherent in lending fictitious capital to 
surplus workers. In particular, I examine how these contradictions have been 
resolved through expansionary policies in the credit system, such as the reliance 
on asset-backed securitisation schemes for low-income housing. 
The creation of fictitious values prior to actual commodity production and 
realisation is always a risky venture (Harvey, 1999: 266). While fictitious capital 
plays a necessary role in absorbing tensions in capital accumulation, ‘Marx is very 
clear that the credit system registers the “height of distortion” to the degree that 
the accumulation of future claims of labour as counter-value outruns real 
production’ (Harvey, 1999: 269). When fictitious capital begins to dominate 
capital accumulation, as has been the case over the past several decades, links 
with the actual expansion of capital accumulation become strained, thereby 
threatening the quality of real money upon which credit money rests. The popular 
conception of capital as something with the properties of automatic self-expansion 
is strengthened and the accumulation of debts begins to appear erroneously as 
accumulation of capital (Harvey, 1999: 269). This also leads to the illusion that 
credit is somehow separated from the realm of production. Our theoretical lens 
prevents us from repeating this error. It also permits us to move beyond the power 
of this illusion by grasping credit money as part and parcel of the wider 
accumulation processes. 
Money-form of revenue 
A second type of credit money is what Marx refers to as the money-form of revenue 
that is not based on collateral. This includes credit cards, student loans and payday 
loans. This type of money credit reflects the majority of consumer credit explored 
in this book and will therefore be used synonymously with ‘consumer credit’ from 
this point onward (Marx, 1991, Ch. 28). Unlike fictitious capital, consumer credit 
is geared toward increasing the initial monetary outlay through interest payments 
and fees (e.g., late fees, administrative fees, etc.) as opposed to the creation of surplus 
value (Mandel, 1968; de Brunhoff, 1976; Bonefeld and Holloway, 1995). Instead 
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of engaging in production and thus employing labour to produce surplus value 
(profit), consumer credit is circulated as money. In formulaic terms, this is 
represented as M . . . M1 (where M is money and M1 is interest). Because this latter 
circuit of the money-form of revenue bypasses labour and remains in the realm of 
exchange, many theorists, including Leyshon and Thrift (1997), have argued that 
the realm of production is not relevant to the study of consumer credit. 
By contrast, in a Marxian understanding of capital accumulation the sphere 
of production and the sphere of exchange are not simply imbricated but inextric­
able. Credit does not emerge naturally from a harmoniously functioning (efficient 
and equilibrating) market; but instead represents social forms of power designed 
to resolve contradictions within the processes of capital accumulation. As such, 
the M . . . M1 circuit of consumer credit is not based on magical, self-expansionary 
mech anisms; but instead are influenced, in part, through a complex assemblage 
of private and public governance strategies aimed at imposing market discipline 
on debtors to ensure that loans, or, at the very least, interest payments, are realised. 
That said, the proliferation of consumer credit to the poor and the relations of 
power therein, is also partly shaped by the tensions in the processes involved in 
capital accumula tion and the tendency toward over-accumulation in particular. 
For example, in Chapter 6, I discuss how the student loan industry has expanded 
its reach to finance low-income students attending for-profit, private universities 
in the United States. Through asset-backed securitisation (ABS), for instance, these 
creditors offset the risks involved in lending to the poor (e.g., the high probability 
of defaults) by repackaging and reselling loans to other investors, such as pension 
funds, in the ‘digitalised spaces’ of global financial markets (Sassen, 2006, 2009). 
I discuss ABS as it relates to the poverty industry in more detail below. 
For now, it is important to emphasise that in the M . . . M1 circuit, which 
underpins the majority of the transactions in the poverty industry, the connection 
between consumer credit and the realm of production is not completely severed, 
as observed by Leyshon and Thrift (1997) in the introductory chapter of this 
book. The reason for this connection is that consumer credit entails secondary 
forms of exploitation whereby workers’ real incomes can be modified (Harvey, 
1999). Unlike primary forms of exploitation, which occur in the realm of pro ­
duction (see Chapter 1), secondary exploitation takes place in the sphere of 
exchange through the extraction of interest and fees from a loan. To repay the 
loan – or to make minimum payments on the principal amount, which is more 
often the case – workers must give up part of their income, savings, or even, as 
we will see in Chapter 7, their welfare cheques. While some workers are no longer 
in the realm of production (e.g., those in the low-wage service sector), consumer 
credit plays an important role in reproducing the labour supply, which is crucial 
for capital accumulation. 
Because of the social power inherent in credit money and given that credit 
transactions occur within the realm of exchange, the interest and fees placed on 
consumer loans by creditors appear as a natural exchange of equivalents. Two parties 
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enter a contractual agreement on a voluntary basis (see Chapter 1). Yet, credit money 
does not walk around with a natural price on its head. It must be constructed. As 
we will see in the following chapters, shifts in usury law by debtfare states have 
allowed the interest and fees applied to credit money to be framed as an equivalent 
exchange for a debtor’s credit rating. This is based on alleged scientific and thus 
objective, calculations that determine the price of the loan (interest) based on 
perceived risk, e.g., losses to the creditor from non-repayment (Marron, 2007). 
Put another way, technologies and strategies such as risk-based pricing allows 
capitalists to charge poorer people more interest and administrative fees than 
materially better off workers (Wyly et al., 2009; Sassen, 2009). 
Like real money, what consumer credit conceals are the exploitative relations 
of class-based power. In the wider community of money, for instance, the real 
(defetishised) relationships within the credit system become very difficult to dis ­
tinguish, while the behaviour of economic agents as debtors is subject to different 
pressures compared with their behaviours as wage-earners (Harvey, 1999). Indeed, 
the designation of debtors with the seemingly apolitical and homogenous term 
‘consumer’ seems to further obfuscate the real relationships upon which credit 
money is built, thereby making the unequal and exploitative relations difficult to 
discern. As we see below and throughout the book, the features of the community 
of money – democracy, freedom and equality – are mirrored in mainstream 
representations of the importance of extending credit money to the poor in the 
wider discourses of financial inclusion and the democratisation of credit. 
While consumer credit does not flow directly into the production process, its 
ongoing expansion is as problematic as fictitious capital in that it resolves temporarily 
some paradoxes in capital accumulation while triggering more tensions. I discuss 
this further in the next section. Here it is useful to note that the temporary fix 
offered by credit money is due partly to the nature of credit money (i.e., it is privately 
created and must return to its origin for redemption) and partly to the fact that 
credit can only (temporarily) resolve the contradictions arising in the sphere of 
production from within the realm of exchange (Harvey, 1999). 
The main point in this section is that credit money is both distinct from and 
similar to, its monetary base. The power of credit is derived, in part, from the 
processes of capital accumulation and, in part, from the ideological and regulatory 
backing of states. To elaborate on this point, we pick up on one of the key tensions 
in the processes of capital accumulation, namely, the continual production of a 
relative surplus population whose social reproduction is tenuous. In particular, we 
explore how and why capitalists have employed consumer credit as a means of 
solving this reproduction problem while creating new markets for interest- and 
fee-generating revenue. We will also begin to see how this solution serves to 
heighten rather than resolve this tension – an inquiry with which the rest of the 
book is concerned. 
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Credit and the surplus population: tensions, solutions and 
the poverty industry 
The relative surplus population: meanings and problems for 
accumulation 
The misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being 
exploited at all. 
– Joan Robinson, 1962: 21 
In his general law of capitalist accumulation in Capital (vol. 1), Marx discusses the 
social consequences of capital’s drive for increased productivity of labour (and thus 
expansion of profit), namely: the production of a relative surplus population or 
reserve labour army, which is not only a key necessity and tension of capital accumu ­
lation, but also shaped by the contradictions in the processes of capital accumulation. 
As Marx (1990: 784) argues: 
But if a surplus population of workers is a necessary product of accumulation 
or the development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus population 
also becomes, conversely, the lever of capital accumulation, indeed it becomes 
the condition for the existence of capitalist mode of production. It forms a 
disposable industrial reserve army, which belongs to capital just as absolutely 
as if the latter had bred it at its own costs. Independently of the limits of the 
actual increase of population, it creates a mass of human material always ready 
for exploitation by capital in the interests of capital’s own changing 
valorization requirements. 
The relative surplus population is an important analytical category in our analysis, 
not only because of its central role in credit-led accumulation in the poverty industry, 
but also because it allows us to grasp the sources from which marginalised workers 
emerge as debtors. For Marx (1990: 794), ‘Every worker belongs to the relative 
surplus population during the time when [s]/he is only partially employed or wholly 
unemployed’. The relative surplus population is intrinsically connected to and 
defined by, the processes of capital accumulation. Moreover, this group of workers 
is a highly dynamic and heterogeneous group of workers that, for Marx, exist in 
several forms: the floating, the latent and the stagnant (Marx, 1990). As various 
authors have pointed out, these categories have varying degrees of importance for 
capitalists, depending on the historical and spatial context (Nun, 2000; Breman, 
2003; Sanyal, 2007; Li, 2009). In the chapters that follow, I specifically define what 
I mean by surplus worker in relation to each case of the poverty industry under 
study. Notwithstanding my attempts to clarify the meaning of this labour category, 
it is important to underscore that the relative surplus population is a social relation 
that is based in, and created by, the wider dynamics of capital accumulation. The 
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meaning of who is surplus is thus far from static or clear, as the lines separating 
surplus from non-surplus workers are, like all things in capitalism, perpetually in 
motion and often blurred. 
In this book, I use the term relative surplus population interchangeably with 
surplus labour power, marginalised workers and low-income workers, as well as 
unemployed and underemployed workers. Regardless of the varied terms, the 
essence of Marx’s definition of the relative surplus population remains. Aside from 
the treatment of this concept as a social category in the wider processes of capital 
accumulation, my understanding of the surplus population relates primarily to what 
Marx describes as workers in the ‘floating’ and ‘latent’ stratum, as these two 
categories reflect those ‘embedded’ in the industrial reserve army and thus are linked 
to the processes of capital accumulation. By floating Marx is referring to people 
who are already proletarianised, who have already been employed as wage-earners, 
who are temporarily unemployed and who, after a period of unemployment, are 
reabsorbed into the labour force as conditions for accumulation improve (Marx, 
1976). As Harvey (2010a: 278) notes, the floating workers are roughly equivalent 
to the pool of unemployed, as recorded in the unemployment statistics, plus those 
classified as underemployed or as ‘discouraged workers’. 
Finally, according to Marx, the latent category of the relative surplus population 
describes peasant populations not yet absorbed into the wage-labour system. ‘As 
soon as capitalist production takes possession of agriculture and in proportion to 
the extent to which it does so, the demand for a rural working population falls 
absolutely, while the accumulation of the capital employed in agricultural advances, 
without this repulsion being compensated for by a greater attraction of workers, 
as is the case in non-agricultural industries’ (Marx, 1976: 795–6). The continual 
destruction of peasant or indigenous forms of subsistence farming and the 
proletarianisation of the rural world has pushed ever-growing numbers of peasants 
into wage-labour (Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Taylor, 2008; McMichael, 2009; 
Breman, 2012; White et al., 2012). This continues to be the case in neoliberal 
times and can be seen in a number of ways, such as the case of many members of 
the informal sector in Mexico, or (illegal) migrants from the global South to the 
United States, which we discuss in the case of the US credit card industry (see 
Chapter 5) as well as the Mexican case studies (see Chapters 8 and 9). 
For Marx, the relative surplus population is ‘the most powerful lever of 
accumulation’ but also reveals why the ‘accumulation of misery is a necessary 
condition, corresponding to the accumulation of wealth’ (Marx, 1990: 772, 
799). Capital accumulation both creates and is dependent upon the relative sur­
plus popu lation. As noted above, capital accumulation depends on a relative surplus 
population – not only because a ready supply of cheap workers is profitable for 
capitalists, but also because the reserve army places downward pressure on existing 
wage levels, threatens employed labourers with layoffs, discourages labour organ ­
isation and increases the intensity of labour for those employed. It is, therefore, in 
the capitalist classes’ interests to manage the relative surplus population, through 
disciplinary tactics and ideological means, in such a way so as to perpetuate it (Marx, 
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1990; Denning, 2010; Harvey, 2010a). The relative surplus population must, there ­
fore, be able to socially reproduce itself by meeting basic subsistence needs. 
Etching out survival at the margins of the expanded reproduction of capital is 
a difficult task for surplus labour at the best of times. It is downright grim during 
times when capital is facing the pressures of over-accumulation. These times have 
been marked by an ever-growing socio-economic gap between rich and poor, both 
within and between countries. As John Holloway (1994: 132) elaborates: 
Capital, in order to survive, needed to free itself from existing relations of 
exploitation, to spit out some of the workers currently being exploited, to 
restructure its relations with others, to go in search of new people to exploit. 
Capital takes flight from the inadequacy of its own basis: this flight is 
expressed in the conversion of capital into money and the movement of that 
money in search of profitable means of expansion. 
If we continue with our attempts to defetishise what Marx refers to as the 
economic fiction that casts (capitalist) markets as natural phenomena, which – left 
largely to their own devices – magically reach equilibrium, we are faced with the 
question of how the silent compulsions that characterise capital accumulation have 
been continually reconstructed and legitimated with regard to the surplus 
population (Marx, 1990). How is dispossession, expropriation and dependence on 
the market imposed on the surplus population in such a manner that it appears 
as a natural and inevitable aspect of life, or the ordinary run of things (Marx, 1976; 
de Angelis, 2007)? 
Unfortunately, we cannot turn to Marx for many answers, as he does not theorise 
the social reproduction of labour power, particularly the surplus population. For 
Harvey (1999: 163; see also, Lebowitz, 2003), since the quantity and quality of 
labour supply is an important feature to Marx’s understanding of capital accumu ­
lation, ‘this omission is, perhaps, one of the most serious of all the gaps in Marx’s 
own theory and one that is proving extremely difficult to plug if only because the 
relations between accumulation and the social processes of reproduction of labour 
are hidden in such a maze of complexity that they seem to defy analysis. This is 
particularly true with regard to the gendered, racial and ethnic dimensions of social 
reproduction (cf. Katz, 2001; Rankin, 2001; Roberts, 2013). My analysis in the 
remaining part of this chapter as well as in the next chapter attempts to partially 
address this gap. 
The (temporary) fix: credit-led accumulation and the poverty 
industry 
The problem for capitalists faced with over-accumulated capital is two-fold. On 
the one hand, capitalists must overcome the barriers to capital accumulation by 
continually searching for more venues to extract revenue (interest and fees) through 
consumer credit (e.g., transactions based on M . . . M1). On the other hand, the 
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burgeoning surplus population must be reintegrated into, or enclosed within, the 
community of money lest the myth that growth-driven capitalism benefits all be 
exposed. A key problem in the neoliberal era is how to enclose and depoliticise 
the spaces of marginality populated by the surplus population, while maintaining 
the (investment) integrity, stability and, above all, ‘naturalness’ of capitalism. 
Capitalists, with assistance from the state and international organisations such as 
the International Monetary Fund, have historically relied on what Harvey refers 
to as a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ or ‘displacement’ to overcome the barriers to capital 
valorisation (Harvey, 1989, 2003; Sassen, 2010). This fix, which constitutes an 
important analytical tool, can be explained in the following manner: the surpluses 
of (real) money can be potentially transformed through temporal displacements, 
for instance, through investment in long-term capital projects or social expenditures 
in education and research (a temporal fix). Surpluses of (real) money can also be 
absorbed through spatial displacements such as the opening of new markets (a spatial 
fix). Temporal and spatial solutions to the strains in capital accumulation can also 
be combined to create spatio-temporal fixes. A good example of this is the creation 
of a housing market for low-income workers in Mexico with surplus money 
originating not only in Mexico but also from the United States and Europe (spatial 
displacement). Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 9, the interest extracted from 
these subprime mortgages has been temporally modified through asset-backed 
securitisation (ABS). The movement from a mortgage traditionally held by a 
bank for several decades to the dynamics of ABS may also be regarded as a type 
of spatial displacement from relatively more concrete moorings to virtual space, or 
what Saskia Sassen refers to as electronic mortgages operating in digital spaces (Sassen, 
2009). I discuss mortgage securitisation in the context of Mexico in more detail 
in Chapter 9. 
The point to keep in mind here is that given the tension-ridden processes 
inherent to the dynamics of capital accumulation, these fixes cannot be understood 
in isolation from each other; but instead must be seen as a continuum in which 
each fix builds on and in turn affects, the preceding solution. 
Heightening tensions in spatio-temporal displacements 
As we will see in Chapter 3, the expansive state policies promoting financial 
inclusion feed off of and, in turn, serve to discipline and recreate, advanced 
marginality. This is largely due to a shortage of work that prevents surplus labour 
from earning a living wage. The increasing role of consumer credit in the supple ­
mentation and in some cases replacement, of regular and living wages and 
adequately funded social programmes (e.g., old age pensions and care, health care, 
child care, education and welfare) has also meant a change in the form in which 
the social relations of power are articulated and fought out. These class-based 
relations of power are distorted in the realm of exchange, which is dominated by 
consumer credit and backed by the power of the state (see Chapter 3). It serves 
as a means to discipline, dispossess and (re-)impose silent compulsions and structural 
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violence by (re-)integrating the surplus population into the capitalist system, even 
if only at the margins, as debtors. These disciplining and coercive features, in turn, 
allow workers to be ensnared in the invisible temporal and spatial constraints of 
consumer credit. 
In this context, it is worth underscoring again that the sphere of production, 
not solely the realm of exchange, plays an immense role in shaping the effectiveness 
and stability of consumer credit for the poor. Indeed, as I have tried to suggest 
throughout this chapter, credit money is only a temporary solution to the tensions 
of capital accumulation. However, these stressors cannot be understood without 
taking into account both features of accumulation – the realms of exchange and 
production. The key tensions of consumer credit may be traced to the three 
distinctive characteristics discussed earlier, namely the existence of a reserve army, 
the ability of the capitalist to access credit and the creation of a market to absorb 
the increasing quantities of commodities produced. In what follows, I highlight 
some of the core tensions underpinning the poverty industry and its dispossessive 
strategies. 
The social power of credit money and the continual dispossession leveraged 
through the poverty industry has facilitated an increase in the power of capitalists 
over the regulation and mediation of surplus workers. Capitalists not only create 
credit money, but also, through the monetisation of the creditor-debtor relation ­
ship, subjugate ‘consumers’ to the domination of abstractions such as interest rates 
and fee payments levied against future revenues, which appear external and 
independent to workers (debtors) (Harvey, 1989). A central tension in this form 
of credit-led accumulation concerns precisely where these revenues are to come 
from and when. If opportunities for work (in the formal or informal sectors) are 
forthcoming, then there is a potential that the fictitious nature of the value of 
consumer loan will not be called into question; that is, it will not result in default. 
If the debtor repays the loan, then consumer credit as a form of dispossession will 
have successfully extracted revenue for the capitalist, while also playing a role in 
reproducing insecurity and in disciplining workers, who either voluntarily submit 
to the structural violence of the workplace in order to pay off their debts, or, more 
often, simply make regular instalment payments on the interest. Nonetheless, 
consumer credit cannot escape the fact that it operates as fictitious value and thus 
continually threatens the stability of capital accumulation by gambling on the ability 
of debtors to repay their loans. If this gap widens too far it threatens the quality 
of real money, with the potential for a crisis to ensue. Since it is vital to protect 
the quality of (real) money to ensure its social power as the universal equivalent, 
capitalists created consumer credit to absorb these tensions. 
Capitalists have devised temporal-spatial fixes to displace the above tension, in 
part through the increased use of asset-backed securitisation. ABS is a financial 
innovation that emerged in the early 1970s in the United States. Its use began to 
increase in the US during the late 1990s, before expanding to Europe and eventu­
ally the global South. Securitisation describes a process of packaging individual 
consumer loans (e.g., student loans, housing loans, credit card loans, etc.) with other 
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debt instruments. This package is transformed into a security or securities, which 
enhances its credit status or rating to further its sale to third-party investors, such 
as mutual and pension funds (Elul, 2005; Sassen, 2008). Securitisation, also referred 
to as ‘slice and dice’ capitalism, essentially converts illiquid individuals loans 
into liquid, marketable securities to be bought and sold (Kothari, 2006). With this 
form of credit money based on future income streams, investors engaging in ABS 
anticipate that the borrower will be able to earn sufficient wages to continue making 
orderly payments on their loan. 
While ABS can temporarily bridge the underlying gap between the fictitious 
value of the consumer loan and real money, it cannot resolve the fact that its success 
is dependent on a future gamble that the debtor can access enough funds to repay 
their loan. Herein lies another tension and defining characteristic of credit money: 
no matter how far afield consumer credit circulates, it must always return to its 
place of origin for recovery, namely, to the debtor. The debtor of consumer credit 
must pay the face value of the debt for credit money to close the circle of exchange. 
Given the precarious situation of the surplus population, however, the risk of default 
is a constant threat and poses a heightened tension in the use of credit money. The 
gamble with future of labour is intensified in consumer credit given its fictitious 
value. On the one hand, pressure is placed on the working poor to find employment 
of any kind at any price (wages) for the length of time necessary to make payments. 
On the other hand, in the current era of credit-led accumulation, employment 
offering living wages is hard to find. 
Concluding remarks 
Building on the conceptual base of the social power of money, this chapter 
explored the social power of credit. I argued that the structural violence and silent 
compulsions that mark capitalism cannot be adequately understood by beginning 
and/or remaining in the realm of exchange, which is, unfortunately, where much 
of the financialisation literature is fixated. Following a Marxian based understanding 
of money and credit, I suggested that a robust analysis must begin with an 
understanding of the monetary basis of credit within the wider, conflict-ridden 
processes of capital accumulation. I discussed the nature of credit by explaining 
how and why credit emerges. In short, it is employed by capitalists to overcome 
inevitable, yet unpredictable, stresses in the expansion of value, such as periodic 
events of over-accumulation. In addition, it facilitates the management of the relative 
surplus population. In the neoliberal era, this takes the form of credit-led 
accumulation. While this accumulation strategy serves capitalist interests, it has, as 
Marx suggests, heightened rather than resolved the paradoxes inherent to the 
processes of capital accumulation. 
Because of these strains, credit and its monetary base necessitates an institution 
that is perceived as class neutral, i.e., existing beyond the realm of exchange and 
production, to help manage and depoliticise conflicts and tensions in the expansion 
of the poverty industry. In fact, although my analysis has kept the state analytically 
1 
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separate from money and credit thus far, I have done so only for the sake of clarity. 
Capital accumulation, as we will see in the next chapter, has always required capitalist 
states to secure its reproduction. Under neoliberalism, many states have accommo­
dated the needs of capital and credit-led accumulation in particular. The next chapter 
explores the roles played by neoliberal states in facilitating the expansion and 
reproduction of the poverty industry through the social power of money. 
Note 
It is widely known that Marx never completed his analysis on money and credit. As 
Harvey observes, Marx’s notes on credit were left in great confusion (Harvey, 1999). 
While it is true that Marxists continue to pay scant attention to money and credit, there 
have been several seminal works on the topic (Mandel, 1968; de Brunhoff, 1976; Amin, 
1974; Clarke, 1988; Itoh and Lapavitsas, 1999). I draw on these authors but base my 
primary reading on Marx and Harvey. The latter (Harvey, 1989, 1999) provides, in my 





As we saw in the previous chapter, the role of privately created money (credit) in 
the wider dynamics of capital accumulation is riddled with contradictions. A core 
tension that concerns us in this book is the need for the constant expansion of the 
poverty industry coupled with the reproduction of the surplus population. Because 
capitalism’s claims to freedom of exchange and liberty of contract are a myth, 
the system requires a mediating social relation to facilitate the expansion and 
reproduction of capital accumulation that is at the heart of the poverty industry. 
In this chapter, I argue that neoliberal states have played a vital role in this process. 
In particular, I suggest that the debtfarist feature of neoliberal states provides vital 
institutional and ideological support to the growth of the poverty industry, not 
least by normalising and disciplining the dependency of the surplus population on 
credit. 
Neoliberal states have played a vital role in legitimising, promoting and 
mediating the contradictions inherent to credit and the wider process of capital 
accumulation. I suggest that there are four core components of neoliberal states 
that have played vital roles in the expansion and reproduction of the poverty industry 
in both the United States and Mexico. These overlapping features are: monetarism, 
corporate welfarism, workfarism and what I refer to as debtfarism. Debtfarism plays 
a direct role in the ongoing reconstruction and normalisation of the poverty industry. 
As with monetarism, corporate welfarism and workfare, debtfarism seeks to achieve 
these goals by invoking the social power of money. This includes removing struggles 
from the realm of production and shifting them to the realm of exchange, where 
exploitation and class power is less visible. 
Through a complex and tension-ridden web of regulative and rhetorical 
processes, debtfarism imposes market discipline while actively reconstructing and 
normalising the growing dependency of the surplus population on high-priced credit 
to subsidise their basic subsistence needs. Later in the chapter and throughout the 
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book, I employ the term debtfare state. It is important to emphasise that by debtfare 
state I do not imply a standalone state. Instead, I use this term to capture the 
institutionalised rhetorical and regulatory practices of debtfarism, most notably usury 
and bankruptcy law, consumer protection legislation and dominant neoliberal tropes, 
such as financial inclusion and the democratisation of credit. 
I develop this argument in five main sections. Section One elaborates on my 
understanding of a materialist conception of states. Section Two broadly the 
rhetorical and regulative manifestations of neoliberal state forms of intervention 
and some of their basic assumptions. Section Three discusses three core components 
of neoliberal states that undergird the poverty industry: monetarism, corporate 
welfarism and workfarism. Section Four explains the roles played by debtfare states 
in the expansion and social reproduction of the poverty industry. Section Five 
concludes by summarising the argument. 
A Marxian understanding of capitalist states 
Marxist, or materialist, state theories represent a diverse and contested terrain. 
My particular reading in this book draws on the work represented by the West 
German State Derivationist Debate1 of the 1970s (Hirsch 1978, 1995; Altvater and 
Hoffmann, 1990) and various contributions from the Conference on Socialist 
Economists (CSE), which took place in the 1970s and 1980s (Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1978; Clarke, 1988). The many points of disagreement with regard to 
these various strands within broader materialist approach to the state have been 
well-documented.2 For our purposes here, we focus broadly on the principal 
contribution of materialist state theories: capitalist states must be subjected to the 
same Marxian techniques of deconstruction (i.e., those based in historical 
materialism) that I employed in previous chapters to denaturalise money and credit. 
Just as Marx seeks to deconstruct seemingly neutral categories such as the 
commodity and money to reveal their inner social content, materialist state theories, 
which are based on historical accounts of Western liberal democracies, also attempt 
to deconstruct seemingly neutral categories, such as bourgeois law and parliamentary 
democracy to expose their inner social content. A materialist framing treats capitalist 
states as historical social relations that shape and in turn are shaped by, the dynamics 
of capital accumulation. It follows from this view that they are highly complex 
and contradictory fields of struggle that cannot be understood either as instruments 
of class rule or as autonomous political actors (Clarke, 1988). 
A materialist view of capitalist states facilitates the deconstruction of states as 
autonomous political institutions along the same lines of analytical duality applied 
in the previous investigations into money and credit. On the one hand, we can 
study the fetishised articulations of capitalist states as democratic, pluralistic, 
egalitarian institutions that not only embody the common good in the judiciary, 
executive and political arenas, but also stand apart from the market (cf. Dahl, 1965; 
Evans et al. 1985). Much of the financialisation literature replicates this stance, relying 
on an institutionalised view of the state as removed from the dynamics of capital 
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accumulation. Assuming the state occupies an extra-economic sphere, however, 
leads to an incomplete and overpoliticised explanation of the state (Strange, 1988; 
Helleiner, 1994; Germain, 1997; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997).3 
It is worthwhile re-emphasising that designating state forms as fetishised does 
not imply they are illusions. Nothing could be further from the truth. These 
fetishised articulations of everyday social existence take differentiated but very real 
institutionalised forms. As Simon Clarke (1991: 10) argues, however, ‘the central 
point is that these institutionalised forms only derive their content from the social 
relations which they express and so it is only on the basis of those social relations 
that they can be understood and their development explained’. Similar to the 
community of money, relations of power and class domination exist below the 
fetishised surfaces (forms) of bourgeois states and their apparently egalitarian 
institutions.4 
Capitalist states assume separate and neutral forms to guarantee the expansion 
and social reproduction of capital accumulation because these functions cannot 
be fulfilled by individual capitalists and still maintain economic fictions aimed at 
representing capitalism as naturally evolving and harmonious in nature; that 
is, premised on freedom, democracy and equality (Hirsch, 1978; Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1978). Unlike the mainstream and post-structuralist accounts of states 
in the financialisation literature, materialist understandings of capitalist states do 
not see the emergence of the state as the result of the conscious activity of society 
in pursuit of its ‘general will’; but instead, as the result of often contradictory 
and short-sighted class struggles and conflicts that frame, and are framed by, 
the dynamics of capital accumulation (Hirsch, 1978: 65). The nature of state 
inter vention as a response to perceived threats to capital accumulation is com­
plex, contradictory and dynamic. These interventions may best be designated 
as what Hirsch refers to as reactive mediations, by which he means that capitalist 
states are able to intervene into the processes of capital accumulation in an ex post 
facto, temporary and paradoxical manner only (Hirsch 1978; von Braunmühl et al., 
1973). 
A materialist understanding of capitalist states allows us to see the class power, 
or content, inherent to all bourgeois state formations. States have institutional 
attributions, or concrete forms, that are spatially and historically differentiated. These 
take various expressions; for example, government departments or ministries that 
are populated by politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats that design, implement 
and articulate policies, regulations and laws. It cannot be stressed enough, however, 
that these institutionalised (concrete) state forms derive their content from the social 
relations of the capitalist mode of production and exchange and consequently reflect 
the tensions therein. To capture the institutional forms of capitalist states, such as 
debtfarism, I complement my materialist approach with theorists who employ 
different conceptual resources to analyse the class dynamics and power inherent in 
institutionalised articulations of state forms in contemporary capitalism, specifically 
neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
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Neoliberalisation: meanings and assumptions 
Rhetoric and regulation 
The rhetorical landscape of neoliberalism in this study refers to the ideological and 
disciplinary features inherent to government policy, speeches from elected officials, 
bureaucrats and technocrats (e.g., legal and economic advisors), government-
sponsored studies, special task force reports and so forth. I apply a materialist lens 
to these discursive state artefacts to understand how they naturalise and universalise 
neoliberal beliefs and values that are aimed at facilitating the expansion and 
reproduction of the poverty industry (Gramsci, 1971; Eagleton, 2007). In this sense, 
my understanding of rhetoric follows and builds on the work of Pierre Bourdieu 
(1991, 2009); Stephen Gill (1995); Loïc Wacquant (2009), Jamie Peck (2010) – 
all of whom, in different ways, stress the inseparability between institutional, material 
and discursive elements of neoliberalism and the power relations therein. 
By regulative features of neoliberalisation, I am referring to the institutional 
expression of state powers in the form of laws issued and sanctioned by the state 
that pertain to the poverty industry, most notably usury and bankruptcy laws as 
well as consumer protection initiatives. The legal terrain explored in the case 
studies encompasses both informal (voluntary or soft law) and formal (mandatory 
or hard law) rules (Cutler, 2003; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Picciottio, 2011). The 
regulatory dimensions of neoliberal states are important for understanding the power 
relations of the poverty industry. This is because regulation aimed at not only 
depoliticising and managing (in an ex post facto manner) the tensions inherent to 
credit-led accumulation, but also imposing social discipline with regard to the surplus 
population. A Marxian lens allows us to pierce the fetishised appearance of the 
rule of law in all its various articulations (May, 2012, 2014) and grasp that inequality 
and class power are internal to law, despite its classical liberal claims of universal 
principles that strive to achieve equal rights and justice for all legal subjects (Mattei 
and Nader, 2008; Baars, 2011; Bruff, 2014). As will become clearer below, the 
appearance of neutrality in the law provides a cloak for extra-legal forms of state 
power (Picciotto, 2011) that act as scaffolding for the community of money. 
Meanings of neoliberalism 
Broadly speaking, neoliberal forms of state intervention first emerged in Chile in 
the mid- 1970s (Taylor, 2006) and then early 1980s in the Anglo-American countries 
(e.g., United States and United Kingdom) before spreading, albeit in a differentiated 
and uneven manner, throughout the world (Soederberg et al., 2005). Despite the 
variegated articulations of neoliberal state forms across regional, national and local 
scales of governance, there are several core features and fundamental assumptions 
shared and propagated, by all neoliberal states forms (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner 
et al., 2010; van Apeldoorn et al., 2012). 
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First, neoliberal state forms emerged from the demise of previous state forms, 
such as Keynesian welfare states in the global North (Peck, 2010; Crouch, 2011) 
and their counterparts in the global South (Woo-Cumings, 1999; cf. Burkett 
and Hart-Landsberg, 2003; Soederberg, 2010c) to deal effectively with the under ­
lying tensions and crises in capital over-accumulation and the subsequent social 
fallouts, such as labour unrests, civil rights movement, rampant unemployment, 
increasing levels of public debt, runaway inflation and low growth rates (Altvater, 
1993; Bonefeld and Holloway, 1995; Harvey, 2005). Second, in response to these 
struggles and tensions, the rhetorical and regulatory features of neoliberal state 
forms include: a withdrawal or abstention by the state in economic matters; the 
shifting into the private sector (or, the contracting out) of public services and 
the commodification of public goods such as health, housing, safety, education 
and culture – e.g., radio and television – into commercial goods, turning the users 
of these services into clients; and a renunciation of the power to equalise 
opportunities and reduce inequality (Bourdieu, 2005: 11). 
Neoliberalism is a complex, contested and contradictory set of rhetorical and 
regulatory processes that emerged from a theoretical perspective generally referred 
to as neoclassical economics, which is largely associated here with the highly 
influential Chicago School and its iconic scholar, Milton Friedman (1993, 2002; 
cf. von Mises, 2009; von Hayek, 2011). Neoclassical economics formed the 
intellectual basis for guiding state policy in the United States in the late 1970s because 
it was widely accepted by dominant classes at a particular point in history and not 
because it was analytically sounder than its theoretical rival, namely Keynesianism. 
In contrast, the Chicago School could best address the threats perceived by 
powerful classes to the expansion and reproduction of capital accumulation. As 
Robert Cox advises, ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox, 
1995: 85). In what follows, I identify some of the core assumptions of neoclassical 
theory not only because it deepens our understanding of neoliberal states, but 
also because these underlying premises require constant reproduction, if their 
universality is to be legitimately imposed and accepted. 
According to Bourdieu, neoclassical economics rests on two pervasive postulates, 
which these theorists largely regard as proven. First, ‘the economy is a separate 
domain governed by natural and universal laws with which governments must 
not interfere by inappropriate intervention’. Second, ‘the market is the optimum 
means for organising production and trade efficiency and equitably in democratic 
societies’ (Bourdieu, 2005: 11). Milton Friedman, for instance, suggests that the 
main goal of society should be to ensure political freedom to its citizens through 
the establishment of economic freedom, otherwise known as the free market 
(Friedman, 1993). Both freedoms, according to Friedman, are based on removing 
state interference into the operations of the market. 
Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements 
are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion 
of power. The kind of economic organisation that provides economic free­
dom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom 
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because it separates economic power from political power and in this way 
enables the one to offset the other. 
(Friedman, 2002: 9) 
Because individuals are inherently rational, they will pursue their economic 
interests. The best way to ensure the collective good is to ensure that these individual 
pursuits occur without the interference of states through for instance, price and 
wage caps, social assistance programmes and so forth (Albo, 1994; Peck, 2001; 
Altvater, 2009). On this view, the market will thus reward and punish individuals 
if they possess the correct incentives to voluntarily and meaningfully participate in 
the market, i.e., surrender to the social discipline of the abstract forces of the market 
(World Bank, 2012d).5 
The rule of individuals is a recurrent and central theme in neoliberal rhetoric 
supporting the poverty industry. In the words of a key promoter of neoliberalism 
as universal value, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) stated 
that there is ‘“no such thing as society, only individual men and women” – and, 
she subsequently added, their families. All forms of social security were to be dissolved 
in favour of individualism, private property, personal responsibility and family values’ 
(Harvey, 2007: 23; Wacquant, 2009). With this veneration of indi vidualisation and 
responsibilisation, failure to achieve economic success is located not in inequities 
of capitalism; but instead, in individual failings such as laziness, lack of entre ­
preneurial skills, adequate levels of knowledge and so forth (Bourdieu, 2005). 
The assumptions of neoclassical economics are what Pierre Bourdieu refers to 
as an economic common sense rooted in a system of beliefs and values, an ethos and 
a moral view of the world based on a particular case: the United States. Through 
various rhetorical and regulative processes, the neoliberal state form seeks to 
universalise these particular beliefs and values by spreading and embedding them 
throughout the world.6 As many scholars have demonstrated, a crucial instrument 
for this attempt to universalise the ethos and moral views of neoclassical economics 
has been through the policies pursued by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (e.g., privatisation, liberalisation and fiscal austerity) often referred 
to as the Washington Consensus (Fine 2006; Soederberg, 2004, 2006). Although 
there are multiple and competing meanings of the rule of law (Dworkin, 1985; 
Carothers, 1997), the Washington Consensus promotes a particular version form ­
ulated in universal terms (e.g., common values and norms) with great appeal to 
and concern for, protecting vulnerable populations largely by ensuring that govern ­
ments maintain predictable and transparent investment environments (Mattei and 
Nader, 2008; May, 2014). This dominant view of the rule of law, which has been 
closely associated with good governance principles ranging from transparency to 
anti-corruption, is the aimed at creating social justice by promoting laws and 
regulatory institutions that promote economic growth by upholding private pro ­
perty rights, rights to appropriation and contractual obligations (Commission on 
Global Governance, 1995; Cooter, 1997). 
As components of capitalist states, the rhetorical and regulative features of 
neoliberalism are neither natural nor neutral nor static. Following Jamie Peck and 
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Adam Tickell, we are better to think in terms of neoliberalisation: i.e. constantly 
evolving, contradictory, open-ended and adaptive processes (Peck and Tickell, 
2002). As Jamie Peck explains (2010: 7), ‘neoliberalism has never been about a 
once-and-for-all liberalisation, an evacuation of the state from the economy, but 
instead rolling programmes of market-oriented reform, a kind of permanent 
revolution of free-market liberation’. For Peck (2010) and others, a primary driver 
of continual experiments in market-based governance is the tension in the utopian 
nature of the assumptions underpinning neoliberalism, that is, the unrealisable goal 
of free markets (Altvater, 1993, 2009). Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 96), for instance, 
suggests that neoliberalism is based on a separation between economic and social 
realities and seeks to construct a reality in which an economic system corresponds 
to the (neoclassical) economic fictions of theory, a type of logical machine based on 
the assumption of rational actors, ‘which presents itself as a chain of constraints 
impelling the economic agents’. While the continual attempt to reconstruct 
neoliberal state on these utopian premises of neoclassical economics leads to 
recurring paradoxes that must be resolved through rhetoric and regulations, or what 
Jamie Peck (2010) refers to as fail forward strategies, we must not lose sight of their 
connective tissue to the dynamics of credit-led accumulation, which includes the 
poverty industry and the power relations therein. 
Having laid the conceptual floorboards of a materialist understanding of capitalist 
states, the remainder of this chapter turns to addressing two core questions: What 
roles have states played in facilitating the expansion and reproduction of credit-
led accumulation and, by extension, the poverty industry? And, how have states 
sought to discipline and reimpose silent compulsions, while maintaining the 
illusions of the community of money and thereby masking the exploitative features 
of the poverty industry? To answer these queries, I identify several components 
of neoliberal states that have played central roles in facilitating these dispossessive 
strategies: monetarism, corporate welfarism, workfarism and debtfarism. Although 
each does so in different ways, all four neoliberal components actively draw on 
the social power of money and seek to shift the articulation of tensions away from 
the realm of production to the realm of exchange (e.g., the community of money). 
This serves to normalise and depoliticise struggles associated with the discipline 
and dispossession of surplus labour through the secondary forms of exploitation in 
the poverty industry. 
The core components of neoliberal states 
Monetarism and the social power of privately created money 
Monetarism is central to our approach because it serves to frame the regulative 
and rhetorical landscape of neoliberalism and its interventions into credit-led 
accumulation. Monetarism describes a set of economic premises originally based 
in the neoclassical approach (Peck, 2010). According to monetarism, the key 
economic ills of the day were associated with inflation and the root cause of inflation 
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is excess money. As such, to tackle high rates of inflation, or the general rise in 
prices – which grew rampant throughout many countries in the late 1970s and 
1980s – central banks were urged to control the growth of money supply through 
the manipulation of interest rates (Cerny, 1997; Panitch and Gindin, 2012). Once 
the money supply is under control – and assuming governments do not engage in 
‘fine-tuning’ the economy through redistributive policies characteristic of the 
proceeding Keynesian era – Friedman suggested that markets would equilibrate to 
create employment opportunities for those willing to work (Friedman, 2002). On 
this basis, monetarists were fundamentally against redistributive policies to alleviate 
unemployment and poverty.7 
Monetarism reinforces credit-led accumulation in several important ways 
(Clarke, 1988). It assumes that when given the proper market-based regulative 
environment markets will miraculously reach an equilibrium from which most 
people will benefit. Monetarism moreover is based on the belief that unemployment 
is either voluntary (people prefer leisure to work) or due to barriers in the labour 
market, such as workers demanding higher wages and benefits, the existence of 
minimum wages, unemployment insurance and so forth (Albo, 1994; Drainville, 
1995; Bourdieu, 1998, 2005). Largely due to its assumptions of the causes of 
unemployment, its hyper-individualised view of the world and its blind-faith in 
the market’s natural ability to achieve full-employment equilibrium, monetarism 
justifies its focus on controlling inflation as opposed to reducing unemployment 
or addressing poverty issues. 
To understand the class-based nature of this emphasis on inflation, it is useful 
to look briefly at who benefits the most from this policy focus in the era of credit-
led accumulation. 
Inflation is, of course, a persistent concern not only for states and capitalists, 
but also for ordinary people, particularly those on a fixed income, such as 
government assistance. However, powerful interests are also adversely affected 
by rising inflation levels. Financial institutions (e.g., banks, hedge funds, payday 
lenders, credit card companies, student loan providers, microfinance lenders and 
so forth), which are the key players in the poverty industry, dislike high inflation 
rates because it erodes the value of their (privately created) money. Jim Stanford 
(2008: 201–2) lucidly explains this position with the following example: 
If a bank charges 5 percent annual interest for a loan when overall prices 
are also growing at 5 percent, the bank’s wealth doesn’t change – because 
the loaned money, once repaid with interest, has no more purchasing power 
than it did when it was loaned out. If interest rates are lower than inflation, 
the real interest rate is negative: the borrower, not the lender, is better off 
at the end of the loan because the money they pay back is worth less than 
the money they borrowed. 
As an integral feature of neoliberal state forms, monetarism is not a neutral and 
apolitical strategy; but instead a class-based project aimed at managing, absorbing 
and depoliticising struggles and tensions emerging from credit-led accumulation 
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(Clarke, 1988). Readers will recall from the previous chapter that unlike (physical) 
money, credit money is privately created money that emerges to deal with the 
strains placed on money as a store of value. However, due to its internal contradic­
tions, credit can only provide temporary solutions to the strains in the processes 
of capital accumulation that it was intended to resolve. And, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, credit ends up heightening as opposed to absorbing these tensions. Credit 
money in the form of either fictitious capital or consumer credit is privately created 
and thus increases in volume in a disorderly (unregulated) manner to deal with the 
barriers to capital accumulation. As such, a core component of the social power 
of money is threatened. The ability of money to retain its social power – that is, 
its function as a trusted store of value – needs to be safeguarded. 
Protecting the quality of money becomes difficult when privately created credit 
begins to dominate the accumulation processes. The tendency for credit to enter 
into swindling and gambling tendencies is always present, but is particularly acute 
in times when expanded value production is less lucrative than generating income 
through interest and fees (M . . . M1). Regardless of how far afield credit-led 
accumulation strategies move, however, they must ultimately return to their place 
of origin for redemption. If a substantial amount of debt along the complex chain 
of speculative transactions (as in the case of asset-backed securitisation) cannot be 
redeemed and/or if the gap between the fictitious value of credit and money 
becomes too wide, the quality of money is called into question, which threatens 
its social power. This situation has played itself out over and over again in the 
spate of crises over the past two decades, from the Mexican Peso Crisis in 
1994–1995 (Soederberg, 2004) to the dot-com crisis in the early 2000s (Soederberg, 
2010c and d) to the spectacular 2008 financial crisis, which was ignited by the US 
subprime mortgage debacle (Schwartz, 2009; Wyly et al., 2009; Konings, 2010). 
The basic reason for this is that excess levels of privately created credit money 
(and their fictitious values) place downward pressure on the quality of money, which 
is devalued through inflationary pressures. Moreover, the tensions inherent to credit 
money inevitably result in crises of confidence in the value of money, in both its 
physical and credit forms. In contrast to Friedman and his followers, who assume 
that the only impact of money (viewed as a neutral object or thing) is to determine 
the absolute price level, our materialist understanding of money allows us to 
deconstruct its fetishised form to grasp that it is a social power without an intrinsic 
value. On this view, any policy designed to manipulate the supply of money 
(represented as a neutral thing) and its impact on the general price level is first and 
foremost a political act rooted in class-based power, not a technical exercise. It 
therefore comes as no surprise that such policies shift attention away from 
unemployment and poverty. 
The ability to depoliticise neoliberal restructuring through monetarism has 
served as a formidable and effective way to mask the class nature of these policies 
as well as to subject people to the social power of money. A key state institu­
tion that bolsters this power is central banks. Central banks are the key places in 
neoliberal state forms that are in charge of fighting inflation and conducting 
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monetarist policies. Central banks have the power to regulate everything from prices 
to job creation to incomes. Moreover, in many countries, central banks perform 
their duties without any direct accountability whatsoever to the broader population, 
or even to other segments of the state (Drainville, 1995; Stanford, 2008). Through 
a variety of regulative and rhetorical machinations, central banks are portrayed as 
independent and ‘apolitical’, that is, free from political interference or capitalist 
influence as well as free from democratic oversight, to insulate its inflation-
controlling mandate from popular pressure (Stanford, 2008: 211).8 
The illusion of neutrality of central banks and the class-content of monetarism 
aimed at subjecting the working poor to the exigencies of the self-equilibrating 
and rational market, while protecting the interests of capitalists benefiting from 
various forms of credit-led accumulation is vital to the general reproduction of 
capitalism. The representation and reproduction of the central bank as a nonaligned, 
technical and thus apolitical institution, is thus vastly important to managing 
paradoxes in credit-led accumulation, most notably ensuring the social power of 
money by guaranteeing its value. Seen from this angle, the shift to monetarism 
also represents regulative and rhetorical attempts by neoliberal state forms to 
depoliticise struggles. 
Through monetarism and its institutional form of the central bank, neoliberal 
states have been able to protect and invoke the social power of money as a central 
disciplinary machination in credit-led accumulation. The basic expression of this 
power is its ability to veil and distort relations of exploitation, inequality and 
domination by shifting focus away from the sphere of production, which is a core 
source of the swelling surplus population. Rhetoric and regulative activities are 
instead transferred to the realm of exchange, which its formal emphasis on equality, 
democracy and freedom. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Marx refers to this illusion 
as the community of money. 
The rhetorical and regulative features of monetarism support economic fictions 
suggesting that unfettered market freedom and competitive individualism can spur 
economic growth and break the rise of inflation. Given its ability to effectively 
reduce all social issues (poverty, unemployment, underemployment, etc.) to 
technical features of (objectified) money, monetarism acts to depoliticise overt class 
politics and has provided the ideological and institutional scaffoldings for credit-
led accumulation to take hold and flourish. In doing so, it enables capitalists to 
make ‘money out of money in a desperate attempt to accumulate as much as possible 
without getting dirty in the contested terrain of production’ (Bonefeld, 1995: 55; 
see also, Clarke, 1988). The rise of the poverty industry in the 1990s is a case in 
point. 
Corporate welfarism and the class power of privately created 
money 
A second principal component of neoliberalism that has served to undergird the 
poverty industry may be captured by the term corporate welfarism. Although this 
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term has been employed in different ways (Whitfield, 2001; Slivinski, 2006; ‘The 
Corporate Welfare State: a cause to unite the tea party and the occupy Wall Street 
crowd’, The Wall Street Journal, 8 November 2011), I view corporate welfarism as 
an integral feature of neoliberal state intervention that provides rhetorical and 
regulative forms of state protection for powerful capitalists. Complementing the 
broader neoliberal strategies of privatising state-owned enterprises as well as financial 
and trade liberalisation, corporate welfarism refers to a state strategy that seeks to 
meet the needs of capitalist interests and needs through government initiatives such 
as socialisation of investment risk and debt, subsidies, tax loopholes, loan guarantees 
and so forth (Soederberg, 2010b). Corporate welfarism plays a central role in the 
expansion financial corporations that dominate the poverty industry examined in 
this book, such as Sallie Mae in the student loan industry (Chapter 3), Advance 
America in the payday loan industry (Chapter 4), Grupo Elektra in microfinance 
industry in Mexico (Chapter 5) and so forth. 
The legitimation underpinning corporate welfarism is based on the neoliberal 
belief in the power of markets to achieve economic growth and general prosperity 
for everyone. A key tenet therein is that states must facilitate powerful market actors, 
namely corporations, not through restrictive regulatory measures (e.g., interest rate 
caps); but rather by providing the most optimal investment environment in which 
corporations can flourish and, in turn, create jobs. Seen from a neoliberal 
perspective, states should strive to create a pro-competition and pro-business 
policy environment that will attract and retain corporations, or what Philip Cerny 
and others have described as competition states (Hirsch, 1995; Cerny, 1997; 
Soederberg et al., 2005). Framed by the monetarist justification for lower policy 
prioritisation of unemployment and poverty, neoliberal states should neither strive 
to provide social protection for their most vulnerable citizens, nor aim toward 
redistribution of income through progressive forms of taxation, as was the goal of 
Keynesian welfare policies. According to the neoliberal paradigm, both of these 
goals are misplaced as they serve to distort price signals, dull the competitive nature 
of individuals and interfere with the inherent rationality of markets. As such, to 
ensure the social protection of the poor and, more generally, the creation of optimal 
conditions to foster employment equilibrium, states should strive to safeguard the 
economic well-being of corporations, as the latter are seen as playing an effective 
role in protecting the poor. 
One way in which corporate welfare strategies have facilitated attempts to 
overcome the tensions of capital accumulation has been by channelling workers’ 
old age savings (pensions) into corporate coffers (Minns, 2001; Soederberg, 2010a 
and b), As pension funds across the constituencies of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have ramped up investment in corporate 
stocks and bonds, workers have become increasingly dependent on the economic 
performance of corporations for the value of their retirement savings. In 2008, in 
the wake of the Great Crash, pension funds still allocated about half of their assets, 
approximately $10 trillion, into corporate equity holdings. In the US alone, total 
assets in equity holdings amounted to $3.5 trillion, down from $5.6 trillion in 2007, 
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but still higher than after the dot-com crisis at the start of the new millennium 
(OECD, 2009). Encouraged by the prescriptions of their creditors, particularly the 
World Bank (1994), the Mexican government, as with many countries in the global 
South, began privatising its old age pension system in 1997 (Madrid, 2002). This 
corporate welfare initiative was undertaken concurrent to reducing and closing many 
welfare programmes and institutions (Luccisano, 2006: 62; Marier, 2008). 
Through corporate welfare initiatives neoliberal states have constructed a reality 
in which workers’ savings in the form of pension funds feed off of both their own 
increased indebtedness and that of other workers, a condition driven largely by 
stagnant real wages, the absence of an adequate social safety net and high levels of 
structural unemployment and underemployment. As evidenced in the US, the 
dependence of pension funds on high-risk ventures leads to a situation in which 
investment strategies mutilate the value of pension savings with the advent of more 
frequent and intensified financial crises, wiping out gains made during a speculative 
run. Instead of serving to weaken credit-led accumulation, however, financial crises 
and subsequent forms of corporate welfarism, have had the effect of deepening 
neoliberalisation by allowing financial corporations that are tied to the poverty 
industry (and their shareholders, which include pension funds) to prey on 
dispossessed workers, who strive to maintain basic living standards through the credit 
system (Soederberg, 2010a). In the late 1990s, for instance, institutional investors 
such as mutual and pension funds began to seize hold of consumer debt (credit 
cards, student loans and so forth), transforming it into new and profitable investment 
opportunities. As discussed in Chapter 2, a key strategy used in generating interest 
income from consumer debt involves asset-backed securities. ABS involves 
bundling a stream of future repayments on, for example, student loans and credit 
cards, to provide the basis for the issue and payment of interest and principle 
on securities (e.g., dividends on corporate stock). I discuss this in more detail in 
Parts II and III of the book. 
Despite their ability to invoke and protect the social power of money, as well 
as to guide policy formation for the other components of the neoliberal state (e.g., 
workfare and debtfare), monetarism and corporate welfarism do not directly 
manage the social reproduction of the surplus population. The neoliberal state feature 
that disciplines and normalises marginalisation through the social power of money 
is workfarism, to which I now turn my attention. 
Workfarism and the social power of money 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the relative surplus population is inherent 
to the processes of capital accumulation, even if its articulations and constitu­
ency (in terms of race, gender and class identities) vary across space and time. The 
relative surplus population does not replicate itself automatically but has been 
socially reproduced historically by active forms of state intervention ranging from 
workhouses to welfare states (Shragge, 1997). Put another way, the coercive and 
ideological aspects of capitalist states have played a role in reproducing the basic 
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imperative of surplus labour to earn a living based on dispossession, expropriation 
and dependence on the market as if it were a natural and inevitable feature of life 
(Denning, 2010). At a basic level, the motivation to socially reproduce the surplus 
population, which is a central feature of capital accumulation, is vital in order that 
capitalists have a ready and steady supply of eager and easily exploitable workers. 
Workfare states are the neoliberal variant of these state forms aimed at normalising 
and disciplining the relative surplus population. 
Like monetarism, workfarism also relies on the social power of money (in the 
form of state benefits) to impose more direct discipline on the surplus population. 
Workfarism, which began to emerge in the early 1970s with the general decline 
of welfare states, refers to neoliberal strategies that have come to replace previous 
forms of disciplining labour, namely: welfare regimes (Piven and Cloward, 1993). 
Workfarism serves to regulate labour and discipline workers through the deterrence 
of claims for social assistance benefits ( Jessop, 1993; Shragge, 1997; Collins and 
Mayer, 2010). In the wider parameters of neoliberalism – with its assumptions of 
hyper-individualism, its attempts to commodify all aspects of life and its demand 
for responsibility – workfare strives to socially reproduce the surplus population 
(cf. Wacquant, 2009). As Eric Shragge (1997: 29–30, quoted in Peck, 2001: 35) 
observes, ‘The surplus population, though “excluded” from the labour market, is 
in other ways attached to it. Workfare policies tied the surplus population to the 
discipline of the labour market and workfare is the means of marshalling them 
towards it’. Workfare also serves to reinforce the dictates of neoliberalism and 
monetarism, regarding the common sense assumption that unemployment and, by 
extension, poverty is either voluntary or the result of labour market rigidities. 
The rhetoric and regulative aspects of workfarism comprise an important 
feature of neoliberal state forms that are employed to individualise, demobilise and 
thereby strip away possibilities for collective action of marginalised workers, while 
subjecting them to class power in the impersonal form of the exigencies of the 
market. As Jamie Peck explains, workfare is aimed at getting the non-working 
poor (e.g., the unemployed) to work – a segment of the population that has been 
growing rapidly across the globe. The increased numbers of these workers is due, 
in part, to the nature of credit-led accumulation and its lack of investment in 
production in the United States; and, in part, to the draconian welfare reform 
in the United States in the mid-1990s, most notably the Clinton Administration’s 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation (or, PRWORA) 
of 1996. As discussed above, a key component of the workfare state is premised 
on the exchange of employment (e.g., cleaning public housing and the offices of 
the private agencies administering welfare programmes) for government assistance, 
with an eye on weaning people off the latter completely (Collins and Mayer, 2010). 
As Peck (2001: 10) explains: 
The essence of workfarism [in its variegated national forms] . . . involves the 
imposition of a range of compulsory programmes and mandatory require ­
ments for welfare recipients with a view to enforcing work while residualizing 
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welfare. This does not mean that welfare itself completely disappears, but it 
does mean that the logic, structure and dynamics of the system of poor relief 
are transformed so as to maximize work participation while minimizing 
‘dependency’ on welfare. 
Workfarism is a boundary feature of the neoliberal state in that it seeks to mediate 
the paradoxes in the labour market by socialising the surplus population, many of 
whom are single mothers, to the norms of the workforce (Peck, 2001; Wacquant, 
2009). Workfare also creates and manages workers’ expectations with regard to 
work and wages, employment continuity, promotion and security (Peck, 2001; 
Collins and Mayer, 2010). 
While Peck’s formulation of workfare was primarily in terms of Anglo-American 
capitalism, the normalising and disciplinary features of workfare are also evident, 
albeit in different forms, in Mexico. Despite neoliberal promises reflected in the 
Washington Consensus, wage stagnation, underemployment and inflation have 
served to erode the income level of some 31 million Mexicans and lead to ever-
increasing socio-economic inequalities (‘Mexico’s Poverty Conundrum’, Financial 
Times, 11 April 2013). For instance, real minimum wage has fallen in Mexico by 
73 percent since 1976 to a historic low of 34 pesos per day (Barkin, 2009). According 
to Mexico’s National Council on the Evaluation of Social Development Policy 
(or, CONEVAL), the number of Mexicans living in poverty in 2010 was 52.3 
million, or 46.2 percent of the population (CONEVAL, 2012).9 Yet, there is a 
growing and large part of Mexico’s population that is not included in the counting 
of incomes and salaries. The National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico 
(INEGI) says some 57 percent of Mexico’s economically active population work 
in the informal sector (‘Mexico’s Poverty Conundrum’, Financial Times, 11 April 
2013).10 The latter encompasses wide and varied forms of employment from street 
vendors to Mexico’s expansive black market, i.e., counterfeit and stolen goods 
markets (cf. INEGI, 2012). 
To deal with this growing mass of surplus labour, Mexico has turned to 
increasingly individualised and market-based strategies aimed at dealing with the 
growing surplus population. Since the mid-2000s, the government has cut broad-
based social spending, opting instead to target programmes for those in extreme 
poverty, such as PROGRESA in 1997 and its replacement, Oportunidades founded 
in 2002 (Yanes, 2011; Soederberg, 2010c). In 2006, approximately one-quarter of 
Mexico’s population participated in the conditional transfer payments that define 
Oportunidades (Moreno-Brid et al., 2009). 
Both PROGRESA and Oportunidades were specifically aimed at appeasing 
and depoliticising the increasing presence of resurgent popular movements, 
while acting as a bromide for the masses, so as to signal political stability and a 
well-disciplined and relatively cheap labour market 11 made possible by ongoing 
forms of the structural violence of labour, e.g., dereliction of labour laws and the 
dominance of precarious work (Wacquant, 2009). True to neoliberal assumptions 
and mirroring the US workfare state, Oportunidades strives to create a disciplined 
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and productive labour force for the future by conferring greater responsibilities 
on the poor by drawing on the social power of money as a mechanism whereby 
the poor can begin to resolve their problems without relying on society (Barkin, 
2009). Oportunidades draws on the social power of money to ensure that the 
poor, many of whom are mothers, embrace the spirit of responsibilisation and 
individualisation and become creditworthy consumers of welfare by, for example, 
working hard toward ensuring their children’s human capital development (e.g., 
school attendance) (Luccisano, 2006). In this way, both Oportunidades and the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
1996 initiative in the US strive to create market citizens, but without the right to 
a living wage and thus the right to lay claim to basic subsistence needs. 
As was the case with monetarism, workfarism emphasises the realm of exchange 
and its alleged freedoms (choice between working and not receiving welfare 
support), democracy and equality (equal exchange of work for welfare). The realm 
of production and neoliberal restructuring policies, which have served to throw 
these workers out of a living wage and social protections are not broached. The 
deleterious effects of neoliberal restructuring on the productive sectors in the US 
and Mexico are also avoided in the individualising and market-based rhetoric and 
regulative features of workfarism. This will become clearer in the following two 
parts of the book. 
Debtfarism and the poverty industry 
Debtfarism reinforces and encapsulates the three components of neoliberalism 
discussed above. The regulatory and rhetorical processes that mark debtfarism have 
directly facilitated the expansion and reproduction of the poverty industry since 
the 1990s by serving to naturalise the commodification of social reproduction. 
Paralleling the neoliberal insistence that there is no better alternative but for 
individuals to rely on the market, the rhetorical and regulative features of debtfare 
states serve to back widespread reliance on expensive consumer credit to augment 
and/or replace the social wage or a welfare cheque. In this sense, debtfarism supports 
workfare strategies by imposing market discipline on the working poor. 
As with monetarism and workfarism, debtfarism calls on the social power 
of money to overcome the tensions that are heightened by the spatio-temporal 
fixes of dispossessive capitalism (see Chapter 2). By promoting the growing 
dependence of the poor on credit for basic subsistence, debtfarism draws on 
and, in turn, reinforces the concrete abstractions of money and the related monetisa ­
tion of social relationships (i.e., relations between things), which underpin the 
community of money (Harvey, 1989). The secondary exploitative nature of con ­
sumer credit is concealed through the social power of money (realm of exchange) 
and its class nature is distorted through formalised abstractions (interest rates and 
late fees), as opposed to primary forms of exploitation between employer and 
employee. 
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Debtfarism embodies a complex, tension-ridden and differentiated set of 
rhetorical and regulatory processes aimed at facilitating and normalising the reliance 
on credit, while foregoing a material compromise with the working class (i.e., public 
support for the social wage). As we will see in the case studies that follow, this is 
accomplished in various ways, depending on the type of credit and the national 
context. However, there are three shared traits: selling the idea of financial 
inclusion and/or democratisation of credit; teaching people to fear market sanctions 
for transgressing the privilege of inclusion; and facilitating the further displacement 
of the underlying tensions of credit-led accumulation. 
First, debtfare states seek, through regulative and rhetorical means, to (re-)create 
the community of money that reflects the constructed illusion of one class, one society 
(Gramsci, 1971). For example, the attempts by states at designating the poor as 
consumers or, as in the case as the United States, as middle class (Chapter 7), serves 
as a powerful trope to de-class, de-gender and de-racialise the working poor. In 
effect, this acts to depoliticise and naturalise debt relations among the poor. Put 
differently, debtfarism safeguards the illusions of market freedoms and equality 
to ensure that all consumers may benefit from standards of fairness, competition, 
transparency and accountability. These market freedoms backed by debtfarism are 
continually framed in the illusions of the community of money and bolstered by 
the seeming neutrality of the legal obligation of debt and consumer protection. 
It also bears repeating that as neoliberal forms of governance, debtfarism does not 
operate exclusively at the national level. Instead, it should be understood as multi-
scalar in scope and meaning (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner et al., 2010; 
Macartney and Shields, 2011). 
The above strategy of debtfarism is also evident in the democratisation of credit 
trope, which was the precursor to the financial inclusion agenda. In the the United 
States, a series of federal legislations during the 1970s, including the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act of 1975 and the Community Reinvestment Act (or, CRA) of 
1977, extended the provision of credit to hitherto excluded communities, 
effectively reducing credit-related discrimination (Federal Reserve Board, 2008). 
But these initiatives reinforced market individualism by attempting to shift 
democratic values (equality and freedom) from the political to the economic sphere 
in order to foster ‘a broader sharing of the benefits of the society’s economic 
endowments by a wider spectrum of consumers’ (Austin, 2004: 1255). In doing 
so, the euphemism of democratisation of credit masked exploitative and unequal 
relations of power by locating, framing and solving struggles among poor 
‘consumers’ within the (ostensibly) apolitical market. 
Focusing on the realm of exchange allowed banks – rather than the cuts to 
public housing and social services that were driven by neoliberal restructuring policies 
– to be framed as the fundamental cause of the economic decline of inner cities 
(Minton, 2008). Within the parameters of the democratisation of credit, solving 
social problems rested on extending market citizenship to the poor based on credit 
scores that were allied to a false sense of respectability and security. As will become 
clear throughout the various case studies in this book, credit acceptance meant 
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social inclusion into the community of money. Without a living wage, however, 
the price paid for this inclusion was particularly high for lower class Americans, 
especially for women, ethnic and racial minorities. 
While debtfarism mediates the surplus population, it concurrently plays into the 
trajectories of capital accumulation at national and global levels. The democratisation 
of credit trope in the United States, for instance, emerged around the same time 
as usury laws regarding consumer lending were being dismantled in 1978. This 
was a key strategy to overcoming the inflationary barriers to capital accumulation. 
As I will demonstrate in Parts II and III of this book, financial inclusion as a 
core feature of the development agenda also coincides with a wave of financial 
liberalisation schemes and the rise of asset-backed securitisation (ABS). 
Simultaneously, debtfarism has facilitated spatio-temporal fixes to credit-led 
accumulation strategies by allowing private creditors to supplement low-paying, 
low-benefit jobs. In doing so, debtfarism supports largely marketised forms of 
the social reproduction of segments of surplus labour (Collins and Mayer, 2010; 
Albeda, 2012). Second, debtfarism buoys consumption levels and thus creates 
markets for retailers (e.g., Grupo Elektra in Mexico as discussed in Chapter 8) and 
construction companies (e.g., CEMEX in Mexico as discussed in Chapter 9) by 
allowing the surplus population to continue to purchase durables (houses and cars) 
as well as non-durables (clothing, food, medicine and so forth). Such strategies are 
aimed at integrating members of the relative surplus population within capitalist 
society despite their exclusion from the capital relation in the most important sense, 
that is, without the ability to earn a social wage. Marx refers to this as the expanded 
reproduction of capital as opposed to interest-generating revenue (i.e., M . . . M1, 
as discussed in Chapter 2). 
A second, and related, feature of debtfarism serves to further expose the surplus 
population to market discipline by ensuring that debtors accept employment under 
any conditions to meet payment on their debts. The secondary forms of exploitation 
inherent to debt relations act to socialise and impose temporal discipline over the 
excluded masses in order to serve the prerogatives of capital. Citizens are taught 
to be respectful/fearful of the consequences of market discipline. These include 
the coercive tactics employed by collection agencies, such as the threat of court 
proceedings, prison and so forth; the less onerous imposition by creditors of 
expensive late fees and other pecuniary penalties; and the lowering of one’s credit 
scores – all of which result in either lack of access to credit or higher risk premiums 
on the next issuance of credit. 
As mentioned above, the disciplinary features of debtfarism intersect with other 
facets of neoliberal state forms, such as workfare. As we saw above, workfare also 
creates and manages workers’ expectations with regard to work and wages, 
employment continuity, promotion and security (Peck, 2001; Collins and Mayer, 
2010). Forced into low-wage employment, actual and former welfare recipients, 
many of whom are single mothers, turn to payday loans to subsidise subsistence 
needs (Karger, 2005). As we will see in Chapter 7, there appears to correlation 
between the boom in the payday lending industry in the mid-1990s and the 
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introduction of workfare. One study has revealed a strong causality between 
welfare (workfare) recipients and payday borrowing (Stegman and Faris, 2005; see 
Chapter 6). 
Debtfarism buttresses the disciplinary features of the workfare state by legally 
permitting payday lenders to target and exploit a specific segment of workers, thereby 
generating enormous amounts of income from uncapped interest rates and the 
continual extension of expensive forms of credit to the working poor. The expan ­
sion of payday lending to welfare recipients also subjects payday borrowers to the 
temporality of market discipline by compelling them to accept any form of work 
to meet the repayment criteria on their loans. Thus, aside from facilitating secondary 
forms of exploitation, consumer credit for the poor has become an effective neo ­
liberal method for providing a social basis for dispossessive capitalism. 
In keeping with the general tenets of neoliberalism, a central theme running 
through the concrete manifestation of debtfarism has been its ability to shift 
collective and rights-based worker protections toward individualised and marketised 
expressions of responsibilisation in which the state simply guarantees the formal 
equality of exchange. Through legal and regulatory means, for instance, the role 
of the debtfare state is to protect the ethos of freedom, equality and the hyper­
individualised – as well as the de-racialised, de-classed and de-gendered – consumer 
by ensuring that payday lending companies act responsibly and rationally, upholding 
basic standards of fairness, transparency and accountability. This is evident in the 
consumer protection trope that runs through the case studies that follow. 
Consumer protection is a key trope of debtfare, as it relocates social protection 
to the impersonal market and simultaneously redefines and normalises an indi ­
vidualised understanding of economic security in which the working poor are 
compelled to depend on themselves (e.g., to work harder, to work longer hours 
and to save more) and on the credit system, as opposed to relying on the protection 
of the state and/or employers. The dissemination of the idea that private con ­
sumption is more efficient than public consumption is central to neoliberalisation 
(Fine, 2002; Peck 2010). 
Third and lastly, debtfarism serves to mediate the deepening tensions inherent 
to credit-led accumulation strategies. These include the persistent threat of defaults, 
weighing the fictitious value of credit against the need to guarantee money as a 
trusted store of value, managing the tendencies of credit to encourage swindling 
and gambling and so forth. As noted in Chapter 2, extending loans to the working 
poor entails a gamble with the future. For instance, debtors need to earn enough 
wages to sustain themselves (food, shelter and clothing) and meet the basic payment 
terms on their debt. The debtfare state mediates this tension by permitting creditors 
to rollover debts, as is the case of payday lending, facilitating coercive debt col ­
lection and management tactics through soft regulation, dismantling usury laws with 
regard to certain types of consumer credit and implementing increasingly harsh 
measures with regard to bankruptcy laws. As we will see in Part II, the continual 
revision of the US Bankruptcy Act is part and parcel of attempts to deal with the 
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threat of defaults and thus reinforce the discipline and social power of credit money 
through the regulative processes of debtfarism. 
Taken together, the above strategies of debtfarism bolster and reinforce the wider 
neoliberal state forms, such as monetarism, corporate welfarism and workfarism, 
to socially reproduce the growing numbers of surplus labourers while assisting in 
the continual expansion and intensification of credit-led accumulation. A common 
element running through all three strategies of debtfare is the continued attempts 
to reconstruct the fetishised appearance of the community of money and shifting 
the focus and root of struggle away from the realm of production to the realm of 
exchange. This, in turn, facilitates the normalisation of secondary forms of exploita ­
tion by guaranteeing appropriate and seemingly neutral structures of regulatory 
governance. 
Debtfarism recreates the illusions of the community of money and upholds 
individualised market freedoms and responsibilisation, democracy and equality by 
actively representing consumer credit as a neutral and technical aspect of the market 
ruled by economics and law (bankruptcy laws, consumer protection legislation and 
usury laws). The implication is that this path is non-exploitative and class-neutral. 
The surplus population and capitalists thus confront each other as equal (i.e., 
voluntary agents as creditor and debtor), yet simultaneously unequal parties in the 
realm of exchange. However, neoliberal state forms are moving targets. The core 
components of neoliberal power, including debtfare and other intervention 
strategies, are constantly shifting and realigning to reactively mediate, depoliticise 
and absorb the unfolding tensions of credit-led accumulation. 
To analytically capture the processes of debtfarism, I employ the term ‘debtfare 
state’ in the following six case studies. This term does not refer to a standalone 
state but rather to the institutionalised rhetorical and regulatory practices of 
debtfarism that have been embedded into the institutional forms of neoliberalism 
since the 1990s. 
Concluding remarks 
By providing a Marxian framing of state power in contemporary capitalism, I 
sought to complement our understanding of the social power of money and 
the paradoxes inherent to credit-led accumulation, with special reference to the 
poverty industry. I argued that a materialist understanding of capitalist states allows 
us to more fully grasp how neoliberal forms of domination have sought to mediate 
the poverty industry by invoking the social power of money to discipline and 
normalise the continual exploitation and marginalisation of the surplus population. 
In so doing, I explored the rhetorical and regulatory meanings of neoliberalism 
by identifying several of its significant – albeit not exclusive – components: 
monetarism, corporate welfarism and workfarism. 
Moreover, I suggested that a particular component of neoliberal state inter ­
vention, namely debtfarism and its institutionalised expression – the debtfare state 
– plays a vital role in socially reproducing the expansion and intensification of 
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secondary forms of exploitation of the working poor. Through its rhetorical and 
regulatory features, for instance, the debtfare state also draws on the social power 
of money to facilitate the general reproduction of surplus value in neoliberal times 
by ensuring that the dispossession and discipline of the surplus population appear 
as democratic, free and equal. Expressed differently, it is precisely because of the 
processes and structures discussed in the first three chapters of this book that 
the dominant illusion of freedom of exchange and liberty of contract continues to 
gull us all (Harvey, 1999, 2010a: 290). Framed in, and informed by, a historical 
materialist understanding of money, credit and states, the following six case studies 
strive to explain how and why the poverty industry and the surplus population 
have been reproduced and normalised. 
Notes 
1 In the 1970s and 1980s, the West German State Derivationist Debate emerged around 
questions regarding the (illusionary) separation between ‘the economic’ and ‘the political’ 
under capitalism (for an overview, see Carnoy 1980). 
2 Contesting materialist accounts of state theory were widely and vigorously debated 
throughout the 1970s and early 1990s (Clarke, 1988; see also Carnoy 1984 for a good 
overview). Since this time, there have been few Marxian accounts of the nature of capitalist 
states with regard to money. This does not diminish the explanatory power of some of 
the general insights that can be gleaned from the general materialist approach to 
understanding capitalist states, however. 
3 In Marxian terminology, this partial, institutionalised view of the state is referred to as 
the state form. On the other hand, however, we also see the capitalist content of the state’s 
appearance by which we mean class-based forms of domination that are based in the 
processes of capital accumulation. Materialist state theorists refer to this side of the analytical 
equation as the state content. Unlike other approaches to states discussed earlier, a materialist 
perspective establishes and maintains the connective tissue between states and the 
processes of capital accumulation. This link is a vital method of materialism in permitting 
us to grasp the power and roles played by capitalist states in socially reproducing credit-
led accumulation and the poverty industry in particular. 
4 The question that emerges here is: ‘What is it that gives rise to the constitution of the 
economic and the political as distinct moments of the same social relations?’ (Holloway, 
1994: 28). Or, as Marxist legal scholar Evgeny Pashukanis (1951: 185 quoted in 
Holloway and Picciottio, 1991: 113) queried in his famous quote: 
‘Why does the dominance of a class not continue to be that which it is – that is to 
say, the subordination in fact of one part of the population to another part? Why 
does it take on the form of official sate domination? Or, which is the same thing, 
why is not the mechanism of state constraint created as the private mechanism of 
the dominant class? Why is it disassociated from the dominant class – taking the form 
of an impersonal mechanism of public authority isolated from society’. 
5 It will be recalled from our discussion in Chapter 1 that under capitalist social relations, 
individuals are compelled to surrender to the social discipline of abstract forces (e.g., Adam 
Smith’s hidden hand of the market) that effectively govern their relations and choices 
(Harvey, 2010a: 42; see also, Wacquant, 2009; Peck, 2010). 
6 The World Bank, for instance, actively encourages states to ‘build institutions for markets’. 
The idea is that this will, in turn, foster competition within and between countries, firms, 
and individuals. The attraction and retention of foreign capital is expected to dramatically 
increase incomes and reduce poverty levels by modifying economic behaviour, i.e., by 
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introducing flexibility into markets, most notably labour markets (World Bank, 2002b). 
Labour flexibility, however, proved to be a euphemism for lifting social protection 
for workers, such as minimum wages, collective bargaining rights, social benefits, and 
so forth (Clarke, 1988; Taylor, 2008; Moody, 1997, 2007). Ultimately, labour market 
flexibilisiation eventually led to making workers more vulnerable to, and reliant on, the 
market for basic subsistence and social protection in both the global North and the global 
South. 
7 In response to the inability of monetarist tools to achieve the natural full employment 
equilibrium, monetarism has been altered slightly. In an updated version of monetarism, 
it is also assumed that central banks should target the inflation rate to guide the economy 
to its full-employment equilibrium. Despite minor differences in its various incarnations, 
monetarism remains a central and extremely powerful component of neoliberal state forms 
(cf. Clarke, 1988; Peck, 2010). 
8 The fetishised appearance of the neutrality of central banks is particularly poignant in 
the American case, as the Federal Reserve Bank is a complex mix of private and public 
governing agencies. Bourgeois law and the social power of money (expressed in terms 
of monetarism) underpin the ability of ‘the Fed’ to appear as class-neutral institution for 
the public benefit (see, for instance, Greider, 1989; ‘Priceless: How The Federal Reserve 
Bought The Economics Profession’, Huffington Post, 23 October 2009). 
9 Another reading of these statistics sees a more positive trend, that is, extreme poverty 
down due to, among other things, the success of Oportunidades, For more information: 
www.wilsoncenter.org/article/mexico%E2%80%99s-latest-poverty-stats (accessed 17 
January 2014). 
10 The definition of informal workers is quite woolly and has been contested in the literature. 
For instance, the INEGI 2012 report, ‘Mexico at a Glance’, uses the concept of the 
informal sector to include informal commerce, which focuses data collection on 
housework, i.e., the ‘percentage employed population that works in an economic unit 
operating with household resources’ (INEGI, 2012: 16). The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO, 2003), however, prefers informal economy, which includes more 
categories of labour such as unemployed people who are interested in working but cannot 
find employment as well as auxiliary workers and relatives, without a contract or legal 
and/or social protection in formal and informal companies. The informal economy also 
includes workers employed in informal positions in formal and informal companies. The 
ILO’s informal economy also includes categories of independent workers, and employers 
that own their own informal companies; as well as those who have formal positions in 
informal companies, and also members of cooperatives of informal producers (see, for 
example, ILO, 2012). Between 2006 and 2011, 65.8 percent of the new employment 
in Mexico was said to be created in the informal economy. For more information: 
www.idwn.info/news/mexico-658-informal-jobs-created-last-5-years (accessed 10 June 
2013). 
11 Wage stagnation in Mexico has closed the gap with their major competitor for foreign 
direct investment, China (see, for example, ‘Mexican Labour: cheaper than China’, 
Financial Times, 5 April 2013). 
PART II 
Debtfarism and the 
poverty industry in 
the United States 

Preface to Part II 
DEBTFARISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE MAKING OF 
THE POVERTY INDUSTRY 
This second part of the book shifts the analysis to a concrete level of discussion of 
three significant features of the poverty industry in the United States: credit cards 
(Chapter 4), student loans (Chapter 5) and payday lending (Chapter 6). The US 
poverty industry entails a vast and multi-featured terrain, which includes automobile 
loans, pawnshops, subprime mortgage financing and so forth. As an integral feature 
of capital relations, the poverty industry is also highly dynamic and fluid in nature. 
This means, among other things, that the various components of poverty lending, 
such as the credit card industry, the student loan industry and the payday loan 
industry, do not exist in isolation from each other but are instead intertwined in 
at least three ways. The first is through the institutional, rhetorical and regulative 
pillars framing the credit system – all of which are linked to the state and, in 
particular, to its debtfarist modes of intervention. These pillars are anchored in, 
and also reflect, the power configurations in the wider dynamics of capital 
accumulation. Here I refer to both the realm of exchange and the sphere of 
production. 
The second way in which the components of the poverty industry are 
intertwined is through their close alignment with mainstream banking, i.e., Wall 
Street; and the third is through the borrowing activities of debtors. A distressed 
debtor, for instance, may seek to pawn her wedding ring to help make a payment 
on her auto loan. A welfare-recipient who is strapped for cash after paying the 
minimum on her credit card may take out a payday loan to help buy school supplies 
for her children (Williams, 2004; Karger, 2005). A subprime homeowner may turn 
to his credit card to assist in meeting his monthly mortgage payment (Geisst, 2009). 
Although the following three case studies do not directly emphasise the linkages 
between different personal loans, the connection – implicitly made – is present in 
the everyday lives of the surplus population and increasingly in those of people 
with relatively more secure and well-paying jobs. The key difference between these 
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two categories of labour power is that while surplus workers turn to expensive 
credit out of necessity, affluent workers use credit out of convenience. 
In these chapters I examine the use of credit cards, student loans and payday 
loans. In current debates, these three nodes of the borrowing nexus remain 
undertheorised, especially with regard to the intersections of the social power of 
money, surplus workers and the state. The second reason I focus on these nodes 
is because they represent riskier forms credit. Credit cards, student loans and payday 
loans are non-collateralised debt, meaning they do not involve an asset or property 
that the debtor pledges to relinquish in case of default. The chancier gamble with 
the future entailed in non-collateralised debt to the poor facilitates the examination 
of the disciplinary features and paradoxes inherent to credit-led accumulation as it 
relates to the debtfarist roles of the state, the surplus population and the power of 
money. 
The United States provides an important site to examine these cases for several 
reasons. First, as noted in the previous chapter, the United States represents the 
so-called heartland, or archetypal version, of neoliberalisation that the Global South 
has been urged to emulate (Soederberg, 2004). This occurs both through structural 
adjustment lending by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and, less 
visibly, by credit rating agencies, institutional investors (e.g., pension and mutual 
funds) and private lenders (e.g., investment banks and equity firms) (Bourdieu, 1998; 
Soederberg, 2004, 2006; Wacquant, 2009; Peck, 2010). Part III of this book 
explores how similar features of the poverty industry in the United States are 
rapidly taking hold in Mexico under the ambit of financial inclusion. Understanding 
the poverty industry in the United States, therefore, is necessary to grasping the 
uneven nature of the expansion and intensification of credit-led accumulation on 
the global scale. 
The second reason I draw on the United States is because, more than any other 
country, it allows us to study the tensions in neoliberalisation as they relate to the 
wider processes of credit-led accumulation. In contrast with the rhetoric of 
neoliberalism, the experience of market-led restructuring of capitalism in the 
United States has not operated to the benefit of all. Market-based neoliberal 
capitalism has resulted in the immense concentration of wealth at one pole and 
the increasing misery, degradation and toil of labour at the other. Socio-economic 
inequality, for instance, in the world’s most powerful ‘developed’ country has 
widened dramatically over the past three decades (Bivens and Mishel, 2013). 
According to tax filings, ‘The income gap between the richest 1 percent of 
Americans and the other 99 percent widened to a record margin in 2012. The top 
1 percent of US earners collected 19.3 percent of household income, breaking a 
record previously set in 1927’ (‘US income inequality at record high’, BBC News, 
10 September 2013; Saez, 2013). 
Since the 1980s, ‘rent-seeking’ (as opposed to wealth-creation activity) has been 
the primary means through which the top income earners extracted their wealth 
(Bivens and Mishel, 2013). One important example of this is the expansion of the 
poverty industry, which is marked by attempts to integrate the surplus population 
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into secondary forms of exploitation through personal loans. In the absence of a 
living wage and state-sponsored social benefits and programmes, for instance, credit-
led accumulation has benefited the top decile in the United States, while 90 percent 
of households saw a 4.2 percent decline in their market-based incomes from 2001 
to 2005 (Sassen, 2010). Between 2000 and 2008, poverty in the suburbs of the 
largest urban areas – the former stronghold of middle-class America – increased 
by 25 percent. Poverty levels were exacerbated in the aftermath of the rent-seeking 
(credit-driven), US subprime mortgage debacle, which left 30 percent of the 
country’s population below 200 percent of the federal poverty level (see Table 4.2 
in Chapter 4 for more information). Suburbs in the United States became home 
to the largest share of the nation’s poor (Brookings Institute, 2010; see also Table 
6.4 in Chapter 6 for common reasons for payday borrowing). 
A third and related reason that I concentrate on the US context is because 
of the exponential growth and expansion of credit-led accumulation aimed at 
extracting interests, commissions and fees from the working poor since the late 
1990s. Two observations are worth raising here with regard to the meteoric rise 
of credit-led accumulation. First, this strategy, which has been carried out by 
capitalists and facilitated by the state, also involves ordinary workers through a 
phenomenon that may be referred to as cannibalistic capitalism. By this term 
I mean the processes by which workers’ savings in the form of pension funds feed 
off of both their own increased indebtedness and that of other workers, a condition 
driven largely by stagnant real wages, absence of an adequate social safety net and 
high levels of structural unemployment and underemployment (Soederberg, 2010a). 
As evidenced in the United States, the dependence of pension funds on high-risk 
ventures leads to a situation in which investment strategies mutilate the value of 
pension savings with the advent of more frequent and intensified financial crises, 
wiping out gains made during a speculative run. 
Instead of serving to weaken capitalism, however, financial crises have had the 
effect of deepening neoliberalisation by allowing financial corporations and their 
shareholders, which include pension funds, to prey on those dispossessed workers 
who strive to maintain basic living standards through the credit system (Soederberg, 
2010b). This feature of credit-led accumulation has also meant that those benefiting 
from the poverty industry are not solely capitalists but also (non-surplus) ordinary 
workers, who unwittingly benefit from the secondary exploitation of the surplus 
population. Although this feature is not made explicit in the following three case 
studies, it is important to keep to keep in mind, as it not only reveals the 
complexities and tensions in the US poverty industry but also represents the 
culmination of past attempts by capitalists, with the assistance of the state, to deal 
with the tensions inherent to credit-led accumulation. 
The second point I wish to make here is that the expansion and reconfiguration 
of credit-led accumulation in the United States has been facilitated by a key rhetorical 
and regulative feature of debtfarism: the democratisation of credit. As I discuss in 
the next chapter, this term has been associated with progressive struggles that 
emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s aimed at ensuring access to affordable credit 
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for the poor (Austin, 2004). The democratisation of credit trope is powerful largely 
because the power of money allows for the illusions of freedom and equality to 
take hold. Seen through a Marxian lens, however, the democratisation of credit 
masks an underlying class-based strategy aimed at integrating excluded sectors of 
the working population – that is, the surplus population – into the mainstream 
credit system. Under conditions of stagnant real wages, the absence of an adequate 
social safety net and high levels of structural unemployment and underemployment, 
the poverty industry has become a site where the silent compulsions to earn a living 
based on dispossession, expropriation and market-dependence are constantly 
reproduced and reimposed in such a manner that it appears as a natural, voluntary 
and inevitable aspect of life, or the ordinary run of things (see Chapter 2). 
The democratisation of credit is an integral feature in the social reproduction 
of the poverty industry. It represents the confluence of power and tension through 
the intersection of money, debtfarism and the surplus population. Owing to this, 
I provide here a historical account of the democratisation of credit and explain 
how lending to the poor in the United States shifted from illegal to legal framings 
due to changing material conditions and forms of state intervention. My aim is to 
problematise and deconstruct the illusions of the equality of exchange, and liberty 
of contract that is inherent to the democratisation of credit trope. In doing so, I 
reveal how the exploitative, disciplinary and unequal relations of power that 
constitute creditor–debtor relations are social constructions imbricated in the 
dynamics of capital accumulation and debtfarism. 
To begin, it is important to note that the democratisation of credit is neither a 
new concept, nor one that is exclusive to neoliberalism. The idea ‘that people of 
small means should be able to borrow small loans with dignity from banks in the 
same way as the wealthy, cutting out loan sharks’ first emerged in the United 
States in 1914 (Burton, 1998: 92). Salary lending, the precursor to modern payday 
lenders, was a type of loansharking that emerged around the time of the so-called 
Gilded Age (i.e., 1870s) and reached its apex between 1900 and World War I 
(1914–1918).1 Broadly, loansharking describes ‘the lending of money at an illegal 
rate of interest and without holding a claim to some physical possession of the 
borrower as collateral’ (Haller and Alviti, 1977: 126; Nugent, 1941). Loansharking 
emerged in a period that is characterised by the panics resulting from speculation 
and the tendency toward overaccumulation, particularly in 1873 and 1893. This, 
in turn, led to severe depressions accompanied by high unemployment and inflation 
rates (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999).2 The usury laws of most states in the late 
nineteenth century set the maximum interest rate so low (approximately 6 percent 
annually) that is was not profitable to operate a small loan company legally (Haller 
and Alviti, 1977; Woolston, 2010). Added to this, respectable opinion frowned 
upon consumer borrowing as a sign of moral weakness and lack of self-discipline, 
which was based in social disciplinary codes with regard to workers, e.g., employers 
often fired employees if it was revealed that the latter were in debt (Haller and 
Alviti, 1977: 127; Peterson 2003). 
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Salary lenders responded to this market. Salary lenders, unlike the later racketeer 
loansharks, did not resort to violence for debt collection. Instead, their effectiveness 
involved creating the illusion that the loan represented a legal obligation. As the 
next three chapters will demonstrate, the construction of the legal obligation is an 
important disciplinary feature of personal debt under capitalism. In the case of salary 
lending, legal obligation was achieved through various strategies. For instance, 
most lenders operated out of an office; a prospective borrower was investigated 
to determine whether he had a steady job; and the borrower signed complicated 
forms before receiving the loan. More importantly, to evade the illegality of their 
operations, salary lenders would treat the loan as a ‘purchase’ of the borrower’s 
future salary. Until the early twentieth century, state sanctions against salary lenders 
were not rigorously imposed (Nugent, 1941; Austin, 2004).3 
Access to credit offered by salary lenders was highly gendered. Borrowers were 
generally married men, who held steady jobs in large organisations: government 
civil servants, railroad workers, streetcar motormen and clerks in firms such as 
insurance companies (Haller and Alviti, 1977:128). Mirroring the motives of con ­
temporary payday borrowers, the reasons why workers turned to salary lenders 
included unexpected illnesses in the family, the costs of moving, paying rent in 
advance and the need for funds for special occasions. The loans offered by salary 
lenders usually ranged from $5 to $50. It was not uncommon for interest rates to 
run at more than 1,000 percent when computed on an annual basis (Haller and 
Alviti, 1977: 132). The alleged reason for high interest rates was because admin ­
istrative expenses (e.g., processing and collection) were the same for all loan amounts 
– large and small (Haller and Alviti, 1977). 
In the early twentieth century, as demands for loans began to grow in the wake 
of further deteriorating economic conditions, public attention began to turn against 
salary lenders. The campaigns against loansharks sought to establish legal frameworks 
for small loans, so as to remove the dependency of workers on salary lenders. It is 
important to underscore that salary lenders framed the problem and the solution 
in the realm of exchange and its illusions of equality. The reason for usurious salary 
lending, for instance, was due to the existence of a market for small loans among 
underemployed workers (see Chapter 2). As in contemporary neoliberal times in 
the United States, the solution to this problem was not to impose requirements 
that employers pay workers a living wage and provide basic benefits to cover health, 
vacation pay, moving expenses and so forth. Instead, the solution was to establish 
a legal framework in which sources of small loans could be adequately regulated 
and set at interest rates that were considered reasonable for the borrower yet 
profitable for the lender. 
Between 1910 and 1935, the modern era of consumer credit and the birth and 
expansion of instalment credit, alongside the strategy of democratising credit, began 
to emerge in the United States (Michelman, 1970; Calder, 1999). During this time, 
a variety of legalised small loan systems emerged in American states. In lieu of a 
living wage, for example, corporations and labour unions established credit unions 
for their employees and members. By the 1920s and 1930s, commercial bankers 
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recognised the profitability and respectability of the small loans market and opened 
small loan departments. The suggested rate of 3.5 percent monthly was deemed 
necessary for a profitable small loan business. By 1933, 27 states had passed small 
loans acts (Haller and Alviti, 1977). 
A key tension guaranteeing the quality of (physical) money and the price 
(fictitious value) of credit money emerged in the 1920s, leading up to the Great 
Crash of 1929. Notwithstanding the fact that lenders in many states were permitted 
to charge a profitable interest rate of 3.5 percent monthly, lenders faced declining 
profits, brought on by inflationary pressures and the increased risks of making loans 
for personal needs. During this period average loans were growing in the face of 
increasing unemployment and underemployment. Legal small loan operations thus 
left a gap, which was filled by a new type of illegal lender in the 1930s: the racketeer 
loanshark. Unlike salary lenders, the latter resorted to the threat of violence as the 
standard collection procedure (Haller and Alviti 1977). 
In response to the global economic downturn and the devastating consequences 
of the Great Depression in the 1930s, the American state enacted a series of relief 
efforts to support the poor under the umbrella programme of The New Deal 
(1933–1936), including (old age) Social Security and unemployment and welfare 
provisions. In addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act was introduced to cover aspects 
such as minimum wages and maximum hours worked (Hilztik, 2011). After World 
War II (1939–1945), programmes geared toward the social protection of workers 
were further bolstered by Keynesian welfare policies, which, in turn, assisted in 
the expansion of mass production and consumption in the United States. As 
elaborated in Chapter 4, from the 1960s onward, the capitalist state undertook 
several regulative and rhetorical measures to encourage the democratisation of credit 
among those with steady employment. This included various consumer protection 
laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968, the Marquette Decision 
of 1978, which allowed nationally chartered banks to export interest rates to states 
with stricter regulations and important revisions to the personal Bankruptcy Code 
(see Chapter 4 for a detailed account of these regulations). 
As discussed above, the democratisation of credit refers to the removal of 
barriers that impede market access, particularly for the poor. In short, the poor are 
encouraged to participate in the realm of exchange by incurring debt. This, in 
turn, diverts our attention away from the class power and exploitation in the realm 
of exchange and obscures thus the root causes of poverty. Adhering to the 
neoclassical approach, high-cost, privately created money is expected to smooth 
the consumption needs of the poor such that they can lift themselves out of poverty. 
This is opposed to providing workers with living wages and the public provisioning 
of safety nets such as unemployment insurance, healthcare, old age pensions and 
so forth. 
Another equality-based assumption underpinning the democratisation of 
credit is that all individuals – despite different resource endowments and different 
assets – can become good market citizens (cf. CGAP, 2010a; US Department of 
Commerce, 2010). The assumption here is that borrowers and lenders will interact 
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in a mutually beneficial manner based on equal exchange. This level playing field 
also implies that the poor will be held accountable to meet their payment obligations 
in a timely manner with the same moral expectations applied to wealthy borrowers. 
In support of capitalist strategies to expand consumer credit, which we discuss below, 
the American state has heavily promoted the democratisation of credit and its 
underlying illusions of equality, freedom and democracy. Framing credit exclusively 
in the realm of exchange, attention is focused on questions of access, fairness and 
transparency, as opposed to creating a more level playing field by guaranteeing a 
living wage, social protection and the subsidisation of basic social services (Marx, 
1990, 2005). 
Grassroots campaigns waged in the 1970s by various organisations, such as the 
National Welfare Rights Organisation, sought to ensure that consumer credit was 
‘a right of American citizenship’, particularly for poor and low-income people of 
colour (Austin, 2004: 1254). Drawing inspiration from the community of money, 
some supporters argued that democratic values (formal equality and individual 
freedom), which were believed to exist in the political arena, should be brought 
into the market in order to foster ‘a broader sharing of the benefits of the society’s 
economic endowments by a wider spectrum of consumers’ (Austin, 2004: 1255). 
The American state responded to these claims and, in turn, nurtured the growth 
needs of the consumer credit industry, through several major pieces of legislation, 
including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1975 and the Community 
Reinvestment Act (or, CRA)4 of 1977 (Federal Reserve Board, 2008). In doing 
so, the state assisted in expanding the membership in the community of money 
and thereby imposing values based on market individualism and social discipline. 
In what follows, I touch on the disciplinary strategies inherent to the 
democratisation of credit in the form of credit scoring. Before doing so, however, 
it is useful to highlight the term ‘consumer’, which is often used in the debates 
on this topic, as well as in the financialisation literature, but which is rarely 
problematised. The term ‘consumer’ (debtor) acts to mask the class-based power 
in the community of money. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is a powerful trope 
used in both regulatory and rhetorical framings to de-class, de-gender and de-racialise 
workers, who are homogenised, equalised and individualised as consumers. More 
importantly, the uncritical embrace and usage of the term ‘consumer’ ensures that 
the entire discussion of expanded access to credit remains within the realm of 
exchange, thereby obscuring the connections to inequality and exploitation rooted 
in processes of credit-led accumulation. As David Harvey notes, consumerism, along 
with individual libertarianism, were part and parcel of the neoliberal construction 
of a market-based popular culture (Harvey, 2005). 
Mirroring the above sentiment that democratisation of credit creates equality 
in capitalism, Dawn Burton, a scholar of consumer society, suggests that providing 
appropriate access to credit will then ensure that poor consumers are active market 
participants in consumer society on an equal footing (Burton, 2008: 92). One way 
this equal footing has been achieved is through the application of risk-based pricing 
machinations to determine the interest that the poor need to pay to access credit. 
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FICO scores are the main mechanism for determining pricing for the poor in the 
United States. Although the credit card industry does not begin to entice surplus 
workers until the late 1980s, it is useful to explore briefly the meaning and nature 
of these credit scores, given their dominant role in disciplining debtors in the poverty 
industry. 
The methods employed by FICO, which was established by the Fair Issac 
Corporation in 1965, are used by the three main credit reporting (and debt 
collection) agencies in the United States: Equifax, Experian and TransUnion. 
Through regulatory framings of debtfarism, FICO scores facilitated the expansion 
of the credit card industry, particularly to the surplus population, while justifying 
the stratification of the cost and amount of credit offered by banks.5 The quantitative 
and mathematical nature of FICO scores not only facilitates the construction of 
‘ideal type’ consumers but also allows for the application of market discipline. 
Furthermore, FICO scores serve to naturalise and normalise the power granted to 
banks to determine not only the value of credit money to be lent but also which 
workers are to receive the money. This in turn allows for the highly political, 
subjective and random setting of a ‘price’ for credit card loans based on class, racial 
and gendered differentiation (Dymski, 2009; Wyly et al., 2009; Roberts, 2013). 
Recall from our discussion in Chapter 2 that, like money itself, credit does not 
possess an intrinsic value, only a fictitious value. However, the latter requires 
validation and justification. Credit-rating agencies and techniques such as the FICO 
thus provide a valuable service to capitalists. 
Based not on the subjectivity of the lender but on an individual’s credit history, 
FICO scores are seen to determine objectively the amount and terms of a loan 
(e.g., length of time, interest rates, fees, etc.). Those with scores below 600 are 
categorised as subprime, or below the prime or benchmark. The stigma attached to 
the subprime category is associated with economic coercion in the form of higher 
interest rates and exorbitant fees (Montgomerie, 2010). Such devices also facilitate 
disciplinary measures regarding debtors’ payment practices. If a borrower is late 
making a payment and is maxing out on lines of credit – issues that are prevalent 
among surplus labour – his/her credit rating is immediately affected, potentially 
making access to future credit more expensive (i.e., higher fees and interests). In 
the United States, where employers’ credit checks are the norm, a poor credit rating 
may also result in the denial of paid employment, thereby reinforcing the multi­
dimensionality and rewards of being a good market citizen. Ironically, poor credit 
scores in the United States are largely linked to unemployment, lack of health 
coverage and medical debt (Traub, 2013). 
Determined by seemingly apolitical abstractions (i.e., interest rates, credit scores 
and so forth), FICO scores act not only as a formidable gate-keeper to the 
community of money, but also as a disciplinary mechanism for its existing and 
aspiring members (cf. Drysdale and Keest, 2000; Marron, 2007). As one legal scholar 
puts it: ‘for middle and working class people, access to credit (and the denial of 
credit to others) [is] part of their sense of respectability’ (Austin, 2004: 1254). The 
ability to transform the meanings of self-worth and citizenship in terms of the market 
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has been a powerful disciplinary feature of the democratisation of credit. As the 
following three chapters demonstrate, this disciplinary power would not be possible, 
however, without the regulatory and rhetorical framings of the capitalist state and 
the social power inherent in money. It is only by unpacking these processes that 
we can understand how the social power of the state, capitalists and money work 
together, albeit in a highly paradoxical and tension-ridden manner, to expand and 
remake the poverty industry and reproduce the surplus population. 
Notes 
1	 Salary lending arose in the post-Civil War period in the context of two legal small loan 
institutions: the pawnshop (the oldest and far more important in terms of the volume of 
business) and the chattel lender, who made small loans secured by a mortgage on personal 
property such as furniture, a sewing machine, or jewellery. By the 1880s, these lenders 
began offering loans without security (Nugent, 1941; Haller and Alviti, 1977). 
2	 As discussed in Chapter 3 with regard to the Marxian concept of relative surplus labour, 
unemployment rates act to decrease the level of the social wage. Absent from the capitalist 
scene at this time were welfare provisions and other forms of social protection such as 
unemployment insurance, minimum wage requirements, and so forth. 
3	 The law was sometimes unclear and penalties for usury were minimal, e.g., lenders were 
not subject to criminal penalties, and when this did occur, it was classified as a 
misdemeanour and no official had specific enforcement responsibility. Penalties ranged 
from forfeiture of the illegal interest to forfeiture of principal and interest. The penalty 
could only be imposed if the borrower undertook the expenses of a lawsuit (Haller and 
Alviti, 1977: 127). 
4	 The CRA was driven, in part, by the response of grassroots organisations and government 
officials to the lender-led practice of ‘redlining’ neighbourhoods in inner cities, i.e., 
drawing a red line, both literally and figuratively, around areas with perceived undesirable 
characteristics and systematically refusing credit to residents, regardless of individual 
creditworthiness (Austin, 2004). 
5	 The FICO scores are purported to give lenders ‘the most accurate picture of credit risk 
possible using credit report data’ (www.myfico.com). In 1958, two years after the FICO 
score was invented, Visa’s precursor, the BankAmericard was issued by Bank of America 
(Geisst, 2009: 62). 
4 
DEBTFARISM AND THE CREDIT 
CARD INDUSTRY 
In 1958, the BankAmericard was launched by Bank of America and subsequently 
renamed as Visa in 1976. BankAmericard introduced workers to an extended 
payment system in which individuals were permitted to pay their balances over 
time while being charged interest on the unpaid balance (Geisst, 2009). It wasn’t 
until the late 1980s, however, that credit cards became a central feature of the 
burgeoning poverty industry in the United States.1 From this time onward, the 
credit card industry rapidly expanded its lending activities to underemployed and 
unemployed workers, or the surplus population. In lieu of living wages, savings 
and adequate welfare provisions, credit cards have come to represent a privatised 
safety net for surplus workers to pay for essential services and subsistence needs 
(most notably health care), particularly when workers fall ill, divorce and/or lose 
their jobs (Warren and Tyagi, 2004; Bird, 1997; Stegman and Faris, 2005). 
According to a 2012 study, 40 percent of households in the United States still 
rely on credit cards to pay for basic living because they did not have enough money 
in their chequing or savings account – a rate that that has remained constant since 
2008. Among households with annual incomes of less than $50,000, this increases 
to 45 percent (Traub and Ruetchlin, 2012, see also Table 4.2). Behind apolitical 
economic terms such as ‘consumption smoothing’, credit card debt for the poor 
often involves a vicious debt cycle in which high fees and interest payments are 
paid monthly as opposed to paying off the balance. On the other side of the 
accounting ledger, it is clear that the increased reliance of the working poor on 
credit cards has come to represent one of the most lucrative sectors for the handful 
of Wall Street banks that dominate the industry.2 
What remains less clear is why, and how, the dependence of the surplus 
population on privately created money (and the exploitative relations therein) has 
become normalised. This chapter seeks to shed critical light on these questions in 
two ways. The first goal is to denaturalise the emergence of the credit card industry 
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and thereby reveal it as a socially constructed and capitalist phenomenon. The second 
and related goal is to deconstruct and explain the increased dependence of the surplus 
population on privately created money in the form of credit cards by identifying 
the rhetorical and regulative roles played by debtfarism. 
The overarching argument in this chapter is that the US debtfare state has played 
a crucial role in both the expansion and the reproduction of the credit card industry. 
Debtfarism is central to the accumulation of fictitious value, a process that exposes 
ever-greater numbers of the surplus population to market discipline. A key way 
the debtfare state legitimises the increasingly coercive nature of privatising basic 
subsistence has been by framing and resolving tensions in the realm of exchange, 
where class power and exploitation are demystified by the fetishised virtues of 
equality, freedom and democracy given uptake by the community of money. The 
US debtfare state, for example, has facilitated an expansion of secondary forms of 
exploitation by permitting credit card issuers (banks) to generate enormous amounts 
of income from uncapped interest rates and fees by continually extending plastic 
money to the surplus population. This subjects surplus workers to the disciplinary 
requirements of the market across time, compelling them to find and accept any 
form of work in order to meet their monthly payment obligations. Thus, driven 
by economic distress, they behave as good market citizens. 
This argument is developed in four main sections. Section One describes some 
of the key features of the credit card industry and its relationship to the US surplus 
population. Section Two explores historically the rise of the credit card industry 
in the United States by tracing three institutionalised regulative and rhetorical 
features: (1) consumer protection, (2) usury laws and (3) bankruptcy laws. Each of 
which strengthens and reproduces the illusions of the community of money. This 
section also maps the foundation of the US debtfare state, which will be vital not 
only to the present discussion, but also to our discussion of other cases of the US 
poverty industry, namely student loans (Chapter 5) and payday lending (Chapter 
6). Section Three examines how the debtfare state has facilitated and mediated 
several spatio-temporal displacements in the credit card industry. Here I focus 
on credit card asset-backed securitisation (ABS), the wooing of undocumented 
workers, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) and the 2009 Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure 
Act (or, Credit Card Act). Each of these initiatives has had negative implications 
for the working poor, who have largely been ignored by the financialisation 
literature. Section Four concludes by summarising the argument. 
The credit card industry and the US surplus population: 
an overview 
Credit card industry 
In contrast to the neoliberal rhetoric, the credit card industry is an oligopoly. Visa 
controls 50 percent of the market share, MasterCard controls an additional 25 percent, 
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while American Express, Discover and other smaller companies share the remaining 
25 percent (Karger, 2005). It is important to note that neither Visa nor MasterCard 
issues credit cards. Rather, these companies provide advertising, credit authorisation 
and payment services for their financial members, most of whom are large US banks 
(see Table 4.1). 
Each bank sets its own credit card terms, interest rates, fees and penalties. The 
loose structure of Visa and MasterCard partly explains the vast range of credit card 
terms, fees and interest rates available (Manning, 2000). As we will see in the 
next section, the variability is also due, in part, to the regulatory environment. 
Visa and MasterCard, for instance, have long benefitted from having exclusive ties 
to banks, while the latter have benefitted from numerous loopholes available to 
corporations to circumvent anti-trust legislation, i.e., laws designed to promote 
free competition (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). In response to a US Supreme 
Court ruling regarding anti-trust violations, for instance, MasterCard and Visa filed 
initial public offerings (IPOs)3 in 2006 and 2008, respectively, thereby transforming 
their structure from membership associations, jointly owned by banks, to public 
companies. Despite this reorganisation, the ownership of Visa and MasterCard 
remains largely in the hands of specific banks, whose concentrated power has been 
neither acknowledged nor addressed by the state agency responsible for regulating 
nationally chartered banks: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 
The largest banks still own half of MasterCard and Visa (‘Chinese fund major 
investor in Visa IPO’, CBC News, 25 March 2008). JP Morgan, for instance, is 
not only the largest shareholder of Visa, it is the company’s largest customer, getting 
breaks on pricing not available to most other customers. The IPOs raised substantial 
amounts of money for the banks that own Visa and MasterCard. In the case of 
Visa, the IPO raised a record-breaking $17.9 billion for the banks – including JP 
Morgan Chase, Bank of America and Citigroup – which own it (‘Visa’s record 
IPO rings up 28 percent gain’, CNN.com, 19 March 2008). The money raised in 
the IPO has also been used to pad the already considerable anti-litigation war chest 
of Visa and Mastercard. To get a sense of the size of this anti-litigation fund, 
MasterCard has $650 million at its disposal. The credit card industry remains an 
extremely effective cartel, represented by one of the country’s most powerful lobby 
groups, American Bankers Association (ABA). 
TABLE 4.1 Top four credit card issuers in the United States, 2009 (in billions $) 
Rank† Credit issued 
1 Bank of America/MBNA 194.70 
2 Chase 184.09 
3 Citi 148.90 
4 American Express 105.00 
† The fifth-ranked bank was Capital One with $68.78 in credit issued.
 
Source: ‘World’s Top 10 Credit Card Issuers’, CNBC.com; data compiled from CreditCards.com and
 
Nilson Report, December 2009.
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Two core sources of income for the credit card industry are fees (e.g., late 
penalties, administrative fees, annual fees, processing fees and so forth) and uncapped 
interest rates (see Table 4.7). Rates are set at the discretion of credit cards issuers. 
The type of debt that characterises credit cards is known as revolving credit, or 
unsecure debt, which describes open-ended loans with irregular balances that change 
on a monthly basis (Manning, 2000; Karger, 2005). So-called ‘revolvers’ are 
debtors who do not pay their credit card balance at the end of each month. 
Revolvers represent the most lucrative segment of credit card debtors, as card 
companies can extract interest payments for longer periods of time and collect higher 
fees, e.g., late penalties. Revolvers account for a substantial segment of credit card 
users in the United States and the total revolving debt is substantial. In 2009, for 
instance, 56 percent of card users had an unpaid credit card balance.4 In 2011, the 
total amount of unpaid debt reached $796.1 billion.5 Revolving debt levels have 
not only steadily increased since the 1980s, but also a disproportionate number of 
revolving debtors are non-white workers (African-American and Hispanic) from 
lower-income brackets (Bird et al., 1997; Federal Reserve, 2001; Delpechitre and 
DeVaney, 2006). Recall from Chapter 2 that credit cards represent a form of credit 
money – that is, they are a money-form of revenue and thus contribute to the 
expansion of fictitious value. We pick up on this, again, below. For now, it is 
useful to briefly elaborate on the relationship between the surplus population and 
the US credit card industry. 
The surplus population in the United States 
In this chapter, I employ Marx’s concept of ‘surplus population’6 to refer to ‘poor’ 
and ‘low-income’ individuals and households, following the definitions7 of these 
terms used by the US government.8 Specifically, low-income individuals and families 
have income below two-times the poverty threshold (or, below 200 percent of 
the poverty line), while poor individuals and families register incomes at or below 
100 percent of the poverty line (see Table 4.2).9 
TABLE 4.2 2013 federal poverty guidelines* (in $) 













Source: FamiliesUSA: The Voice for Health Care Consumers (2013) ‘2013 Federal Poverty Guidelines’, 
Washington, DC: FamiliesUSA. Available at: www.familiesusa.org/resources/tools-for-advocates/ 
guides/federal-poverty-guidelines.html (accessed 13 June 2013). 
* Calculations by FamiliesUSA based on data from the US Department of Health and Human Services 
(HSS). Based on poverty guidelines. See the HHS website at: http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13 
poverty.cfm (accessed 13 June 2013). Data excludes Alaska and Hawaii. 
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FIGURE 4.1 Working families by poverty status, 2007–2011 (in %) 
Source: US Census Bureau, American Community Survey, cited in Roberts et al., (2013) Low-Income 
Working Families: The Growing Economic Gap. Washington, DC: The Working Poor Families Project, 
p. 2. 
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Against the general backdrop of stagnant wages, rising costs of living and the 
steady withdrawal of publicly supported social services, the surplus population in 
the United States has grown steadily over the past several decades of neoliberalism 
(National Poverty Centre, 2012). While productivity has increased 80.4 percent 
from 1979 to 2011, the inflation-adjusted wages of the median worker grew just 
6 percent and that growth occurred exclusively as a result of the strong economy 
of the late 1990s (Traub and McGhee, 2013). Over the past decade (2000–2011), 
earnings and income have taken a substantial hit, as the median family income in 
the US has declined 6 percent, from $66,259 to $62,301 (Federal Reserve Board, 
2010a; Traub and McGhee, 2013). As Figure 4.1 reveals, the hardest hit have been 
the most vulnerable households. It should be noted that the wealthiest 20 percent 
of working families faired quite well during this time – taking home nearly half 
(48 percent) of all income, while the poorest 20 percent received less than 5 percent 
of all income (Roberts et al., 2013: 1). 
As Table 4.3 demonstrates, the surplus population has been turning to credit 
cards.10 While the change in credit card debt depicted in Table 4.3 has been 
celebrated as indicating both a rebound in the economy and a positive response 
to the implementation of the Credit Card Act of 2009, these numbers also reflect 
the loss of access to credit by many families during and after the 2007 subprime 
crisis, largely due to the debacles socio-economic fall out, e.g., job loss and/or loss 
of home (Traub and Ruetchlin, 2012). I discuss this point within the larger context 
of the Credit Card Act of 2009, which I discuss below. 
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TABLE 4.3 Amount of credit card debt carried by surplus population, 2008 and 2012 
2008 (in $) 2012 (in $) % change 
All 9,887 7,145 -27.7 
Age 
18–24 3,498 2,982 -14.7 
25–34 10,407 5,156 -50.5 
35–44 10,141 6,156 -39.3 
45–54 10,154 8,408 -17.2 
55–64 10,013 8,228 -17.8 
65 and older 9,823 9,283 -5.5 
Race/ethnicity 
African American 6,970 5,784 -17.0 
Latino 9,049 6,066 -33.0 
White, Non-Hispanic 10,358 7,315 -29.4 
Income level 
Less than $35,000 7,763 5,405 -30.4 
$50,000–$74,999 11,528 8,916 -22.7 
$75,000 or more 11,896 9,235 -22.5 
Source: Amy Traub and Catherine Ruetchlin (2012) The Plastic Safety Net: findings from the 2012 National 
Survey on Credit Card Debt of Low- and Middle-Income Households, New York, NY: Dēmos, p. 7. 
The increasing economic insecurity of surplus labour lies not simply in the burden 
of the high-fee and high-interest debt cycle of credit cards; but also in the absence 
of living wages and stagnant labour market, as well as the decline of public support 
for basic subsistence needs – welfare, health, shelter and education (Katz, 2001; 
Wacquant, 2009). The vulnerability and profile of these debtors is clearly revealed 
in the demographics of personal bankruptcy filings (15 percent of all indebted 
households have declared personal bankruptcy and 20 percent have entered 
into a settlement agreement with a credit card company (Ausubel, 1997; Karger, 
2005; Moore, 2009). There is also a tension in this particular form of credit-led 
accumulation, which relies on ‘unsecured’ (or, non-collateralised) forms of exploita ­
tion involving a gamble with the future, i.e., the ability of poor and low-income 
workers to make minimum interest payments on their debt (Bonefeld, 1995; Harvey, 
1999). This is the core paradox of the credit card industry. As we will see, it demands 
continual intervention by the debtfare state. 
The rise and oligopolistic power of the credit card industry did not emerge 
from the naturally evolving, competitive forces of the market. To provide an 
alternative to this dominant narrative, I turn my attention to a historical materialist 
explanation of the rise of credit cards and the integral role played by debtfarism. 
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Debtfarism and the making of the credit card industry 
Consumer protection through disclosure 
As the community of money expanded to include more and more surplus workers, 
so too would the state need to uphold the virtues of democracy, equality and 
freedom in the sphere of exchange by striving to protect consumers while normal­
ising their exposure to secondary forms of exploitation through credit (see Chapter 
2). Consumer protection was focused on ensuring that the loan contracts remained 
transparent, so that rational borrowers could make informed decisions about 
whether or not to enter voluntarily into debt with a credit card company. The 
protection thus offered by the state would guarantee transparency about the terms 
of the debt contract as opposed to the actual terms of payment and conditions 
therein. Consumer protection essentially forms the bedrock of the neoliberal move 
away from the collective and rights-based social and economic protection of workers 
toward monetised and individualised relations, as well as market-driven forms of 
citizenship whereby the state simply guarantees the formal equality of exchange. 
A main regulatory feature of consumer protection in the United States is the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 (hereafter: the 1968 Act). This Act is an 
umbrella consumer protection law that includes the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 
the Fair Credit Billing Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Truth in Lending 
Act (or, TILA) that was originally part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. It 
should be underlined that since the passing of the 1968 Act, there has been no 
comprehensive or overarching consumer protection legislation in the US. Instead, 
the emphasis has been on a series of separate laws that target specific business 
practices, industries and consumer products (Crane et al., 2011). 
An important feature of the TILA is that it promotes a regulatory shift away 
from legally-binding contractual restrictions to relying on disclosure as a primary 
way of protecting consumers (Peterson, 2007: 1132). The TILA requires, for 
instance, that consumer creditors disclose all the specifics of a given loan in order 
to protect consumers (Drysdale and Keest, 2010).11 The TILA also introduced 
minimum payments and standardised the calculation of interest with the creation 
of Annual Percentage Rates12 (APR) (Peterson, 2003). With the exception of high-
cost mortgage loans, the TILA does not regulate what charges may be imposed 
for consumer credit. Instead it requires standardised disclosure of the costs and 
charges imposed (Crane et al., 2011: 319). 
Based on economic assumptions of rational individualism, TILA was not 
designed to protect borrowers in terms of the price of the loan (e.g., interest rates 
and fees), but instead to ensure that they were given a ‘choice’ (freedom) among 
lenders. Through its emphasis on consumer protection, the TILA also served to 
distort the arbitrary power of the state and credit card industry by rehearsing its 
commitment to formal equality and freedom for consumers as well as guaranteeing 
a level playing field through the act of disclosure (Peterson, 2003). The legalisation 
of revolving credit was also packaged as a convenience to the consumer, as 
opposed to a windfall for creditors. 
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In another effort to depoliticise its actions, the debtfare state sought to promote 
the informed use of consumer credit. Instead of implementing this through the 
OCC (the agency originally designed to deal with federal banking regulation), 
however, the state delegated responsibility to the central bank (Federal Reserve 
System). As one observer notes, TILA represented the only federal law ever passed 
dealing with interest rates, which makes the OCC conspicuous in its absence (Geisst, 
2009). By ensconcing the TILA in the Federal Reserve, the social power of money 
could be invoked to impose market discipline and order on the emerging landscape 
of credit-led accumulation that was beginning to rise to the surface in the late 1960s 
(Peterson, 2003). 
The TILA was far from neutral legislation. It was designed with an adequate 
number of loopholes for the banks to manoeuvre around the cap on interest rates, 
which was still in place at this time, by adding fees to card balances (Peterson, 
2003). Moreover, by temporally extending card balances into the future under the 
guise of consumer protection, banks were able to generate more revenue. There 
remained a major obstacle to this strategy, however. The credit card industry was 
restricted to charging a limited amount of interest under existing usury laws. In 
1978, the lifting of caps on interest rates through the revision of usury law marked 
a pivotal moment in the credit card industry and the wider poverty industry in 
the United States. The judicial decision served to legitimatise and naturalise, 
through the fetishised understanding of the neutrality of laws, the continual, albeit 
tension-ridden, expansion of fictitious value that drives the poverty industry. 
Expanding fictitious value: lifting caps on usury laws and the 
landmark 1978 Marquette Decision 
Despite the loopholes afforded to the credit card industry by the TILA, the primary 
barrier to making more money from expanding the money-form of revenue (credit) 
remained fixed interest rates, as usury laws were still in effect in most states. The 
McFadden Act of 1927, for instance, granted individual states the authority to govern 
bank branches located within state jurisdiction; prohibited interstate banking; and 
placed usury ceilings on lending institutions (Drysdale and Keest, 2000). Up to 
1978, for instance, banks could charge no more than 2.5 to 3 percent higher than 
the cost incurred in making the loan. 
One of the key tensions underpinning the credit system, namely, the gap between 
credit money and its monetary base opens up here (see Chapter 2). The main 
problem with legal caps on interest rates, for instance, was that they benefitted 
customers if rates rose, putting the risk and opportunity losses squarely on the banks 
that made the loans. Before the regulatory environment would facilitate asset-backed 
securitisation (ABS or securitisation), which I discuss below, banks had to leave 
the loans on their books and manage their own interest rate exposure accordingly. 
These assets (debt) were not sellable and could pose risks to the banks. Their lack 
of flexibility made them unmarketable to a third party (Geisst, 2009). The influential 
American Bankers Association repeatedly lobbied the government not only to lift 
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the ceiling on interest rates but also to allow banks to charge these rates on revolving 
basis thereby creating a minimum balance. In effect, the banks were seeking to 
expand the base of the fictitious value tied to their consumer loans (see Chapter 
2). Before turning to the loosening of usury laws in the United States in the late 
1970s, it is useful to highlight the core legislative features of the credit card industry 
that acted as an impediment to lending to the poor and, subsequently to hedging 
the banks’ gambles through ABS. 
During the latter half of the 1970s, a tension emerged from the tight monetarist 
policies pursed by the Federal Reserve. High interest rates were serving to discipline 
labour to the power of money and protect the value of the dollar. But they also 
threatened to inflict a deathblow to large and highly indebted financial corporations 
such as Citibank. Under the new reign of monetarism, the high interest rates set 
up by the Federal Reserve to fight inflation were greater than the nominal interest 
rates banks were allowed to charge their borrowers. This was due to legal caps on 
interest rates (see Chapter 3). In other words, due to inflation large and powerful 
US banks were suffering from a gap between the legal limit of interest and the 
cost of money. In 1978, the US Supreme Court decision in Marquette National 
Bank vs. First of Omaha Services Corporation played a decisive role in repealing aspects 
of the McFadden Act of 1927, particularly with regard to lifting the caps on interest 
rates (Burgess and Ciolfi, 1986). 
The freeing of privately created money in the form of credit cards occurred 
through the seemingly neutral and arbitrary arena of the legal system, as opposed 
to the more overtly political OCC. Reflecting Harvey’s concept of a spatial fix, 
the Marquette decision effectively allowed lenders in a state with liberal usury 
rates to export those rates to workers residing in states with more restrictive usury 
ceilings thereby breaking through barriers to credit-led accumulation (Ellis, 1998). 
The decision sparked a race among states, particularly less affluent states like South 
Dakota, to attract banks by deregulating their usury caps on interest rates. The 
spatial barriers to accumulation were thus temporarily resolved through the Supreme 
Court. The removal of usury ceilings for national banks expanded access to 
consumer credit and higher level of personal bankruptcies (Ellis, 1998). 
Bankruptcy laws and social discipline: the coercive side of the 
community of money 
Around the same time as usury was legalised, another landmark decision took place, 
namely: the Reform of Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which represented the first 
comprehensive overhaul and replacement of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Among 
the various changes introduced by the Act, was the inclusion of new types of 
bankruptcy to the code, such as Chapter 13, or what is known as ‘individual debt 
adjustment’. In contrast to Chapter 7 of the personal bankruptcy code (i.e., 
liquidation), Chapter 13 provides a longer and more onerous system of repayment 
for distressed debtors (Kirschner and Volpin, 2009). The Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 was, however, highly contested by the American Bankers Association, as 
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it was believed that these new types of bankruptcies, despite their burdensome 
features, would result in more filings (Domowitz and Eovaldi, 1993). Put another 
way, creditors were averse to providing what they viewed as legal safe havens 
for delinquent debtors (i.e., market distortions). As we will see below, bankers 
continued to lobby the state to keep debtors out of bankruptcy protection, 
particularly Chapter 7. 
This 1978 bankruptcy reform was a stark signal that the state was required to 
help mediate and legitimate continual marked-based forms of financial regulation 
and the spatial expansion of consumer credit. As long as the income extracted 
through fees and interest rates remained greater than losses of revenue through 
bankruptcy, credit card issuers were still ahead in terms of income-generation. Yet, 
this form dispossessive capitalism also depended on the constant discipline and social 
reproduction of the surplus population. One of the ultimate acts of disobedience 
(for borrowers) is the breach of the legal contract with their creditors. When this 
contravention occurs, the otherwise equal, voluntary and democratic nature of the 
credit system, asserts its class and coercive nature to protect and sanction the value 
of money and respect for the law. Personal bankruptcy laws are therefore an integral 
feature of the US debtfare state in its attempts at expanding and socially reproducing 
the credit card industry and the poverty industry, more generally. 
Consumer credit was growing quickly among the lower socio-economic groups 
of society throughout the 1980s (see Table 4.4). From 1989 to 2001, for example, 
credit card debt among low-income families grew by an astonishing 184 percent 
(Dēmos, 2003). At the same time, however and despite the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, personal bankruptcies continued to rise alongside poverty rates, 
unemployment rates and interest rates (Mishel and Bernstein, 1994; Dickerson, 
2008). According to many legal scholars and industry observers, a key cause of 
these personal bankruptcies was workers becoming dependent on revolving credit 
card debt to help finance basic subsistence needs during hard economic times 
(Moore, 2009). The demographics of personal bankruptcies represent those groups 
and classes that were most vulnerable prior to entering into a contract with credit 
cards and other forms of consumer debt. African-American and Latino workers 
are 500 percent more likely than white homeowners to find themselves in 
bankruptcy. Other groups likely to file for bankruptcy are laid-off workers, whose 
numbers are rising; and older Americans, who are now the fastest-growing age 
group in bankruptcy (Rodriguez, 2007; Dymski, 2010; Traub and Ruetschlin, 2012; 
see Table 4.5). 
The rise in personal bankruptcies over the 1980s also revealed that the limits 
of capital accumulation based on the money-form of revenue were re-emerging. 
As Marx reminds us, credit money is both ‘the saviour of accumulation’ and ‘the 
fountainhead of all manner of insane forms’ because credit ‘suspends the barriers 
to the realisation of capital only by raising them to their most general form’ 
(cited in Harvey, 1999: 270, 286). The expansion of the credit card industry to 
include the working poor thus accentuates the contradictions of capitalism by, 
for instance, increasing secondary forms of exploitation through the expansion of 
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the money-form of revenue, which in turn depends on the future employment 
earnings of the surplus population (see Chapter 2). The ability of indebted surplus 
workers to meet minimum monthly payments on their credit cards depends, 
however, on their ability to earn wages in the realm of production – the sphere 
of capitalism where credit money is unable to resolve contradictions (Harvey, 1999). 
Despite high earnings, the American Bankers’ Association pressured the Clinton 
Administration (1993–2001) to impose tougher forms of market discipline to make 
bankruptcy less attractive to distressed debtors. The debtfare state responded by 
enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which occurred a year prior to the 
draconian welfare reforms known as the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation (or, PRWORA), which launched the workfare state 
(Peck, 2001; Wacquant, 2009; see discussion in Chapter 3). Rising levels of 
impoverishment due to stagnant wages and rising costs of living were reflected in 
the rise of credit card debt among the poor a year after PRWORA was imple­
mented. Studies show that ‘in 1995, more than one in eight poor households 
had credit card debt greater than twice as large as monthly income. More than 
one in six had credit card debt as large as monthly income or larger’ (Bird et al., 
1997: 11). 
Among various changes made to the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1994, 
consumers were encouraged to file under Chapter 13 (reorganisation of debts) rather 
than use Chapter 7 (discharge all debts), thereby aiding creditors in recovering claims 
against bankrupt estates (Ausubel, 1997). Making Chapter 7 a more difficult option 
for dispossessed debtors, these bankruptcy reforms were designed to benefit the 
banking cartel, while allowing creditors more time (as an expression of the social 
power of money) to impose market discipline and extract payments. As we will 
see below, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 would only deepen the tensions 
of credit-led accumulation. In the aftermath of the Act, for example, credit card 
delinquency rates exceeded 3.5 percent, the highest level since 1973, when statistics 
were first collected. Notwithstanding this development, the profit margins of major 
banks issuing credit cards continued to widen (Ausubel, 1997). 
TABLE 4.4 Percent of families holding credit card balances, 1983 and 1989 
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Taken together, these various pieces of legislation acted to expand the 
democratisation of credit, alongside the continual dismantling of the social welfare 
state and the lack of secure, high-wage jobs in the productive realm. This played 
an integral role in constructing a social reality that dragged poorer workers into a 
growing reliance on private provisioning (e.g., credit cards) to augment and/or 
replace not only their social wages but also essential services no longer provided 
by the welfare state (Stegman and Faris, 2005; Karger, 2005; see Table 4.5). More 
importantly, the expansion of the democratisation of credit also ensured that a larger 
segment of the surplus population would be contained, disciplined and socially 
reproduced. It is within this context that the US debtfare state begins to emerge 
and build upon the previous rhetorical and regulative landscape discussed above. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, credit can resolve tensions in the realm of exchange 
only. Thus, for the credit card industry to ensure future income streams from a 
large number of debtors holding maxed out credit cards with high interest rates 
TABLE 4.5 Credit cards in the income distribution, 1983–1995* 
1983 1989 1992 1995 
Income below poverty line 
Percentage owning at least 1 card 18.4 22.5 36.6 38.9 
Among them: 
Average number of cards 2.5 3.0 2.9 3.1 
Percentage carrying a balance 58.7 54.1 71.7 68.1 
Average balance 723 352 917 1,347 
100–150% of poverty line 
Percentage owning at least 1 card 39.9 50.4 61.9 58.3 
Among them: 
Average number of cards 3.2 3.7 3.8 3.9 
Percentage carrying a balance 52.6 61.9 65.8 75.8 
Average balance 449 948 1,100 2,070 
150–200% of poverty line 
Percentage owning at least 1 card 52.7 60.8 73.6 71.3 
Among them: 
Average number of cards 3.1 3.9 4.0 4.2 
Percentage carrying a balance 56.7 62.0 69.9 63.2 
Average balance 488 1,291 1,098 1,409 
Source: Bird, et al. (1997) Credit Cards and the Poor, University of Wisconsin-Madison: Institute for 
Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 1148–97, p. 10. 
*All money figures are in real 1995 dollars. Data from Federal Reserve Board, Survey on Consumer 
Finances, 1995. 
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there must be a possibility for these workers to earn wages to service their 
debt. This situation cannot be directly mediated or controlled by either the credit 
card industry or the debtfare state. The tensions emerging from this can be miti ­
gated by the debtfare state by facilitating ongoing forms of market-led discipline 
as well as the displacement of these contradictions through temporal deferral or 
geographical expansion, or what Harvey refers to as a spatio-temporal fix (Harvey, 
2001). 
Debtfarism and spatio-temporal fixes: expanding fictitious 
value and reproducing the credit card industry 
Displacement of risk through time and (digitalised) spaces of 
expanding fictitious value: asset-backed securitisation 
The key to making money from money in the credit card business does not involve 
collecting the original loan, but extracting the highest levels of interest and fees 
possible from the greatest number of people for the longest period of time. To 
remain viable, credit card issuers require a steady and rising number of workers 
who not only are willing (forced) to incur debt but who also may be charged the 
highest interest rate possible for the longest time possible, i.e., subprime borrowers. 
The limits involved in this form of accumulation, which is largely driven by credit 
money and its gamble with the future, requires hedging (mitigating risks). Breaking 
the barriers also entails devising ways to more rapidly extend credit to an increasing 
number of workers, particularly since credit card companies are not receiving the 
original amount lent out to the revolvers. The cash flow from interest and fee 
payments is also partly interrupted by the steady increase of personal bankruptcies. 
The temporal fix devised by capitalists and facilitated by the debtfare state involves 
asset-backed securitisation (transforming illiquid assets into tradeable securities) and 
the creation of the swap markets (trading debt for something based on future cash 
flows) (Kothari, 2006; Elul, 2005). Reflecting the rise of credit card lending to the 
surplus population, the first case of credit card securitisation occurred in 1986, but 
it began to gain momentum in the late 1990s and took off in the 2000s. This was 
true of other forms of asset-backed securitisation of non-collateralised consumer 
debt, such as student loan securitisations (Chapter 5). The securitisation of credit 
cards helps to resolve the contradictions in the money-form of revenue through 
a temporal fix in which the originator of the credit card loans (banks) are able, 
with lightening speed, to transform this debt into a commodity (inclusive of fictitious 
value) and sell it (e.g., within a matter of hours or days) to various institutional 
investors (e.g., equity firms or pension and mutual funds) before the first minimum 
payment on the credit card falls due (e.g., 30 days). The particular form of credit 
money, coupled with information technology and algorithmic trading, allows for 
accelerated temporality in the buying and selling of credit card debt in what Saskia 
Sassen refers to as digitalised spaces of global finance (Harvey, 1989: 194; Sassen, 
2006). 
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This temporal displacement also involves strategies and actors straddling the 
virtual-real geographic divide. The annihilation of space by time in the attempts 
to win the gamble with the future entails new actors, new strategies and the continual 
inversion of time and the expansion of virtual space to continue to fund claims 
on the fictitious value of credit. The temporal fix represented by credit card 
securitisation is represented by the over-the-counter credit derivative market (a 
largely deregulated market where investors purchase stocks and bonds from other 
investors as opposed to the issuing corporations). Most notably, these derivatives 
include collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs).13 
These instruments have taken securitisation to new levels of temporal displacement. 
Like credit card securitisations, they ‘possess no market price or pricing mechanism 
– beyond the say-so of the rating agencies [fictitious value]’ (Gowan, 2010: 60). 
According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the CDS market 
exploded to more than $45 trillion in mid-2007. This represents roughly ‘twice 
the size of the US stock market (which is valued at about $22 trillion and falling) 
and far exceeds the $7.1 trillion mortgage market and $4.4 trillion US treasuries 
market’ (‘Credit Default Swaps: the next crisis? Time, 17 March 2008). According 
to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2013), notional amounts of CDS 
amounted to $25 trillion at the end of 2012. Regardless of these staggering 
numbers, it must be kept in mind that the real geographies underlying the digitised 
(virtual) spaces of asset-backed securitisation are constructed by people whose power 
derives from the regulatory structures ensuring finance is allowed to thrive, operate 
and reproduce (Sassen, 2006; Mitchell, 2008). 
Banks engage in securitisation as a way to overcome the tensions involved in 
generating income from credit money. Securitisation facilitates temporal and 
spatial displacements that allow banks to shift loans off the balance sheet by selling 
them to outside institutional investors, such as pension and mutual funds. In this 
way, the problems involved in the future gamble with credit money are resolved 
by displacing them onto other people. The credit card issuers, for example, receive 
money from selling the loan (workers’ debt) in order to be able to invest in more 
poor and low-income workers. On the demand side, institutional investors are eager 
to purchase credit card asset-backed securitises because they believe these will pro ­
vide profitable revenue streams. It is useful to consider the reasons driving this 
belief, as they reveal not only the standards upon which the price of credit money 
(workers’ commodified debt) is calculated, but also the unequal relations of power 
involved in credit card debt. 
Credit card companies have at their disposal many coercive instruments to 
ensure that debtors make payments on a timely and regular basis. According to 
the Deutsche Bank, for instance, credit card issuers are able to increase yield on 
an existing portfolio by changing the financing rate charged and by altering late 
fees, over-limit fees and annual fees – all of which can be quite large. Credit card 
issuers (banks) can also reduce their risk by either closing accounts or pre-emptively 
lowering a cardholder’s credit line. Moreover, as we saw in Table 4.1, the credit 
card industry is highly concentrated – larger players have economies of scale and 
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TABLE 4.6 Concentration of US top credit card issuers, 2000–2008 
Year Mergers and acquisitions 
2000 Chase Manhattan Bank merges with JP Morgan & Co. to form JPMorgan 
Chase Bank 
2004 Bank One Corporation merged with JP Morgan Chase and Company 
2004 FleetBoston Financial Corp. merged with Bank of America 
2005 Washington Mutual acquires Providian Financial, which is a major subprime 
credit card issuer 
2006 MBNA Corporation acquired by Bank of America 
2008 Discover purchases Diners Club 
2008 JP Morgan Chase purchases Washington Mutual and thus owns former accounts 
of Providian 
as part of larger banking networks also the advantage of scope (Kothari, 2006: 388). 
As Table 4.6 depicts, since 2000 the banking sector became increasingly centralised 
and concentrated, largely due to lax regulation by the debtfare state that consolidated 
power in the credit card industry. 
Expanding the poverty industry: the undocumented and the 
newly bankrupted 
Aside from its ability to invert time and to expand into more abstract (and thus 
less visible and depoliticised spaces) in order to offset risk and generate interest 
income, the credit card industry has also continually sought to expand its debtor 
base by tapping into the unbanked and underbanked sectors of the surplus 
population. 
In an incessant search for income, credit card issuers began to enlist more debtors 
from the unbanked and underbanked categories, which still provide an untapped 
market. According to a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) publication, 
National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, an estimated 9 million 
American households, in which 17 million adults reside, are considered unbanked. 
This refers to individuals who do not have accounts at banks or other mainstream 
(formal) financial institutions. According to the FDIC, 21 million individuals may 
be classified as underbanked, which describes a category of people who hold a 
chequing or savings account but are dependent on alternative financial services, 
such as payday loans, pawnshops, rent-to-own facilities and so forth (FDIC, 2009: 
3; Rivlan, 2010). Predictably, both unbanked and underbanked workers are largely 
comprised of poor and low-income, ethnic and racial minorities as well as single-
headed households (single mothers), which operate primarily, if not exclusively, 
with cash forms of money (FDIC, 2009). 
Precisely because of their relative poverty, such households are identified as a 
sizeable market for the extension of formalised debt. According to a 2008 study 
conducted by the Centre for Financial Services Innovation (CFSI) and co-sponsored 
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by Citibank, Fidelity National Information Services, H&R Block and MasterCard, 
approximately 106 million individuals (40 million households) are unbanked and 
underbanked, representing billions of dollars of potential income. Among the 
individuals interviewed by CFSI, 41 percent were unemployed, 11 percent held 
part-time employment and 47 percent held full-time employment. Moreover, 
25 percent of the respondents registered credit scores that were considered prime, 
while 42 percent had thin or no credit history (and thus could not be ‘scored’), 
whereas 33 percent of the respondents were considered subprime (Centre for 
Financial Services Innovation, 2008). 
As an example of this expansion of formal credit operations into informal 
spaces, the big banks that run the credit card industry have been targeting the 
approximately 10 to 20 million undocumented workers in the United States (Moore, 
2009). Undocumented workers, like the surplus population in general, are not a 
homog eneous entity. Indeed, some illegal migrants earn enough money to place 
them squarely in the middle class.14 Regardless of their income differentials, all 
undocumented workers usually live in a constant state of fear of deportation and 
police harassment, endure the stigma of being classified as an outsider/non-citizen 
and must cope with varying levels of economic insecurity. This susceptibility, 
combined with the burden of debt creates a well-disciplined labour force and a 
potentially lucrative clientele for credit card companies. According to a story in 
the Wall Street Journal, Bank of America has been offering credit cards to customers 
who don’t have a Social Security number and who are usually undocumented 
immigrants. The credit cards are not cheap. They carry interest rates that typically 
hover at 21 percent and the fees attached to these cards are hefty. Observers estimate 
that card companies generate $4 billion to $5 billion annually through fees for 
financial services paid by the surplus population.15 
This strategy of extending the democratisation of credit to undocumented 
workers allows the banks to break through barriers to capital accumulation while 
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enticing ‘non-citizens’ to become part of the community of money, where they 
can experience (temporarily) formal equality and freedom. This also allows illegal 
workers to build a credit history so they can purchase cars, homes and other big-
ticket items on credit (‘Bank of America Casts Wider Net for Hispanics’, 13 February 
2007, Wall Street Journal). Again, the state plays a paradoxical role in terms of its 
support for the expansion of the community of money. On the one hand, it must 
be actively seen to clamp down on illegal immigrants and thereby to feed the social 
construction of protecting the interests of the American worker by demonising 
the ‘other’. At the same time, the state’s highly visible and coercive crackdowns 
on illegal workers serve to instil constant fear and, by extension, discipline among 
this segment of the surplus population (‘Illegal-immigration crackdown on Chipotle 
restaurants could hurt workers, activist says’, LA Times, 7 February 2011). On the 
other hand, the state has stepped in to ensure that undocumented workers pay 
taxes through the single taxpayer identification number (ITIN) issued by the Internal 
Revenue Service and have access to formal banking facilities, such as credit cards, 
mortgages and so forth in order to allow them to function at the bare minimum 
as market citizens (‘Embracing Illegals: companies are getting hooked on the buying 
power of 11 million undocumented immigrants’, BusinessWeek, 18 July 2005). 
If this were not enough, the 2008 credit crisis in the United States presented 
opportunities to make money from another segment of the surplus population: the 
newly bankrupted. Workers facing foreclosures on their homes, including, as we 
will see below, the recently bankrupted, represent a potential source of income 
for credit card companies, particularly with regard to the fees and interests that 
can be earned through the issuance of secured credit cards. Secured credit cards 
require borrowers to guarantee the credit line in order to avoid default by supplying 
cash collateral through an escrowed savings account. These cards also come with 
extremely high interest rates and fees (Karger, 2005). Dispossessed workers turn to 
these sources of credit as they have no savings, no assets, no health insurance and 
for the most part do not earn a living wage. Although the default rate is high for 
secured cards, the combination of low lines of credit and extremely high interest 
rates and fees (e.g., origination fees, late fees, etc.) means that banks can still make 
a lot of money (Karger, 2005). It should be noted that the secured credit cards (or, 
subprime credit cards) are not an exclusive feature of the fringe economy. Some of 
the largest banks, such as Bank of America, Chase and Citigroup, have and continue 
to engage in the extremely lucrative and growing business of subprime credit card 
lending (‘A big lenders credit card trap’, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 12 June 2006). 
As an increasing number of subprime debtors started to default on their 
mortgages in 2007, credit card issuers increased their efforts to sign up such customers 
despite their tarnished financial histories. Direct mail credit card offers to subprime 
customers in the United States jumped 41 percent in the first half of 2007, 
compared with the first half of 2006, while direct mail offers targeted at customers 
with the best credit fell more than 13 percent. As home values decline and banks 
are turning away from issuing subprime mortgages, structurally dispossessed workers 
can no longer raise cash by tapping into their home equity. The only option left 
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to these indebted workers can be credit cards. In an effort to distort and depoliticise 
the class nature of the subprime housing fiasco, the key lobby group for the credit 
card industry, the American Bankers Association (ABA), justifies direct mail offers 
in terms of market competition, saying they represent an attempt to lure customers 
who have credit cards away from competitors, which means better rates and terms 
for borrowers. According to an ABA senior economist, ‘Consumers should be 
grateful that we have a very competitive market’ (‘Credit card companies woo 
struggling mortgage-holders’, The Boston Globe, 4 September 2007). 
It bears repeating that credit money temporarily resolves some of the paradoxes 
in capital accumulation while triggering more tensions. Among the core reasons 
for the inability of credit to permanently resolve the paradoxes of capital 
accumulation is the fact that privately created money must return to its origins for 
redemption. That is, despite the temporal and spatial fixes discussed above with 
regard to ABS and the expansion of the market to include more precarious 
workers, credit can resolve tensions only in the realm of exchange, not in the entire 
capital accumulation process. Because of this, the paradoxes that the US debtfare 
state will be required to mediate and depoliticise to guarantee the expansion and 
reproduction of the credit card industry, as well as the ongoing discipline of the 
surplus population, will also be aimed at the realm of exchange. Interestingly, both 
of the following cases of state interventions into the poverty industry are premised 
on invoking the trope of consumer protection, while more fully exposing workers 
to the discipline of the market expressed in terms of lower credit scores, higher 
interest rates, denial of credit, late fees and so forth. 
State protection for banks and market discipline for distressed 
debtors: the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA) 
The G. W. Bush Administration (2001–2009) enacted the draconian Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (or, BAPCPA) in April 2005. 
The push for the BAPCPA was driven by the insistence of credit card issuers ‘that 
the extraordinary increase in bankruptcy filings [over the past 30 years] is the 
consequences of declining stigma and “too-easy” protection of moral slackers, who 
refuse to pay their debts’ (Sullivan et al., 2006: 214). The BAPCPA, which made 
major changes to the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act, was seemingly created to 
protect creditors from bad market citizens, that is from consumer abuse and lack 
of financial responsibility (Mann, 2006). For its supporters, including the American 
Bankers Association and the US Chamber of Commerce, the statute would benefit 
both creditors and consumers equally. By making the option of personal bankruptcy 
less appealing for workers, its promoters argued that the BAPCPA would serve to 
reduce the losses by creditors and would therefore benefit consumers (workers) by 
lowering the cost of credit. The key point remains, however, that the record profits 
registered by credit card companies have never translated into lower costs to credit 
card debtors (Simkovic, 2009). 
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Aside from augmenting the income of credit card issuers (banks), the BAPCPA 
serves at least two purposes in terms of reproducing and legitimating credit-led 
accumulation by dispossession. On the one hand, the BAPCPA exposes dispossessed 
workers and their families to more pronounced and prolonged market discipline 
through debt management plans. On the other hand, as one legal scholar has astutely 
suggested, the statute ‘facilitate[s] the credit card lending business model, by 
slowing the time of inevitable filings by the deeply distressed and allowing issuers 
to earn greater revenues from those individuals’ (Mann, 2006: 375–6). Expressed 
differently, the BAPCPA allows credit card issuers a longer period of time to extract 
income from debt servicing revenues paid by distressed workers who are not yet 
in bankruptcy (Mann, 2006). The BAPCPA, for instance, not only increased the 
costs to file for bankruptcy, but also removed the right of debtors to choose between 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy (which discharges all debts) and Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
(requiring a repayment plan). If workers wish to file under Chapter 7, they must 
subject themselves to and pass, an intrusive and humiliating means test; if the debtor 
fails the means test, the bankruptcy must be filed under Chapter 13, if filed at all 
(Moore, 2009: 430). For that reason, it is viewed here as an integral expression of 
the debtfare state. 
The BAPCPA reflects the power of money and its ability to impose market 
discipline by removing the right of self-determination by debtors to propose their 
own repayment plans. Under Chapter 13, for instance, debtfare determines how 
much a debtor must repay, based on their disposable income for five years, thereby 
also lengthening the repayment plan from three years. BAPCPA defines ‘disposable 
income as the difference between debtors’ average monthly family income during 
the six months prior to filing and a new income exemption’. The definition of 
disposable income is based on the determination by the Internal Revenue Services 
of an allowance for living expenses for each debtor (Moore, 2009: 430–1). The 
immediate effects of this particular definition of disposable income threatens the 
most vulnerable, namely, children and single mothers, as it allows more non-child­
support debts to survive bankruptcy (e.g., credit card and auto loans) (Karger, 2005; 
Roberts, 2013). 
The BAPCPA also permits creditors (banks) to threaten debtors with costly 
litigation. Debtors, many of whom cannot afford to defend themselves in court, 
will be coerced into giving up their legal rights (Karger, 2005: 192). Other 
examples of the imposition of market discipline, disempowerment and stigmatisa­
tion from the community of money enabled by the BAPCPA include making it 
easier for a residential landlord to evict a tenant who is in bankruptcy, even if the 
tenant has paid back rent (Karger, 2005: 193). In addition, under BAPCPA 
bankruptcy judges are not permitted to waive the means test even if the debtor 
has experienced a circumstance, such as a medical emergency (Karger, 2005: 192; 
Coco, 2012). 
A final manner in which the social power of money by credit card issuers imposes 
discipline and thereby assists in socially reproducing credit-led accumulation is 
through the increased and legitimated role the BAPCPA granted to credit 
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counseling agencies (or, CCAs) (Karger, 2005). Briefly, the CCA industry is financed 
through a mechanism called Fair Share. Under this policy, credit card issuers volun ­
tarily return a percentage of each payment they receive through a debt management 
plan (or, DMP). If the DMP is accepted, the credit card companies may waive 
late and other fees and grant a lower interest rate. Although monthly payments 
are slightly reduced, the full balance is still owed and interest continues to accrue 
during the repayment period, which usually takes four to five years and has a high 
failure rate (only 26 percent of debtors complete DMPs) (Stehl, 1999; Karger, 2005: 
177). However, in keeping with Mann’s (2006) aforementioned observation, the 
DMPs, like the BAPCPA, allow for an extended period of time for credit card 
companies to receive payment on interest. Moreover, non-revolving debts, such 
as mortgages and auto loans, are rarely consolidated, which in turn has led to 
dangerous trade-offs whereby credit cards are given priority over homes and cars 
– two assets most workers require for shelter and work (Karger, 2005: 177). 
The BAPCPA represented a huge win for credit card issuers. The banks were 
able to avert a number of legislative reforms demanded by various consumer 
advocacy groups that would have dampened the banks income-generating strategies, 
such as dramatically cutting fees and limiting abusive marketing tactics (‘In victory 
for Bush, House approves Bankruptcy Bill’, New York Times, 14 April 2005). 
Revolving debt per household showed its highest rate of increase in five years 
during the first year after BAPCPA. The reform, however, was not able to resolve 
the underlying tension of dispossessive capitalism, for while the bankruptcy rate 
decreased sharply after the law went into effect, it increased quickly thereafter: ‘By 
the end of 2007, the US bankruptcy rate exceeded all levels recorded during the 
1980s, approached the levels prevalent during the early 1990s and exceeded more 
than half of the level before the passage of the new law’ (Weller et al. 2008: 1). 
According to the 2010 year-end filings report of the National Bankruptcy 
Research Centre, for example, ‘data show that filings for 2010 finished just above 
1,500,000 [or, 1 in 150 people] about nine percent more than in 2009 and the 
highest since the two-million-plus filings in 2005’ (National Bankruptcy Research 
Centre, 2011: 1). The 2005 bankruptcy legislation was also unable to mitigate the 
use of Chapter 7 (liquidation) and encourage the use of Chapter 13 (rescheduling), 
which further highlights the plight of dispossessed workers caught in the exploitative 
web of the high-debt, high-interest modus operandi of dispossessive capitalism. Indeed, 
there has been a continued decline in the use of Chapter 13 (only 28 percent of 
the filings in 2010) and ongoing prevalence of Chapter 7 (National Bankruptcy 
Research Centre, 2011: 2; Coco, 2012). 
The Credit CARD Act of 2009: more consumer protection in the 
community of money 
In the wake of the subprime debacle in 2007, increased foreclosures, rising levels 
of unemployment and general discontent over the massive corporate bailout 
by taxpayers, the credit card industry was thrust into the political spotlight again. 
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In May 2009, the Obama Administration implemented the Credit Card Account­
ability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act (or, Credit CARD Act).16 The Credit 
CARD Act was described by the White House as sweeping reform aimed at pro ­
tecting consumers by ensuring that credit card companies act responsibly, upholding 
basic standards of fairness, transparency and accountability (White House, 2009). 
Tellingly, the OCC – the key regulatory agency responsible for banks – once again 
faded into the background. Instead, the Credit CARD Act of 2009 involved an 
amendment to Regulation Z of the aforementioned Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 
which is to be carried out by Federal Reserve (Dickerson, 2008; ‘Press release’, 
Federal Reserve, 29 September 2009).17 
On the surface, the Credit CARD Act appears to be a stronger version of 
previous attempts to mitigate certain practices of credit card issuers; for example 
in provisions for a 45-day notice if the terms of the card change and no interest 
rate increases in the first year. There are at least three reasons why we should 
be wary of the above positive spin given to the honeymoon phase of the Credit 
CARD Act. 
First, in its attempts to protect consumers from predatory lenders, the Credit 
CARD Act only prevents issuers from raising rates retroactively. In other words, 
credit card issuers remain free to charge whatever rate they want at the start of the 
contract (Manning, 2000). While this has important ramifications for both secured 
and unsecured credit cards, workers, who only qualify for secured cards (e.g., illegal 
migrants, newly bankrupted, etc.), are particularly vulnerable to extremely high 
rates. In September 2010, Premier Bankcard of South Dakota mailed test offers of 
79.9 and 59.9 annual percentage rates (APR) on credit cards with a $300 limit. 
The high APRs were justified by the risk-based pricing rationale. According to 
the CEO of Premier Bankcard, ‘We need to price our product based on the risk 
associated with this market and allow the customer to make the decision whether 
they want the product or not’ (‘Credit CARD Act: one year later, how’s it going?’ 
Daily Finance, 3 June 2011; ‘Issuer of 79.9 percent interest rate credit card defends 
its product’, CreditCards.com, 12 February 2010). Premier Bankcard reported that 
the 79.9 percent APR was very popular with workers who have bad credit ratings. 
However, the card ultimately, and unsurprisingly, performed poorly. For example, 
‘A lot of the people ran up the card, defaulted and went directly to charge off.’ 
Since then, nearly 700,000 people have signed up for the 59.9 percent card – and 
more than half of them carry a monthly balance’ (‘My card had a 79.9 percent 
APR’, CNN.money, 14 February 2011). Again, it should be underlined here that 
in 2009 the Federal Reserve funds rate, or the interest rate at which the Federal 
Reserve lends money to commercial banks, stood at 0.16 percent.18 
Second, while the Credit CARD Act has mitigated some of the predatory 
tendencies and excesses within the credit card industry, its most profitable feature, 
namely usurious interest ceilings, have remained untouched. Nor has the Credit 
CARD Act stopped banks from preying on the most vulnerable segments of society. 
On the contrary, the Credit CARD Act may have scaled back, minimally, 
predatory aspects of the credit card industry, such as placing a cap on fees. Its most 
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salient feature, however, has been to legitimate the usurious practices of credit cards 
by providing a false sense of regulatory protection by the debtfare state. Various 
observers have suggested that the Credit CARD Act has made consumer credit 
‘safer and more transparent while interest rates and fees have stabilised since its 
passage in 2009’ (Pew, 2011). Although interest rates stabilised in 2010, the spread 
between the prime rate set by the Federal Reserve (3.25 percent) and the average 
APR (on unsecured cards) at 14.06 percent was the widest in the past two decades 
(‘A new landscape for credit cards’, Wall Street Journal, 23 January 2011). 
According to Pew’s latest analysis, for example, the median advertised interest 
rates for bank credit cards ranged from 12.99 to 20.99 percent, depending on a 
consumer’s credit history, remained unchanged from 2010 (Pew, 2011). In Table 
4.7, I compare Pew data collected on APR and various fees issued by the 12 largest 
banks in the US, which account for about 90 percent of credit card outstandings 
(balance remaining on cards), prior to and after the enactment of the Credit CARD 
Act of 2009. 
The Pew analysis is important as it serves to legitimate dispossessive practices 
by the credit card industry by naturalising and normalising usurious interest rates. 
It seems to buy into the regulatory hype of the debtfare state regarding consumer 
protection instead of grasping that the Credit CARD Act offers minor tweaking 
to the cannibalistic practices of the credit card industry’s ongoing attempts to expand 
and intensify an exploitative form of credit-led accumulation (see Chapter 2). The 
Credit CARD Act allows credit card companies enough leeway to wiggle through 
the regulations. 
As with its predecessor, the TILA, the Credit CARD Act ultimately reproduces 
fetishised sentiments of formal freedom and equality as well as individual 
TABLE 4.8 Credit card annual interest rates (APRs) and fees, 2008–2009 and 2010–2011a 
Median fee or charge December 2008 July 2009 March 2010– 
January 2011 
US prime rateb 3.25 percent 3.25 percent 3.25 percent 
Purchase APR 9.99–15.99 percent 12.24–17.99 percent 12.99 percent 
Cash advance APR N/A 20.24–21.24 percent 20.99 percent 
Penalty APR 27.99 percent 28.99 percent 24.24 percent 
Late fee $39 $39 $35 
Over-limit fee $39 $39 $35 
Cash advance fee N/A 3 percent 4 percent 
a The Pew Health Group (2011) ‘A New Equilibrium: After Passage of Landmark Credit Card Reform, 
Interest Rates and Fees have stabilized’ (May). Available at: www.pewtrusts.org/ . . . /Reports/Credit_ 
Cards/Report_Equilibrium_web.pdf (accessed 26 May 2011). 
b Wall Street Journal Prime Rate History. Available at: www.wsjprimerate.us (accessed 26 May 2011). 
Source: The Pew Health Group (2009) ‘Still Waiting: “Unfair or Deceptive” Credit Card Practices 
Continue as American Wait for New Reforms to Take Effect’, The Pew Charitable Trusts, October. 
Available at: www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_detail.aspx?id=630 (accessed 26 May 2011). 
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responsibilisation (consumer beware!). That is, it looks for solutions in the realm 
of the market, as opposed to demanding rigorous state-led regulation that would 
put a cap on interest rates and ensure higher minimum wage laws, well-funded 
public housing, health, welfare and education programmes and so forth. The Credit 
CARD Act is thus designed to normalise the exploitative role (high-debt, high-
interest) of credit cards in the everyday lives of workers, particularly the working 
poor and structurally dispossessed. It also presents credit card issuers as willing partners 
in empowering, as opposed to protecting, consumers. According to Kenneth J. 
Clayton, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for the American Bankers 
Association card policy, ‘The bottom line is this: the credit card industry is 
changing and these new rules will help empower consumers to take control of 
their personal finances.’19 
Third, for some observers, the Credit CARD Act has created some relief for 
distressed credit card debtors. As Table 4.3 shows, some families and individuals 
have indeed managed to pay down their balances through traditional means such 
as tax refunds, working extra hours and tapping into their savings (Traub and 
Ruetschlin, 2012). These figures must be understood in the wider context that 
approximately $193.3 billion of this credit card debt was charged off (i.e., a 
declaration by a credit card company that a specific amount of debt is unlikely to 
be collected) by issuers from 2009 through the third quarter of 2011, according 
to the most recent data available from CardHub.com. Banks, moreover, have written 
off billions in bad debt, which helps create a deceptively rosy-looking picture. 
According to Federal Reserve data, credit cards have the highest level of charge­
offs compared to other forms of consumer debt and were particularly high from 
2009 to 2011.20 Dēmos cites Federal Reserve data showing that revolving credit 
dropped from $965.5 billion in 2009 to $798.6 billion in 2012 (Traub and 
Ruetschlin, 2012). With labour markets shedding jobs and credit markets tightening 
in the aftermath of the subprime housing fiasco, from 2009 to 2012, 39 percent 
of households, particularly low-income households ($25,000 to $50,000), which 
tend to suffer from higher levels of credit card debt, have either had credit lines 
cut or reduced, or been denied new credit, while 48 percent cut their spending 
as a result of increased economic pressure from the downturn. The surplus 
population would spend more to meet basic survival needs if they had access to 
more credit. Dēmos survey respondents, for example, have more debt in 2012 
than they did in 2009 and fewer resources for paying it off (Traub and Ruetschlin, 
2012). 
To summarise this section: The Credit CARD Act may be seen as an attempt 
by the debtfare state to address the underlying tensions in credit-led accumulation, 
while at the same time guaranteeing the illusion of a naturally evolving, level, 
objective and individualised playing field in which consumers are protected from 
practices that run counter to freedom, democracy and equality. In reality, the Act 
traps people in the community of money. Furthermore, the Credit CARD Act, 
like BAPCPA, remains focused on and framed in, the sphere of exchange, where 
the social power of credit and the debtfare interventions that undergird them are 
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aimed at socially disciplining surplus labour to the exigencies of the market as well 
as neutralising the class nature of secondary exploitation upon which the credit 
card industry is predicated. 
Concluding remarks 
As increasing numbers of poor and low-income workers rely on highly exploitative, 
corporate forms of social welfare and wage replacement/augmentation, so too have 
political modes of domination undergone a transformation, particularly in the face 
of growing levels of impoverishment and dispossession. In my attempts at 
denaturalising and politicising the credit card industry in the wider processes of 
credit-led accumulation, I have suggested that the rhetorical and regulative features 
of the US debtfare state play a strategic role in constructing, mediating the tensions 
within, and socially reproducing the credit card industry. By extension, these features 
also serve to discipline the surplus population to the exigencies of the market. The 
debtfare state has allowed the credit card industry to overcome the barriers inherent 
to forms of accumulation involving the expansion of the money-form of revenue 
by facilitating continual spatio-temporal fixes. These fixes, however, are not only 
temporary but also inherently paradoxical in nature, demanding further intervention 
by the debtfare state. 
Credit cards are an important feature of the flourishing poverty industry in the 
United States. But they are neither the only sector, nor the largest segment of the 
poverty industry. In the next chapter, we turn to the role of the debtfare state in 
facilitating the meteoric rise of the student loan industry, gripping ever more 
members of the surplus population. 
Notes 
1 Credit cards have a long history in the US economy. In 1946, for example, the popular 
instalment credit plan (Manning, 2000) was replaced with the first credit card, the Charg-
It plan. The Charg-It was followed by cards that were broader in scope in terms of uses, 
but were still casting a relatively small net of potential borrowers. These cards offered 
profitable but simple payment facilities: ‘The balance had to be paid in full before credit 
was extended again’ (Geisst, 2009: 62). 
2 Banks specialising in credit cards have been much more profitable than banks in general. 
According to 2007 data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the 
return on equity was 15.1 percent for credit card banks, compared to 8.2 percent for 
all banks. Consumers Union (2009) ‘Credit Card Facts and Stats’, 21 May. Available at: 
http://consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/credit-card-facts-stats.pdf 
(accessed 3 January 2012). 
3 Initial Public Offerings refer to the ‘first sale of stock by a private company to the public. 
IPOs are often issued by smaller, younger companies seeking the capital to expand, but 
can also be done by large privately owned companies looking to become publicly traded’. 
Available at: www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp (accessed 3 May 2011). 
4 About 56 percent of consumers carried an unpaid balance in the past 12 months. ‘The 
Survey of Consumer Payment Choice’, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, January 2010. 
Read more at: www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-industry-facts­
personal-debt-statistics-1276.php#ixzz1O8TUFoUJ (accessed 7 January 2014). 
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5 Ibid. 
6 It will be recalled from our discussion in Chapter 2 that Marx’s concept of the surplus 
population encompasses underemployed and unemployed. Counting both categories 
that comprise the surplus population has been fraught with many shortcomings. For 
instance, the government measures unemployment by the number of workers receiving 
unemployment benefits. This method, however, is misleading, since unemployment 
benefits expire. The US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) is also based on a limited sample 
size of its monthly surveys on 60,000 households (out of approximately 115 million 
households in the country) (see US Department of Labour, 2009; US Bureau of the 
Census, 2012). The BLS surveys, like the federal government unemployment reports, 
fail to account for those no longer looking for a job, largely out of despair and/or other 
factors (child or elderly care, illness, and so forth). 
7 Government definitions of poverty are also extremely problematic. According to its critics, 
the poverty line is simply too low, and does not adequately capture families and individuals 
who are unable to meet basic needs. As Jeannette Wicks-Lim points out, the official 
poverty line has been changed – augmented by the Supplemental Poverty Measure in 
2011 – only once since it was established half a century ago (‘Undercounting the Poor: 
The US’s new, but only marginally improved, poverty measure’, Dollars & Sense, 
May/June 2013). However, the categories of low-income and poor are consistent with 
the primary sources that measure credit card debt used in this study, including Dēmos 
and the Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). SCF is a house ­
hold level survey that deals with a relatively small sample size, for instance anywhere 
from 3,143 household in 1989 to 6,492 households in 2010 (Federal Reserve, 1989, 2010). 
The SCF is also said to oversample wealthier households (Bird et al., 1997). In contrast 
Dēmos conducts smaller surveys than the SCF (997 households in 2012), but concentrates 
on low-income and middle-class households (Traub and Ruetchlin, 2012). 
8 There are minor differences in terms of the numbers collected by the US Census and 
the US Department of Health and Human Services. For further information on the two 
different ways the US government calculates poverty (e.g., poverty threshold versus 
poverty guidelines), see: www.irp.wisc.edu/faqs/faq1.htm (accessed 13 June 2013). 
The US Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, for instance, draws on the 
poverty threshold definition, while the HSS employs the poverty guidelines measure. 
The differences between the two measures are slight, e.g., according to the US Census’ 
preliminary estimate of weighted average poverty thresholds for 2012, one person with 
income of $11,722 or less is considered poor, whereas for a two-person household, the 
threshold is $14,960; for a three-person household, $18,287; and for a four-person 
household, $23,497. US Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Census (2013), 
Preliminary Estimate of Weighted Average Poverty Thresholds for 2012, Washington, DC: US 
Census. Available at: www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/index.html 
(accessed 10 June 2013). 
9 For more information, see methods and definitions at the US Census website at: www.
 
census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/methods/definitions.html (accessed 17 June 2013).
 
10 See also Table 6.4 in Chapter 6 for common reasons that working poor to turn to payday
 
lending. 
11 Most of the requirements imposed by the 1968 Truth in Lending Act are contained within 
a legal framework referred to as Regulation Z, although both TILA and Regulation Z 
are often used interchangeably (Drysdale and Keest, 2000). For more information on 
Regulation Z, see the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s website on this topic: 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6500-1400.html (accessed 7 January 2014). 
12 Annual Percentage Rates or APR refers to the yearly cost of the loan in terms of interest 
and fees. By law, credit card companies and loan issuers must demonstrate the APR of 
a particular agreement to facilitate transparency of the actual rates applied. Credit card 
companies are allowed to advertise interest rates on a monthly basis (e.g. 2 percent per 
month), but are also required to clearly state the APR to customers before any agreement 
is signed (e.g., 2 percent for 12 months reflects an APR of 24 percent). 
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13 Collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) represent various types of debt and credit risk. 
These different categories of debt are often referred to as ‘tranches’ or ‘slices’, e.g., junior 
and senior tranches. Each tranche has a different maturity and risk associated with it. The 
higher the risk, the more the CDO pays to investors. Investorpedia. Available at: 
www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp (accessed 24 May 2011). Collateralised debt 
swaps (CDSs), on the other hand, describe unregulated ‘insurance-like contracts that 
promise to cover losses on certain securities in the event of a default. They typically 
apply to municipal bonds, corporate debt and mortgage securities and are sold by banks, 
hedge funds and others. The buyer of the credit default insurance pays premiums over 
a period of time in return for peace of mind, knowing that losses will be covered if a 
default happens. It’s supposed to work similarly to someone taking out home insurance 
to protect against losses from fire and theft’. Available at: www.time.com/time/business/ 
article/0,8599,1723152,00.html (accessed 24 May 2011). 
14 Conventionally based on median pre-tax income of $50,000 (US Department of 
Commerce, 2010). 
15 ‘Prepaid, reloadable payment cards for immigrants roll out: The “no SSN” [Security Card 
Number] prepaid cards offer respite from high-cost fringe services’, CreditCards.com, 
19 September 2008. Available at: www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/immigrants­
prepaid-credit-cards-social-security-1282.php#ixzz1MixDgl3w (accessed 19 May 2011). 
16 For more information, see ‘The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act’. Available at: http://maloney.house.gov/documents/financial/creditcards/ 
MAY22.CreditCardSummaryFinalPassage.pdf (accessed 4 April 2011). See also overview 
by the Federal Reserve Bank. Available at: www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/ 
wyntk_creditcardrules.htm (accessed 4 April 2011). 
17 Some of the most significant features of the Credit CARD Act of 2009 included: 45­
day notice if the terms of your card change; no rate increases in the first year; payment 
dates must be the same every month; statements must be delivered at least 21 days before 
the due date, and the statement must be explicit about late fees and other consequences 
of late payment; fees cannot exceed 25 percent of the initial credit limit on the card; 
over-limit fees are no longer permitted, and so forth (‘Press Release’, Federal Reserve, 
29 September 2009). 
18 Historical Data ‘Federal Funds’, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Available at: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (accessed 1 June 2013). 
19 ‘Consumers Benefit from Fed’s Sweeping New Credit Card Rules’, News Release, 
American Bankers Association, 12 January 2010. Available at: www.aba.com/Press+ 
Room/011210FedCreditCardRules.htm (accessed 1 June 2011). 
20 See, for example, ‘Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at 
Commercial Banks’. Available at: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/chgallnsa. 
htm (accessed 24 June 2013). 
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DEBTFARISM AND THE 
STUDENT LOAN INDUSTRY 
Registering $1trillion in April 2012, student loans in the United States exceeded 
the total amount of all other forms of unsecured consumer debt.1 Educational 
loans remain the only form of consumer debt to markedly increase since the 
peak of household debt in late 2008 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012). 
The student loan industry is comprised not only of private lending institutions, 
such as Sallie Mae, Wells Fargo and JP Morgan Chase, but also the US state, which 
operates its own lending facility. This formidable component of the US poverty 
industry has become a highly lucrative venture for private lenders. In the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis, however, policy pundits and economists have been very 
concerned about rapidly increasing levels of student loans because educational loans 
act as a drag on housing recovery, as highly indebted recent graduates cannot afford 
to purchase a home (‘Student debt is stifling home sales’, Bloomberg 23 February 
2012). 
Other groups, such as the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Attorneys, are concerned about what they call the student loan debt bomb, as they 
view current debt levels of recent graduates, parents who co-signed their loans, 
and older students returning to school for job training, as unsustainable. Defaults 
on student loans have steadily increased from 6.13 percent in the first quarter of 
2003 to 8.69 percent in 2012, with delinquency rates higher than that of mortgages, 
auto loans and home equity lines of credit (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2012). The growing numbers of student debtors, who have been subjected to the 
devastating and humiliating social consequences of default, have also vented their 
anger and frustration with the nature and management of these loans through 
numerous acts of protest and active lobbying, most notably, the Occupy Student 
Debt Campaign2 (Collinge, 2009). 
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The main objective of this chapter is to denaturalise a key feature upon 
which the student loan industry has been constructed: the continued expansion of 
a loan-based system of higher education. Drawing on the historical materialist analysis 
developed in Part I of the book, I offer the following three-pronged argument. 
First, I suggest that the student loan industry is an integral feature of the wider 
processes of credit-led accumulation. Seen from this angle, there is a central para ­
dox inherent to the student loan industry: on the one hand, an incessant drive by 
capitalists to expand fictitious value tied to credit (i.e., private and federal student 
loans) and, on the other, the increasing inability of the surplus population (students) 
to meet payment obligations, leading to a greater number of defaults. 
Second and related, I argue that the institutionalised debtfare strategies pursued 
by the state have played an integral, albeit contradictory, role in resolving various 
articulations of this core tension of the industry. In its capacity as both lender and 
super-creditor, for instance, the debtfare state ensures that tensions emerging from 
credit-led accumulation are resolved within the bounds of the neutral authority of 
the law, that is, by upholding the bourgeois construction of the legal obligation 
of debt repayment through constant revisions of the bankruptcy law. These state 
interventions are bolstered by and, in turn support, the (re-)construction of 
monetised and individualised relations between creditor and debtor that appear to 
be ruled by abstractions such as interest rates as opposed to a class-based relation 
of exploitation. The debtfare strategies pursued by the state also attempt to 
depoliticise and mediate paradoxes, while facilitating the expansion and reproduc­
tion of the student loan industry through what Harvey (1989) describes as spatio­
temporal displacements.3 These fixes are evident, for example, in the central role 
played by student loan asset-backed securitisations (hereafter: SLABS) and what I 
refer to as the commodification of debt. 
Third and related, I suggest that the unfolding rhetorical and regulative 
intervention of the debtfare the state assists in constructing and normalising the 
growing dependency of the surplus population on credit to fund higher education 
through a loan-based system as opposed to grant-based aid. In doing so, the debtfare 
state validates and perpetuates what for many indebted students has proven to 
be an expensive myth: improving one’s skill sets through higher education will 
result in a middle-class lifestyle at best (US Department of Commerce, 2012; Traub 
et al., 2012).4 
I develop this argument in three main sections. Section One provides an 
overview of the student loan industry and discusses the meaning of students as surplus 
population therein. Section Two embarks on a historical materialist analysis of the 
role of the debtfare state in the expansion and reproduction of the student loan 
industry from the 1970s to 2010. Section Four provides concluding remarks by 
highlighting the key findings of a government report that identifies private student 
loans as the main problem of student loan debt in the US. 
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The student loan industry and students as surplus 
population: an overview 
The student loan industry 
As noted above, total educational loan indebtedness surpassed the shocking level 
of $1 trillion in 2012, up from $663 billion in 2003 (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 2012). The majority of this debt is comprised of federal government loans, 
with about $150 billion stemming from private loans (Coco, 2013). As will 
become clearer below, the burgeoning student loan industry is part and parcel of 
the neoliberal shift away from public support for higher education to placing the 
burden of financing on the individual. This move is evident through, for instance, 
the steady shift away from grant-based aid to predominantly loan-based aid (Traub 
et al., 2012; Coco, 2013). The student loan industry has grown steadily over the 
past several decades in lockstep with rising student demand and rapidly rising tuition 
fees (US Department of Education, 2012). The industry is comprised of two main 
categories of loans and lenders: public student loans, which are issued by the federal 
government and represent the largest type of loan (85 percent) (Consumer Finance 
Protection Bureau, 2012) and private student loans, which are issued by banks such 
as JP Morgan Chase and Citibank. Private lenders, primarily banks, have played a 
critical role in the industry, supplying about 80 percent of the $55 billion to $60 
billion in new federal loans made annually from 1998 to 2008 and $15 billion to 
$20 billion in the form of private loans (Ergungor and Hathaway, 2008). 
The Guaranteed Student Loan Program was established in the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 and was later renamed the Federal Family Education Loan Program 
(FFELP). The FFELP guaranteed and subsidised student loans, which were origin ­
ated and funded by private lenders, most notably banks. Key loans that constituted 
the FFELP program included: federal Stafford loans (the largest type of student loan), 
unsubsidised federal Stafford loans, Perkins loans, FFELP PLUS loans and FFEL 
consolidation loans (Eglin, 1993). FFELP loans can be applied to both public and 
private colleges. These guaranteed FFELP loans place the full faith and credit of 
the US government behind a private bank loan to each student. With the excep ­
tion of the unsubsidised Stafford loans, the state pays interest on the loan during periods 
of grace (six-months after graduation) and deferment, in addition to paying the 
difference between a set low interest rate and the market rate after graduation (the 
so-called ‘special allowance’) (Corder and Hoffman, 2001). Aside from subsidising 
interest rates, the state guarantees a large portion (97 to 100 percent) of the FFELP 
loan if a parent (typical co-signer) or student defaults (Fried and Breheny, 2005). 
To help raise capital and ensure liquidity to assist in guaranteeing federal student 
loans, the government set up a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) – Student 
Loan Marketing Association (or, Sallie Mae) in 1972. As I discuss below, Sallie 
Mae raised funds through the issuance of student loan asset-backed securitisations 
(SLABS), which created an efficient way of generating money to help finance low 
interest rate loans to students by subsidising and guaranteeing repayment to 
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their private lenders (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012). Sallie Mae was 
privatised in 1996 (SLM Corporation) and eventually became the largest issuer of 
SLABS in both federal and private student loans, as well as the largest educational 
lender of private student loans in the US. The poverty industry has proven such 
fertile ground for generating revenue that the corporation has expanded into 
other areas of consumer finance (e.g., mortgages, credit cards, car loans) and created 
Laureate, an online loan delivery system.5 The company has also moved into debt 
collection and guarantor servicing. Sallie Mae has been growing at such a rapid 
and highly profitable pace that in 2013 it announced it intended to split into two 
separate, publicly traded companies: ‘an education loan management business and 
a consumer banking business’ (‘Sallie Mae to split loan and banking businesses into 
two separate companies’, The Guardian, 29 May 2013). 
The passage of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act in 2010 put 
an end to the FFELP programme, replacing it with the William D. Ford Direct 
Student Loan Program (or, DLP). Under this new law, public student loans 
originate directly from the US Department of Education, effectively ending the 
ability of private banks to originate – but not to profit from – student loans backed 
by the federal government. Like the FFEL loans (e.g., Stafford loans), DLP loans 
can be applied to both public and private colleges. I address the Stafford loans in 
more detail below. 
Although federal student loans remain the largest category of educational 
lending, private student loans have been growing at a swift pace over the past decade 
(CFPB, 2013). Default rates on private student loans, which carry higher interest 
rates than federal student loans, are high and show no signs of abating. The 
percentage of borrowers who defaulted on federal loans within the first three years 
of payments rose to an average of 13.4 percent in 2011. This number was 
considerably higher, 22.7 percent, for students who attended for-profit colleges 
(US Department of Education, 2012). Students attending for-profit, private 
universities – also known as proprietary schools – tend to have higher levels of 
student debt, given the comparatively higher tuition fees and other costs (see Table 
5.2) (Lynch et al., 2010). For instance, while 62 percent of students graduating 
from public colleges held some kind of student debt, 72 percent of students attending 
private colleges, particularly for-profit, private colleges, many of whom are from 
a low-income bracket, held a student loan ( Johnson et al., 2012). 
The precise debt load of recent graduates is difficult to ascertain given the 
variation in public and private debt as well as the nature of the higher education 
institution (e.g., public colleges, for-profit private colleges, non-profit private 
colleges) across state lines.6 According to an oft-cited source, in 2011 two-thirds 
of all college students held an average of $26,500 in student loan debt upon leaving 
college.7 One in ten borrowers now graduates with more than $54,000 in loans. 
The colour of student debt is also noteworthy: 
African-American and Latino students are especially saddled with student debt, 
with 81 percent of African-American students and 67 percent of Latino 
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students who earned bachelor’s degrees leaving school with debt. This 
compares to 64 percent of white students who graduate with debt. 
( Johnson et al., 2012: 1) 
Students as surplus labour 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the relative surplus population is a highly dynamic and 
heterogeneous segment of the population that is comprised of underemployed and 
unemployed workers. Seen from the wider processes of the student loan industry, 
students may be regarded as surplus labour. They attempt – often in failure – to 
move beyond this category by obtaining a higher education. It is only after 
graduation that students will find out whether they are indeed surplus labour or 
not. In the meantime, they will have accumulated hefty debt loads, thereby 
amplifying the risks involved and feeding the coffers of the student loan industry. 
Many students carrying an average debt load (and higher) do not earn a median 
income immediately after graduation. Aside from poor employment prospects,8 
‘more young graduates were considered underemployed. Among those who 
wanted to be working full time, as many as 19.1 percent were either working part 
time or had given up looking for work. Further, 37.8 percent of working young 
graduates had jobs that did not require a college degree, depressing their wages’ 
(The Project on Student Debt, 2012: 2). Student debtors struggle not only with 
educational debt but also with the rising costs of health care and housing (US 
Department of Commerce, 2010). Coupled with poor job prospects, students have 
resorted to desperate measures by moving back home with their parents, defaulting, 
dropping out of college, working two jobs, putting off marriage and starting families 
and attempting to file bankruptcy to reduce overall debt loads (Traub et al., 2012; 
Coco, 2013).9 
Particularly hardest hit from the increasing shift from an aid-based to loan-
based system of higher education have been low-income students. In this chapter, 
I define the latter category by drawing on the income limits employed by the 
US Department of Education to determine eligibility for Pell Grants. The latter, 
as I document below, are aid-based grants (i.e., money not requiring repayment) 
designed to supplement low-income students’ higher education. In July 2012, the 
debtfare state revised the maximum adjusted gross income10 from $30,000 per annum 
to to $23,000 per annum. This has made it more difficult for low-income students 
to access a Pell Grant. Moreover, based on the 2013 federal poverty guidelines 
laid out in Table 4.2 (see Chapter 4), this new income limit means that Pell grants 
are now geared primarily to those families living below 100 percent of the poverty 
line. The Pell Grant is also quite small in comparison with the rising cost of higher 
education. In 2012, for instance, while the maximum Pell Grant reached $5,500, 
the average amount of the grant dispersed was only $3,800.11 In 2013, Pell Grants 
reached their highest level at $5,635. Yet even if this full amount were to be awarded 
to low-income students, it would cover only one-third of the average cost of college 
– the lowest since the start of the programme in 1972 (Reimherr et al., 2013: 3). 
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A historical materialist account of the making of the 
student loan industry 
Contextualising Sallie Mae 
Sallie Mae was established in 1972 as a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE). 
It emerged from a specific political and material environment, which was marked, 
among other things, by Keynesian ideals of managed capitalism and the slowing 
of economic growth once fuelled by Fordist forms of domestic and international 
expansion of exports (Harvey, 2003). Under this configuration of state and material 
relations, the US saw an expansion of the middle class12 in the 1950s and with it 
the belief that a college education leads to social and economic mobility. In the 
1960s and 1970s, social and political pressure by the Civil Rights and Women’s 
Rights Movements resulted in many policy changes, not the least in discriminatory 
practices regarding access to higher education and credit. These pressures coincided 
with increased demand for higher education and the sector experienced a period 
of unprecedented growth. The state infused money into higher education to fund 
academic research, expansion of colleges and federal loans (Gumport et al., 1997). 
In this context, student loans played a secondary role to grant aid under the Higher 
Education Act (HEA) of 1965. In a reauthorisation of the HEA in 1972, for instance, 
Senator Claiborne Pell, sought to expand federal aid directly to low-income 
students rather than through the institutions. The Pell Grants would serve to reduce 
the need for low-income students to borrow money to pay for their higher 
education. As one legal scholar notes, the logic behind the 1972 Act was to shift 
the majority of the costs of attending college ‘from low-income students and their 
families to the federal government’ (Coco, 2013: 584). 
Seen against the above backdrop, Sallie Mae was a state-led attempt to influence 
the flow of capital and credit to the student loan industry by absorbing the financial 
risks (defaults and bankruptcies) involved in lending to students (Corder and 
Hoffman, 2001). Like other GSEs, such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, Sallie 
Mae was a special type of government-backed, shareholder-owned, for-profit 
corporation. Unlike other GSEs, however, Sallie Mae was legally permitted to 
purchase, service, sell, or otherwise deal in government-issued student loans, 
which were, in turn, fully guaranteed and directly subsidised by the state (Corder 
and Hoffman, 2001). The official justification for this state guarantee was due to 
the high-risk nature of student loans. Notwithstanding the subsidised interest rates, 
special allowances and other state guarantees, lenders (mostly large commercial banks) 
were unwilling to participate in the programme because student loans not only 
represented forms of unsecured debt (i.e., an absence of collateral), but they were 
also illiquid and long-term (Kothari, 2006). As we saw in the previous chapter, in 
the tumultuous environment of the 1970s, interest rates would at times fall below 
the rate of inflation, cancelling state subsidies to the banks. 
To overcome this barrier, Sallie Mae raised funds in two ways. First, it sold 
debt securities (e.g., bonds) on secondary markets. Second, after the passage of the 
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Education Amendments in 1980, it was permitted to securitise its financial ‘assets’ 
(student loans) (Corder and Hoffman, 2001). This second and related method of 
subsidising lenders pursued by Sallie Mae coincides with what I refer to here as 
the commodification of debt and the rise of the neoliberal state, with its underlying 
neoclassical assumption that private consumption is superior to public consumption 
(see Chapter 3 and Fine, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
Before continuing with the historical materialist analysis, it is useful to expand 
upon and deconstruct student loan asset-backed securitisation (SLABS), as this 
strategy acts as a portal through which we can gain more insightful understanding 
of the tensions inherent to the student loan industry and the displacement of the 
social dimension of risk to the surplus population. 
An interlude: deconstructing SLABS and the commodification 
of debt 
A central, yet undertheorised, feature of the student loan industry is student loan 
asset-backed securitisation, or SLABS.13 This refers to a technique in which illiquid 
assets such as student loans are transformed into tradable securities through a legally 
created tax-exempt entity called either a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or a Special 
Purpose Entity (SPE) (Elul, 2005). Since the 1980s, SLABS has represented the 
backbone of the student loan industry, accounding for over 100 percent of student 
loans in 2006.14 According to industry observers, SLABS act as the ‘main artery 
through which funds are channelled from investors to students’ (Ergungor and 
Hathaway, 2008: 2). SLABS is often presented as offering a highly efficient method 
of raising capital and mitigating or, as some claim, reducing risk for lenders, including 
the threats of default and bankruptcy (Gorton and Souleles, 2007; Fabozzi and 
Kothari, 2008). Government and private educational lenders represent SLABS as 
a neutral, financial instrument that afforded Sallie Mae an efficient way of raising 
money to help finance low interest rate loans to students by subsidising and 
guaranteeing repayment to private lenders (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2012). 
It is important to move beyond this economistic understanding of SLABS as 
an apolitical, efficient, win-win financial instrument. This view suggests SLABS 
limit or reduce risk, creating more credit by transforming student debt into assets 
that can be bought and sold in the digitalised spaces of finance15 (Sassen, 2006). 
I begin the analytical deconstruction by maintaining that SLABS is not a thing, 
but a social relation that embodies both temporal and spatial sources of social power 
that play themselves out in the concrete geography of the community of money 
(Harvey, 1989). SLABS, for instance, is a form of privately credit money, or more 
specifically and drawing on our discussion in Chapter 2, a money-form of revenue. 
It should be highlighted that credit entails the creation of fictitious value that is 
mediated by formalised abstractions (interest rates, risk-based pricing, fees and so 
forth) as opposed to direct forms of domination between employer and employee. 
SLABS represent a temporal displacement or what Harvey refers to as a fix, given 
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that it aims to accelerate the transaction process. A necessary condition for this 
temporal power is the ability to create what Marx refers to as fictitious value (Harvey, 
1989). 
In Marxian terms, fictitious value draws our attention to the fact that credit in 
the form of student loans (interests and fees), including their extensions in the form 
of SLABS, do not possess an inherent value, yet they can assume a price (Harvey, 
1999: 265ff). While the price used to value SLABS is believed to be objectively 
set through various complex metrics based on algorithms and sanctioned by credit-
rating agencies, the construction of the price given to various SLABS ultimately 
rests on the trade in promises to pay. These promises are not solely based on the 
cultural features of the credit system, e.g. relationships of trust, subjectivities and 
performativities. Instead they depend on the political and legal relationships that 
command repayment from borrowers regardless of their ability to make such 
payments, or the social costs involved in doing so.16 It is, therefore, fundamentally 
an issue of power. 
The relations of power underpinning SLABS must contend with an inherent 
feature of credit money: ‘no matter how far afield these various bills of exchange 
circulate, they must always return to their place of origin for redemption’ (Harvey, 
1999). Put another way, SLABS, as with student loans, ultimately relies on the 
viability of future labour (e.g., students’ salary or wage earnings upon completion 
of college) as a counter-value, making it inherently risky for all parties involved – 
although, as we will see below, the risk is distributed unequally among creditors 
and debtors. 
SLABS, therefore, not only wield temporal power over debtors, they are 
simultaneously able to accelerate the payment time of the student loan to suit 
capitalists’ interests and needs. A freshman at UCLA who gets a four-year, $25,000 
student loan from a private bank (e.g., post-1996, privatised Sallie Mae), for example, 
will end up paying, depending on the repayment schedule and an interest rate based 
on creditworthiness, anywhere from $50,545.95 (based on a 145-month repayment 
plan) to $70,259.07 (based on a 193-month repayment plan) or even $74,126.61 
(based on a 144-month deferred repayment plan) to Sallie Mae.17 On the other 
hand, shortly after making the transaction, the originator (Sallie Mae) sells this loan, 
as well as a bundle of other student loans, to an outside investor, thereby receiving 
a payment immediately, as opposed to receiving small monthly payments for 12 
to 16 years from the student and taking the risk that the student may default on 
his/her loan during this time. The basic belief driving this transaction is that the 
student loan (debt) is an asset – a commodity that can be owned or controlled to 
produce value (e.g., interest, commission and fees). 
I describe this process, which shifts financial risk to debtors and institutional 
investors, as the commodification of debt. Mitigating or even eliminating risk (e.g., 
default and bankruptcy) linked to lending to students is one benefit of SLABS. But 
there is another fee-generating perk: By receiving the funds today from selling the 
student loan to investors, the educational lender has the opportunity to profit further 
by originating even more loans and thereby earning origination fees (Elul, 2005). 
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The processes involved in the commodification of debt are not technical and 
apolitical, but are imbued with social relations of power that are asymmetrical and 
exploitative in nature. Following Marx, the latter term refers to secondary forms 
of exploitation that occur through dispossessive strategies pursued through the credit 
system, which are aimed at modifying workers’ wages and salaries through interest, 
commission and fee payments (Harvey, 1999; Sassen 2009). 
SLABS are class-based attempts to overcome the contradictions inherent in credit-
led accumulation by reducing financial risk and increasing liquidity for educational 
lenders, so that they may continue to extend credit to primarily high-risk (subprime) 
borrowers (students, particularly low-income students). Yet, student debtors are 
afforded no protections in terms of dealing with the social consequences of risk, 
such as the inability to find employment, illness, inflation of health-care and housing 
costs, inability to complete an educational degree and so forth (Traub et al., 2012; 
Johnson et al., 2012). Student debt burdens must be understood alongside the 
unemployment rate for young college graduates, which has risen from 8.7 percent 
in 2009 to 9.1 percent in 2010, the highest annual rate on record (CFPB, 2012; 
Project on Student Debt, 2012). As a result of these conditions, student debtors 
are also carrying higher levels of credit card debt (Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, 2012) – all of which serves to increase pressure on students’ debt 
burdens. Indeed, almost three-quarters of students who default on their educational 
loans (many of whom are minority students from low-income backgrounds) have 
done so after withdrawing from school and failing to complete their studies (Lynch 
et al. 2010). 
The unequal and exploitative relations of power involved in securitising student 
loans are concealed in the dominant representation and depoliticisation of risk in 
exclusively financial terms. As I discuss below, these relations are further masked 
by the legal obligation between creditor and debtor. Here, it is important to note 
that risk, as it is used in the financial industry, has at its roots in dominant 
neoclassical theory and its underlying assumptions of rationality, efficiency and 
individualism. For instance, risk understood exclusively in financial terms relates 
to uncertainty and/or potential financial loss for the lender (Luhmann, 2008). With 
regard to securitisation, this prevailing meaning of financialised risk includes 
probable harm only to ‘key participants’ in SLABS: securitisers (e.g., a government 
sponsored enterprise or a trust), originators of the assets (educational lenders) and 
investors (e.g., pension and mutual funds)18 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2012). Yet, if we understand SLABS and the wider credit system as relations of 
power imbued with the ability to wield command over time, risk also has social 
dimensions, notably in the form of defaults. The social dimension of risks for student 
debtors is thereby expunged from the sanitised, mathematical and technical 
understanding of neoclassical economics (Bourdieu, 2005). As this exemplifies, in 
the highly abstract world of neoclassical economics and its narrow view of individual 
rationality, there is a constant severance of the economic from the historical and 
social conditions in which risk is constructed, defined, governed and reproduced 
(Bourdieu, 1998). 
Debtfarism and the student loan industry 113 
Risk and its strategies of mitigation and measurement are profoundly social 
questions of power. This is particularly the case if we accept the premise that credit 
entails not only social power over time and space but also is, in effect, a gamble 
with the future lives of student debtors. Financial corporations (e.g., SLM 
Corporation) possess the power to sell (and transform) unsecured debt into assets 
in order to accelerate the temporal dimension of repayment on their initial outlay 
plus interest, fees and commission. They do so, however, by displacing the social 
dimensions of risk involved in this process onto student debtors. This is not a neutral, 
natural and inevitable feature of the market driven by competitive forces and 
technological innovation; instead, it represents a socially constructed reality that is 
both highly dynamic and paradoxical in nature. A central force in governing the 
social and financial dimensions of risk in the student loan industry is the debtfare 
state and its role in displacing and disciplining student debtors. 
Debtfarism and the mediation of the social dimensions of risk 
During the period of economic instability in the 1970s and much of the 1980s, 
many students graduating from colleges were unable to secure well-paying jobs to 
meet their loan obligations. Indeed, as one commentator notes many graduates at 
this time were either unemployed or employed in jobs that they could have secured 
without post-secondary education (Wiese, 1984: 459). Unsurprisingly, default rates 
on student loans rose, as did student loans discharged in bankruptcy. In 1975, there 
was a 59.9 percent increase over the number of claims filed in 1974. Toward the 
end of 1975, the federal government and guaranty agencies had reimbursed lenders 
for $20.9 million of guaranteed student loans discharged in bankruptcy (Birdwell, 
1978: 593). Despite these trends, the debtfare state was busily creating more demand 
for federal loans and, by extension, private banks. In 1978, for instance, the govern ­
ment permitted most middle-class Americans to access federal loans without the 
requirement that students demonstrate financial need (Grant, 2011). 
To deal with the social risks involved in rising default rates on student loans 
during this period, Congress enacted disciplinary policies to restrict access to 
bankruptcy relief for student debtors. For instance, student loans were dischargeable 
until Congress enacted the Higher Education Act of 1976 (§439A), which in effect 
made student loans non-dischargeable if the first payment came due within five 
years of bankruptcy, unless the debtor could prove undue hardship. The temporal 
dimension is important to note here, as it reveals the relations of power and their 
ability to dictate the time horizons of repayment. Moreover, these temporal 
dictates and the burden of undue hardship were further reinforced by the debtfare 
state with a revision to the Bankruptcy Act. As I discussed in the previous chapter, 
US Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and replaced it with the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. In terms of educational loans, the latter approved 
the Education Amendment provision to the original §523(a)(8): no discharge unless 
the first payment became due more than five years prior to the bankruptcy filing 
or the debtor could demonstrate undue hardship (Grant, 2011). It should be 
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underlined that the undue hardship clause is an exception to education loans. In 
other words, debtors with other kinds of debt are not laden with the task of proving 
undue hardship. Some observers critical of §523(a)(8) have pointed out that undue 
hardship is ‘unnecessarily harsh, denying debt relief to all but a few select debtors 
and usually only to those with dependents and medical conditions that prevent 
gainful employment’ (Grant, 2011: 819). 
Despite concerns of rising defaults on student loans, the debtfare state was actively 
promoting and subsidising through Sallie Mae, the growth of proprietary schools 
(for-profit, private universities) in higher education. During the 1980s, proprietary 
schools represented one-half of the increase in higher education enrolment (Beaver, 
2012). The proprietary schools benefitted from federal student loans, but these loans 
were often accompanied by a private loan, given the high tuition fees charged by 
these schools (see Table 5.2). As with their federal student loan counterparts, private 
lenders securitised their private loans to students to offset the financial risks involved 
in repayment. The social risks were left to the debtfare state to mediate and 
depoliticise, largely through a revision of the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1976 
and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 
Set against the backdrop of a bleak economy, the dual growth in enrolment of 
proprietary schools and the higher levels of student indebtedness pushed up defaults 
on student loans. In 1985, 600 for-profit, private (or, proprietary) schools reported 
default rates of over 50 percent (Beaver, 2012: 3). Nonetheless, with the probusiness 
legislative environment of the Reagan Administration and government subsidisation 
(corporate welfare), it was business as usual for proprietary schools. Between 1983 
and 1990 loan volume of private student loans increased by 83 percent, while defaults 
increased by 336 percent (Beaver, 2012). Indeed, while default rates were climbing 
across the higher-education system, proprietary schools were the worst offenders. 
‘While proprietary schools account for 33 percent of Stafford loans, they are 
responsible for 48 percent of defaulted student loans’ (Eglin, 1993: 54). 
Instead of mitigating the social dimensions of risks by, for instance, taxation for 
education, subsidising public universities to help suppress the steady rise of tuition 
fees, allowing for greater protection in bankruptcy proceedings and so forth, the 
debtfare state facilitated new venues of dispossessive capitalism by promoting 
proprietary (private, for-profit) schools and, by extension, private student loans, 
which, in turn, carried higher rates of interest and stricter repayment schedules 
(US Department of Education, 2012). At the same time, the Reagan administration 
(1981–1989) was eager to impose major cuts to the federal student grants 
programme, which, by 1985 surpassed total federal grant aid by over $3 billion 
(Coco, 2013). The Reagan administration used the reauthorisation of the HEA in 
1986 to cut rather than expand aid to needy students, even with 60 percent tuition 
hikes at colleges across the country. Congress also assumed a similar approach by 
making it more difficult for low-income students to qualify for and obtain, Pell 
Grants. To fill the funding gap caused by cuts in government aid, Congress drafted 
a loan provision allowing lower and middle-income students to borrow more per 
year to fund their education (Altbach et al., 2007; Coco, 2013). 
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The state as super-creditor and the displacement of 
financial risk 
The early 1990s saw further changes to legislation governing student loan debt, 
which was aimed at creating more dependency of students on credit to pay for 
higher education. Before continuing, it is important to underline that the debt-
fare state enjoys super-creditor status, meaning that it has limitless powers (to garnish 
wages, tax refunds and even Social Security payments) and unlimited time (no statute 
of limitation) to collect student loan debt (Coco, 2013: 589). The debtfare state 
thus wields enormous temporal power over debtors through the means of the 
seemingly neutral legal framework. The class nature of this power and social 
discipline is masked by the social power of money and the continual imposition 
of legal obligation between creditor and debtor. In turn, this serves to reproduce 
the monetisation, responsibilisation and hyper-individualisation of social relations. 
This allows the debtfare state to depoliticise the tension between the increasing 
expansion of the student loan industry, on the one hand and increasing default 
rates, on the other. 
In 1990, for instance, two important revisions to the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 were undertaken that had important ramifications for distressed student 
debtors. First, the debtfare state was able to lengthen the temporal period in which 
distressed student debtors had to wait before they were permitted to file a 
bankruptcy claim from five years to seven years. Second, the further narrowing 
placed on dischargeability of educational loans was revised with an amendment to 
§523(a)(8) in 1990. The section effectively exempts educational loans made, 
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit or non-profit body (Pashman, 2001). 
Supporters of the amendment to §523(a)(8) note that educational loans are not 
granted on the same basis as other loans. Lenders or guarantors who participate in 
educational loan programs typically extend credit to students who might not qualify 
for credit under traditional standards. In the desire of the state to promote access 
to educational opportunities (democratisation of credit), interest rates and repayment 
terms are made to be very favourable to the student borrower and no security 
(collateral) is usually required. Seen as a benevolent and public-spirited act, students 
failing to respect the terms of their student loan contract are, therefore, viewed as 
irresponsible market citizens who harm the good of the wider society by opting 
to default. 
To absorb the social dimensions of risks rooted in the commodification of debt 
and articulated in the form of default on student loans and to introduce more 
disciplinary measures with regard to the collection of debt owed to the government, 
the debtfare state introduced the Higher Education Technical Amendments in 1991. 
These amendments effectively removed all statutes of limitation (previously it was 
six years) with regard to the collection of student loan repayments or grant 
overpayments under the Higher Education Act student assistance provisions. In 
effect, the 1991 Amendments protected the profits of debt collection agencies, 
particularly those that specialised in student debt, by allowing these companies to 
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tack on hefty collection and commission fees of 25 and 28 percent, respectively, 
to what students already owed (Ferry, 1995). 
A further HEA reauthorisation created the unsubsidised Stafford Loan 
programme in 1992. Stafford loans are federal student loans that are either subsidised 
or unsubsidised. The primary difference between these two categories is the 
amount of interest students are required to pay on their loan. In 2013, subsidised 
Stafford loans were geared toward low-income students and carried an interest rate 
of 3.4 percent, plus a one percent origination fee and a lifetime loan limit of $23,000, 
whereas unsubsidised Stafford loans carried an interest rate of 6.8 percent, plus a 
one percent origination fee and a lifetime limit of 34,500 for undergraduates.19 
These regulatory initiatives pursued by the US debtfare state facilitated increased 
borrowing by low- and middle-income students to fund their education. By the 
close of the 1990s, the debtfare state had managed to increase student loans 125 
percent in comparison with a 55 percent increase in aid to low-income students 
(Coco, 2013: 586). As we will see below, the debtfare state also increased the interest 
rate on unsubsidised Stafford loans, which hit low-income students particularly hard. 
At the same time student loans were expanding, further amendments to the 
Higher Education Act in 1994 (also known as the 1994 Regulations) assisted in 
decreasing the involuntary lender involvement in and need for, collection litigation 
by giving defaulting student loan debtors a new option of entering into ‘affordable’ 
repayment agreements that were aimed a rehabilitating their loans, thereby 
permitting them to be removed from default status (Ferry, 1995). 
It should be flagged here that since lenders involved in FFELP loans are 
protected against the risk of non-payment, only educational lenders pursue 
collection on defaulted student loans to the point of litigation. Seen in this light, 
the 1994 Regulations may also be understood as an effort to mitigate the financial 
risks for educational lenders issuing private student loans. These measures, which 
aimed at making debt collection more efficient, also reflected the increasing levels 
of consumer indebtedness in the 1990s (US Department of Commerce, 2010; Draut, 
2011). Indeed, in 1996, Congress enacted the Debt Collection Improvement Act, 
which, among other changes, permitted Social Security benefit payments to be 
used (garnished) to repay defaulted federal student loans (Pashman, 2001). 
These legislative modifications pursued by the debtfare state reflected the 
sentiment that risk, understood exclusively in financial terms and thus concerning 
lenders, was given higher priority through the creation of SLABS. The social risks 
associated with educational loans were muted and usually represented by the media 
and Congress as individualised acts of irrationally, immorality and/or irresponsibility. 
It was, therefore, acceptable to garnish old age and disability benefits that fall under 
the Social Security program in the United States. In the context of the bankruptcy 
system, the burden of proof was placed on the debtor to provide adequate evidence, 
which could be reduced and tested mathematically, to satisfy the court’s subjective 
understanding of ‘undue hardship’ (Pashman, 2001; Coco, 2013). 
Despite the increases in student loan defaults in the 1990s, Sallie Mae was quite 
effective in managing financial risks for private lenders by operating with its 
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implicit assumption of guarantee and by engaging in asset-backed securitisation of 
student loans in the early 1990s. While FFEL loans were guaranteed by the federal 
government, there was no such explicit government guarantee of GSE debt, i.e., 
loans purchased from private providers and resold in secondary markets. Yet, there 
remained a very strong market perception that GSE securities are very much like 
US Treasury issues. This implicit perception by investors, along with changes to 
Sallie Mae’s charter, resulted in a rise in the amount of loans sold by Sallie Mae 
in secondary markets, increasing from less than 30 percent from 1981 to 1985 to 
about 60 percent from 1988 to 1990 (Lea, 2005; US Treasury, 2006). 
Political questions concerning the social fallout of risk rose to the foreground 
in the mid-1990s, as attention began to turn to the privatisation of Sallie Mae (Lea, 
2005). Adhering to neoliberal logic, it was argued that privatising Sallie Mae would 
benefit lenders and borrowers, increasing efficiency and competition through 
market exposure. For example, as a private market participant, Sallie Mae could 
redirect its focus from encouraging bank lenders to sell their student loans to 
encouraging colleges and lenders to become business partners and distributors 
for a Sallie Mae-branded set of student loan-related products and services (Lea, 
2005: 5).20 
The privatisation of Sallie Mae 
In 1996, Sallie Mae became the first government-sponsored enterprise in the US 
to privatise. The former GSE was subsequently renamed the SLM Corporation, 
although it is still commonly known as Sallie Mae. Almost four years earlier than 
planned, its GSE activities were completely terminated in 2004. A key reason for 
this accelerated target date was due to its high volume of securitisation (commodi­
fication of debt), which, in effect, allowed it to raise capital through the selling 
of assets (student loans). One year prior to the termination of its GSE status in 
2004, for instance, Sallie Mae issued $20.3 billion of non-GSE financing, which, 
combined with securitisation, equalled 2.4 times its student acquisitions. For those 
in favour of privatisation, this was suggestive of Sallie Mae’s ability to finance itself 
in a post-GSE environment and signalled the viability of securitising student loans. 
From this period onward, Sallie Mae has continued to be the largest issuer of SLABS 
(see Table 5.1) and thus plays a central role in ensuring funds are channelled from 
institutional investors to students (Ergungor and Hathaway, 2008). 
It is important to note that the student loan industry is highly concentrated. 
Prior to 2010, when major reforms were introduced, 91.5 percent of the new 
Stafford and PLUS loans and 99.8 percent of consolidated loans were originated 
by only 100 lenders, with Sallie Mae dominating the industry after its privatisation 
(Ergungor and Hathaway, 2008). Moreover, the intensifying depth and breadth of 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets, in which SLABS and other asset-
backed securities emerged through active state intervention, aimed at re-regulating 
financial markets to facilitate greater risk-taking activities. The idea was to design 
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TABLE 5.1 Ten top issuers of SLABS in federal student loans (in billions of $) 
Issuer 2005 2006 2010 
Sallie Mae 26,990 33,752 6,103 
Nelnet Student Loan 6,540 5,313 1,183 
SLC Student Loan Trust 4,350 4,912 920 
Brazos Higher Education Authority Inc. 3,717 243 1,120 
National Collegiate 3,487 4,724 N/A 
College Loan Corporation Trust 2,700 1,700 N/A 
Collegiate Funding Services Educational Trust 2,700 N/A N/A 
Access Group Inc. 2,074 1,007 464 
Wachovia Student Loan Trust 1,800 1,611 N/A 
GCO Education Loan Finding Trust 1,130 2,643 N/A 
Sources: Data collected from Asset Backed Alert and Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC in E. Walsh (2008) 
‘Student Loans ABS’ in B. P. Lancaster, G. M. Schultz and F. J. Fabozzi (eds) Structured Products and 
Related Credit Derivatives: a comprehensive guide for investors, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, p. 135; 
SLM Corporation (2011) ‘ABS East Conference’, October. Available at: https://www1.salliemae. 
com/NR/rdonlyres/50F355EE-8FA7–49FA-AABF-D4A4B507A89C/15130/ABSEastConference 
vFinal.pdf (accessed 1 October 2012). 
instruments that insured investors against a potential default while allowing them 
to extract revenue from credit money, such as credit default swaps. 
In 1998, for instance, the Chairperson of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan 
Greenspan, argued that there was no reason why derivatives markets ‘should be 
encumbered with a regulatory structure devised for a wholly different type of market 
process, where supplies of underlying assets are driven by the vagaries of weather 
and seasons. Inappropriate regulation distorts the efficiency of our market system 
and as a consequence impedes growth and improvement in standards of living’ 
(Federal Reserve Board, 1998, 2008). In the wider context of market-friendly re-
regulations (e.g. the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, or GLB), educational lenders 
such as Sallie Mae thrived. Between 2000 and 2005, for example, Sallie Mae’s fee 
income increased by 228 percent (from $280 million to $920 million), while its 
managed loan portfolio increased by only 82 percent (from $67 billion to $122 
billion). Sallie Mae’s stock increased by more than 1600 percent between 1995 
and 2005, which represented an average annual rise of about 160 percent (Collinge, 
2009: 5). 
At the same time as the GLB Act was signed, SLM Corporation aggressively 
pursued several key acquisitions in the student loan industry, which gave the 
company more reach into various aspects of lending. In 1999, for instance, SLM 
Corporation purchased Nellie Mae, a non-profit student loan company, which was 
quickly followed by the acquisition of two of the country’s largest non-profit student 
loan guarantors, the USA Group and Southwest Student Services. In the early to 
mid-2000s, Sallie Mae acquired two of the largest student loan collection companies 
in the United States – Pioneer Credit Recovery and General Revenue Corporation 
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– as well as Arrow Financial Services in 2004 and GRP Financial Services in 2005 
(Collinge, 2009: 12–13; see also Table 5.1). Procuring some of the largest collection 
companies and numerous guaranty agencies (i.e., institutions that administer the 
FFEL program loans) Sallie Mae represents the largest private lender of student 
loans and collector on student loan debt. It also owns the largest guarantor 
companies, whose lifeblood is comprised of penalties and fees attached to defaulted 
loans. Sallie Mae, therefore, benefits greatly from all aspects of the lending 
transaction: securitising student loans, lending and debt collection (‘Does Sallie 
Mae Want Students to Default?’ Forbes, 6 June 2012). Thus, state strategies have 
facilitated the concentration and centralisation of capital to form oligopolistic 
financial companies with massive political influence and market power in the student 
loan industry. 
Debtfarism, discipline and the depoliticisation of social risks 
in the 1990s 
While private educational lenders were enjoying the highly lucrative environment 
fuelled by state-led subsidisation and market-friendly framings of SLABS, the social 
dimensions of risk linked to the commodification of debt have been playing 
themselves out on the ground. Despite the promise to students, particularly the 
low-income demographic, that a college degree would deliver higher paying jobs, 
the service sector was the fastest growing and largest employer from 1989 to 1990. 
According to the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS), private service providing 
industries accounted for 90 percent of the job growth in the 1990s (BLS, 2002). 
Within this category, low-wage retail and service sector jobs accounted for 
70 percent of all new job growth between 1989 and 2000. The majority of these 
so-called McJobs were filled by by women (Collins and Mayer, 2010: 6). Moreover, 
the BLS reports that employment in the temporary help services industry, which 
predominately employs women, grew from 1.1 million to 2.3 million during the 
1990–2008 period and thus represented a larger share of workers than before in 
higher skill occupations. 
During the 1990s, the Clinton Administration (1993–2001) actively pursued 
sharp spending cuts to decrease the budget deficit by slashing financing in key social 
programmes such as welfare and higher education (US Department of Education, 
2012). Low-income and middle-class Americans turned increasingly to consumer 
credit to deal with overall higher living costs, decreased welfare benefits and stagnant 
wages. At the same time, as the state’s support for higher education and grant-
based aid were rapidly dwindling, tuition and fees at public universities and colleges 
increased by 112.5 percent between 1990 and 2010. Moreover, the budgets of 
public universities and colleges have gone from a 23.2 percent dependency on tuition 
and fees in 1986 to 43.3 percent in 2011 (Coco, 2013: 589). 
Seen within this wider context of the neoliberal restructuring of labour markets 
and public provisioning, defaults on student loans and increasing delinquent 
payments continue to mark the consumer debt landscape of the US. In an attempt 
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to tackle the issue of defaulting student loans, the Clinton Administration signed 
into law the Higher Education Amendments of 1998, which removed the seven-
year exception leaving only the undue hardship exception to non-dischargeablity 
regarding student loans (Pashman, 2001). In accordance with this change, Congress 
revamped the Bankruptcy Code, once again in 1998 with the Bankruptcy Review 
Act. As noted above, prior to 1998 student loan debts were non-dischargeable unless: 
(1) the loans first become due more than seven years before the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy, or (2) not allowing the student loans to be discharged would impose 
an undue hardship on the debtor and/or the debtor’s dependents (Pashman, 2001: 
605; Coco, 2013). Yet, Congress has refused to provide a definition of undue 
hardship, opting instead to transfer responsibility for interpretation and thus 
punishment, to the courts. This has created a situation in which ‘there are as many 
tests for undue hardship as there are bankruptcy courts’ (Pashman, 2001: 609). As 
one legal scholar observes, ‘The rigidity of some of those “tests” (e.g., means testing) 
almost suggests that the solution to human suffering lies in the application of algebraic 
equations’ (Pashman, 2001, my emphasis). 
The increased use of abstract mathematical tools to deal with social problems 
is both rooted in, and reflected by, the dominant position of neoclassical economics 
in the policy formation of the debtfare state as well as the social power of private 
lenders (banks) in the student loan industry. This method of testing is also instru ­
mental in depoliticising the disciplinary nature of bankruptcy and, by extension, 
those debtors considering or entering into default, by expunging social con ­
siderations and upholding the myth of impartial and expert interpretation 
inherent to the legal framing of undue hardship. Class power is thus effectively 
erased from the individualised and monetised relations between debtor and creditor. 
Seen from this angle, the dispossessed students who fail to meet their legal 
obligation are conveniently deemed not only as undeserving (morally weak and 
fiscally irresponsible) of empathy by the law, but also as abusing the bankruptcy 
system (Pashman, 2001).21 
It should be noted that the amendment of the Bankruptcy Code to limit 
bankruptcy relief only on the grounds of undue hardship lacked any convincing 
empirical evidence to support the claim that students and graduates were trying to 
take advantage of the bankruptcy system, or that such bad actors actually posed a 
threat to the continued viability of student loan programs and the role of the 
benevolent state and taxpayers in their efforts to ensure educational access for all 
Americans (Pashman, 2001; Coco, 2013). Congress represented its actions as 
sending a message to abusive student debtors to protect the solvency of student 
loan programs. In particular, the state was concerned by reports of irresponsible 
students and recent graduates declaring bankruptcy as a way to avoid repayment 
of student loans on the eve of lucrative careers. §532(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy 
Code was a disciplinary tactic to remove the perceived temptation of recent 
graduates to use the bankruptcy system as a low cost method of unencumbering 
those future earnings. This representation continued despite the availability of 
evidence by the General Accounting Office that only a fraction of one percent 
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of matured student loans had been discharged in bankruptcy, a rate, at the time, 
which compared favourably to the consumer credit card industry (Pashman, 2001; 
see also Chapter 4). 
Preying on the dispossessed in the new millennium: 
capitalising on the unmet needs of the surplus population 
In the first decade of the new millennium, under the leadership of the G.W. Bush 
Administration (2001–2009) and its explicit embrace of private consumption, 
federal funds flowed into proprietary schools (private, for-profit colleges), from 
$4.6 billion in 2000 to $25 billion in 2010 (Gorski, 2010). During this time, 
enrolment in proprietary schools increase 37 percent compared to the 11 percent 
average during the previous decade. Interestingly, the demographic of these 
students shifted. According to a study by the US Department of Education, the 
majority of students enrolling in the for-profit, private schools are more than 25 
years of age. There also appears to be a gender and racial dimension to the student 
bodies, as slightly more women are returning to school (US Department of Educa­
tion, 2012). Moreover, the majority of students attending proprietary schools are 
from low-income backgrounds and stem from minority groups (Lynch et al. 2010). 
According to The Project on Student Debt, African-American undergraduates 
were the most likely to take out private loans, with the percentage quadrupling 
between 2003–2004 and 2007–2008, from 4 percent to 17 percent (Project on 
Student Debt, 2012). In 2003, without Congressional approval, the US Department 
of Education modified the financial aid formula governing student eligibility for 
federal grant-based aid (Coco, 2013: 587). This approach substantially reduced the 
debtfare state’s contribution for federal grants to low-income students thereby cutting 
hundreds of millions of dollars in Pell Grants and increasing the dependency of 
these students on the loan-based system. 
Private student loans are closely linked with the rapid rise in enrolment of for-
profit, private universities over the past decade.22 The for-profit higher education 
sector charges some of the highest tuition fees in the country, which means that 
low-income students usually turn to private educational lenders, such as Sallie Mae, 
to top up their federal student loans and grants. Once grant-aid is taken into 
consideration, the out-of-pocket cost – or unmet need23 – for low-income students 
at proprietary schools is even higher than at private non-profit colleges, which 
draw on institutional grants to defray college costs (Lynch et al. 2010: 3; see 
Table 5.2). ‘At four-year for-profits, low-income students must find a way to finance 
almost $25,000 each year, with only a 22 percent chance of graduating’ (Lynch 
et al. 2010: 3). This means that low-income students in the for-profit, private 
schools are borrowing heavily, which results in an increasingly large debt burden. 
Moreover, given that the graduation rate at four-year, proprietary schools is 
22 percent (compared with 55 percent at public and 65 percent at private, non­
profit colleges and universities) the chances of income improvement to meet loan 
payments are low. Data collected from the US Department of Education’s 
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Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) reveals that the gradua­
tion rate at the nation’s largest for-profit university – the University of Phoenix – 
is only 9 percent (Lynch et al. 2010). 
A Harvard-based study on proprietary schools revealed that six years after 
graduation students – many of whom were from low-income families – who 
attending proprietary schools are more likely to be unemployed as well as to be 
unemployed for periods longer than three months. Moreover, if these students 
manage to find employment, students who attend for-profits make, on average, 
between $1,800 and $2,000 less annually than their peers who attended other 
institutions (Deming et al., 2012). Despite these grim numbers, proprietary schools 
have expanded rapidly in the neoliberal era. They have become the fastest grow ­
ing feature of the US higher education sector, with enrolment increasing from 
0.2 percent to 9.1 percent of total enrolment in degree-granting schools 
from 1970 to 2009. Moreover, private, for-profit schools account for the majority 
of enrolments in non-degree granting post-secondary schools (Deming et al., 
2012). As noted above, the largest private, for-profit educational institution is the 
University of Phoenix with an enrolment of 450,000 students, which makes it 
the second largest university in the US (Beaver, 2012). 
The financial risks associated with the issuance of federal student loans and private 
student loans for the rapidly rising proprietary sector of higher education were offset 
TABLE 5.2 Unmet need among low-income students, 2007–2008 




Private, for-profit* $31,976 $ 3,518 $ 3,501 $24,957 
Private, non-profit $34,110 $ 3,911 $13,624 $16, 574 
Public $18,062 $ 3,798 $ 5,676 $ 8,588 
Two-Year 
Private, for-profit* $26,690 $ 1,882 $ 3,736 $21,072 
Public $11,660 $ 3,659 $ 2,523 $ 5,478 
* Proprietary schools, such as University of Phoenix, attract a large segment of low-income, minority 
students (Deming et al., 2012; US Department of Education, 2012). 
† The expected family contribution (EFC) is an index number that the debtfare state has set to determine 
how much financial aid a student should receive. It is a calculated according to a formula established 
by law and is based on a family’s taxed and untaxed income, assets and benefits (e.g., unemployment 
or Social Security).24 
Source: Education Trust analysis of NPSAS:08 using PowerStats; Full-time, full-year, one-institution 
dependent students in the bottom half of the income distribution are included in this analysis. Lynch, 
M., J. Engle and J. L. Cruz (2010) Sub-prime Opportunity: The Unfulfilled Promise of For-Profit Colleges 
and Universities, Washington, DC: The Education Trust, p. 3. Data from National Centre for Educational 
Statistics, 2011.25 
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by the issuance of SLABS in private student loans. Key SLABS issuers in the area 
of private student loans in 2008 included SLM Private Credit (which represented 
the largest issuers of private SLABS), First Marblehead, Access Group Inc. and 
Keycorp (Walsh, 2008; see also Table 5.1). The industry thrived off of the double-
digit growth rates of private student loans in the late 1990s and early 2000s, reaching 
its peak in 2007–2008, with the advent of the subprime crisis. According to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), private student lender under­
writing standards loosened considerably during this time. Between 2005 and 2007, 
coinciding with its peak phase, private lenders, such as Sallie Mae, embarked on 
aggressive lending techniques in which an increased percentage (from 40 percent 
to over 70 percent) of loans were made to undergraduate students without school 
involvement or certification. Additionally, during this period, lenders were more 
likely to originate loans to borrowers with lower credit scores (CFPB, 2012: 3). 
Private lenders could offload their financial risks, of course, through the issuance 
of SLABS. 
By the mid-2000s, the G. W. Bush Administration was forced to deal with the 
tension between supporting, on the one hand, proprietary schools and educational 
lenders and depoliticising the social risks inherent in the increasing levels of 
educational debt and the rise of defaults on private student loans, on the other. 
The debtfare state undertook at least two major moves in the attempts to resolve 
this tension. First, the government implemented the Higher Education Reconcilia­
tion Act of 2005, which effectively cut $12.6 billion from student financial aid. 
This made it more expensive for students to pay for their education, forcing them 
to turn to private student loans to make up the difference (see Table 5.2). Second, 
the Bush Administration responded to the risks tied to increasing default rates 
by implementing draconian changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 with the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (or, 
BAPCPA). 
There are at least two major features of this Act that are relevant to understanding 
the coercive features of the debtfare state and its attempts to manage social risks 
generated by the student loan industry. First, BAPCPA was designed to keep debtors 
out of bankruptcy. Of the two basic options of obtaining relief from creditors, 
namely Chapter 7 liquidation or Chapter 13 adjustment of debts for debtors who 
have adequate income to repay all or part of their debts through a repayment plan, 
the former was made extremely difficult to obtain. Under Chapter 13, if the student 
debtor is granted bankruptcy by convincing the courts of undue hardship, loan 
repayment plans revise the temporal span of indebtedness and usually assign 
some sort of debt management plan (see Chapter 4; Coco, 2012). This attempt to 
keep debtors out of bankruptcy has important consequences for distressed student 
debtors who may be seeking relief in other areas of indebtedness, such as credit 
card debt (New York Federal Reserve, 2012). 
The second major feature of the BAPCPA with regard to the student loan 
industry was that it further reduced the minimal consumer protections under the 
Bankruptcy Code for student debtors. For instance, BAPCPA amended §523(a)(8) 
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in order to broaden types of educational student loans that cannot be discharged 
absent proof of undue hardship. As Coco notes, according to §220 of BAPCPA, 
debtors are no longer able to discharge private educational loans, which have higher 
interest rates and less flexibility in repayment. Private lenders such as Sallie Mae 
now possess similar status and thus power and state protection, in bankruptcy under 
§523(a)(8). Through the continued categorisation of educational debtors as eligible 
for a conditional discharge only (Coco, 2013: 597), the US debtfare state draws 
on the temporal power of money and the (fetishised) neutrality of the law to impose 
market discipline on student debtors by ensuring they avoid seeking relief through 
bankruptcy. 
In addition, under §220 of the BAPCPA, the protections afforded to the state 
and non-profit lenders have been extended to private student loan lenders. Sallie 
Mae, for example, now enjoy the same super-creditor status as the US debtfare state 
in the bankruptcy system because private loans are non-dischargeable pursuant to 
§532(a)(8) (Coco, 2013: 593). This extension of super-creditor status by the US 
debtfare state to Sallie Mae has important social implications in terms of the 
deepening of the hold of corporations over higher education financing, especially 
given the fact that one out of five students also carry more costly private loans, 
where unlike government loans, interest rates are in the double digits and fees add 
to the balance (Draut, 2011). 
Given the inherent tensions in credit-led accumulation, most notably the imper ­
a tive that credit money needs to return to its origins for redemption, the BAPCPA 
would only temporarily resolve the paradoxes and associated risks in the student 
loan industry. Despite the restrictions imposed by BAPCPA, for instance, a growing 
number of desperate former students have opted for bankruptcy in the hopes of 
gaining some relief in terms of repayment procedures in other areas of indebted­
ness such as credit card debt (CFPB, 2012). Two years after the BAPCPA was 
enacted, federal loans accounted for 70 percent of the educational funding provided 
to students (Coco, 2013). The debtfare state would, once again, intervene in order 
to ease the pressures of overburdened debtors, who could no longer turn to 
bankruptcy as an option. Hence, the debtfare state’s reauthorisations of HEA in 2007 
and 2008 were concerned with loan repayment plans, interest rates and limited 
loan forgiveness – all of which were compounded by the financial crash of 2007– 
2008 and the onset of the Great Recession (Coco, 2013). 
Mediation of risks in the community of money: corporate 
welfare and debt management 
The credit crunch that ensued in the wake of the 2007 crisis had an immediate 
impact on the student loan industry. To manage with the increased defaults of 
highly indebted, low-income students, the College Cost Reduction and Access 
Act was signed into law in 2007 (hereafter: Access Act). The Access Act created 
a system of income-based repayment plans for, among other constituencies, lower-
income graduates with typically high debt loads. Under this income-based 
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programme, the student debtor must pay 15 percent of his or her discretionary 
income for a period of 25 years after which the borrowers can apply for a cancel ­
lation of the remaining debt (Coco, 2013: 589–99). Again, this solution reflects 
attempts by the debtfare state to impose social discipline on the debtors by injecting 
just enough relief to ensure that the debtor can meet regular payment schedules, 
while shifting the problem into the future (e.g., 25 years). 
Educational lenders had no one to sell their government guaranteed loans to in 
order to offset their financial risks. One of the first measures the federal government 
established to deal with asset-backed securities was the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (or, TALF) in 2008. According to a 2010 Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) Report, in the post-crisis environment the TALF 
program spent $7.15 billion propping up asset-backed securitisations, including 
SLABS (GAO, 2010).26 
Meanwhile, the social dimensions of risks tied to high student loan debt, 
especially, but not exclusively, with regard to private student loans, intensified due 
to the crisis. By 2009 the unemployment rate for private student loan borrowers 
who began their studies in the 2003–2004 academic year was 16 percent. Default 
rates began to spike considerably following the subprime housing crisis of 
2007–2008 (CFPB, 2012). 
To ensure that liquidity (trading activity) remained stable in education lending, 
the Bush Administration implemented the Ensuring Continued Access to Student 
Loans Act (or, ECASLA) in 2009. ECASLA authorised the US Department of 
Education to purchase FFELP loans outright if secondary demand dipped. In effect, 
the ECASLA represented a major, yet largely unnoticed, government bailout of 
the student loan industry. The ECASLA was originally to be a temporary program, 
to exist only until 28 February 2009 and was to use approximately $6.5 billion. 
According to the US Department of Education, ‘the Department [of Education] 
will purchase loans [from the private sector, e.g., Sallie Mae, JP Morgan Chase, Wells 
Fargo, Discover Financial Services, Bank of America and so forth] at 97 percent of 
the principal interest coincidental with the standard guaranty rate for these loans’. 
The US Department of Education anticipated purchasing up to $500 million in loans 
each week up to an aggregate of $6.5 billion during the designated time-period (US 
Department of Education, 2011). As the banks demonstrated continued disinterest 
in lending to students in the immediate aftermath of the subprime crisis, the ECASLA 
was subsequently extended and augmented. 
In 2010, the US Department of Education projected that it will eventually 
purchase $112 billion in FFELP loans from private lending corporations (US 
Department of Education, 2011). To manage rising and untenable levels of student 
debt, President Obama sought to address further income-based repayment in the 
2010 Health Care Reform Act. The latter, for instance, reduced payment amounts 
and (temporal) length of payment for the income-based repayment plan or the 
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program (PSLF) discussed above. Student debtors, 
for instance, who qualify for the PSLF programme, are now required to pay only 
10 percent of their discretionary income over a ten-year period (Coco, 2013: 599). 
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In an effort to depoliticise growing anger over government bailouts of private 
student loan providers, the Obama Administration (2009–2017) reintroduced the 
controversial Federal Direct Loan Programme. According to the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), the direct loan programme could save the government $67 
billion over the next decade (CBO, 2010). These savings presented an attractive 
cost-offset to the Health Care Reform Act for the Obama Administration. Included 
as a rider clause to that Act, as of 1 July 2010 the $60 billion-a-year FFELP was 
replaced with the Federal Direct Loan Program, making it the only government-
backed loan programme in the US. From that time on, the direct lender of all 
federal student loans was the US Department of Education and not private banks. 
The Democrats touted the legislation, which was represented as a key feature of 
President Obama’s education agenda, as a ‘far-reaching overhaul of federal financial 
aid, providing a huge infusion of money to the Pell grant program and offering 
new help to lower-income graduates in getting out from under crushing student 
debt’ (‘Student loan overhaul approved by congress’, New York Times, 25 March 
2010). 
Upon closer inspection, however, the Direct Loan Program did not introduce 
far-sweeping changes to the student loan industry. For one thing, as noted above, 
the family income threshold for a student to qualify for this grant has also been 
lowered from $30,000 to $23,000 further reducing the numbers of eligible students 
from low-income families and, in turn, making these excluded students more 
dependent on the loan-based system. Moreover, the maximum Pell grant award 
climbed from $5,550 for the 2010–2011 academic year to $5,900 in 2019–2020 
(CBO, 2011). This is an insignificant amount given it covers only a third of the 
cost of attending a public university, compared to three-quarters when the program 
began in the 1970s. More importantly, as discussed above, the majority of low-
income students are attending proprietary schools, whose tuition rates are several 
times the price of most public universities. As such, the major winners of the Direct 
Lending Program remain the financial markets, which continue to benefit from 
the low-risk SLABS that rest on the market perception of government guarantees 
to solidify the compulsion of debtors to repay. 
Despite the fact that the 2010 Health Care Reform Act cut private lenders, out 
of the lucrative business of originating new federal student loans (the US debtfare 
state now originates student loans directly), private lenders and Sallie Mae in 
particular, have nonetheless benefited from the 2010 Health Care Reform Act 
(‘Sallie Mae split marks bet on much-abused private student loans’, Bloomberg, 
31 May 2013). In addition to its role as the largest private student loan provider 
in the US, key student loan debt collector and the country’s largest issuer of SLABS, 
Sallie Mae, along with four other corporations (i.e., FedLoan Servicing, Great Lakes 
Educational Loan Services, Inc., Nelnet and Direct Loan Servicing Centre) have 
been assigned the role of the federal loans servicers.27 In this capacity, Sallie Mae 
continued to grow by acquiring in 2010 $28 billion of securitised federal student 
loans and related assets from the Student Loan Corporation, a subsidiary of Citibank 
(SLM Corporation, 2010). It also reported that it would begin loosening its 
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restrictive lending practices in 2010 and that ‘volumes should pick back up as the 
company did some “tweaking” to its standards’ (‘Sallie Mae cuts private-loan rates 
to maintain volume growth’, Wall Street Journal, 16 May 2011). Relaxing its 
allegedly strict lending requirements meant enticing more low-income students to 
sign a private student loan and thereby expand its net to capture more subprime 
borrowers (CFPB, 2012). 
Due to these changes, Sallie Mae provides service to 3.6 million loan customers 
on behalf of the US Department of Education and is prospering from its new status 
as service provider to the debtfare state. In 2011, the company earned $63 million 
in servicing revenue from its US Department of Education loan-servicing contract, 
compared to $44 million in 2010 (SLM Corporation, 2011). The combination of 
the government bailout and loosening lending restrictions has benefitted the 
country’s largest private educational lender and issuer of SLABS. Sallie Mae 
reported a 19 percent increase in loan originations for 2011 and a 29 percent increase 
in loan originations in the third quarter of 2011 alone (SLM Corporation, 2011). 
In the fourth quarter of 2012, Sallie Mae reported a 22 percent increase in private 
education loan originations to $3.3 billion, decreased delinquency rates and core 
earnings of $237 million (Sallie Mae, 2013). Student loans proved to be very lucrative 
for the US government, too. From 2008 to 2013, the US Department of Education 
is believed to have generated $101.8 billion in revenue from student loans.28 The 
government has been able to generate this revenue by exploiting a spread between 
the low interest rate the government pays to borrow from the Federal Reserve 
(e.g., 10-year Treasury bonds were at 2.52 percent as of 28 June 2013)29 and what 
it charges to students (e.g., 6.8 percent for Stafford loans).30 
Concluding remarks: mitigating social risk through 
consumer protection 
In response to the rising concerns and contestation around mounting student debt, 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (hereafter: CFPB) and the US 
Department of Education released a 2012 joint-report about the state of student 
loans in the United States (hereafter: Report), with a specific focus on private student 
loans.31 The Report argues that risky lending practices tied to private student loans 
have not only increased more rapidly than public student loans over the past decade 
but also have come to share many similarities to the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis 
(CFPB, 2012). According to the Report, private lenders issued loans without 
considering the repayment ability of borrowers. The lenders (private banks) then 
securitised the loans to mitigate their losses when students default and resold the 
loans to investors. According to the Report, since the 2007 crisis, there were more 
than 850,000 cumulative defaults in private loans, which exceeded $8.1 billion 
(CFPB, 2012). 
For the CFPB and the US Department of Education, private student loans 
represent a riskier form of credit for students than federal student loans because, 
interest rates tied to these loans are far higher than public loans. Moreover, unlike 
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other consumer loans, repayment plans for private student loans are neither based 
on income nor can these loans be discharged through bankruptcy proceedings. 
The Report suggests two main reasons for the increase in private student loans 
and subsequent defaults. The first is the lack of proper financial education on the 
part of students and their families, as public student loans are far more economical 
(i.e., lower interest rates) and have better consumer protection clauses built into 
their loan products (CFPB, 2012). The second reason for the increases in defaults 
proffered by the Report is greed, fuelled by institutional investor appetite for SLABS. 
This, in turn, facilitated the growth of the private student loan market from less 
than $5 billion in 2001 to over $20 billion in 2008, before contracting to less than 
$6 billion in 2011 (CFPB, 2012: 3). The private educational lenders’ aggressive 
lending practices, which lie at the heart of this growth, prompted the Secretary of 
Education to argue that subprime lending has moved from the housing market to 
colleges (CFPB, 2012). 
The above reading of the student debt crisis is based on a somewhat misleading 
private loan-public loan dichotomy, which represents the student loan industry in 
largely ahistorical and apolitical terms and thereby glosses over, and even serves to 
distort, the significant role played by the state and its unfolding forms of debtfarism 
in the construction and normalisation of students’ increased reliance on loans – 
both public and private – to fund their higher education. These tendencies toward 
debtfarism are evident in the following three solutions pursued by the state. The 
state left largely unaltered the ‘main artery’ of the student loan system, including 
the allegedly riskier private student loan sector: SLABS. The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), for instance, 
did not impose legal limits to risk production on the part of financial markets and 
various sectors therein, nor did Dodd-Frank seek to cap interest rates and fees.32 
Second, federal student loans have become more expensive for low-income 
students. On 1 July 2013, the interest rate on new subsidized Stafford loans doubled 
to 6.8 percent from 3.4 percent. The increase will affect approximately 7 million 
student debtors by increasing the cost of their federal subsidised Stafford loans by 
an additional $1,000 per year (‘Sallie Mae’s profits soaring at the expense of our 
nation’s students’, BillMoyers.com, 12 June 2013). 
Third and last, the only substantial regulation that the US Department of 
Education issued to deal with the social risk inherent to the student loan industry 
was the introduction of the ‘gainful employment’ clause in 2011 targeted at 
private, for-profit universities. Essentially, the gainful employment clause suggests 
that private colleges will lose eligibility to participate in the federal student loan 
program, if less than 35 percent of their graduates are repaying the principle on 
their loans and if loan repayments exceed 30 percent of a typical graduate’s 
discretionary income and 12 percent of their total earnings. However, no penalties 
will be imposed on schools until 2015 (Beaver, 2012: 277). In 2012, the state also 
sought to deal with increasing default rates by, once again, redefining the temporal 
meaning of default, extending the length of days from 270 to 360 in the Direct 
Loan Program (under 34 CFR 668.183(c).33 Thereby pushing a central feature of 
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credit money into the future, i.e., the contracted bill of exchange (loan) must always 
return to its place of origin for redemption. 
While the predatory nature of private student loans and their servicing tactics 
should be critiised, the distinction between private and public student loans is not 
as clear cut and unproblematic as presented by the Report and other scholarly 
treatments of private student loan debt (CFPB, 2012; Beaver, 2012). The literature 
concentrating on the abuses linked to private student loans and, by connection, 
the for-profit, private colleges and universities not only downplays the role played 
by the debtfare state, but also, by extension, public student loans, in subsidising 
capitalist interests through dispossessive practices. For-profit colleges, for instance, 
derive 66 percent of their revenues from federal student loans (Lynch et al., 2010). 
Through its neoliberal restructuring strategies, the debtfare state has played a central 
role in promoting and permitting the private student loan market to thrive and 
feed off of low-income students and their families, i.e., constructing silent com ­
pulsions among the surplus population. The borrowing limits on public student 
loans have not kept pace with the rapidly increasing tuition fees in both private 
and public colleges over the past several decades thereby forcing students to turn 
to private loans, which have higher borrowing caps. As I have demonstrated in 
this chapter, the state, through its unfolding forms of debtfarism, has facilitated the 
rapid rise of for-profit, private universities by encouraging the expansion and 
reproduction of the student loan industry. 
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32 Indeed, in a report to Congress the Federal Reserve concluded that due to the 
‘considerable heterogeneity’ between the asset classes, it was ‘unlikely to achieve the stated 
objective of the [Dodd-Frank] Act – namely, to improve the asset-backed securitisation 
process and protect investors from losses associated with poorly underwritten loans’ 
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6 
DEBTFARISM AND THE 
PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 
Payday lending is a highly lucrative and rapidly growing segment of the poverty 
industry that preys on the working poor. Payday loans, also known as ‘deferred 
deposit services’, are small, short-term, unsecured cash advances that are due on 
the customer’s next payday (usually two weeks). The size of the loan permitted 
varies by state jurisdiction and ranges from $50 to $1,000, with $325 being typical 
(Peterson, 2007; Advance America, 2010). Several studies indicate that general 
average payday loan rates range anywhere from 364 percent to 550 percent Annual 
Percentage Rate (APR), not including common charges such as late fees and 
bounced cheques fees, which can cost nearly as much, or even more, as the loan 
itself (Graves and Peterson, 2005: 661; National People’s Action, 2012). 
In 2004, when Advance America – the country’s largest payday lender – 
decided to go public (with Morgan Stanley leading the offering), the company 
posted profit margins of 23 percent. To put this in perspective, only the most 
successful technology companies at that time posted numbers in this range (Rivlin, 
2010). The high profitability of payday companies rests on their ability to trap 
customers into spiralling debt cycles, or what is referred to in the industry as ‘rollover’ 
loans (Damar, 2009). Studies have revealed, for instance, that 75 percent of payday 
debtors are unable to repay their loan within two weeks and are forced to get 
a rollover loan at additional costs (Chin, 2004; Graves and Peterson, 2005; US 
Department of Defense, 2006; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013). If 
the borrower agrees to pay the rollover fee, by contrast, the loan is usually 
extended for another two weeks. ‘Nearly 90 percent of payday lending revenues 
are based on fees stripped from borrowers who have flipped loans and are trapped 
in a cycle of debt. The typical payday borrower will have an outstanding payment 
for 30 weeks’ ( Jory, 2009: 319). 
There appears to be a consensus among both the industry’s supporters and its 
critics that many payday borrowers tend to fall into recurring debt patterns 
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(Peterson, 2007). The average payday borrower is said to receive eight to 13 loans 
per year, which represents the backbone of the industry (Chin, 2004). According 
to a non-profit consumer advocacy group, the Centre for Responsible Lending 
(CRL), the typical payday loan borrower ultimately has to pay $800 for a $300 
loan (CRL, 2011). Unlike other forms of consumer credit, payday loans are relatively 
quick to obtain. They do not require a credit report and decisions on whether to 
issue a loan can be made on the spot using the borrower’s paycheck or proof of 
a government benefit, such as a welfare cheque, as collateral (Graves and Peterson, 
2005). The convenience and swiftness in obtaining cash linked to payday loans 
has been increasingly intensified with the aggressive expansion of Internet-based 
lending, which I discuss below (CFPB, 2013). 
Predatory lending often emerges as a descriptor for the debates on payday loans.1 
There is, however, no clear legal meaning of predatory lending in the United States, 
which attests to the social power of the poverty industry. That said, various public 
agencies define predation in the credit system by relying on the principle of 
disclosure, which forms the basis of consumer credit protection laws in the US 
(see Chapter 4). For the US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(2001), predatory lending refers to manipulation and/or providing incomplete 
information. It affords benefits to the lender while taking advantage of the 
borrower’s lack of knowledge regarding the terms of the loan. Whereas the Federal 
Reserve defines subprime lending as an extension of credit to those with a 
significantly higher risk of default than other borrowers (Karger, 2005). 
Scholars, who question the welfare-enhancing features of payday loans, highlight 
the exorbitant interest rates attached to these loans and the ensuing debt trap that 
occurs when many borrowers cannot make their payment and thus select to rollover 
their loan for longer periods of time, incurring more interest and fees. For these 
authors, the predatory nature of payday loans, which is marked by over-lending, 
over-charging, deception and targeting certain consumer segments, is inappropri ­
ate based on grounds of the moral predicate (Chin, 2004; Morgan, 2007). As a 
corrective, these observers champion the reform of usury laws, which they regard 
as a feature of consumer protection law that serves to ‘protect the needy from the 
greedy’ (Drysdale and Keest, 2000: 657). The lending system would thus become 
more moral through the enactment of laws that encourage more effective and fair 
ways of determining whether a loan is appropriate for a borrower on the basis of 
their capacity to make the required repayments (Austin, 2004; Woolston, 2010). 
The above readings and resolutions to predatory lending fail to grapple with 
the inherent social structures and processes that lead to and, in turn, perpetuate 
payday lending. To fill this gap in the literature and thereby provide a more complete 
explanation of the power and paradoxes of the payday lending industry, this chapter 
questions and transcends two core assumptions upon which predatory lending is 
based: first, the uncritical liberal embrace of the market as a naturally evolving arena 
marked by individualised expressions of liberty, equality and freedoms (based on 
legal contract and private property); second, the assumption that credit is a thing 
(neutral object) that has evolved to become a core component of the social safety 
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net for the working poor (Austin, 2004: 1227) as well as a primary mechanism to 
augment (non-living) wages. 
The reliance of the surplus population on private provisioning for basic 
subsistence needs is not interrogated as a construction. Remaining exclusively in 
the realm and exchange, these discussions are devoid of considerations of class 
relations and state power in the wider processes of capital accumulation. As such, 
these discussions are unable to provide an adequate explanation as to why – despite 
public outcry and continual attempts at reform – payday lending not only continues 
to thrive, but also has proven to be wildly lucrative (Peterson, 2007; National 
People’s Action, 2012). 
This chapter addresses the above oversights by developing the following 
two-pronged argument. On the one hand, I suggest that payday loans are not 
characterised by market freedoms, but instead are socially constituted forms of silent 
compulsions inherent to the processes of credit-led accumulation. To deal with 
these paradoxes, the payday loan industry is compelled to continually undertake 
spatio-temporal displacements to overcome tensions in the credit system. A spatial 
fix might entail an expansion of the payday industry to a physical space (e.g., opening 
storefronts in locations of convenience near to the working poor’s places of 
employment) or digitalised space (i.e., online lending), whereas a temporal fix could 
denote strategies that seek to lengthen the payment time as in the case of rollover 
loans. On the other hand, I suggest that the state and, in particular, its regulatory 
and rhetorical forms of debtfarism, play an integral role in the expansion and 
reproduction of the payday loan industry. Aside from facilitating and depoliticising, 
albeit in a contradictory manner, the above spatio-temporal displacements, the 
debtfare state acts to naturalise the commodification of social reproduction. One 
primary way this is achieved is by bolstering the fetishisations of the community 
of money, particularly in terms of consumer protection and the framing of debt 
as a legal obligation. 
I develop this argument in three main sections. Section One provides an 
overview of the payday loan industry and describes the core features of its debtor 
base, namely: the surplus population. Section Two maps the rhetorical and 
regulative landscape of debtfarism with an eye to explaining how these processes 
have served to expand and reproduce the payday lending industry. Section Three 
provides concluding remarks. 
The payday lending industry and the surplus population: 
an overview 
The origins of contemporary payday lending may be traced to 1993, when Check 
Into Cash, Inc. of Tennessee opened the first payday loan store in the United States 
(Chin, 2004). During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the industry experienced 
significant growth (National People’s Action, 2012). There are four main providers 
of payday lending in the US: local, privately owned, or what some refer to as ‘mom­
and-pop’ providers; large national providers; national banks; and Internet providers2 
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(Mann and Hawkins, 2007). The 10,000 payday stores that were in operation in 
2000 grew to over 21,000 by 2004 (Rivlin, 2010). By 2010, there were 22,000 
lending companies, which are dominated by 17 major firms (National People’s 
Action, 2010, 2012). The largest payday lenders, such as Advance America, 
dominate the industry and control a significant proportion of market share (see 
Table 6.1). According to the industry, this growth is explained as a response to 
the decreasing availability of short-term consumer credit alternatives from traditional 
banking institutions, as well as the relatively low-costs of entry and the regulatory 
safe harbour that many state statutes provide for cash advance services (Advance 
America, 2010: 5). 
With the exception of national banks, usury laws in the United States fall under 
state jurisdiction, meaning payday lenders are subject to different (and highly variable) 
usury laws (Graves and Peterson, 2005: 673). States maintain primary, albeit not 
exclusive, jurisdiction over these non-bank lending institutions, particularly with 
regard to interest rates (Mann and Hawkins, 2007; Peterson, 2007).3 Although the 
activities and product innovation of payday lenders are expanding and diversifying, 
they are very much shaped by the geographies in which they operate. Advance 
America, for example, offers instalment loans directly to customers in Illinois and 
Colorado and second mortgage loans in Ohio. Other products offered by Advance 
America include costly pre-paid Visa debt cards4 and so forth (Advance America, 
2010). 
In 2000, the payday industry established two national organisations that spend 
millions of dollars in lobbying and public relations (Peterson, 2007). The 
Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA) forms one group, 
which is ‘dedicated to advancing financial empowerment for consumers through 
small-dollar, short-term loans’.5 The second is the Financial Service Centres of 
America (FiSCA), which was established to keep pace with the ‘expanding industry 
of financial services providers in local communities across the country’.6 Both CFSA 
and FiSCA are formidable lobby groups and actively seek to counter legislation 
that its members perceive to be harmful to daily business operations, such as caps 
on interest rates and excessive fees and regulation regarding rollover or refinancing 
loans (Drysdale and Keest, 2000). 
It should be emphasised that the payday industry is in no way peripheral to 
credit-led capitalism, i.e., Wall Street. Payday lenders are financed by and have 
strong ties to, mainstream financial institutions (see Table 6.1).7 Wells Fargo, for 
example, is a key financier of payday lending – offering credit to one-third (32 
percent) of the payday loan industry, based on store locations (National People’s 
Action, 2010: 5). The close relations between Wall Street and the payday loan 
industry became apparent in 2004, with Advance America’s first public offering, 
which was led by Morgan Stanley, one of the largest investment banks in the US 
(Karger, 2005). Moreover, the investment banking arms of Wells Fargo and Bank 
of America were among those lending their names and sales teams to the effort 
under the ‘rent-a-bank’ scheme, i.e., forging partnerships between payday lenders 
and national banks to evade state-imposed interest rate caps, which I cover later 
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TABLE 6.1 Payday lenders and financing profile, 2009 
Payday company Size Sources of finance 
Advance America, Cash 
Advance Centres, Inc. 
Over 2,500 stores 
operating in 32 US states, 
as well as Canada and the 
United Kingdom, issued 
over $1.2 billion in 
Wells Fargo, Bank of America, 
US Bank and Wachovia 
provided a $275–300 million 
line of credit.* 
payday loans in 2009 
in US. 
ACE Cash Express† Over 1,800 stores. Wells Fargo, JP Morgan 
Chase, US Bank and 
KeyBank National provided 




Some 1,200 stores in 
the US and abroad. 
The company claims to 
have ‘the largest financial 
service store network of 
Wells Fargo and Credit Suisse 
$475 million in 2006. 
its kind’ in Canada 
(461 stores) and the United 
Kingdom (337 stores) and 
the second-largest network 
in the US (358 stores). 
In 2009, it originated 




Approximately 670 payday 
lending stores. A major 
payday lender on the 
Internet, with 1.7 million 
online loans made in 2009. 
Wells Fargo along with eight 
banking lending partners 
(including JP Morgan Chase, 
US Bank and KeyBank) 
provide $300 million line of 
credit. 
First Cash Financial 
Services 
546 locations in 12 US 
states and 16 states in 
Mexico. 
Wells Fargo and JP Morgan 
Chase provide the company 
with $90 million. 
EZ Corp, Inc. Operates 479 stores 
nationwide. 
Wells Fargo lead lender, 
providing $50 million of the 
total $120 million in credit. 
Source: National People’s Action (2010) ‘American Profiteers: How the Mainstream Banks Finance the 
Payday Lending Industry’. Available at: www.npa-us.org (accessed 14 July 2013). 
* In 2009, Advance America was able to lend out in the form of payday loans over 4.4 times their 
credit limit. 
† ACE Cash Express was formerly a publicly owned corporation, but turned to private hands in 2007. 
138 Debtfarism and the poverty industry in the United States 
in the chapter (Chin, 2004; Consumer Federation of America, 2004; Mann and 
Hawkins, 2007). According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
major banks provide a minimum of $1.5 billion in credit to payday lenders, who 
fund an estimated $15 billion in payday loans every year (National People’s Action, 
2010). Aside from financing payday lending, national banks have been swiftly 
moving into the lucrative payday business. I return to this topic in Section Three. 
The segment of the surplus population that relies on payday lending does not 
involve the poorest of the poor – many of whom are considered ‘unbanked’ because 
they do not possess the requisite chequing account for payday loans. This segment 
functions in the cash economy, relying on alternative lending facilities such as 
pawnshops (Austin, 2004; Karger, 2005; Rivlin, 2010; National People’s Action, 
2012). Payday lenders target the segment of the surplus population with income 
sources and a chequing account and/or proof of a government subsidy, such as a 
welfare or Social Security, but whose daily lives are characterised by high levels 
of economic insecurity. This, for example, would include workers living from 
paycheck to paycheck, with no financial wiggle room for emergencies and/or 
illnesses. According to the website of the CFSA: 
Payday advance customers are the face of America: Men and women with 
families and jobs who sometimes have unbudgeted or unexpected expenses 
between paychecks and need small dollar, short-term credit to meet their 
obligations. In addition to steady sources of income, 100 percent of our 
customers have a chequing account at a bank or credit union.8 
While exact numbers of payday borrowers are difficult to obtain, estimates range 
from 12 million to 30 million (cf., Logan and Weller, 2009; National People’s 
Action, 2010). Data regarding the income profiles of payday borrowers range slightly 
from study to study. According to some scholars and consumer advocacy groups, 
for instance, half of payday loans are issued to people earning between $25,000 
and $50,000 per year (Karger, 2005; Logan and Weller, 2009). National People’s 
Action also cite this salary range, noting that 75 percent of borrowers had an annual 
household income of less than $50,000 and one-third had a household income 
below $25,000. Similarly, a 2013 study conducted by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) observes that payday borrowers have income that is 
largely concentrated in income categories ranging from $10,000 to $40,000 on an 
annualised basis (CFPB, 2013: 17). 
Despite the above differences in income levels, the data shares a commonality in 
that the income of payday borrowers remains with the range from low-income 
individuals and families have income below two-times the poverty threshold (or, 
below 200 percent of the poverty line), while poor individuals and families register 
incomes at or below 100 percent of the poverty line (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4). 
Data also reveals that borrowers also tend to be disproportionately female, with single 
mothers making up a key segment of payday customers. African-American and Latino 
customers also comprise a disproportionate number of payday borrowers (National 
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People’s Action, 2012: 6). Furthermore, over one-quarter of all bank payday 
borrowers are recipients of Social Security benefits (CFPB, 2013; CRL, 2013). 
A historical materialist understanding of the payday 
loan industry 
The emergence of legalised payday lending 
With the rise of credit-led accumulation in the late 1970s, two trends have gone 
hand in glove. First, the era has been characterised by a rise in low-wage, unskilled 
labour, which constitutes the fastest-growing and largest segment of employment 
in the country. According to the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS), this pattern is 
expected to hold until 2020 (Moody, 2007; Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2012).9 
Low-wage retail and service sector jobs, for example, ‘accounted for 70 percent of 
all new job growth between 1989 and 2000. And the majority of these jobs are 
filled by women’ (Collins and Mayer, 2010: 6). Second, under neoliberalism, there 
has been a steady withdrawal of public and corporate support of the social wage 
(Katz, 2001). Both trends have resulted in a subsequent reliance on private credit 
to secure and sustain social reproduction. Taken together, the absence of a living 
wage coupled with the persistence of stagnant real wages, high levels of (long-term) 
unemployment and the ongoing structural violence of labour – e.g., dereliction of 
labour laws, the dominance of precarious, low-wage work that falls dispro ­
portionately along gendered and racial/ethnic lines (Peterson, 2003; Wacquant, 2009; 
LeBaron and Roberts, 2010; McNally, 2011) – has led to the creation of a lucrative 
market of surplus population upon which payday lenders prey. 
Coinciding with the rise of the payday loan industry was the introduction of 
the draconian welfare reform in the United States in the mid-1990s and its turn 
to workfarism (Peck, 2001). As discussed in Chapter 3, the workfare state was 
premised on the exchange of employment for government assistance, with an eye 
on weaning people off the latter completely. As Randy Albeda (2012: 12) puts it, 
‘the new mandate for poor adults, especially single mothers [during this time], was 
to get a job – any job’. Seen from this angle, there may be a connection between 
the boom in the payday lending industry in the mid-1990s and the introduction 
of workfare. One study has revealed a strong connection between welfare 
(workfare) and payday borrowing: 10 percent of current Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) recipients and 15 percent of leavers used payday lenders, 
compared to nine percent of all low-income families (Stegman and Faris, 2005). 
We explore the profile of payday borrowers below. 
Aside from payday lenders, clear beneficiaries of this turn to privatised and 
individualised forms of the provisioning of social reproduction through credit have 
been low-wage employers (e.g., Wal-Mart), who can hire cheap hourly workers 
without providing social benefits (Karger, 2005). By permitting and legitimating 
the commodification of basic subsistence among the surplus population, the state 
and, in particular, its debtfare forms of intervention, assists in facilitating credit-led 
accumulation in two ways: first, it allows for the social reproduction of a large 
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segment of the American labour force (surplus population) by permitting private 
creditors to supplement low paying jobs that lack benefits; second, in doing so, it 
supports the largely marketised forms of the biological reproduction of this segment 
of the workforce (Collins and Mayer, 2010; Albeda, 2012). 
Debtfarism and the remaking of the payday industry 
One class, one society: the middle-class trope in the payday 
loan industry 
I turned to Advance America not because I was frivolous or careless with money. I turned 
to them because at the time I didn’t have the funds available. We are Americans who work 
hard and live right. Things happen. And when you have places like Advance America that 
can help everyday people, that’s a good thing. 
– Advance America Customer, Advance America, 2010: ii 
In the consumer society, class boundaries have been blurred as opposed to clearly 
demarcated, due in large measure to an exclusive focus on the realm of exchange 
(see Chapter 3; Burton, 2008; cf. Fine, 2002). This distortion is reflected in dominant 
tropes used by the payday lending industry. To gloss over the vulnera bility of the 
workers upon which it preys, the payday loan industry insists on portraying its 
customer base as Mainstreet USA or middle-income consumers (Advance America, 
2010). The blurring of class differences based on income is also created by rhetoric 
employed by the state in its debtfare capacity. The middle-class ideology is an 
extremely powerful cultural trope in terms of depoliticising the socio-economic 
inequalities within and between states that have heightened under neoliberal rule 
(Harvey, 2005; cf. Wacquant, 2009). As we saw above, the payday loan industry 
has also described its consumer base as middle class. Before turning to a closer 
inspection of this trope in the context of the payday lending industry, it is helpful 
to grasp the meaning of the middle-class trope as it is employed by the US state, 
for example, in the form of G. W. Bush’s ‘Ownership Society’ (Soederberg, 2010c), 
followed by US Vice-President Joseph Biden’s ‘Middle-Class Task Force’ 
(MCTF).10 
According to a study commissioned by the MCTF, simply aspiring to be middle 
class is as important an indicator of middle-class status as income levels (US 
Department of Commerce, 2010: 5). Although the report admits that ‘it is harder 
to attain a middle-class lifestyle in 2008 than it was two decades ago, particularly 
since the real prices of the signifiers of middle class have increased in relation to 
average wages and salaries’ (see Table 6.1), it is by no means impossible. Signifiers 
of this coveted status (homes, college education, health security and so forth) can 
be purchased through savings and hard work (US Department of Commerce, 2010: 
5), although the MCTF study does admit that incomes below the poverty line 
‘cannot support a middle-class lifestyle’, i.e., economic security (US Department 
of Commerce, 2010: 3; see Table 6.2). 
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TABLE 6.2 Price changes in key middle-class items, 1990–2008 (inflation adjusted) 








(Median Value) 126,600 197,600 56 
Health Care 
(Premium and out-of­
pocket expenses) 2,000 5,100 155 
College 
Four-year public college 
(Tuition, fees and room and board) 
Four-year private college 







Source: US Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics and Administration (2010) Middle Class 
in America. January. Prepared for the Office of the Vice-President of the United States and the Middle-
Class Task Force, Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, p. 24. 
In contrast to the portrayal of the middle class by the American state and the 
payday lending industry, the reality is that the United States has become increasingly 
polarised, not only through the pursuit of free market policies such as the 
commodification and privatisation of health and education, but also through the 
growing prevalence of low-wage and precarious jobs, the rise of workfare policies, 
regressive taxation practices, the ongoing subsidisation of capitalist enterprises and 
so forth. It is important to stress, once again, that the growing socio-economic 
divide has not only manifested itself along the lines of class, but also race (notably 
Latino and African-American) and gender (single-parent, predominantly female, 
households) (Peterson, 2003; Dymski, 2009; National People’s Action, 2012; 
Roberts, 2013). 
Data from the MCTF Report (see Table 6.3) reveal that female-headed, single-
parent households fall into the average payday borrowers’ income range, that is, 
$25,000 to $50,000. This, in turn, supports a payday industry study that reveals 
the typical payday customer is female with children living at home, is between 24 
and 44 years of age, earns less than $40,000 a year and has little job security (Karger, 
2005: 19). As noted in Table 6.3, the primary reasons for borrowing from payday 
lending reflect basic subsistence needs, as opposed to conspicuous consumption. 
According the 2010 Annual Report of Advance America, payday lending is a 
seasonal business. Demand is highest during the third and fourth quarters of each 
year, corresponding to the back-to-school and holiday seasons, which suggests that 
spending may be geared largely toward children’s needs such as clothing, school 
supplies and presents (Advance America, 2010). 
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TABLE 6.3 Income levels for selected families, 2008 (in dollars) 
In the distribution of In the distribution of 
two-parent two-child families one-parent two-child families 
Lowest quartile cut-off 
(25th percentile) 50,800 13,200 
Median 
(50th percentile) 80,600 25,200 
Highest quartile cut-off 
(75th percentile) 122,800 44,000 
Poverty Line 21,800 17,300 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics and Administration (2010) Middle Class 
in America. January. Prepared for the Office of the Vice-President of the United States and the Middle-
Class Task Force, Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, p. 2. 
The class, racial and gendered lines of payday borrowers are also revealed in a 
study that investigates the differences between payday loan borrowers and non-
borrowers using figures from the Federal Reserve’s 2007, Survey on Consumer Finances 
(hereafter: SCF), which, for the first time, data on payday loans (Federal Reserve 
Board, 2007; Logan and Weller, 2009). Not unsurprisingly, this study found that 
families, who turned to payday lenders, earned considerably less than non-
borrowers. Moreover, while CFSA-sponsored studies report that the majority of 
payday loan customers are married (Elliehausen and Lawrence, 2001), SCF data 
suggest that 40 percent of payday loan borrowers are a married couple, while 41 
percent of families who borrow from a payday lender are headed by single women. 
With the decrease in family income and rise of poverty levels from 2007 to 2010, 
the reliance on payday lending has not only continued, but also increased (Federal 
Reserve Board, 2010a; National Poverty Centre, 2012). According to the SCF 
2010 survey, for instance, 3.9 percent of families reported having taken out a payday 
loan in 2010, which represents an increase of 2.4 percent from 2007 (Federal Reserve 
Board, 2010a).11 
In terms of race, 38 percent of those who have borrowed a payday loan within 
the last year were non-white, while just 22 percent of families who did not take 
out such a loan were non-white. Minority families are more likely to have 
borrowed from a payday lender than white families. Additionally, payday industry 
data indicate that African Americans make up a larger share of payday customers 
than of the general population (Logan and Weller, 2009). This finding has been 
reinforced by a study conducted by the Centre for Responsible Lending, which 
found that payday lending has a disparate impact on communities of colour 
(Li et al., 2009). 
Another finding interrupts the depictions of payday borrowers as middle-
income consumers by revealing their precarious position relative to consumers 
who are not economically insecure: The 2007 SCF data reveal that families who 
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borrowed from payday lenders had a mean net worth of $22,616. Families 
who did not rely on payday loans enjoyed a mean net worth more than 20 times 
that of payday loan users, i.e., $469,374. The median net worth of payday loan 
borrowers was, by comparison, $0. Families who did not take out a payday 
loan possessed a median net worth of $80,510. Another difference between payday 
borrowers and non-borrowers was reflected in the total value of their assets. In 
2007, payday loan borrowers’ mean asset value was $73,309, less than one-eighth 
of the mean value of non-payday loan borrowers’ assets, which stood at $639,467. 
The median asset value of families who withdrew a payday loan was $4,550, while 
those who did not take out a payday loan had a median asset value more than 44 
times as large – $201,000 (Logan and Weller, 2009: 8–9). The borrowing histories 
of families were also considerably different. The 2007 SCF data show that the share 
of payday loan borrowers who previously applied for but were denied any type of 
loan within the last five years was 33 percent, compared to 10 percent for non-
payday loan users (Logan and Weller, 2009: 9). 
Seen from the above angle, the middle-class trope promoted by the debtfare 
state serves an important role in constructing consent around the existence of, and 
reliance on, payday loans by erasing (depoliticising) class, racial and gendered 
differences through the portrayal of society as one (middle-class) class, evoking 
previous cultural tropes such as the Ownership Society (Soederberg 2010b). The 
cultural trope of debtfare also serves to promote the illusion in which rational and 
individualised consumers can seek economic protection and security by participating 
(consuming, borrowing) in a free, equal, democratic and competitive market. In 
what follows, we lift the veil off of this debtfare trope to expose the gendered and 
racial features of the middle-class consumers of payday loans. 
Spatial and temporal constructions of ‘convenience’ 
Just as many consumers prefer the convenience of specialty stores to large department stores, 
many consumers prefer the efficiency and convenience of financial service centers over banks. 
They prefer transacting at FiSCA member stores because of their neighborhood locations 
and longer hours of operation and the friendly service they receive. 
– Financial Service Centres of America (FiSCA)12 
As noted above, unlike other forms of consumer credit, payday loans are relatively 
quick to obtain, as they do not require a credit report and decisions on whether 
to issue a loan are made on the spot, using as collateral the borrower’s paycheque 
or proof of a government benefit such as a welfare cheque (Graves and Peterson, 
2005). Nor do payday lenders generally report the borrower’s repayment history 
later on (Peterson, 2007). The convenience and speed associated with payday loans 
has been increasingly intensified with the rapid expansion of largely unregulated, 
online payday lending. While online payday lenders still comprise a minority of 
the total loan volume, some industry analysts believe it may eventually overtake 
storefront loan volume (CFPB, 2013). As I noted earlier, the social power of money 
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expresses itself in terms of space and time (Harvey, 1989). The word ‘conven­
ience’ figures prominently in the payday industry literature. Ease and accessibility 
to credit are indeed important elements of the wider trope of the democratisation 
of credit (Advance America, 2010). According to FiSCA and other reports, the 
ease of payday loans helps to ‘bridge the unexpected need for short-term credit 
when other options are not available’.13 The business strategy of payday lenders 
is based on the assumption that customers will be attracted to lenders based on 
proximity to their workplace. Some scholars have suggested that the only factors 
a payday borrower takes into consideration are convenience of location, ease of 
process and speed of approvals and not the interest rate (FDIC, 2009). The con ­
venience factor also explains the growth in Internet-only payday lenders (UNC 
Centre for Community Capital, 2007; Francis, 2010: 619). 
The centrality of convenience in payday lending is also confirmed in Table 6.4. 
Two points are relevant here. First, given the demographics of the payday 
borrowers, convenience cannot be considered in isolation from other reasons listed, 
particularly basic consumption needs, including food, gas, vehicle expenses, medical 
payments, utility costs, or rent (Federal Reserve Board, 2010a). Second and related, 
convenience is not only a social construction of space that is connected to the 
social power of money, but also to wider compulsions and structural violence in 
neoliberalism, such as workfare states, lack of social protection and living wages, 
the ability of banks to charge exorbitant fees and interest on bounced cheques and 
so forth. As the following discussion of the 2006 military ban – one significant ban 
of many – on payday lending demonstrates, the construction of convenience with 
regard to the geographies of storefronts is also sanctioned by debtfarism. Although 
the payday industry denies targeting people of colour, ‘payday loan stores are highly 
TABLE 6.4 Reasons for borrowing from payday lenders, 2007 and 2010 
Reason Share of borrowers, Share of borrowers, 
2007* (%) 2010 † (%) 
Convenience 34 21 
Emergency 29 36 
Basic consumption needs 21 20 
Home 9 N/A 
Only available option 8 N/A 
Need to pay other bills and loans N/A 11 
Other needs, e.g., ‘Christmas’ and N/A 12 
need to ‘help family’ 
Source: A. Logan and C. E. Weller (2009) Who Borrows from Payday Lenders? An Analysis of Newly Available 
Data. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, p. 11. 
*Logan and Weller’s calculation based on 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance Data, Washington, DC: 
Federal Reserve Bank (i.e., totals 101% in original). 
†Federal Reserve Board (2010a) 2010 Survey of Consumer Finance Data. Washington, DC: Federal Reserve 
Board, A47. Percentages rounded by author. 
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concentrated in African-American and Latino neighbourhoods’ (National People’s 
Action, 2012: 6). 
Various scholarly studies have concluded that payday lenders actively target spaces 
in urban areas with: more people on public assistance; fewer banks per capita 
than other spaces; relatively higher minority concentrations, including areas with 
more recent immigrants and others who are less likely to speak English; a higher 
percentage of people in the military; and people with less formal education (Burkey 
and Simkins, 2004; Graves and Peterson, 2005; US Department of Defense, 2006; 
Gallmeyer and Wade, 2009). As noted earlier, this targeted demographic is not 
the unbanked but the underbanked. The latter category, according to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), comprises 17.9 percent of the US 
households. Roughly 21 million people are underbanked (i.e., possess a chequing 
or savings account and rely on alternative financial services such as payday loans) 
(FDIC, 2010: 3). 
One study reveals that payday lenders actively seek people who are already served 
by banks, suggesting that payday lenders are attempting take advantage of the 
increased debt levels among ‘banked’ households and/or the payday loans are 
becoming more mainstream, which in turn has prompted entry into these spaces 
(Damar, 2009). The social space of accessibility and ease of payday lending is also 
linked to the temporal violence associated with the loan in the form of the rollover 
phenomenon or, debt trap. 
Unmasking ‘predators who care’ and best practices 
Following the general neoliberal trend of corporate caring and good citizenship, 
or what I have elsewhere referred to as the ‘marketisation of social justice’ 
(Soederberg, 2010b), the payday industry has engaged in aggressive campaigning 
to rebrand itself as a respectable lending institution that is engaged in ‘helping 
hardworking Americans meet their financial obligations’ through the creation of 
programmes such as the 2010 America Needs a Raise campaign14 in which the 
corporation does not recognise and award Americans for their ‘extraordinary 
service’ in their spaces of employment, but rather outside of the workplace 
(Advance America, 2010). Aside from the façade of the friendly neighbour to be 
reconstructed by the industry, the middle-class trope, as is the community of money 
in which it represented, is protected and reproduced. Our gaze is moved away 
from the wider dynamics of capital accumulation in which these workers earn wages 
or extract benefits to make payments on their loans. 
The payday industry is also vested in signalling its good citizenship by adhering 
to consumer protection laws and meeting other requirements set by regulators. In 
the attempts to curtail meaningful regulation regarding its interest rates and fees, 
for instance, the payday lobby organisation CFSA has announced its strong support 
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) recommendations for a 
principles-based reform approach to ensure fair treatment for all customers through 
the focus on disclosure (cf. Lamoreaux, 2010; CFPB, 2013). Advance America has 
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stressed it will meet these requirements ‘by promoting transparency on all aspects 
of lending practices, improving and streamlining disclosures to enable customers 
to easily compare borrowing options and ensuring that similar products are 
regulated in an equitable manner to support market competition’ (Advance 
America, 2010: iii). To this end, FiSCA lists a ‘Code of Conduct’15 and the CFSA 
has devised a ‘Customer Bill of Rights’, including a list of coercive collection 
practices that they dissuade their members from considering or using as a threat 
toward a customer (US Department of Defense, 2006; cf., Picciotto, 2011).16 
These absences of legally binding rules in consumer finance have resulted in 
not only higher priced credit for the poor, but also inferior legal protections 
(Drysdale and Keest, 2000). Legal obligation continues to act as a coercive and 
ideological frame governing the relations between debtors and creditors, while the 
latter are able to evade any meaningful legal obligation and, as we will see, are 
even permitted to distort the meaning of legal obligation in the same manner as 
the salary lenders. For instance, although the CFSA’s list of ‘best practices’ prohibits 
the threat of prosecution as a collection tactic, many payday lenders use this approach 
to collect past due accounts. What is more, some lenders do not limit themselves 
to merely threatening debtors with criminal prosecution, but also moving forward 
with this threat in court. In one Dallas, Texas precinct in one year, payday lenders 
filed over 13,000 criminal charges with law enforcement officials against their 
consumers (Drysdale and Keest, 2000: 610). 
What is not well known among payday loan borrowers – despite the financial 
education services that the payday lending industry allegedly offers – is that a post­
dated cheque given to someone who knows that it will not clear, rarely supports 
criminal prosecution. As a federal district court in Tennessee noted, one should 
assume that the borrower does not have enough money in the bank to cover the 
cheque – otherwise they would not be in court: ‘Certainly a lender’s exaction of 
a fee to “defer” deposit signifies the requisite acceptance on his part necessary to 
remove the transaction from the realm of the criminal bad cheque statute’ (Drysdale 
and Keest, 2000: 611). Notwithstanding the absence of criminal prosecution 
threats, however, payday debtors, who default on loans are subject to punitive 
charges in the form of delinquency and collection fees. Payday loans are the only 
type of consumer debt that can trigger treble damage penalties upon default17 
(Drysdale and Keest, 2000). 
In keeping with voluntary-led regulation based on neoliberal assumptions of 
market freedoms, since the early 1990s many US corporations, including payday 
lending companies, have required borrowers to sign contracts to compel them to 
resolve any dispute between the payday company and the consumer in the form 
of mandatory arbitration. In contrast to litigation, mandatory arbitration, which is 
backed by the Supreme Court, is contentious due to its private and often non-
consensual nature (Schwartz, 1997; Jory, 2009). Although it may only be flagged 
here, mandatory arbitration should be viewed as a political response to the ongoing 
tensions in dispossessive capitalism, which are evidenced by the growing number 
of defaults and debt collection lawsuits and the booming debt collection industry, 
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which is the fastest growing industry in the United States, according to the Bureau 
of Labour Statistics. Mandatory arbitration should also be understood as part of 
wider debtfare strategies regarding bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 200518 has been the most recent and 
coercive expression of the state’s attempt to deal with the paradoxes inherent in 
secondary forms of exploitation of the working poor. 
Debtfarism, rhetorical payday bans and salience distortion 
A narrow definition of usury is the taking of more for the use of money than the 
law allows. Usury laws are believed to protect against the oppression of debtors through 
excessive rates of interest charged by lenders. Since there is no federal usury law, 
each state has its own percentage rate that is considered a de facto usury rate ( Jory, 
2009: 321). But, for the most part, usury laws have failed to regulate the payday 
lending industry (Peterson, 2007). Thirty-six percent (APR) is the limit set by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) Responsible Small Dollar Lending 
Guidelines and is double the cap for federally chartered credit unions. A majority 
of states have statutes regulating what loan terms are permitted and prohibited.19 
The statutes also entail penalties for non-compliance. Many of these states even 
cap the interest or fees lenders can charge to consumers (Plunkett and Hurtado, 
2011). Most of these states limit the number of loans that can be made or renewed 
with the aim of reducing predatory cycles of debt ( Johnston, 2010). 
Yet, debtfarism – in both its federal and state articulations – has facilitated the 
evasion of usury laws by payday lenders. After conducting a rigorous empirical 
study of 50 state usury laws, legal scholar Christopher L. Peterson, concludes that 
since 1965 usury law has become more lax, more polarised and more misleading. 
He refers to this trend as ‘salience distortion’ (Peterson, 2007: 5). Seen from our 
theoretical frame, Peterson’s views reflect wider attempts by the debtfare state to 
assist payday lenders by depoliticising increasing public criticism and controversy 
regarding the industry’s disregard for consumer protection laws and the creation 
of so-called debt traps (i.e., rollover loans). In what follows, I outline some 
examples of salience distortion exercised by debtfare practices with regard to 
usury laws. 
When faced with usury caps or an outright ban of payday lending from state 
legislatures in the early 2000s (e.g., Georgia and North Carolina in 2004), payday 
lenders created ‘rent-a-bank’ partnerships with nationally chartered banks. This move 
was largely facilitated by previous debtfare interventions, such as the Marquette 
Decision of 1978 (Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.), 
which allowed banks to circumvent state usury laws ( Johnston, 2010; see Chapter 
4). Briefly, the Marquette Decision represented an attempt by the US federal 
government to displace state regulation (Mann and Hawkins, 2007). The US 
Supreme Court ruled that lenders in a state with liberal usury laws (e.g., Delaware 
and South Dakota) could apply rates to workers residing in states with more 
restrictive usury ceilings (Peterson, 2007). 
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Significantly, the Marquette Decision served to undermine usury protection, 
which was a vital step in the growth of secondary forms of exploitation. The 
American state thus effectively legalised usury in 1978. From this time onward, 
any national bank was permitted ‘to charge an interest rate as high as the maximum 
rate permitted by the laws of the state where the bank is located’ (Mann and 
Hawkins, 2007: 871). And, while this pertained to national banks, it played a major 
role in normalising usury across the United States, allowing national banks to charge, 
among other things, over 4,000 percent (median) interest rates on overdraft 
cheques (i.e., in excess of 20 times that of payday loans), creating a ludicrous situation 
in which payday loans become a cost effective alternative (Fusaro, 2008). 
Seen from the above perspective, the clear beneficiaries of interest rate caps on 
payday loans across several states20 are not the working poor, but national banks. 
Around the time of the start of various payday bans in 2004, the bounced cheque 
rates in both Georgia and North Carolina increased. Eager to take advantage of 
this new opening, the federal government passed the Check Clearing for the 21st 
Century Act in 2003 (or, ‘Check 21’), which came into effect in 2004 (Morgan 
and Strain, 2008). One of the features of this new law effectively enhances bank 
profitability with regard to bounced cheques. For instance, the Act allows deposi ­
tory institutions to debit payers’ accounts more quickly (using electronic presentment) 
without crediting payees’ accounts more promptly. Less ‘float’ for cheque writers 
means more bounced cheques revealing the social power of money through its 
temporal dimension (Morgan and Strain, 2008: 14). 
To avoid regulation, some payday lenders shut down their physical offices in 
states with severe restrictions and began conducting payday lending via the Internet, 
where they charge higher rates and issue loans in greater amounts than their 
brick-and-mortar stores ( Johnston, 2010). Since 2006, for example, the state of 
California’s Department of Corporations has been trying to force these unlicensed, 
Internet-only businesses to adhere to the same rules that govern the state-licensed 
(brick-and-mortar) payday loan stores that offer short-term, unsecured loans of up 
to $300 and cap the annualised percentage rate at 459 percent for a maximum 
31-day period. Internet payday lenders have been allowed to circumvent state law 
by claiming that they are associated with sovereign Aboriginal nations that operate 
outside of California and are thus immune from state regulation. Authorities 
estimate that these Aboriginal-based Internet-only lending companies involve 
thousands of websites that generate billions of dollars in revenue nationwide 
(‘Internet payday lenders with ties to Indians dodge California regulators’, LA Times, 
13 April 2009). 
Other online competitors are also attempting to reconfigure the spatio-temporal 
dimensions of short-term loans and, in doing so, may affect the dominant position 
of virtual payday lending. ZestCash, an online small-loans lending company 
established in 2009 by former Google executive Douglas Merrill, raised $73 million 
of funding in early 2012 to expand the company’s operations (‘Former Google 
CIO Raises $73 Million to Reform Payday Loans with Data-Driven Startup 
ZestCash’, TechCrunch, 19 January 2012; zestcash.com). ZestCash offers loans of 
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up to $800 but, unlike payday lenders, allows the loans to be repaid over a period 
of months, as opposed to weeks. According to its website, by using ‘analytical 
techniques’, ZestCash suggests that it is able to offer a fair, lower cost alternative 
to people ‘who do not have access to traditional credit’. Yet, like payday borrowers, 
these lenders require a bank account and a source of income. Moreover, ZestCash 
still charges triple-digit interest rates, when computed in terms of APR. Although 
it markets its product as 50 percent cheaper (for those with relatively better 
credit ratings) than traditional payday lenders, ZestCash loans, according to the 
company’s website, average 365 percent APR as opposed to 480 percent APR of 
payday loans.21 
Two further examples of how payday lenders have circumvented state usury 
laws due to the existence (and maintenance) of loopholes are worth mentioning 
here (Woolston, 2010). The first is the case of Ohio. In 2008 and in response to 
increasing pressure from constituents and consumer advocates, the Ohio State 
Legislature passed and signed into law the Short-Term Loan Act to curb predatory 
payday lending. The Act essentially capped the maximum loan amount at $500, 
limited the APR on loans at 28 percent and made the maturity date a minimum 
of 30 days. Additionally, the Act banned lenders from issuing more than four loans 
per year to the same borrower. The statute also addresses a common circumvention 
technique of out-of-state lenders – issuing loans via the Internet or telephone – 
by banning out-of-state lenders from issuing loans to Ohio residents ( Johnston, 
2010). After mounting a $20 million campaign to overthrow the new law through 
a voter initiative on the November 2008 ballot, Ohio voters overwhelming 
defeated the industry’s initiative. 
The payday lenders, however, quickly found legal loopholes through salience 
distortion (Peterson, 2007; Johnston, 2010). While only 19 lenders, for instance, 
obtained a licence under the new law, the majority of lenders were licensed under 
either Ohio’s Mortgage Loan Act, which does not require issuance of an actual 
mortgage and does not place limits on the interest rates that can be charged, or 
under Ohio’s Small Loan Act, which permits payday lenders to charge 423 percent 
APR, even higher than the 391 percent allowed under the repealed payday 
lending statute ( Johnston, 2010). In a 2009 study, every payday lender surveyed in 
Ohio charged triple-digit interest rates and required loans to be paid back within 
two weeks or less. Furthermore, the majority issued loans in amounts exceeding 
$500 ( Johnston, 2010: 12–26). Yet, to date, neither the state of Ohio nor the federal 
government has enacted any meaningful laws or regulations that curtail this practice 
(Woolston, 2010). 
Texas also provides a good example in which to gain insight into the loopholes 
involved when banning or mitigating payday lending in the name of consumer 
protection. To overcome the rent-a-bank prohibition, payday lenders in Texas 
have been exploiting a loophole in a broadly worded statute that allows them to 
operate as ‘credit service organisations’ (or, CSOs) (Mann and Hawkins, 2007). 
CSOs were originally established in the state to improve a customer’s credit rating. 
In Texas, CSOs are legally required to pay a $100 registration fee to the Secretary 
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of State, post a $10,000 bond for each store, disclose contract terms and costs to 
borrowers and permit borrowers three days to cancel a contract (‘The perils of 
payday’, The Texas Observer, 30 April 2009). Payday lenders use the CSO status 
to process loans from third parties and then collect fees – not interest – thereby 
evading usury laws ( Johnston, 2010: 17). Targeting low-income neighbourhoods 
in the state, payday lenders grew from 1,513 storefronts in 2005 to more than 2,800 
in 2009. Like the rest of the United States, the payday lending business was extremely 
lucrative in the wake of the 2008 recession (‘The perils of payday’, The Texas 
Observer, 30 April 2009). 
Legal protection for some 
When faced with pressure from specific segments of power within the state, the 
debtfare system is able to impose laws without legal loopholes. In the early 2000s, 
in the context of growing discontent and attacks on payday lenders, commanding 
officers at military bases in the United States began complaining about the active 
targeting of their personnel by payday companies (Graves and Peterson, 2005). 
According to the Centre for Responsible Lending, one in five military members 
had taken out a loan in 2004 versus one in sixteen civilian Americans (Logan and 
Weller, 2009; Rivlin, 2010). The demographics of the military reflect those of 
payday borrowers, i.e., there is a disproportionate representation of African-
Americans and Latinos with limited educational backgrounds (Graves and Peterson, 
2005: 676). 
According to the Pentagon, payday borrowing does more harm than good for 
the military ( Johnston, 2010). In a 2006 report issued by the US Department of 
Defense, ‘service members need better enforcement from Congress and state credit 
regulators to prevent predatory lending abuses, which undermine military readiness 
and harm the morale of troops and their families (US Department of Defense, 2006: 
9). Moreover, ‘the President of the Navy Marine Corps Relief Society called payday 
lending ‘the most serious single financial problem that we have encountered in 
[a] hundred years’ (Centre for Responsible Lending, 2007, cited in Carrell and 
Zinman, 2008: 3). 
The payday industry normally wields power in the Senate Financial Services 
Committee, but this battle was waged by the Pentagon’s Armed Services Com ­
mittee. In the summer of 2006, Senator Jim Talent (R-Missouri) and Senator Bill 
Nelson (D-Florida) added an amendment (also known as the Talent-Nelson 
amendment) to the annual defense authorisation bill that capped the payday loan 
rate for military families at 36 percent (Mann and Hawkins, 2007; Rivlin, 2010). 
The Pentagon successfully lobbied Congress for the implementation of the Military 
Lending Act of 2006, which was a binding federal cap on loans to military mem ­
bers and their families (36 percent APR) effective 1 October 2007 as part of the 
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (Carrell and Zinman, 2008). 
The military payday ruling was important for several reasons. First and foremost, 
it underscores the fact that usury law is a highly political affair, as opposed to a 
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technical exercise to be left primarily to lawyers and corporate lobbyists. Indeed 
and in contrast to state legislatures, Congress has the power to cap interest rates 
for both banks and non-depository lenders alike (Peterson, 2007). Second, the 2006 
ruling reveals the social configuration of power between various departmental units 
within the neoliberal state as well as the larger geo-political context of the time, 
namely: the Second Gulf War, fought in the name of freedom. And, third, this 
case also indicates shifting configurations of power in the payday lending industry; 
a key segment of which involves large national banks (see Table 6.1; Center for 
Responsible Lending, 2013). 
Competition from national banks: good for consumers or a 
spatial fix? 
As noted earlier, large, national banks play an integral role in financing payday 
lenders. The banks listed in Table 6.1, most of which received Troubled Asset 
Relief Programme (TARP)22 bailout funds in 2008–2009, have benefited from 
other types of state subsidisation in the form of accessing capital at exceptionally 
low interest rates from the Federal Reserve (National People’s Action, 2010; Centre 
for Responsible Lending, 2013; for various Federal Reserve lending rates, see 
Chapter 4). These banks loaned money to payday lenders at an average of 
4.1 percent and 7.76 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Payday lenders then 
used this credit to issue millions of loans to the working poor at average rates of 
400 percent APR (National People’s Action, 2010). Given these lucrative spreads, 
it should not come as a surprise that some banks, particularly those that acted as 
creditors to payday lenders (e.g., Wells Fargo) have been aggressively entering the 
payday lending industry since the mid-2000s. 
Over the years, national banks, which do not have to abide by state usury 
laws, have been increasing their competition for a share of the lucrative $30 billion-
a-year payday lending market and its estimated $7.3 billion generated by fees 
(‘Bad Credit: how payday lenders evade regulation’, The Nation, 25 April 2011). 
Since the 1980s, non-interest income (e.g., fees) has grown twice as fast as interest 
income and accounts for half of all bank revenues (Stegman, 2007). According 
to one industry estimate, 60 percent of service fee revenue comes from non-
sufficient funds (NSF) fees (Fusaro, 2008).23 Competition from payday lenders has 
driven banks to increase overdraft fees and reduce the availability of free chequing 
accounts (Meltzer and Morgan, 2009). 
The national bank payday loans took off after the FDIC issued its Affordable 
Small-Dollar Loan Guidelines in 2006.24 In the wake of the 2005 ban on rent-a­
bank partnerships, these guidelines (read: not legally binding) were aimed at ‘non­
member banks to encourage them to offer small-dollar loan products that are 
affordable. FDIC-supervised institutions that offer these products in a responsible, 
safe and sound manner may receive favourable consideration under the Community 
Reinvestment Act’ (CRA).25 In terms of interest rates, the FDIC noted that: 
152 Debtfarism and the poverty industry in the United States 
Pricing may vary depending on the risk profile of the target group. For 
example, a number of institutions have developed affordable small-dollar credit 
programs with APRs that range between 12 percent and 32 percent with 
no or low fees. We encourage lenders to offer small-dollar credit with APRs 
of 36 percent or less.26 
Despite these guidelines, national banks such as US Bancorp, Wells Fargo and Fifth 
Third Bancorp – all three recipients of taxpayer bailout funds (TARP) – have been 
creating their own payday loan products with triple-digit interest rates to serve 
their chequing account customers (National People’s Action, 2010). Banks make 
payday loans by depositing money into a customer’s chequing account. According 
to the Centre for Responsible Lending (CRL, 2011), ‘The bank then automatically 
repays itself in full by deducting the loan amount, plus fees, from the account when 
the customer’s next direct deposit paycheck or other benefits income comes into 
the account’. Depending how quickly the loan is repaid, APR can range from 120 
to 365 percent on these ‘chequing account advance’ or ‘direct deposit advance’ 
accounts (CRL, 2010; ‘Report blames big banks for payday loan growth’, Wall 
Street Journal, 14 September 2010). Moreover, studies by the CRL of actual 
chequing account activity found that bank payday borrowers are in debt for 175 days 
per year, i.e., twice as long as the maximum length of time the FDIC has advised is 
appropriate (CRL, 2011). 
Due the doctrine of federal preemption with regard to national banks – which 
falls under the purview of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – banks 
can continue making loans in states that permit payday lending as well as in states 
that prohibit or restrict the product from non-bank lenders. Bank payday loans 
have also undermined federal protections of the Military Lending Act of 2006 
discussed above (CRL, 2013). National banks are able to evade this law by 
rejigging the structure and nomenclature of loans. For example, since the 2006 
regulation covers ‘closed-end’ loans, banks refer to their loans as ‘open-end’ loans, 
despite the fact that the due date for the loan, like the closed-end loan, is fixed as 
the next deposit date or, at the latest, after 35 days (CRL, 2013: 7). 
Aside from the sheer volume of capital they possess vis-à-vis payday lenders, 
banks are not only immune from state usury laws, but because overdraft protection 
is not legally recognised as a loan, banks are not required to comply with the Truth 
in Lending Act (TILA) or the disclosure of APRs (Fusaro, 2008: 251). Banks argue 
that unlike payday lenders, customers can’t extend or rollover the loans because 
the amount owed is automatically repaid with the next direct deposit. According 
to the banks, this restriction mitigates the debt chain to which many payday 
borrowers have been exposed. The default risk for banks is also minimal, since 
borrowers who sign up for the loans agree to give the banks first dibs on their 
next direct deposit of $100 or more. In contrast, most payday companies still rely 
on customers showing up with a cheque (CRL, 2010). As one industry insider 
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notes, the banks ‘get to charge a 120 percent interest rate on what is essentially a 
risk-free loan . . . It shouldn’t be a mystery why banks are doing this’ (‘Biggest 
banks stepping in to payday arena’, Star Tribune [Minneapolis-St. Paul] 6 September 
2009). As of 1 March 2013, bank payday lenders received another perk. After this 
date, electronic distribution of government cheques became mandatory. Given that 
one-quarter of all bank payday borrowers are Social Security recipients, upon receipt 
of the electronic government benefit, banks are now able repay themselves the 
payday loan amount before any other expense or creditor (CRL, 2013; CFPB, 
2013). 
FiSCA and CFSA have fought back against competition from national banks 
by aggressively lobbying Congress on the grounds of market freedom, competition 
and transparency – all in the interest of consumer protection.27 For example, the 
Urban Institute for the US Department of Treasury has said that: ‘Narrowing the 
credit market could reduce price competition between lenders and raise prices’, 
and warns that ‘restricting supply can reduce consumer well-being, as consumers 
turn to inferior products or options to deal with inferior products or options to 
deal with credit needs’ (Advance America, 2010: 4). In an ironic twist of events, 
the payday lending industry, known for circumventing state law (see above), has 
complained that banks like Fifth Third are ignoring interest rate caps imposed under 
state payday lending statutes ( Johnston, 2010: 20). The fact remains, however, that 
national banks do not have to abide by state usury laws, as they are regulated by 
federal banking legislation ( Johnston, 2010: 21). As other commentators have noted, 
while national depository institutions have no incentive to reveal the APR of their 
chequing advance products, payday lenders have aggressively publicised the results 
of a 2008 FDIC study on the costs and usage of overdraft credit (cf. Peterson, 
2007; Melzer and Morgan, 2009; CFPB, 2013). 
Debtfarism and regulatory remedies in the bounds of 
consumer protection 
The CFPB [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] has a statutory obligation to promote 
markets that are fair transparent and competitive. 
– CFPB, ‘Payday Loans and Deposit Advance Products: 
A White Paper of Initial Data Findings, 2013: 4 
In the aftermath of the 2007 subprime crisis and in the renewed spirit of reforming 
the predatory practices of consumer finance, two legislative bills were introduced 
in 2009 to reform the payday lending industry: the Payday Loan Reform Act and 
the Protecting Consumers from Unreasonable Credit Rates Act. Notably, neither 
bill has been enacted at the time of writing. As we will see, each bill has a built 
in loophole that not only allows the payday lending industry to engage in business-
as-usual behaviour; but also does little to radically alter the existing conditions 
and violent nature of payday lending practices in the United States. The proposed 
bills – informed by the central trope of consumer protection – do not challenge 
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the disciplinary and exploitative nature of dispossessive capitalism, but rather aid 
in the remaking of the illusions of the community of money. 
Introduced by US Representative Luis Gutiérrez (D-Illinois), head of the 
House Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit, the Payday Loan Reform Act of 200928 requires lenders to provide specific 
disclosures to payday loan customers and claims to extend protections of the Military 
Lending Act to all Americans ( Johnston, 2010; Francis, 2010). There are very useful 
features of the proposed bill, particularly with regard to collection practices. Under 
the bill, for instance, payday lenders are not permitted to threaten or seek to have 
consumers prosecuted in criminal court to collect outstanding loans. In addition, 
the bill forbids lenders from taking a security interest in property to secure the 
loan ( Johnston, 2010). For legal scholar Creola Johnson, however, the bill provides 
the following loophole: ‘It shall be unlawful for a payday lender to require a 
consumer to pay interests and fees that, combined, total more than 15 cents for 
every dollar loaned in connection’ ( Johnston, 2010: 24). This provision will, in 
effect, grant Congressional approval to lenders that charge triple-digit interest rates 
for payday loans. Thus, the bill is ‘an ersatz reform that would allow payday lenders 
to charge at what amounts to an APR of 390 percent’ ( Johnston, 2010: 24; ‘391 
percent payday loan’, New York Times, 12 April 2009). 
The Protecting Consumers from Unreasonable Credit Rates Act of 2009 was 
introduced by Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Illinois) to establish ‘a national usury 
rate for consumer credit transactions’.29 In contrast to the Gutiérrez bill, consumer 
protection proponents support Durbin’s bill. Like the Military Lending Act, 
Durbin’s bill would cap interest rates at 36 percent. While there are some strengths 
of the bill, it falls short in terms of providing needed consumer protection. A critical 
component of the bill, for instance, is section 141(b)(2) under the heading 
‘Tolerances’. This section provides that the definitions of ‘fee’ and ‘interest rate’ 
do not include ‘credit obligations that are payable in at least three fully amortising 
installments over at least 90 days’ ( Johnston, 2010: 27). In addition, for loans of 
$300 or more, payday lenders are permitted to charge additional fees, which include: 
origination fees of no more than $30, as well as late fees of either $20, or a fee 
authorised by state law. As history has shown, lenders will draft loan contracts to 
circumvent the purpose of the legislation ( Johnston, 2010). 
The fact that neither bill has been enacted, despite their industry-friendly 
formulations, is telling. The payday lending industry is central not only to highly 
lucrative forms of secondary exploitation, but also to the commodification of social 
reproduction in the United States as a disciplinary device. Moreover, it is telling 
that the debates remain within the moral bounds of usury law, which, as many 
authors have noted, has been a historical source of conflict that predates capitalism 
(Peterson, 2007; Graeber, 2011). 
What is omitted in these reforms are the relations of power that have a vested 
interest in constructing and reproducing a social reality in which the working poor 
are made dependent on private credit as a primary means of obtaining economic 
security. This position is mirrored in a 2013 study on the payday loan industry by 
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the CFPB. The report begins by uncritically accepting the existence of payday 
loans. ‘The CFPB recognises that demand exists for small dollar credit products. 
These types of credit products can be helpful for consumers if they are structured 
to facilitate successful repayment without the need to repeatedly borrow at a high 
cost’ (CFPB, 2013). The report goes on to investigate and suggest various ways 
payday loans can be transformed into what they refer to as ‘sustained use’ (CFPB, 
2013). 
Issues that remain out of bounds in terms of discussing (let alone achieving) a 
reasonable interest rate, include living wages with mandatory social benefits by 
employers as well as adequate state provisioning of education, housing, health, old-
age and child care and so forth. This is symptomatic of a major trend in advanced 
forms of neoliberalisation, namely: the neglect of poverty and how to address it. 
According to Randy Albelda (2012: 11), this has been not figured prominently on 
the national agenda since the ‘welfare reform’ debates in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have sought to denaturalise the payday loan industry and, in doing 
so, transcend the assumptions underpinning the economistic treatment of money 
and legalistic literature that dominates the subject. The payday loan industry 
provides an important example of how the state and capitalists have attempted to 
construct debtfarism, alongside the credit card industry and the student loan 
industry. Drawing on the theoretical framework established in Part I of this book, 
I argued that the payday loan industry cannot be understood simply within the 
realm of exchange, but instead must be seen as an integral part of the wider dynamics 
of capital accumulation and the tensions therein. 
I also suggested that through processes of debtfarism, the state facilitates the 
expansion of credit-led accumulation by supporting ongoing spatio-temporal 
displacements in the interest of banks and the payday loan industry. Debtfarism 
has also served to smooth tensions arising from the commodification of social repro ­
duction, from which the payday lending industry extracts its revenue. The state, 
through its debtfare forms of intervention, strives to forge consent in the community 
of money through the protection of consumers (disclosure and fairness) and 
borrowers (legal obligations) as opposed to providing workers with social protection 
against market forces through, at a minimum, a living wage. 
The legal and political framings of debtfarism have been successfully employed 
to bolster the payday loan industry and the underlying dynamics of capital accum ­
ulation. Since the 2007 subprime meltdown and subsequent recession, annual 
earnings for the country’s (publicly-traded) payday corporations (e.g., Advance 
America, Cash America, Dollar Financial, EZ Corp, First Cash Financial, QC 
Holdings) have risen to their highest levels on record. 
Annual filings show that the nation’s major payday lenders collectively earn 
more from their high-cost cash advances than before the financial crisis. From 
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2007 to 2010 their combined revenues from payday lending have increased 
2.6 percent, or some $30 million in annual revenues. 
(National People’s Action, 2012: 10) 
It should not come as a surprise that the rapid growth of payday lending is not 
restricted to the US. The industry is also expanding rapidly into Canada, the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, South Africa and South Korea (Aitken, 2010; Bond, 2013). 
Interest in payday lending is also emerging in the global South. In 2012, Grupo 
Elektra, a retailer that specialises in expensive credit to the poor in Latin America 
(or, what it refers to as ‘underserved’ consumers), acquired control of all outstanding 
shares of the largest payday lender in the United States, Advanced America.30 
I explore Grupo Elektra and its role in the Mexican poverty industry in Part III 
of this book. 
Notes 
1 Given that the literature on payday lending has been dominated by legal (Mann and 
Hawkins, 2007; Huckstep, 2007) and economic (Agarwal et al., 2009; Edmiston, 2011) 
scholars, it is not surprising that the debates about the societal benefits of payday lending 
fall into one of two views – both of which remain within the realm of exchange (see 
Chapters 1 and 2): that payday lending is welfare enhancing (Morgan and Strain, 2008), 
or that it is welfare destroying (Carrell and Zinman, 2008). On the first view, it is believed 
that payday loans can help distressed individuals to smooth liquidity shocks without 
incurring the more expensive costs of overdraft fees and interests, bounced cheques, late 
fees, and/or getting evicted or foreclosed upon (Meltzer and Morgan, 2009; Zinman, 
2010). Here, payday loans fill an important void in the existing credit system, which is 
evidenced by strong consumer demand for convenient, small amounts of short-term credit 
at high rates of interest (Morse, 2009; Drysdale and Keest, 2000). On the ‘welfare reducing 
provision of credit’ such as payday loans, critics point to the adverse economic effects of 
over-lending, over-charging, deception, targeting certain consumer segments such the 
working poor (Morgan, 2007; cf. Austin, 2004). 
2 Because local providers are not publicly traded, for instance, it is difficult to generalise 
about their activities. However, it is clear that the much of the growth of the larger 
providers is due to acquisitions of ‘mom-and-pop’ storefronts. Another interesting feature 
about these local providers is that, given their size, they are exempt from usury limits in 
the range of 20 to 30 percent (Mann and Hawkins, 2007). The most difficult sector of 
the payday lending industry to study is online providers. Although I discuss Internet 
providers later in the chapter, in this section, I concentrate on national providers and 
banks, as information is readily available on these key industry players. 
3 For an overview of different state regulations and interest rates, see: www.advance 
america.net/apply-for-a-loan/fees (accessed 1 March 2012). Mann and Hawkins (2007) 
identify three common patterns of usury regulation with regard to payday lenders. Some 
states tolerate payday lenders with specific usury ceilings (e.g., Michigan), while other 
states exercise an under-enforced prohibition. The latter normally implies a usury 
ceiling that has no specific exception authorising payday lending transactions (Mann and 
Hawkins, 2007). An example of this second category is Texas, which I discuss below. 
The third category is true prohibition of payday lending, which usually involves a general 
usury limit. New York, for instance, has a general usury ceiling of 6 percent (Mann and 
Hawkins, 2007) 
4 For more information about the fees tied to this card see the Advance America website: 
https://www.advanceamerica.net/services/details/visa-prepaid-cards (accessed 3 July 
2013). 
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5 For more information, see the CFSA website: http://cfsaa.com (accessed 4 July 2013). 
6 For more information, see the FiSCA website: www.fisca.org (accessed 14 July 2013). 
7 The National People’s Action report notes that ‘It is often difficult to determine the exact 
amount of financing provided by a given bank to a payday company because funding is 
often pooled from a variety of lenders and the specifics are not disclosed by the SEC 
[Securities Exchange Commission]’ (National People’s Action, 2010: 4). 
8 CFSA, ‘Customer Demographics’. Available at: http://cfsaa.com/about-the-payday­
advance-industry/customer-demographics.aspx (accessed 1 May 2012). 
9 For more information on the BLS projections, see ‘BLS Forecasts Fastest-Growing Jobs’, 
The Wall Street Journal, 2 February 2012. 
10 See: www.whitehouse.gov/strongmiddleclass (accessed 16 May 2012). 
11 The Federal Reserve will complete collecting data for the following SCF in December 
2013, after the date of publication of this book. More information available at: 
www.federalreserve.gov/scf/ (accessed 12 July 2013). 
12 ‘FiSCA History’. Available at: www.fisca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutFISCA/ 
FiSCAHistory/default.htm (accessed 20 April 2012). 
13 FiSCA ‘Consumer Fact Sheet’. Available at: www.fisca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ 
ConsumerCenter/ConsumerFactSheet/default.htm (accessed 24 April 2012). 
14 See Advance America. Available at: www.americadeservesaraise.com/ (accessed 1 June 
2013). 
15 FiSCA ‘Code of Conduct’. Available at: www.fisca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ 
AboutFISCA/CodesofConduct/default.htm (accessed 30 April 2012). 
16 CFSA Customer Bill of Rights. Available at: http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-member-best­
practices/cfsa-customer-bill-of-rights.aspx (accessed 20 April 2012). 
17 These penalties are legally sanctioned by the civil bad cheque laws in several states. For 
examples of various state penalties for bad cheques, see: www.ckfraud.org/penalties. 
html#civil (accessed 1 June 2013). 
18 I discuss this 2005 draconian revision to the Bankruptcy Code in more detail in Chapters 
4 and 5. 
19 Seven states (Arkansas, Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Vermont) plus the federal district of Washington, DC protect consumers against 
abusive practices in small loan products (Plunkett and Hurtado, 2011: 37-38). Yet, five 
states set no usury caps for small loans, including Delaware, Idaho, South Dakota, Utah, 
and Wisconsin (Plunkett and Hurtado, 2011). 
20 Since the subprime housing debacle of 2007, and the subsequent recessionary 
environment, several states have increased regulatory pressure on payday lending, 
including Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Oregon – 
home to over 3,400 payday loan stores issuing over $3 billion in payday loans annually. 
These seven states have limited small-dollar loan interest rates between 17 percent and 
45 percent APR, effectively ending or severely limiting payday lending (National People’s 
Action, 2012; cf. Woolston, 2010). 
21 For more information, see: www.zestcash.com/not-payday-loans/cheaper-than-payday­
loans (accessed 14 May 2012). 
22 For more information about TARP, see the Congressional Budget Office, ‘Report on 
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PART III 
Debtfarism and 
the poverty industry 
in Mexico 

Preface to Part III 
DEBTFARISM, DEVELOPMENT 
AND DISPOSESSION 
In this third and final part of the book, I explore the poverty industry within the 
wider ambit of global development through the lens of the following three case 
studies: the attempts by the Group of Twenty (G20) at universalising financial 
inclusion (Chapter 7), Mexico’s microfinancing industry (Chapter 8) and Mexico’s 
housing finance industry (Chapter 9). Taken together, these three chapters look 
at the coercive and ideational processes involved in the expansion and reproduction 
of the poverty industry and the power relations therein. 
As I have suggested throughout the book, debtfarist forms of state intervention 
have been integral to the expansion and reproduction of credit-led accumulation 
in the form of the poverty industry. Because of the fluidity and globality of 
capitalism, debtfarism does not take place exclusively within national spaces, but 
globally, too. In the context of this part of the book, the global spaces of debtfarism 
are represented by the regulations and rhetoric of core international development 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Inter-
American Development Bank and G20, as well as prominent think-tanks, such as 
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). As I demonstrate in my 
discussion of the G20’s Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion of 2010, the 
rhetorical and regulative features of global debtfarism serve to legitimise, normalise 
and universalise the poverty industry in both Bangladesh and Mexico. 
The relationship between debtfarism at global and national (e.g., Mexican) scales 
should not be construed as a top-down, determinist relationship between domestic 
and international levels of governance. Instead, the multi-scalar articulations of 
debtfarism must be understood as involving messy, contradictory and dynamic 
interactions. These complex interactions reflect the power relations that play out 
across the spaces in which capitalists seek to rapidly increase the fictitious value of 
privately created money (credit) by lending it to the surplus population. 
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Seen from the above angle, Mexico provides an interesting context in which 
to study the intersections between global-national debtfarism, credit money and 
the surplus population. In part, this is because Mexico has long represented a 
showcase for the Washington Consensus (IMF, 1992, 2011). More than this, I 
have selected Mexico as a site for my case studies in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 
because of its economic position vis–à–vis the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and because of its physical proximity to the heartland of 
neoliberalism, namely: the United States (Peck and Tickell, 2002)1. Due to its geo ­
political positioning as well as its historical configurations of capital accumulation, 
the contradictions of the neoliberal-led development project are easily legible 
in Mexico. In terms of the poverty industry, Mexico has a rapidly growing for-
profit microfinance industry that includes some of the world’s largest and most 
lucrative lending institutions for surplus workers (Chapter 8). The marketisation 
of mortgage financing aimed at the surplus population is also quite extensive in 
Mexico, as is the increasing integration of this financing in global financial markets 
(Chapter 9). 
That said, each of the following three chapters shares the common goal of 
providing an interrogation into how various expressions of debtfarism have played 
a direct role in the construction and normalisation of the poverty industry. A central 
concern running through all three chapters is an analysis of the social powers and 
inherent tensions of privately created money (credit). I attempt not only to 
understand the role played by the revolutionary power of credit money in the wider 
dynamics of credit-led accumulation, particularly as this regards the surplus 
population, but also to reveal the ways in which the regulatory and rhetorical 
processes of the Mexican state strive to resolve the tensions in capital accumulation, 
including the expansion of the poverty industry. 
The financial inclusion agenda, which has become the cornerstone of the 
neoliberal-led development project over the past decade, provides a useful 
portal into our investigation into the social power of money and its connection 
to debtfarism in the global South. Generally speaking, financial inclusion refers to 
increasing access to formal or semi-formal financial services (ranging from banking 
to micro-credit to housing loans) for approximately 2.5 billion poor adults (CGAP, 
2009a).2 According to the Centre for Financial Inclusion – a global initiative 
comprised of powerful private and public sponsors, such as the Citi Foundation, 
Credit Suisse, the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, the Inter-
American Development Bank, Visa and MasterCard Worldwide – ‘financial 
inclusion means that everyone who can use them has access to a range of quality 
financial services at affordable prices with convenience, respect and dignity, 
delivered by a range of providers in a stable, competitive market to financially capable 
clients’.3 It should be noted that this understanding of financial inclusion stresses 
the importance of formal – that is, legally recognised – financial institutions, as 
opposed to informal institutions (e.g., local money lenders, family, friends and/or 
pawn-brokers), which are believed to be more expensive and less transparent (AFI, 
2010; cf., Bateman, 2013). The widespread appeal of financial inclusion for 
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development practitioners, governments and international organisations lies in its 
alleged benefits to promote economic growth, efficiency and increased welfare for 
the poor (CGAP, 2011). 
Unlike many accounts that have sought to critique financial inclusion initiatives 
within the bounds of what Marx refers to as money fetishism, I neither assume that 
credit ‘just is’, nor that the political and legal structures and practices are either 
neutral or separate from the relations of power rooted in the processes of capital 
accumulation, including the role of the surplus population therein. Instead and 
armed with the historical materialist understanding of money and states outlined 
in Part I, I challenge a core and largely unquestioned, assumption in the financial 
inclusion agenda by asking, first, what is the capitalist nature of ‘the financial?’ And, 
second, how and why has ‘the financial’ been reproduced? 
In posing the above questions, I challenge the financial inclusion agenda on 
two related counts. On the one hand, it is vital to interrupt the representation of 
the financial as a neutral legal contract into which the working poor enter, 
voluntarily and on equal terms and from which they are said to benefit through 
‘consumption smoothing’, a euphemism for the ways in the surplus population has 
come to rely on credit for the provision of basic needs. According to the financial 
inclusion rhetoric, for instance, the benefits the poor allegedly receive upon 
entering a debt contract are both material, i.e., improved welfare and convenience, 
as well as immaterial, i.e., respect and dignity (CGAP, 2010a). On the other hand, 
the fetishised representations of the financial need to be deconstructed in order to 
reveal the underlying capitalist nature of the monetisation of the relations of power 
between creditors and debtors. Another feature that helps to frame, guarantee, 
mediate and normalise the coercive and exploitative nature of these monetised 
relations is the state – particularly its debtfarist interventions. 
By undertaking a historical materialist interrogation of the financial inclusion 
agenda, we will gain deeper insight into the power and paradoxes upon which 
this project has been built. We will also be able to comprehend more fully the 
legal and political machinations involved in the reproduction of the poverty 
industry as a normal and essential feature of neoliberal-led development. It will 
become clear, for instance, that costly credit offered to the poor has not reduced 
poverty. The reason for this, of course, is that the lack of credit is not the cause 
of poverty and thus in many cases, high-priced credit serves to accentuate economic 
precariousness, not resolve it (Bateman, 2010; Roy, 2010; Taylor, 2011; Rankin, 
2013). 
The primary source of poverty for the surplus population in Mexico, as 
elsewhere, is the inability of these workers to secure a living wage. This point is, 
however, evaded in the mainstream treatments of financial inclusion. Remaining 
within the realm of exchange – itself a social construction that needs to be 
continually reproduced by debtfarism – the fundamental causes of poverty, as well 
as the material bases of inequality, disappear behind the mask of freedom, equality 
and democracy. In this context, the promotion of the benefits of financial inclusion 
can take place. The equality of exchange provides an enticing selling point, 
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encouraging the poor to seek for-profit loans from formal lenders, especially when 
they are juxtaposed against informal lenders (e.g., relatives and pawnshops), which 
are represented as lacking not only transparency and, therefore, trust and account ­
ability, but also efficiency, particularly with regard to the pricing of credit (World 
Bank, 2006, 2007, 2014). 
In contrast to the neoliberal promise that free markets can lead to material 
improvements for all, the vast majority of the working poor in the global South 
do not earn a living wage or benefit from any subsidised support (e.g., health care, 
old age provision, unemployment insurance and so forth) for social reproduc­
tion (United Nations, 2012). In the case of Mexico, the underemployed and 
unemployed workers that comprise the country’s large surplus population eke out 
a living in the informal sector, where wages tend to be lower than the formal sector 
and where workers lack social benefits and protections. According to a Report by 
the International Labour Organisation, 53.7 percent of Mexicans are employed 
informally (ILO, 2012).4 Recent data from the National Council of Social Develop ­
ment Policy in Mexico (or, CONEVAL5) reveals that between 2006 and 2010 
the people living in poverty (extreme and moderate) increased from 35 percent to 
46 percent; this number rises to 53.8 percent among children (OECD, 2012). The 
socio-economic gap between rich and poor in Mexico remains very high. After 
Chile, which has often heralded by the IMF and other neoliberal ideologues as 
the poster child of successful market-led development, Mexico is the second most 
unequal middle-income country in the Organisation of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). According to OECD data, the bottom 10 percent of 
the distribution in Mexico receives around 1.3 percent of total disposable income, 
while the wealthiest 10 percent of Mexicans receive close to 36 percent (OECD, 
2012: 8). 
Consumer credit offered to the poor at high interest rates have led to growth 
and wealth creation, but not for the poor. The greatest beneficiaries of the 
poverty industry have been capitalists and institutional investors that comprise 
the lucrative poverty industry in Mexico. Ricardo Salinas Pliego, the majority 
shareholder of Mexico’s Banco Azteca, which specialises in selling consumer credit 
to Mexico’s working poor, is one of the wealthiest people in the world. Since 
2005, Banco Azteca’s highly lucrative business has expanded to other countries in 
Latin America, such as Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, Peru, Brazil and El Salvador. 
As I discuss in Chapter 8, the poverty industry in Mexico has also attracted and 
benefited other high-interest lenders, such as the microfinance behemoth, 
Compartamos, and Banco Walmart (‘Mexican (Legit) Loan Shark Ricardo Salinas 
Is Making Billions the Old-Fashioned Way’, Forbes, 18 April 2012; Euromonitor 
International, 2013). In Chapter 9, I analyse this concentration of wealth among 
poverty-industry capitalists within the context of low-income housing, where one 
of the world’s largest building materials suppliers and cement producers, the 
Mexican-based CEMEX corporation, has been quickly moving into the housing 
financing business, too. 
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The financial inclusion agenda is a powerful rhetorical and regulatory feature 
of debtfarism that assists in reconstructing the moorings of neoliberal development 
through its ability to both identify problems and offer solutions exclusively in the 
realm of exchange, where exploitation and inequality are easily masked. This is 
reflected in the G20 Principles encompassing for instance, consumer protection, 
empowerment through financial education, and proportionality, particularly the 
latter’s emphasis on risk reduction – all of which are supported by non-binding 
(voluntary) or ‘soft’ laws (Cutler, 2003; Picciotto, 2011). I discuss the G20 
Principles in more detail in Chapter 7. Here, I want to stress that financial inclusion 
initiatives, executed at both global and national scales, are reinforced by the 
rhetorical and regulative framings of debtfarism and its continual efforts to translate 
and reposition struggles and solutions within realm of exchange. In this sphere of 
capital accumulation, the appearance of money as an abstract and universal measure 
of social wealth is heightened. The fetish of money (see Chapter 1) expresses itself 
as an external object capable of becoming the private property of any individual 
– wealthy or poor, man or woman. Marx refers to the generalisation of the money 
fetish as the community of money, which is marked by individualised meanings 
of equality, freedom and democracy (Marx, 1990, 2005). As a form of money, 
consumer credit masks the exploitative, disciplinary and unequal relations that 
underpin the community of money. Recreating and reimposing the illusions of 
the community of money are vital to the expansion and reproduction of the poverty 
industry. 
The financial inclusion trope diverts our attention away from the powers and 
paradoxes in the realm of exchange, as well as from the root causes of poverty. 
Left unchallenged are the underlying reasons why people do not possess enough 
money to purchase basic necessities, much less lift themselves out of poverty through 
the entrepreneurial activities that financial inclusion is said to afford (cf. World 
Bank, 2014). The legal and political framing of financial inclusion masks the role 
of capitalist states in the construction and legitimation of debtfare. This, in effect, 
permits states to focus their attention on questions of access, fairness, education 
and transparency as opposed to the provision of a living wage and ensuring 
adequate social protection for the poor through public consumption. 
When viewed through a historical materialist framework, financial inclusion 
represents a core feature of the neoliberal development project and shares many 
similarities with the core rhetorical and regulative feature of the US debtfare state: 
namely, the democratisation of credit (see Chapter 4). It will be recalled that the 
democratisation of credit is concerned with ensuring appropriate access to credit, 
which will, in turn, ensure that low-income individuals not only become active 
market participants, but also do so on an equal footing with other consumers. 
Both democratisation of credit and financial inclusion are similar in that they assume 
credit to be a neutral object devoid of the inherent social power of money. Both 
terms are also firmly entrenched in the realm of exchange, where the illusions of 
the community of money – i.e., democracy, freedom and equality (see Chapter 
1) – prevail. 
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In addition to assisting the capitalist expansion of the poverty industry into the 
everyday lives of the surplus population, the portrayal of financial inclusion as a 
desirable and win-win strategy assists in the privatisation of the social reproduction 
of surplus population. Marx describes this social category in capitalism as ‘the most 
powerful lever of accumulation’ (Marx, 1976: 772). The commodification of basic 
subsistence for the surplus population, which is at the core of the financial inclusion 
agenda, serves to undergird the wider neoliberalisation processes, which champion 
the increased reliance on markets over states. The monetisation of the surplus 
population through processes of financial inclusion also acts to reproduce the basic 
imperative to earn a living based on dispossession, expropriation and dependence 
on the market in a manner that appears as a natural and inevitable aspect of life, 
or the ordinary run of things (Marx, 1990, 2005). The following three chapters attempt 
to peel away various layers of the fetishised understanding of money and states in 
order to reveal the silent compulsions and structural violence of capital accumulation 
that lies at the base of financial inclusion. Mirroring its US counterpart, the regulative 
and rhetorical features of debtfarism in Mexico aim to smooth the tensions 
associated with credit-led accumulation through, for example, the removal of interest 
rate ceilings and a the dominance of soft laws regarding the consumer credit. In 
so doing, the Mexican debtfare state has facilitated the expansion of credit money 
leaving, on the one hand, increasingly more members of the surplus population 
dependent on private provisioning to support their subsistence needs. And, on the 
other, paving the way for capitalists to accelerate and increase revenue by 
commodifying debt through means such as asset-backed securitisation (CGAP, 
2010b). 
As the lead chapter in this section, Chapter 7 takes us through the portal of 
financial inclusion such that we come face to face with the silent compulsions, 
paradoxes and relations of power involved in the expansion and reproduction of 
the poverty industry. To this end, the chapter has been structured to serve two 
purposes. First, its more generalised discussion reveals the broader rhetorical and 
regulative landscape represented by the G20 Principles regarding financial inclusion. 
This landscape both mirrors and supports ongoing debtfare strategies pursued by 
the Mexican state.6 The analysis also demonstrates how restructurings of financial 
inclusion have facilitated spatio-temporal displacements of credit-led accumulation 
through, for example the securitisation of micro-finance institutions (MFIs). Second 
and related, the more generalised analysis of financial inclusion demonstrates that 
the expansion and reproduction of the poverty industry and the role of the state 
are not simply occurring in the United States and Mexico, but rather across many 
national spaces in global capitalism, albeit in a highly uneven and differentiated 
manner (von Braunmühl, 1973; Arrighi, 1994). 
Notes 
The uneven and tension-ridden nature of Mexican-United States relations is nicely 
summed up by the oft-cited quote by the Mexican President Porfirio Diaz (1830-1915): 
‘Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States!’ ‘Gently does it’. The 
1 
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Economist 3 December 2009. Available at: www.economist.com/node/15019872 
(accessed 23 September 2013). 
2	 CGAP (2009) Financial Access: measuring access to financial services around the world, 
Washington, DC: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. 
3	 Available at: www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/ (accessed 14 July 2013). 
4	 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) distinguishes between the informal sector, 
which describes informal businesses, on the one hand, and informal employment, which 
refers to informal jobs, on the other. Employment in the informal sector can be defined 
as the total of employment in the informal sector and informal employment found outside 
the informal sector. Available at: http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/INFORMAL_ 
ECONOMY/2012-06-Statistical%20update%20-%20v2.pdf (accessed 25 July 2013). 
5	 The Spanish acronym CONEVAL stands for Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la 
Política de Desarrollo Social. More information about poverty in Mexico is available 
(in Spanish) at: www.coneval.gob.mx/Medicion/Paginas/Medici%C3%B3n/Anexo­
Estadistico-Pobreza-2010.aspx (accessed 25 July 2013). 
6	 CGAP, ‘Mexico’s National Council for Financial Inclusion’, 16 February. Available at: 
www.cgap.org/blog/mexico%E2%80%99s-national-council-financial-inclusion (accessed 
19 July 2013). 
7 
GLOBAL DEBTFARISM AND 
THE UNIVERSALISATION OF 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Financial inclusion has become the holy grail of poverty reduction and thus forms 
a core feature of the global development project (World Bank, 2014).1 In the words 
of the Executive Director of the influential Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), 
‘Financial inclusion is no longer a side issue in the global economic debate . . . It 
now has a permanent and important place in the global discussion on economic 
development and stability and its ability to reduce poverty’.2 Financial inclusion 
describes a desired situation in which all working-age adults have access to credit, 
savings, payments and insurance from formal service providers, i.e., recognised legal 
status (CGAP, 2011). 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, which was, ironically, sparked by financial 
inclusion initiatives in the subprime mortgage sector,3 the Group of Twenty (G20) 
leaders turned to financial inclusion as a core development strategy for overcoming 
poverty, the global recessionary environment and stabilising the global financial 
system. The G20 leaders emphasised, however, that these goals could not be 
achieved without a proper regulatory and supervisory framework (AFI, 2010). To 
enhance national financial inclusion initiatives, the G20 Financial Inclusion Experts 
Group forged the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion in 2010 
(hereafter: G20 Principles).4 
What remains conspicuous in these discussions is the absence of any clear 
understanding of what ‘the financial’ means as well as how and why it has been 
socially reproduced.5 The concept of the financial is arguably not problematised 
because it is widely assumed to entail a voluntary, yet legally binding, agreement 
between two equal parties: a lender and a borrower. However, the historical 
materialist framework (see Part I) reveals three fundamental reasons why the finan ­
cial has not been critically investigated. First, privately created money (credit) has 
been assumed rather than explained. As such, questions of power involved in the 
creation and extension of privately created money to the poor have been bypassed. 
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Second, the rhetorical and regulative features of financial inclusion have remained 
firmly within the realm of exchange, disconnected from the wider dynamics of 
credit-led accumulation. This, in turn, facilitates the illusions of equality in 
exchange while masking the exploitative and disciplinary nature of the monetised 
relations inherent to financial inclusion. Third, insomuch as the G20 Principles 
represent non-binding legal framings (i.e., ‘soft law’), they assume the appearance 
of neutrality while serving to reinforce underlying class-based power relations in 
the community of money. Soft law dominates the regulatory landscape of financial 
inclusion initiatives, as it is more easily circumvented to protect powerful creditors 
and impose market discipline on debtors. 
I argue that when we acknowledge and transcend the above three social 
constructions, it becomes clear that the financial is neither a neutral nor a natural 
set of relations. The realm of financial inclusion does not refer to a place where 
borrowers and lenders enter voluntarily to engage in an equal, mutually beneficial 
exchange (i.e., wealth generation for creditors and welfare-enhancement for poor 
debtors). In contrast to this mainstream view, which has been propagated by the 
G20 Principles, I suggest that inclusion into the financial is constructed by neoliberal 
states and capitalists to ensure the (re-)imposition of monetised relations, including 
the disciplinary features therein, on the working poor. Like national articulations 
of debtfarism, the legal and rhetorical framings of the G20 Principles act to 
legitimate and reinforce the illusions of equality, freedom and democracy inherent 
in the financial. This, in turn, facilitates the expansion and reproduction of the 
poverty industry in the global South. 
This chapter is organised in four main sections. In Section One, I discuss the 
meaning of soft law with regard to transnational regulatory strategies before turning 
to an outline of the G20 Principles. In Section Two, I examine the G20 Principle 
of Proportionality and its emphasis on risk reduction by surveying an important 
development in financial inclusion: the securitisation of micro-finance institutions 
(MFIs). In Section Three, I explore the G20 Principle of Protection and the Principle 
of Empowerment in the Mexican context. In Section Four, I conclude by 
reviewing the tensions and risks underpinning credit-led accumulation in the wake 
of the implementation of the G20 Principles. 
Universalising financial inclusion: the G20 principles and 
soft law 
Breaking the code of benevolence, freedom and equality 
A good place to begin deconstructing the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial 
Inclusion is to look more critically at the word ‘innovative’. This will allow us to 
decipher the power relations that the G20 seeks to legitimise, depoliticise and 
normalise (Bourdieu, 1991). Here the term innovation connotes rationality, 
modernisation, (self-)improvement, (self-) advancement and freedom in the form 
of independence (see Chapter 1). Innovation is understood and portrayed as part 
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of an abstract vision of a market populated by rational and individualised actors 
interacting on a level playing field. It follows from this perspective that the failure 
to lift oneself out of poverty is explained away by blaming individuals for not 
taking the opportunity to join the financial, or lacking sufficient rational skills to 
engage in entrepreneurial activities. Thus, the historical dimensions of neoliberal 
development and the exploitative and uneven nature of capital accumulation are 
expunged as potential causes of poverty. 
The historical materialist framework developed in Part I allows us to understand 
the term innovation as a social construction that leverages individualising forms of 
market discipline to mask secondary forms of exploitation involved in the moneti­
sation of social relations (i.e., modifying incomes of the surplus population) (Harvey, 
1989; Marx, 2005). Deciphered in this way, innovation is code for the expansion 
and intensification of credit-led accumulation. In the case of the microfinance 
industry, this extension, which began in the 1990s, includes the mainstreaming and 
commercialisation of microfinance institutions (MFIs) (Weber, 2002; Bateman, 2010; 
Roy, 2010; Harper, 2011; Rankin, 2013; Da Costa, 2013). A case in point here is 
the famous initial public offering of Latin America’s largest and one of the world’s 
most lucrative, MFIs, Compartamos Banco, in 2007 (see Chapter 8). Another oft-
cited example of innovative financial inclusion has been the securitisation of MFIs, 
exemplified by the case of Bangladesh’s BRAC in 2006 (Roy, 2010). 
Reflecting back on the discussion in Part I of this book, it is important to keep 
in mind that ‘the financial’ is not neutral, nor does it emerge naturally from an 
apolitical market. The financial refers to privately created money. The inherent 
gap between money and the fictitious value of credit demands continual 
intervention on the part of capitalists and states and – by extension – international 
organisations such as the G20. I refer to the regulative and rhetorical forms of state 
intervention in the neoliberal era as debtfarism. Thus far, I have analysed the activities 
of debtfare at the national scale. Debtfarism, however, is present at other scales 
of neoliberalisation (Brenner et al., 2010). Because the G20 is not a standalone 
organisation but an institution that reflects the power configuration of global 
capitalism, it reinforces and legitimates, albeit in contradictory and contested ways, 
national debtfarist strategies (Gill, 1990; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Harvey, 2003; 
Soederberg, 2004, 2006; Kiely, 2010; Panitch and Gindin, 2012). It does this against 
the backdrop of a world order dominated by the hegemonic role of market-led 
development symbolised by Anglo-American neoliberalisation (Soederberg, 2004, 
2006). As I discuss in the next section, the construction of legality by the G20 
advances dispossessive capitalism through the seemingly benevolent act of financial 
inclusion, wherein the G20 takes on the role of a ‘provider of legitimacy’ (Mattei 
and Nader, 2008). 
Providing legitimacy for dispossession via ‘the financial’ 
The G20 Principles were forged in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to facilitate 
an enabling policy and regulatory environment for the expansion of dispossessive 
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capitalism under the altruistic pairing of innovative financial inclusion and poverty 
reduction. Beneath the gloss, the target of this class-based project involved shifting 
the dependency of 2.5 billion surplus workers from informal lenders to formal (legally 
recognised) commercial lenders.6 Like all social phenomena in capitalist society, 
the strategy of financial inclusion needs to be continually (re-)constructed and re­
legitimised, particularly when its core prescriptions (e.g., market fundamentalism) 
are interrupted by the devastating consequences of financial crises, such as the US 
subprime lending crash in 2007 and the subsequent global recession. As mentioned 
above, the US-led crisis was itself driven by the principles of financial inclusion 
(Wyly et al., 2009; Sassen, 2009). Another relevant example that damaged the official 
portrayal of the credibility of the financial inclusion agenda was the wave of bad 
press associated with the commercialisation of large MFIs and their explicit links 
to Wall Street (Bateman, 2010). 
To many supporters of financial inclusion, the case of Compartamos and its 
transformation into a publicly listed corporation in 2007 signalled a mission drift 
away from poverty reduction (see Chapter 8). In response, the microfinance industry 
and its supporters created various oversight bodies to reinforce the concept’s 
ostensibly social mission. These included the Alliance for Fair Microfinance, 
established in 2007 and MicroFinance Transparency, founded in 2008 (Bateman, 
2013). A code of conduct for the microfinance industry, known as the 2008 
Pocantico Declaration, was also undertaken by the Deutsche Bank, the Boulder 
Institute on Microfinance, and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) 
(Bateman, 2013).7 These industry-based reforms were not based on mandatory, 
enforceable hard laws; but instead on the construction of soft laws. 
Soft law has come to dominate most regulatory framings of financial inclusion 
in the neoliberal era. Soft law refers to publicly sanctioned codes, guidelines and 
laws that are neither mandatory nor legally binding, whereas hard law describes 
mandatory or legally binding law (May, 2014). While soft law marks the rhetorical 
and regulative landscape of financial inclusion, including the G20 Principles, it must 
be emphasised that it is accompanied and complemented by hard laws relating to 
the basic features of capitalist society: the protection of private property, rights to 
appropriation and freedom of contract (Harvey, 1989; cf., Brummer, 2012). Thus, 
laws that protect the interests of creditors are framed in hard law, that is, the coercive 
features of the capitalist state such as courts, police and prisons. As a World Bank 
publication argues, the creation and maintenance of a strong legal system to 
promote the proper functioning of markets (World Bank, 2004a, c). 
Soft and hard laws are neither neutral nor natural evolutions of society (Cutler, 
2003). Nor should laws be understood as something that stands either outside or 
above class relations in capitalist society (Holloway and Picciotto, 1991). Instead 
and drawing on the discussion from Chapter 3, laws should be seen as integral 
features of neoliberal (capitalist) states and by extension, international organisations. 
Seen in this way, laws are highly dynamic and contradictor institutionalised forms 
of state power that emerges from and is intrinsically tied to, the complex and 
dynamic configurations of class relations rooted in the wider processes of capital 
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accumulation. Law as an extension of (capitalist) state powers thus performs a 
dual role of disciplining labour, while recreating, as discussed in Chapter 3, the 
illusion of a neutral state through the masking of extra-legal powers (Picciotto, 
2011; Bruff, 2014). 
Seen from the above perspective, soft laws facilitate the expansion and 
reproduction of the poverty industry in the global South in at least three ways. 
First, as a construct of capitalist interests, soft law creates a supportive structure for 
free-market values through its informal and discretionary application (Cutler, 
2003). This legal shield of neutrality in soft law enables states to remove politically 
sensitive matters from public scrutiny. Such matters include: capping interest rates; 
limiting speculative attempts by microfinance industry insiders to overcome the 
barriers of credit-led accumulation through ‘innovative’ strategies such as an initial 
public offering (Compartamos), or asset-backed securitisation (as in the case of 
BRAC discussed below) (CGAP, 2010b). 
Second, while soft law is less expensive and easier to implement than hard law, 
i.e., requiring less legislative hurdles to clear, it is also much easier to breach with 
impunity. Spatial expansion and temporal displacements pursued by capitalists to 
overcome barriers to accumulation are thus facilitated in soft law, as it gives rise, 
for example, to more opportunities for creative lawyering (e.g., identifying and 
exploiting legal loopholes) and the private shaping of legal regulation (Glasbeek, 
2002; Cutler, 2003; Baars, 2011). 
Third, soft law in the neoliberal era necessarily leads to the enhanced role of 
capitalists (individually as experts and collectively in epistemic communities) within 
public–private governance initiatives (Porter, 2007; Picciotto, 2011; Brummer, 
2012). This expert knowledge is vital to the construction and legitimacy of the 
neoliberal regulation of dispossessive capitalism since, as Foucault notes, ‘Knowledge 
linked to power not only assumes the authority of the truth but has the power to 
make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects and in 
that sense at least, becomes true’ (Foucault, 1980: 131). 
An important knowledge-producing community driving the global financial 
inclusion initiative is the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI).8 The primary mission 
of the AFI is to promote the adoption of inclusive financial policies in the global 
South, so as to lift approximately 2.7 billion people out of poverty (AFI, 2011; 
CGAP, 2011). The AFI was established in 2008 as a Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation9 project and was also supported by the Australian Government 
Overseas Aid Programme: AusAid10 This private/public epistemic community is 
comprised of what is described as a ‘knowledge network’ of central banks and other 
financial regulatory bodies in developing countries. The AFI serves as one of the 
five implementing partners for the G20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclu­
sion (GPFI), which includes the World Bank, the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP). In terms of forging soft law to enable the expansion of financial 
inclusion strategies, the AFI plays an important role in the Sub-Group on Finan­
cial Inclusion Data and Measurement11 and the Sub-Group on the Principles and 
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the Standard Setting Bodies (SSBs).12 In addition, the AFI actively promotes the 
use of the G20 Principles among its members, documenting how countries have 
implemented the Principles and the challenges they have faced in doing so.13 
Normalising innovative forms of financial inclusion: 
the G20 Principles 
In response to the global financial crisis that began in 2008, G20 leaders at the 
Pittsburgh Summit in 2009 committed to improving access to financial services 
for poor people by supporting the spread of new forms of financial service delivery 
capable of reaching low-income adults (AFI, 2010). To achieve these aims, the 
G20 Principles were presented in 2010 at the G20 Leaders Summit in Seoul (see 
Table 7.1). The Access Through Innovation Sub-Group (ATISG) of the G20 
Financial Inclusion Expert Group drafted the Principles.14 The ATISG, which is 
an archetypal epistemic community empowered to produce expert knowledge, was 
comprised of three key partners – Alliance for Financial Inclusion, CGAP and the 
World Bank Group’s private financing arm, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC). From this heady mix of experts, the Principles for Innovative Financial 
Inclusion were drafted and later approved by G20 Leaders at the Summit in Seoul 
in 2010.15 
The G20 is clear that the above Principles ‘are not a rigid set of requirements 
but are designed to help guide policymakers in the decision making process’ (AFI, 
2010: 5). As such, the G20 Principles represent a regulatory framework based on 
voluntary guidelines, not legally binding rules.16 The framing of financial inclusion 
in the realm of soft law serves to reinforce the illusions of the community of money 
while depoliticising spatio-temporal fixes inherent in dispossessive capitalism. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I examine how three of the G20 Principles have 
served to facilitate these displacements in the poverty industry. I do this by, first, 
deconstructing the Principle of Proportionality and its emphasis on risk reduction 
with regard to securitising microfinance institutions, with specific reference to 
BRAC in Bangladesh; and, second, exploring the G20 Principle of Protection and 
the G20 Principle of Empowerment in the Mexican context. 
Deconstructing the G20 Principles of Proportionality and 
Risk Reduction: the case of securitising Micro-Finance 
Institutions (MFIs) 
Access to finance is widely recognised as a key to development. Being crucial to 
build assets, protect against risks, invest in income-generating projects and finance 
enterprise development, access to finance provides stability and opportunities to 
families and businesses and supports the economy as a whole. Families and business 
need affordable access to a safe, secure and reliable financial infrastructure . . . 
– Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, Report to the Leaders, 
G20 Leaders Summit, Cannes, 5 November (CGAP, 2011: 4) 
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TABLE 7.1 G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 
Leadership: Cultivate a broad-based government commitment to financial 
inclusion to help alleviate poverty. 
Diversity: Implement policy approaches that promote competition and provide 
market-based incentives for delivery of sustainable financial access 
and usage of a broad range of affordable services (savings, credit, 
payments and transfers, insurance) as well as a diversity of service 
providers. 
Innovation: Promote technological and institutional innovation as a means to 
expand financial system access and usage, including by addressing 
infrastructure weakness. 
Protection: Encourage a comprehensive approach to consumer protection that 
recognises the roles of government, providers and consumers. 
Empowerment: Develop financial literacy and financial capability. 
Cooperation: Create an institutional environment with clear lines of accountability 
and co-ordination within government; and also encourage 
partnerships and direct consultation across government, business and 
other stakeholders. 
Knowledge: Utilise improved data to make evidence-based policy, measure 
progress and consider an incremental ‘test and learn’ approach 
acceptable to both regulator and service provider. 
Proportionality: Build a policy and regulatory framework that is proportionate with 
the risks and benefits involved in such innovative products and 
services and is based on an understanding of the gaps and barriers in 
existing regulation. 
Framework: Consider the following in the regulatory framework, reflecting 
international standards, national circumstances and support for a 
competitive landscape: an appropriate, flexible, risk-based Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT) regime; conditions for the use of agents as a customer 
interface; a clear regulatory regime for electronically stored value; 
and market-based incentives to achieve the long-term goal of broad 
interoperability and interconnection. 
Source: AFI (2010) ‘Innovative financial inclusion: principles and report on innovative financial inclusion 
from the Access through Innovation Sub-Group of the G20 Financial Inclusion Experts Group’, Alliance 
for Financial Inclusion (AFI), p. 5. 
In this section, I explore the limits of the G20 Principle of Proportionality as it 
relates to the securitisation of micro-finance institutions (MFIs), with special 
reference to the securitisation of BRAC in 2006. The proportionality principle 
refers to ‘the balancing of risks and benefits [of financial inclusion] against the cost 
of regulation and supervision’ (CGAP, 2011: 12). Mirroring the mainstream 
debates about payday lending (see Chapter 6), the proportionality principle assumes 
and thus reinforces, a central truth in the financial inclusion initiative, namely: that 
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financial inclusion results in ‘economic growth, efficiency and increased welfare’ 
– all of which offset and mitigate the risks of financial exclusion (CGAP, 2011: 
2). More specifically, the assumptions of the Principle of Proportionality that risks 
are primarily economic in nature and that these risks can somehow be balanced 
by the benefits of innovative services and products such as the securitisation of 
providers of poverty credit are critically investigated. 
The Principle of Proportionality and asset-backed 
securitisation: interrogating a win-win strategy 
Securitisation is a financial innovation that emerged in the early 1970s in the United 
States. ABS began to increase in use in the US during the late 1990s before 
expanding to Europe and eventually the global South. Securitisation describes a 
process of packaging individual loans and other debt instruments (otherwise known 
as ‘assets’), transforming this package into a security or securities and enhancing 
the credit status or rating to further its sale to third-party investors, such as mutual 
and pension funds (Elul, 2005). Securitisation, also disparagingly referred to as ‘slice 
and dice’ capitalism, essentially converts illiquid individuals loans, e.g., microloans, 
into liquid, marketable securities to be bought and sold (Kothari, 2006; Roy, 2010). 
Previously in the book, I have referred to these processes as the commodification 
of debt (see Chapter 5). 
Proponents have represented ABS as an innovative way to create a win-win 
situation for both borrowers and lenders, particularly in the global South (IMF, 
2001; Stieber, 2007). Since ABS separates the loans from the lender, the impacts 
from local economic slowdowns that affect repayment are, according to this view, 
buffered (Chen, 2007). Seen in this light, securitisation represents a significant 
advancement in financial markets because, among other things, it lowers risk 
exposure to creditors (Graffam, 2000). There are two questions that emerge here. 
Who benefits from ABS? And, who carries the risk? To adequately address these 
questions, we need to shift our analysis beyond the narrow confines of the technical 
and apolitical representations of risk and risk transfer. Accomplishing this task 
demands moving beyond the realm of exchange to the wider processes of capital 
accumulation and the role and power of credit money therein. 
Depending on what type of debt is sold, ABS transactions involve either 
fictitious capital (in the case of mortgages; see Chapter 9) or the money-form of 
revenue (in the case of non-collateralised consumer loans such as microloans; see 
Chapter 8). Both forms of credit money, as discussed in Chapter 2, entail a basic 
tension: ‘no matter how far afield a privately contracted bill of exchange may 
circulate, it must always return to its place of origin for redemption’ (Harvey, 1999: 
245–6). Moreover, both types of credit money operate with what Marx refers to 
as fictitious value (price). This is arrived at through the construction of truths 
obtained through expert knowledge (i.e., by those wielding social power over credit 
money, including credit rating agencies, large investment banks, powerful 
institutional investors, the G20, the AFI, etc.) 
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Regardless of the subjectively determined fictitious value attached to a bundle 
of consumer debt, the latter depends on the realisation of future labour as a counter-
value, as it needs to return to the origins (i.e., the debtor) for redemption. Investors 
engaging in ABS anticipate that the borrower will be able to earn sufficient 
wages to continue making orderly payments on their microloan. ABS, like all forms 
of fictitious capital is based on a gamble. The seemingly technical and thus 
seemingly apolitical, transfer of risk, as represented in the ABS literature, does 
not imply that the gamble disappears (CGAP, 2010b). Instead, it is instead merely 
displaced through a temporal fix – at least for the lenders and investors involved 
in the securitisation transaction. For the borrowers, the element of gamble 
always remains. ABS is therefore not a technical and apolitical process; but instead 
is infused with social relations that wield temporal and spatial dimensions of 
power. 
The word gamble is arguably a more accurate and politicised descriptor of ABS 
transactions than the preferred, technical and economistic term ‘risk’. Risk, as I discuss 
below, generally imparts some sense of control, certainty, objectivity and predict­
ability (i.e., statistical metrics); gamble, on the other hand, implies uncertainty, 
subjectivity, unpredictability and ultimately a lack of control over the future 
(Marron, 2007). Adhering to Stuart Corbridge’s (1993) observation that ‘naming 
is the first step to seeing’, I draw the tensions between the rhetoric and reality 
of ABS into relation by using the concept of ‘risk/gamble’ in this section. My 
reasoning here is that risk/gamble helps us to see the politics and class power involved 
in the spatio-temporal fixes of credit money, which are at the heart of both ABS 
and the broader financial inclusion agenda embodied by the G20 Principles. 
Generally speaking, there are two types of ABS: natural securities and synthetic 
securities. Natural securities describe debt instruments based on the direct payment 
of interest and principal by the obligor to the investor. The term ‘natural’ is curious 
and requires deconstruction, as it seems to represent a highly contrived, constructed 
and subjective financial instrument basically aimed at commodifying and profiting 
from consumer debt as a neutral transaction devoid of power. As we will see, this 
cannot be further from the truth. 
To illustrate, a microfinance institution (MFI) – that is, the originator or issuer 
that owns the assets that will be securitised – offers a $100 microloan to a mother 
with an (average) interest rate (and fee) of 37 percent on a one-year loan (‘Banks 
making big profits from tiny loans’, New York Times, 13 April 2010). The MFI has 
the option of either holding this loan in its portfolio and receiving small monthly 
payments for the year, or moving the loan off its balance sheet by selling it to an 
outside investor. The increasingly credit-constrained, larger MFIs will more than 
likely opt for the latter, as they can receive funds immediately by selling the loan. 
This ensures the opportunity to profit further by originating even more loans and 
thus generating origination fees (Elul, 2005; CGAP, 2010b). By selling underlying 
‘assets’ (in this case, microloans), they are moved off an MFI’s balance sheet, which 
means, in accounting terms, that the securitised microcredit loan is neither an asset 
nor a liability for the MFI. Thus, the shift from on-balance sheet to off-balance 
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sheet is an act of subterfuge that transfers the credit risk/gamble associated with 
the original loans (e.g., microloans) to investors and, indirectly, as I discuss below, 
debtors. This same sleight of hand holds true for the second type of ABS, to which 
I now turn my attention. 
The second, and far more common, type of ABS is synthetic securities, which 
refers to derivatives. Derivatives are financial instruments that have existed for 
hundreds of years (Sassen, 2006), although their role in the form of ABS is rather 
recent. The mortgage-backed security was invented in 1977, although it was not 
widely used at that time (Sassen, 2008). The value of derivatives is dependent on, 
or derived from, one or more underlying assets. Derivatives are largely unregu ­
lated.17 Synthetic securities (derivatives) recycle or divide either the cash flow or 
credit risk/gamble from natural securities to create multiple securities with revised 
bundles of rights and unique characteristics. To return to the MFI example, a 
securitised, one-year microcredit loan of $100 with 37 percent interest can be made 
more profitable through the creation of derivatives contracts that basically bet on 
whether the price of the natural security will go up or down by a specific date. 
Synthetic securitisation, which involves such ‘innovative’ products as credit default 
swaps18 is global in reach and enormous in volume. According to the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS, 2013: 44), in early 2011 the gross notional value 
of outstanding privately traded (i.e., over-the-counter and unregulated) credit 
derivatives in the global marketplace was $29 trillion. To put this number in 
perspective, the Gross World Product (GWP), which is a measure of the combined 
gross national product of all countries in the world, was around $71.83 trillion in 
nominal terms in 2012 (United Nations, 2012). 
Reconstructing slice and dice development: temporally 
displacing the risk/gamble in digitalised spaces of global finance 
The purported benefits of ABS have not been lost on official development 
institutions and practitioners. In the wake of the litany of financial crises in 
emerging market economies in the late 1990s and the subsequent scarcity of low-
cost, long-term loans, the IMF (2001) was touting the virtues of securitisation as 
a way for private and public sector entities in the global South to raise funds, as 
well as to obtain credit ratings higher than those of their governments. The ability 
of an MFI, for instance, to turn to securitisation to raise capital means that more 
financially excluded people, who, in Western terms could be designated as subprime 
(high-risk/high-gamble) borrowers (i.e., those with little or poor credit history), 
are brought into the market by entering into a legal obligation of debt. ABS in 
the global South is quite small in comparison to US markets, but growing at a 
rapid pace. 
According to the BIS (2011), of the estimated $4.5 trillion worth of securitised 
assets globally as of the end of June 2009, more than 85 percent were linked to 
US retail finance. Nonetheless, the use of securitisation in a wide variety of finan ­
cial inclusion initiatives has been growing rapidly, albeit unevenly, since the late 
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1990s (Inter-American Development Bank, 2001). ABS products – ranging from 
microcredit loans derived from MFIs in Bangladesh to future tuition flows in private 
universities in Peru – have become an important instrument in raising capital to 
support the financial inclusion agenda. Mexico, for example, while small in 
comparison to its northern counterparts, now boasts the largest securitised mortgage 
market in Latin America (International Financial Corporation, 2009). I discuss this 
form of ABS in more detail in Chapter 9. It should be noted that in contrast to 
US securitisation, transactions in the global South often employ a structure known 
as ‘future flows’ ABS, describing a process in which the securities are backed by 
receivables that are not expected to be generated until after issuance (Graffam, 2000). 
This point becomes clearer later in this section, when I analyse the securitisation 
of MFIs with regard to BRAC. 
Despite the opacity, increased risks/gambles and complexities involved in 
securitisation, particularly the synthetic variant, securitisation has been enthusias­
tically promoted by the IMF and World Bank as an innovative way of securing 
foreign capital flows and as a market-based approach to preventing the large-scale 
panic that may result when a country’s foreign reserves suddenly dry up. In the early 
2000s, around the same time that commericalised forms of the financial inclusion 
agenda began gaining in significance, ABS was increasing in popularity among 
investors (United Nations, 2003; World Bank, 2008). The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), which represents the world’s largest supplier of financial services 
to private sector entities in the global South and is part of the World Bank Group, 
has been a strong proponent and key player in the securitisation of financial inclusion. 
According to a former IFC director, securitisation is attractive because it enables 
the IFC to expand its reach without expanding its risk/gamble (Graffam, 2000: 
154; Stieber, 2007). On this view, ABS will do particularly well in markets where 
there is a shortage of funds and deficiencies in credit quality despite a growing 
capacity to service debt, such as developing countries. Securitisation thus provides 
an extremely important market-based intervention to solve the tension between 
the limited supply of capital for financial inclusion and the growing demand for 
financial products and services for the poor in the global South (World Bank, 2009a, 
2014). Seen from a Marxian perspective, however, it is not so much the limited 
supply of credit money that is the issue, because investors are drawn to the high 
interest rate margins that the highly profitable poverty industry generates. The turn 
to securitising poverty credit is best explained as an attempt by creditors to 
accelerate the temporal span of the loan transaction, so as to harvest the interest 
more quickly, as well as to expand its lending operations to more surplus workers. 
Financial inclusion as a spatial-fix: undermining 
proportionality through soft law 
The neoliberal rhetorical and regulatory framework has enabled the rapid and 
widespread participation of private markets in financial inclusion. According to 
Deutsche Bank, private investors are drawn to the social mission, stable returns, 
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low default rates and potential diversification of MFI-originated loans (‘Nobel 
winner slams for-profit microfinance’, CNNmoney.com, 28 July 2008). Another 
example of the growing trend of private market actors in financial inclusion has 
been the proliferation of Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) since the early 
2000s. MIVs specialise in providing financing for MFIs, including ABS transactions 
(MicroRate, 2011). MIVs held an estimated total asset value of $7 billion in 2010, 
up from $1.2 billion in 2005, with a projected $8.3 billion for 2012 (MicroRate, 
2011, 2012). This lucrative venue has caught the attention of large, US invest ­
ment banks. In 2007, for instance, Morgan Stanley and the MIV BlueOrchard 
entered into a $108 million ABS transaction. The CEO of BlueOrchard noted 
that the deal would bring microfinance ‘closer to the mainstream of the capital 
markets as a source of medium-term money at competitive rates’ (Morgan Stanley, 
‘BlueOrchard in microfinance ABS’, Reuters, 3 May 2007). 
Mirroring other features of global financial markets, MIVs are not only highly 
concentrated (with the top 10 MIVs holding 65 percent of all investments) but 
also uneven in their investment reach. Preferring, for instance, to invest mostly in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Reddy, 2007). This growing trend toward the 
commercialisation of MFIs and deeper integration into global capital markets has 
also led to emerging and specialised forms of private governance, such as the creation 
of MicroRate in 2005 – the industry’s first rating agency geared toward tracking 
and assessing MFIs (MicroRate, 2012). 
The growing intensity of speculation involved in ABS transactions and the 
increased role of private, powerful and profit-oriented sources of capital to MFIs 
has important social consequences for vulnerable populations that have been made 
to depend on private credit markets to support basic subsistence. I now examine 
securitisation through the lens of the largest, non-governmental microfinance lending 
facility in the world, BRAC,19 in order to reveal how securitisation further 
complicates actually existing power relations and deepens the exploitation inherent 
in the monetised relations that lie at the core of ‘the financial’. In studying the 
BRAC, I am not attempting to draw generalisations from this case, as MFIs do 
not constitute a homogenous set of institutions within and across countries in the 
global South and Eastern Europe. What I am seeking to accomplish in the 
following section is to problematise the purported win-win benefits of securitisa ­
tion and financial inclusion by emphasising the social consequences of further 
integration of the poor into credit-led accumulation – issues that are erased and 
depoliticised by the framing of the financial in the wider illusions of the community 
of money. These fetishisms are embodied, for example, in the G20 Principle of 
Proportionality, which assume an exchange of equivalence and the ability of markets 
to equilibrate risks and benefits in the wider processes of ABS. 
Setting the scene of commercialising: Wall Street meets MFIs 
A core function of MFIs is issuing of microloans. According to the Grameen Bank, 
microloans are small loans extended to very poor people for self-employment 
180 Debtfarism and the poverty industry in Mexico 
projects that generate income, allowing them to care for themselves and their 
families.20 Following the premises of neoliberal-led development, many develop­
ment pundits have insisted that microloans, particularly in their commercialised 
form, improve the welfare of the poor by reducing the variability of consumption 
and cushioning the impacts of income shocks (World Bank, 2009a).21 It is widely 
assumed by the development community that commercialised MFIs carry out this 
service more efficiently than non-profit MFIs due to their overriding goal of profit 
maximisation and their greater reliance on private (rational) sources of funding, 
e.g., MIVs (Reddy, 2007; cf. Bateman, 2010). 
Despite the spectacular growth in MIVs in the New Millennium, there continues 
to be a significant supply-demand gap for MFI services, particularly in countries 
outside of Latin America and Eastern Europe (MicroRate, 2012). In the early 2000s, 
for instance, while market demand for MFI services was estimated at more than 
$300 billion, market supply was just $4 billion (Grameen Foundation USA, 2004). 
In low-income countries that lie outside of the preferred investment sites of MIVs, 
such as Bangladesh, MFIs such as BRAC have sought not only to raise capital 
through securitisations but also have turned to ABS to reduce ‘dependency on 
volatile donor financing’ (BRAC, cited in Roy, 2010: 203). The question that 
emerges is: what social cost does the poor pay through the increased dependency 
of MFIs on volatile global capital markets? The case of BRAC helps to answer 
this question. 
In 2006, the first of many securitisations of MFIs and other forms of financial 
inclusion occurred when Bangladesh-based BRAC, one of the world’s largest 
national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and microfinance providers, raised 
approximately $180 million in financing (Roy, 2010). BRAC’s ABS involved two 
phases, each falling under the category of synthetic securities discussed above. In 
the first phase of securitisation, the Dutch Development Finance Company (FMO) 
and KfW Bankengruppe, a German development bank, purchased loans from 
BRAC for $8 million. In the second phase of securitisation, a finance company 
guaranteed the loans and sold two-thirds of the packaged guarantee and the 
microcredit loans to RSA Capital and Citibank Dhaka for $22 million. FMO held 
one-third of the loans. Citibank supplied the funding and management for their 
debt certificates. These two phases were repeated five times to generate a total of 
$180 million (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). Through the use of (unregulated) 
derivatives and the framing of soft law that facilitates and legitimates these types 
of proprietary transactions, FMO’s and KfW’s original purchase price of $8 million 
has, through the ‘slice and dice’ processes that mark ABS, multiplied over 22 times. 
Tellingly, the BRAC transaction has been represented in apolitical terms, 
despite being anchored in the power relations of debt. In the technical framework 
of securitisation, microfinance loans that are not yet repaid are not considered 
liabilities, but rather assets. Thus the ABS transactions undertaken by BRAC and 
its foreign financial investors are said to involve ‘no debt relationship’ (Chen, 2007). 
The ability of FMO and KfW to increase the value of their investment more than 
22 times is, however, based on the assumption that the borrowers holding this 
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debt will make their repayments in an orderly manner. More broadly, the shift in 
ownership over the ‘assets’ involves a reconfiguration of debt relationships in which 
the power and nature of social risk/gamble are inherent characteristics. In what 
follows, I highlight some ways that ABS has served to further intensify and 
complicate the relations of power and exploitation inherent to MFIs (Karim, 2011). 
Mitigating proportionality through ‘slice and dice’ development? 
The first social risk/gamble relates to both the structure of ABS and market pressure 
to increase loans to the poor. Securitisation of MFI loans is not an ongoing process, 
but occurs only once. Thus, the income generated from ABS is a one-off 
transaction. To receive more money, an MFI must make new loans. This may be 
a welcome incentive for promoters of increased financial inclusion. After its 
securitisation in 2006, BRAC, for instance, sought to expand its lending base to 
include 5 million new, low-income borrowers (Chen, 2007). As in the case of the 
US subprime mortgage crisis, MFIs desperate for cash infusions push new 
microloans on higher-risk/higher-gamble borrowers. Securitisation increases the 
amount of capital available so that more loans can be made to more people. Thus, 
the first social risk/gamble involved in the securitisation of financial inclusion 
strategies is that the process encourages a constantly expanding pool of debtors, 
which in turn pushes MFIs to more risky loans (Chen, 2007). 
A second risk/gamble emerges from the reconfigured debt relationship between 
borrower and lender in securitisation. Under a standard ABS arrangement, loans 
(‘assets’ or receivables) are serviced by a third party; these ‘assets’ are then sold to 
institutional investors. To make these assets attractive to risk-adverse/gamble-adverse 
investors, the originator’s institutional risks/gambles are separated from these assets. 
Moreover, the securitised loan, especially in its synthetic form, is not held by 
one investor as a single asset but rather is further divided between multiple private 
investors – all of whom demand particular procedures that the third-party servicer 
must follow. On the ground, these processes of ABS serve to reconfigure debt 
relations by, for instance, intensifying the already existing strict delinquency 
supervision and limiting the wiggle-room available for the servicer to change the 
terms of repayment on the microloans. This creates difficulties for poor debtors, 
who lack a safety net and are, therefore, vulnerable to a host of events outside of 
their control, including natural disasters and adverse weather, theft, or family illnesses 
that hamper their ability to repay (Bateman, 2010). 
Another related social disadvantage caused by the reconfiguration of MFIs 
through ABS is the impersonal nature of the creditor-debtor relationship. There 
is no one with whom to discuss and possibly negotiate, changes in the terms of 
the loan to circumvent default (Chen, 2007). BRAC, for instance, relinquished 
its ability to change the terms of the loan when it entered the ABS transaction. 
The social risks/gambles for the borrower in this new relationship involve the 
increased likelihood of default, if there is no alternative (delayed) repayment. The 
social and economic consequences of default are significant, as borrowers who default 
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will face difficulty in obtaining future loans. In a group loan setting, borrowers 
who default may also face tremendous social stigma, collective forms of discipline 
and even suicide (Karim, 2011). More fortunate clients, when faced with the 
prospect of default, may elect to sell off their assets (e.g., livestock, which is the 
most important household asset for the poor in the global South) to preserve their 
credit (World Bank, 2010b). Others may resort to applying for more loans and 
increasing their debt load – through formal or informal channels (Rankin and 
Shakya, 2008; Karim, 2011). In essence, new social risks/gambles and relations of 
power become shaped by the processes of securitising debt, which in turn may 
lead to creating more vulnerability for poor borrowers (Chen, 2007). This is 
particularly true in the advent of global financial crises such as the Great Crash 
of 2008. 
In a joint paper, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and JP 
Morgan suggest that despite increased delinquency rates and dropping profita­
bility levels, MFIs were doing well in 2009. Furthermore, equity valuations 
globally have been on the rise since 2007 and that sector has continued to attract 
a larger pool of capital with MIVs (e.g., BlueOrchard, MicroVest and Develop­
ing World Markets) establishing new MFI equity funds, while public investors 
(e.g., World Bank, USAID) significantly increased their financial commitments 
(CGAP and JP Morgan, 2010). The large, US-based investment bank Morgan 
Stanley has reported that worldwide loan portfolios of MFIs equal $17 billion 
and have the potential to grow as large as $300 billion over the next decade. As 
the global director of Citigroup’s MFI division observes, ‘They [the poor] have 
different risk sensitivities. They’re often not part of any sudden boom, such as real 
estate. There are more resilient to some economic cycles’ (‘Citi sees microfinance 
growth even in downturn’, Reuters, 21 December 2007). The poor are thus 
viewed as enduring and bankable even in the face of economic crises. The reason 
for this, according to Citigroup, one of the largest institutional players in MFIs, 
is that ‘the poor have a lower threshold for risk as a class, which makes them more 
resilient to economic cycles and protects them from economic booms and 
depressions’ (Diehl, 2009: 42). This statement by Citigroup reveals how the poor 
and their daily struggles to survive are glossed over in discussions of MFIs. 
In 2009, and in contrast to the above-cited report it later published with JP 
Morgan, CGAP published a study that was based on a survey of over 400 MFI 
managers across the globe. The study concluded that sustained high food prices, 
severe economic contraction and massive job losses were hurting their borrowers. 
Moreover, MFI borrowers were prioritising food expenditures and experienced 
more difficulties in repaying their loans. MFIs also reported that it was more difficult 
for them to access funding. As in previous crises, the most vulnerable – particularly 
women and children – are likely to have been hit hardest (CGAP, 2009b). The 
World Bank also paints a darker picture of the post-2008 world, although it does 
place more emphasis on the MFIs than the poor. According to the World Bank, 
since MFI loans offer the only access to credit for basic subsistence for millions of 
low-income people, these borrowers will take their loans seriously and are very 
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reliable payers (World Bank, 2009a). As such, the extent and depth to which the 
current crisis poses a risk/gamble for MFIs depends on the nature of external finan ­
cing (Diehl, 2009). According to USAID, the increased reliance of MFIs on financial 
markets has meant that the contagion of the 2008 crisis has had a deeper reach 
than past crises, affecting financial markets, liquidity, trade flows, growth, 
employment, inflation and remittance flows because of fact that credit money is 
able to transfer across borders with greater ease than in the past (USAID, 2009). 
As the 2008 crisis becomes a distant memory – at least for the small group of 
powerful people drawing their income from credit-led accumulation – there has 
been increasing pushback by capitalists against what had already been agreed to in 
the wake of the crisis (and bailouts!), as well as inadequate implementation of soft 
law responses to the crisis (IMF, 2012c). The Board of Governors of the US Federal 
Reserve System, for instance, has suggested that it will be difficult to comply with 
the recommendations of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (or, Act) regarding ABS (see Chapter 5). The reason for this, 
according to the Federal Reserve, is that due to ‘considerable heterogeneity across 
asset classes in securitisation chains, deal structures and incentive alignment 
mechanisms [ . . . ] simple credit risk retention rules, applied uniformly across assets 
of all types, are unlikely to achieve the stated objective of the Act – namely, to 
improve the [ABS] process and protect investors from losses associated with poorly 
underwritten loans’ (Federal Reserve Board, 2010b, 3; IMF, 2012a). 
The above position by a key regulatory institution overseeing the largest 
ABS markets in the world contradicts the commitments of the Joint Forum of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision regarding the re-establishment of 
sustainable securitisation markets as a high priority for G20 leaders, the Financial 
Stability Board and other international organisations and national governments since 
2007 (‘SIFMA: Uphold ABS exclusion in applying Volcker Rule’, Asset Securitisation 
Report, 14 February 2012). In terms of the Principle of Proportionality and its focus 
on balancing risk involved in innovative finance with its benefits, it also signals 
that the wider regulatory context from which the G20 Principles emerged were 
aimed at recreating, in the first instance, an enabling framework for the expansion 
of the poverty industry as opposed to protecting the surplus population from market 
generated risk/gamble – much less attempting to lift these workers and their families 
out of poverty by introducing a living wage and guaranteed provisioning for basic 
subsistence. 
Bringing the principles of protection and empowerment 
to life in Mexico’s poverty industry 
In this section, I explore the G20 Principles of Protection and Empowerment to 
demonstrate how these Principles not only mirror the illusions of the community 
of money, but also and by extension, support continual attempts by the Mexican 
state and capitalists to expand and reproduce financial inclusion strategies. It is 
important to emphasise that the G20 Principles do not determine the spatial 
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displacements in credit-led accumulation in Mexico, but instead act to legitimate, 
depoliticise and normalise class-based strategies aimed at monetising the relations 
of the surplus population. Thus, the Principles contribute to imposing market 
discipline on workers, while exploiting them through high interest rates. 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion Report 2011: 
an overview of the Mexican Case 
In 2011, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), in its capacity as the 
implementing partner of the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), 
released a report entitled: Bringing the Principles to Life (hereafter: AFI Report) 
in which it provided a description of how eleven countries in the global South 
have embraced the nine G20 Principles of Financial Inclusion (AFI, 2011). The 
AFI Report gave a brief but positive overview regarding the Mexican state’s attempt 
to implement financial inclusion initiatives, although the text cautioned that it is 
too early to draw conclusions about the quality and extent of Mexico’s adherence 
to the G20 Principles and suggested further observation and monitoring are 
necessary (AFI, 2011: 2). Reflecting the G20 Principles, the Mexican state defines 
financial inclusion as ‘the access and use of a portfolio of financial products and 
services for the majority of the adult population with clear and concise information 
attending the growing demand under an appropriate regulatory framework’ (AFI, 
2011: 38). The so-called ‘proper’ regulatory framework in Mexico involves soft 
law for the poverty industry underpinned by hard law to protect the interests of 
capital, e.g., the protection of private property and the guarantee of legal contracts 
(World Bank, 2004c). 
According to the AFI Report, the Mexican state has been promoting policies 
and legal reforms aimed at increasing the transparency of financial institutions, 
strengthening consumer protection and enhancing financial literacy since the mid­
2000s (AFI, 2011). In 2007, for example, the Mexican state issued the Transparency 
and Financial Services Ordering Law (hereafter: Transparency Law).22 The latter 
was to ensure, among other things, healthy banking and business practices and the 
use of non-jargon based language in order to facilitate the reading and understanding 
of contracts (Raccanello and Romero, 2011). Moreover, the AFI Report goes on 
to commend the expansion of the main financial regulator in Mexico, the National 
Banking and Securities Commission (hereafter: CNBV23) (AFI, 2011). 
Under the Transparency Law, for instance, the CNBV’s mission was broadened 
to include the promotion of a sound and inclusive banking system. In particular, 
the CNBV developed an Access to Finance Unit (AFU), which was set up to inform 
policy decisions on financial access issues, influence business models for providers 
and monitor progress, which in the context of the wider financial inclusion agenda, 
means conducting surveys and reports that analyse gaps between needs and supply. 
The CNBV has also sought to forge partnerships with other key government agencies 
devoted to consumer protection, most notably the National Commission for the 
Defense of Financial Services Users (hereafter: CONDUSEF).24 
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According to the AFI Report, the partnership between CNBV and 
CONDUSEF is significant in two ways. First, as the country’s consumer protection 
agency, CONDUSEF is expected to work toward the reinforcement of the 2007 
Law for Transparency by implementing transparency requirements regarding 
pricing, terms and conditions for products and services. CONDUSEF has also sought 
to ensure disclosure of information on periodic statements, contracts and promo­
tions, grievances and redress mechanisms, sanctions and fines; and transparency and 
disclosure standards on fees charged by financial institutions, which is also part of 
the Law for Transparency (AFI, 2011: 39). For instance, the Transparency Law, 
which is a soft law, has sought to promote, albeit never clearly defining, healthy 
banking and business practices to help the poor understand the content of legally-
binding debt contracts (Raccanello and Romero, 2011). 
Second, CONDUSEF and the CNBV have partnered to conduct financial 
literacy focus groups (AFI, 2011: 38). Since 2008, CONDUSEF has held an Annual 
National Financial Literacy Week that focuses on family’s budgets, savings, 
investments, credit and insurance. There are over 1,000 events across the country 
supported by government agencies, financial institutions, schools and universities. 
CONDUSEF also issued Guidelines for Financial Education for Elementary School. 
There are now six teachers’ guides that provide simple and clear tools explaining 
basic economic and financial concepts for children. Since 2011, with the help of 
the Ministry of Education, these Guidelines have been distributed to Mexico’s 
98,575 elementary schools – reaching a total of 14.6 million students (AFI, 2011: 
40). In 2011, the state launched the national financial education strategy to promote 
programmes, workshops and other initiatives related to financial education in order 
to reach as many low-income, financially excluded Mexicans as possible. 
It should be noted here that the G20 is not the only international organisation 
that has reinforced the importance of financial education as a form of consumer 
protection. In 2013, for instance, the G20, World Bank and OECD hosted a 
conference on empowering consumers of financial products and services.25 
According to this view, through financial education financial consumers will gain 
more information about financial products and concepts thereby developing the 
necessary skills and confidence to function effectively in the market (OECD, 2009). 
The AFI Report concludes its assessment by noting that Mexico’s embrace of 
the above G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion, particularly the 
Principle of Protection and the Principle of Empowerment, has facilitated the 
expansion of financial inclusion. This is evidenced by the fact that formal lending 
institutions have almost doubled in number from 9,429 in 2009 to an estimated 
20,000 by 2011 (AFI, 2011: 39). The trope of the Principle of Protection and the 
Principle of Empowerment serve to strengthen the illusions of the community of 
money, erasing questions of exploitation and power from the financial, as well as 
obscuring the structural violence inherent to neoliberal policies that have led to 
the dependency of the surplus population on privately created money for basic 
subsistence needs (cf. World Bank, 2014). As I have explained in previous chapters, 
the power of the community of money and its illusions of democracy, equality 
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and freedom is based on its ability to conceal its connections to the realm of 
production and states. These assumptions are further rehearsed in the debates 
about the predatory nature of consumer credit for the poor in Mexico to which 
I now turn. 
Debating protection and empowerment in the realm of 
exchange 
As noted earlier, much of the regulative landscape of consumer credit in Mexico 
is framed in soft law. This provides considerable leeway for capitalists to continue 
to expand and intensify dispossessive strategies with regard to the unbanked 
population, comprised of large numbers of surplus labour. For instance, there are 
no legal limits on interest levels and little state oversight regarding formal lending 
institutions in Mexico, particularly those that comprise the poverty industry. 
CONDUSEF, for instance, does not publish the interest rates charged by banks 
for personal loans. Interest rates for consumer loans are high in Mexico for all income 
levels, but particularly for the poor. A credit card from BanCoppel has registered 
Annualized Percentage Rate (APR) interest rates as high as 88 percent, including 
added fees,26 whereas a loan from an unregulated microfinance institution (MFI) 
in Mexico, which I examine in the next chapter, may reach as high as 229 percent 
APR (Bateman, 2013).27 
Notwithstanding the 2007 Law of Transparency, the Mexican state has not 
required that interest rates on loans be reported to and subsequently published by, 
CONDUSEF. The justification for this position is that competition between 
financial providers and growing demand from consumers will ultimately create 
the optimal price level. The government should concentrate on fostering com ­
petition and refrain from interfering in this process so as to avoid distorting 
the rational and self-equilibrating forces of the market. This was the rationale 
behind the establishment of Multiple Purpose Financial Companies (or, as they 
are referred to by their Spanish acronym, SOFOMES28) in 2006. SOFOMES are 
not regulated.29 In keeping with the ethos of market competition as a core way 
to achieve welfare for the poor, the Mexican Congress created SOFOMES to 
further deregulate the consumer credit industry and increase lending activities 
to the poor, such as providing payroll lending and microloans. According to data 
from CNBV and CONDUSEF there were approximately 3,400 unregulated 
SOFOMES operating in Mexico in 2011 (see Chapter 8; IMF, 2012e). 
It is important to note that the debates about the high cost of lending in Mexico 
remain within the realm of exchange thereby reinforcing the associated illusions 
of the community of money. This can be readily seen in the solutions offered to 
the perceived problems in financial inclusion. To mitigate predatory lending, for 
instance, states should strengthen consumer protection through more disclosure 
and improving financial literacy, thereby empowering the poor. Commentators 
based in the economic paradigm, for instance, have suggested that the consumer 
protection laws in Mexico do not adequately protect the poor, who are the main 
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target of financial inclusion strategies – many of which may be described as 
predatory lending. For these authors, predatory lending refers to credit practices 
that take advantage of the borrowers’ lack of financial literacy and financial options 
in order to exploit customers through high-cost credit (Drury, 2009; Raccanello 
and Romero, 2011: 1). Increasing financial knowledge among the poor is viewed 
not only as combating predatory lending practices, but also as increasing savings 
and overall financial wellbeing, e.g., less reliance on the relatively higher-priced 
credit offered by pawnbrokers (Rutledge, 2010; CGAP, 2011). 
The provision of adequate regulation regarding consumer protection is vital in 
avoiding predatory lending through the implementation of soft law. In contrast to 
the AFI’s positive spin on consumer protection in Mexico and the 2012 creation 
of the Mexican National Council for Financial Inclusion,30 critics suggest that the 
conciliatory and dispute resolution functions of CONDUSEF remain de facto 
ineffective (Raccanello and Romero, 2011). In 2007, the same year that the above-
mentioned Law for Transparency was decreed, the consumer protection agency 
solved only 29 percent of conciliation reports. In this same year, however, only 
three cases came to arbitration. Aside from the usual lack of financial resources, 
an important reason for the lack of effectiveness of the consumer protection agencies 
is due to its design in soft law: financial institutions in Mexico are not legally obliged 
to abide by CONDUSEF’S recommendations (IMF, 2012d). 
While the impotence of CONDUSEF – glossed over by the AFI Report – is 
problematic, the above critique of predatory lending in Mexico remains firmly 
entrenched in the depoliticising sphere of exchange. Thus, the source of the problem 
of predatory lending lies not in the exploitative and unequal relations of capital 
accumulation and, by extension, the absence of a living wage and social protections; 
but instead in the absence of a legal definition of predatory lending in Mexico. 
The solution to mitigating predatory lending practices in Mexico remains in the 
realm of exchange. The emphasis is on establishing a level playing field – and 
therewith rehearsing the illusion of an equivalence of exchange – through soft laws 
that emphasise empowerment and more effective forms of consumer protection, 
including strengthening the oversight powers of CONDUSEF. At the same time, 
by not grasping the wider dynamics of capital accumulation and the role of the 
Mexican state therein, these debates inadvertently support key economic fictions 
that serve to reproduce the relations of power in consumer credit, particularly as 
these relate to regulating interest rates. The Mexican state and CONDUSEF in 
particular, refuse to cap interest rates on lending because introducing interest rate 
ceilings would distort markets. Moreover, high interest rates for the poor are viewed 
as ‘the natural result of market forces’, since ‘lower income levels often incur 
significantly higher APRs [Annual Percentage Rates]’ (Euromonitor International, 
2013: 13). 
Despite the commendable progress made by the Mexican government in 
facilitating financial inclusion, the AFI Report identifies some challenges that remain 
unresolved, particularly the proportionality principle, as discussed above. The AFI, 
for instance, recommends that Mexican regulators strive to strike a balance between, 
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on the one hand, the size of the loan to the poor and prudential requirements, 
i.e., the ability of the borrower to pay by identifying how best to balance obligations 
and the alleged soundness and solvency of the financial system, on the other (AFI, 
2011). Remaining true to the neoclassical economic assumptions discussed in 
Chapter 3, the proportionality principle cannot be achieved through the 
implementation of legally binding (hard) laws that constrain the poverty industry 
and other forms of perceived government interference in the market. Instead, 
proportionality is achieved when effective financial consumer protection translates into 
responsible market conduct (CGAP, 2011: 5). 
Viewing the challenges of financial inclusion in terms of a principle of pro ­
portionality does not address the high interest rates that characterise the poverty 
industry, which remains unregulated in Mexico. More importantly, this economistic 
framing also treats the relations between debtors and creditors as apolitical and thus 
devoid of questions of the power inherent in monetised relations. This view also 
reproduces two core assumptions of debtfarism: that exchanges between creditors 
and debtors are based on equivalence and that markets are capable of achieving 
equilibrating risks and benefits – that is, setting a reasonable price for credit (interest 
rates) while maintaining welfare benefits for the debtor. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I tried to throw critical light on what is concealed by the G20 
Principles and to explain why the G20’s representation and promotion of financial 
inclusion is a social construct that entails the expansion and (re-)imposition of 
monetised social relations. Moreover, I sought to demonstrate that these relations 
are not, as the fetishism of the community of money attests, based on equality, 
freedom and democracy; but instead are exploitative, unequal and coercive. I argued 
that the G20 Principles play a supportive role in legitimating and normalising political 
and legal framings by states and capitalists in their ongoing attempts at expanding 
and reproducing the poverty industry through reconstructions of the illusion of 
the community of money. 
By analysing three G20 Principles (the Principle of Proportionality, the Principle 
of Protection and the Principle of Empowerment) within the contexts of Mexico 
and global developments in financial inclusion in Bangladesh, I have shown that 
the G20 Principles should be understood as responses, constructions and con ­
solidations of an underlying attempt to reproduce the neoliberal governance of 
dispossessive capitalism, including the regulatory preference for soft law to facilitate 
spatio-temporal fixes of credit money and the risk/gamble entrapment of the surplus 
population. 
I have suggested that the G20 financial inclusion agenda is not a neutral project, 
but one that is aimed at constructing the dependence of the poor in the global 
South on privately created money (credit). Instead of leading to the neoliberal 
promise of growth through investments in production – and thus stable living wages 
and poverty reduction – the increased frequency and intensity of financial crises 
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linked to credit-led accumulation has made developing countries and their popula ­
tions more vulnerable. Notwithstanding the historical experience of neoliberalism 
since the 1980s, the solution to the latest crisis has been to include more poor 
people into a volatile, speculative and highly interconnected financial system, so 
that they may, in the words of the G20, ‘manage their low, irregular and unreliable 
income’ (AFI, 2010: 14). 
In the next two chapters, I continue interrogating the capitalist nature of the 
financial. Specifically, I seek to show how the Mexican state and capitalists have 
constructed debtfarist policies to facilitate the expansion and reproduction of the 
poverty industry in Mexico. Through a historical materialist analysis, I deconstruct 
how debtfarism has served to reconstruct the financial and its illusions of the 
community of money, while concealing the underlying structural violence that 
silently compels the surplus population to enter into the disciplinary and exploitative 
realm of credit. 
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or more stock ownership of a particular SOFOMS. In this case, the SOFOMES would 
be subject to regulation (BCP Securities, 2010). More information (in Spanish) available 
at: www.condusef.gob.mx/index.php/instituciones-financieras/sociedades-financieras-de­
objeto-multiple (accessed 25 July 2013). 
30 This initiative conveniently coincided with 2012 G20 Leadership Meeting that was held 
in Los Cabos, Mexico. For more information about Mexico’s National Council for 
Financial Inclusion, see ‘Mexico’s National Council for Financial Inclusion’, 16 February 
2012. Available at: www.cgap.org/blog/mexico%E2%80%99s-national-council-financial­
inclusion (accessed 19 July 2013). 
8 
DEBTFARISM AND THE 
MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY 
In 2007, Mexican-based Compartamos Banco (hereafter: Compartamos) became 
the world’s first microfinance institution (MFI) to complete an initial public 
offering (IPO). By selling 30 percent of its company, Compartamos was able to 
raise $467 million, which it claimed was necessary to continue its goal of serving 
the financially excluded. The story of Compartamos, which began life as a non­
profit, grassroots lending organisation in the 1990s before becoming the most 
lucrative, commercialised (for-profit) MFI in the world, is neither unique nor novel. 
Since the 1990s, international donors encouraged the shift away from informal (not 
legally recognised) and/or non-profit lending (Bateman, 2010). However, it was 
not until the mid-2000s that the phenomenon of commercialised microfinance 
lending began to grow – both in pace and breadth – in Mexico. Some of the key 
players in Mexico’s for-profit microfinance industry, which I investigate in this 
chapter, include retail-based banks such as Banco Walmart and Multiple Purpose 
Financial Companies – or, SOFOMES.1 
According to the National Banking and Securities Commission of Mexico 
(CNBV), the average size of MFI loans in Mexico falls within the range of $390 
to $1,950, but the interest rates are high (CNBV, 2010). Compartamos, which 
caters exclusively to group loans (primarily to women) for micro-enterprises, has 
grabbed international headlines for its rates, which range from 110 Annual 
Percentage Rate (APR) to 195 APR (Roodman, 2011; Bateman, 2013). In 2012, 
retail banks, such as Banco Walmart, have been offering credit cards with interest 
rates posted at 94.30 percent APR.2 And, SOFOMES such as CrediConfia charge 
clients as much as 229 APR.3 Despite these high rates and a brief setback in the 
wake of the 2008 crisis, personal lending in Mexico – across all income ranges – 
has been expanding rapidly, with gross lending and returns on investment in the 
microfinance industry showing double-digit increases (EuroMonitor International, 
2013; Bateman, 2013). 
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Guided by the financial inclusion initiative that has become deeply embedded 
in the neoliberal fabric of global development project, commercialised and 
formalised MFIs are widely seen by states, international organisations (e.g., World 
Bank, G20) and epistemic communities (e.g., CGAP) as a viable and effective 
solution to poverty, largely because they are able to offer a more expansive 
outreach and deliver more diverse financial products to the financially excluded 
than their non-profit and informal counterparts (Otero, 2005; Antón-Díaz, 2013). 
Debates on the alleged link between the commercialisation of MFIs and their 
ability to reduce poverty are well documented (World Bank, 2001; Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2006; Lewis, 2008; Bateman, 2010, 2013; Roodman, 2011). 
Over the past two decades of commercialising the microfinance industry, many 
scholars have demonstrated that the connection between for-profit microfinance 
lending and poverty reduction is tenuous and, at the very least, problematic 
(Rankin, 2001, 2013; Elyachar, 2002, 2005; Roy, 2010; Weber, 2002; Taylor, 
2011). One study, even suggests that Compartamos’s high interest rates have not 
impacted the welfare-enhancing features of access to credit, such as smoothing 
liquidity shocks, although the study does cede that these loans have not facilitated 
wealth-generation among the poor (Angelucci et al., 2013). In light of this, some 
major MFIs have cautiously begun to describe their activities not in terms of poverty 
alleviation; but instead as creating opportunities for the poor by granting them access 
to financial services. In words of the co-CEOs of Compartamos, ‘we believe that 
microfinance is finance and has to be sustainable [read: profitable] . . . that the main 
contribution of microfinance is the expansion of the market’ (Danel and Labarthe, 
2008: 1).4 According to its 2012 Annual Report, Compartamos is concentrating 
on eradicating financial exclusion as opposed to poverty (Grupos Compartamos, 
2012). 
Notwithstanding this more guarded position, the core modus operandi of 
commercial MFIs remains predicated on achieving a balance between social values 
and private objectives, which entail extracting high levels of interest (often higher 
than 60 percent APR) to make up for the costs of issuing and maintaining small 
loans (‘Mexico’s Banco Compartamos is seeking to buy micro-finance lender 
abroad’, Bloomberg, 15 April 2010). Regardless of whether the social values have 
been met, it is unequivocal that the private objectives of commercialised MFIs 
have been reached. Compartamos’s return on average equity was 31.22 percent 
in 2012, while its net earnings increased by 9.8 percent to 500 million pesos ($3.7 
million) (Compartamos, 2012; ‘Banco Compartamos to invest in $31.8 million in 
opening 75 new branches’, BN Americas, 18 June 2012).5 
This chapter will not re-enter the well-rehearsed debates about the connec­
tion between poverty reduction and for-profit, microfinance lending. Instead, it 
seeks to complement these discussions by examining the coercive and ideological 
machinations involved in the expansion and reproduction of Mexico’s rapidly 
expanding commercial microfinance industry. To accomplish this task, it is 
necessary to contextualise the poverty industry within the wider dynamics of 
capital accumulation, which include both the realms of production and exchange. 
194 Debtfarism and the poverty industry in Mexico 
This perspective allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the material 
basis of class and state power as well as the paradoxes driving social change and 
repro duction. Put another way, the complex and ongoing constructions and 
recon structions of the microfinance industry are neither natural nor neutral; but 
instead, emerge from, and thrive off of, paradoxes inherent to the processes of capital 
accumulation. 
Seen from the above angle, and in contrast with neoclassical renditions 
of self-regulating market, capitalists can neither proceed with the expansion of 
microfinance lending, nor can the surplus population be effectively reproduced 
without ideological and coercive state intervention. The rhetorical and regulative 
framings of the Mexican debtfare state, as with global debtfarism articulated by key 
global development institutions and organisations discussed in Chapter 7, act to 
mediate, legitimate and depoliticise these tensions. In doing so, debtfare strategies, 
facilitate the continued expansion of the microfinance industry on behalf of 
capitalists’ interests, while employing a market-based solution to the reproduction 
of surplus labour power. One important, albeit powerful, rhetorical device used 
by global development institutions and neoliberal states, such as Mexico, to advance 
the need for financial inclusion as a key solution to poverty is to continually naturalise 
and individualise the causes of poverty. It is to an elaboration of this political act 
vis-à-vis Mexico’s surplus population that I now turn my attention. 
Denaturalising poverty and Mexico’s surplus population 
Within the ambit of market-led development and its neoclassical economistic 
underpinnings, poverty is largely seen as the result of individual choices (e.g., lack 
of entrepreneurial skills, financial illiteracy) and/or poor governance mechanisms 
(e.g., lack of transparency, accountability, rule of law, consumer protection and so 
forth), which lead to the failure of states to capitalise on the ability of markets to 
achieve economic growth for the benefit of all (World Bank, 2000/2001, 2002a; 
cf. Chang and Grabel, 2004).6 Seen from this view, the corrective to poverty is 
to include the poor in ‘the financial’ by, first, offering them credit and, second, 
ensuring that ‘the financial’ is properly governed, for instance, through the 
application of the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion, which I analysed 
in Chapter 7. 
In contrast to the above perspective, a Marxian understanding locates the 
primary causes of poverty in the nature of capital accumulation. In particular, it draws 
attention to the inability of workers to earn a living wage and the unwillingness of 
states to compensate these wages with publicly funded social programmes and 
benefits. This category of labour is deemed the ‘relative surplus population’ as it is 
superfluous to the valorisation of capital, which I demonstrate below (Marx, 1990). 
The surplus population is important to our analysis, as is represents the target of 
the microfinance industry. In the financial inclusion agenda, which masks any 
trace of exploitation and power, the surplus population is depoliticised, dehistori ­
cised and homogenised. This occurs through the labelling of members of the surplus 
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population as the ‘unbanked’, the ‘financially excluded’, the ‘base of the pyramid’, 
and so forth (cf. Dogra, 2012). I explore this in more detail later in the chapter. 
For now, it is important to reconnect the unbanked to the surplus population. 
Readers will recall from Chapter 2 that surplus labour power is vital to the expansion 
of capital accumulation, as the presence of surplus workers serves as a powerful, 
class-based disciplinary strategy to justify the lowering of wages and benefits, 
threatening layoffs and increasing the intensity of work without compensation (Marx, 
1990; Harvey, 1999; Bieler and Lindberg, 2010; Morton, 2011). For the purpose 
of our analysis, it is useful to give the surplus population in neoliberal Mexico (1982­
present) some defining characteristics. To this end, I draw on the income bracket 
that the state deems too low for workers to afford a home in the formal (legal) 
market, namely: zero to four times the minimum wage, which I discuss in the 
context of housing finance in Chapter 7 (Herbert et al., 2012). In 2013, for instance, 
the Mexican state increased the minimum wage by 3.9 percent to 65 pesos ($5.10) 
per day (‘Mexico raises minimum wage by 3.9 percent for 2013’, Wall Street Journal, 
20 August 2013).7 This benchmark also reflects the microfinance industry’s target 
population. A 2012 report commissioned by the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP), for instance, designated the poor and underserved customers (surplus 
workers) as belonging to mid- to low-income households with earnings below 
18,300 pesos ($1,450) per month, which amounted to 22 million households or 
roughly 85 percent of the population (CGAP, 2012b: 1). 
The informal economy encompasses the space in which the majority of 
Mexico’s surplus population is situated. The informal economy includes workers 
‘who are not officially listed as operating registered businesses, or employees not 
listed in the official accounting of the labour force as determined by social security 
or similar entities and working without officially sanctioned labour contracts’ 
(Cypher and Delgado Wise, 2010: 26; see also Tokman, 2007). Based on the above 
income cut-off, some surplus workers are also found in the formal economy and 
can earn less than workers in the informal economy. The difference is that 
formalised workers have access to more social protections and benefits (World Bank, 
2013b). However, it is the surplus population in the informal economy that has 
been the target of the for-profit microfinance industry, as well as Mexican and 
global debtfare policies since the 1990s (World Bank, 2001; CGAP, 2012b; Grupo 
Compartamos, 2012). 
The making of poverty in neoliberal-led development 
In the wake of the 1982 debt crisis, the Mexican state shifted from Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI)8 to an Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) 
accumulation strategy (Soederberg, 2004). This took place under the tutelage and 
pressures of powerful capitalists, who aligned themselves with the neoliberal 
dictates of the Washington Consensus and the wider neoliberal-led development 
agenda, With proper regulation and good fundamentals, market-based restructuring 
was expected to produce a situation in which everyone would be materially better 
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off (IMF, 1992; von Waeyenberg, 2006). As I discussed in Chapter 3, neoliberal 
restructuring also involved imposing market discipline on Mexico’s poor by cutting 
and redesigning social programmes. As in the case of the US workfare state, this 
was intended to reduce the dependency of the poor on state subsidisation (Peck, 
2001; Yanes, 2011). 
Mexican history has revealed this stance to be an economic fiction perpetrated 
by those who benefit materially from this understanding of development (Chang, 
2002; Reinert, 2008). In contrast to the promises of the advocates of market-led 
growth, EOI has ‘been marked by stagnation, astonishingly high levels of emigration 
and an exploding “informal” economy where perhaps a majority of the economic 
population ekes out a precarious hand-to-mouth existence’ (Cypher and Delgado 
Wise, 2010: 9). Mexico has registered lower growth levels in the post-1980 
neoliberal era than during the 1960 to 1980 period. Moreover, it has experienced 
a continued lack of international competitiveness in terms of export and capital 
markets, persistent current account deficits, problematic levels of public debt and 
increasing levels of socio-economic inequality (US Congressional Research 
Services, 2010; Puyana, 2010; see also Table 8.1).9 
Mexico’s comparative advantage continues to rest on its great quantity of cheap 
and unskilled labour – that is, the surplus population. As many authors have 
suggested, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been 
characterised by a tendency toward deindustrialisation (Cypher, 2001; Soederberg, 
2004). As Kathryn Kopinak (1994) notes, the new industries in the maquiladora 
sector offer fewer jobs than the number lost from Mexican-owned industry and 
agriculture.10 As maquiladoras expanded, manufacturing as a share of GDP stagnated 
and the manufacturing share of the labour force diminished ( Jonakin, 2006). 
Moreover, jobs in the maquiladoras are comparatively unskilled and poorly paid, 
which results in a reduction in purchasing power and, in turn, an increase in 
economic inequality and inability to meet basic subsistence needs (Kopinak, 1994; 
Soederberg, 2004). 
While EOI and trade liberalisation were to bring about economic growth in 
Mexico, the service sector (e.g., commerce, restaurants and hotels, communal 
TABLE 8.1 Current account balance, 1990–2011 (US $ millions) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009 2011 
Exports of goods, 
services, and income 
54,570 96,707 192,425 257,418 323,429 251,216 374,702 
Imports of goods 
and services 
63,504 98,571 211,531 262,252 332,110 277,768 406,633 
Current Account 
Balance 
-7,451 -1,576 -18,684 -4,386 -8,335 -5,021 -9,030 
Sources: World Bank (2010a) Global Development Bank – Debt, Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 192; 
World Bank (2013a) International Debt Statistics 2013, Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 202. 
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services and construction) generated more jobs than manufacturing over the 1988 
to 2008 period (Dussel Peters 2000; Puyana, 2010). From 1993 to 2008 and in 
contrast to neoliberal assumptions, growth rates in the relatively better paying jobs 
in manufacturing fell below lower paying employment in the service sector. 
Indeed, growth rates in Mexico remain below those registered under the Import 
Substitution Industrialization accumulation strategy, which spanned from the 1940s 
to late 1970s (United Nations, 2010; Morton, 2011). 
The informal economy (e.g., street vendors, domestic labour, agricultural 
workers and so forth) increased prior to and after the signing of NAFTA, from 61 
percent in 1991 to 64 percent in 2009. According to employment surveys, the 
percentage of the labour force that does not receive any income, or receives only 
twice the minimum wage, accounted for 66 percent and 65 percent of the work 
force in the years 1991 and 2009, respectively (Puyana, 2010: 15). Due to the 
absence of unemployment insurance in Mexico, the unemployed have to find work 
mainly in the informal economy. Employment with no contracts and no social 
security has meant that for many – and informal workers in particular – the embrace 
of market-led reforms imbued in the EOI have not translated into wage gains. 
According to the Economic Policy Institute (2001: 12), ‘underemployment and 
work in low-pay, low-productivity jobs (e.g., unpaid work in family enterprises) 
actually has grown rapidly’ since the signing of NAFTA in 1994. In their attempts 
to earn subsistence wages, many Mexicans risk life and limb to gain employment 
that will yield a living wage, largely as illegal migrant labourers in the informal 
economy in the United States (LeBaron, 2014). Indeed, cheap, unskilled and often 
illegal, labour to the US has become an important Mexican export (Cypher and 
Delgado Wise, 2010). As I discussed in Chapter 4, Mexican migrant workers have 
also fuelled the expansion of the poverty industry in the United States. 
Mexico’s abundant less-skilled and underemployed workforce has also been 
experiencing worsening conditions of employment due to the nature of EOI 
accumulation and structural violence through the weakening of union power and 
overall labour flexibilisiation policies imposed by the neoliberal state. This has been 
exacerbated by increasing competition, most notably from China. From 1996 to 
2002, Mexican workers’ wages deteriorated by 50 percent in terms of their 
purchasing power and 73 percent of the population could no longer afford the 
shopping basket of 40 basic items (Charnock 2005: 6; Jonakin, 2006). According 
to a study conducted by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Mexico’s hourly wages 
are about a fifth lower than China’s, its largest competitor – a huge turnaround 
from just ten years ago, when they were nearly three times higher (‘Mexican 
labour: cheaper than China’, Financial Times, 5 April 2013). This drop in wages 
was, however, not a natural reaction to the competitive forces of an apolitical, 
self-regulating market. Instead, it was an attempt to depress earnings, which were 
far from providing an adequate living wage, through coercive capitalist tactics, 
such as threatening to layoff or fire workers. Such tactics are only feasible due to 
the presence of a vast surplus labour force. By the mid-2000s, for instance, 
the EOI strategy was accompanied by one of the highest rates of unemployment. 
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To legitimate the alleged validity of market-led restructuring in the face of growing 
unemployment and underemployment, the Mexican state considers anyone who 
works for one hour of one day per week to be employed (Álvarez Béjar, 2006). 
Credit-led accumulation emerged from the lack of profitable outlets in Mexico’s 
EOI-led accumulation strategy. By the mid-1990s, for instance, private capital flows 
to Mexico began to overshadow public funds from bilateral and multilateral 
organisations, including aid (World Bank, 2012c). The high interest rates needed 
to keep inflation low as well as to draw in and retain much-needed foreign capital 
flows, for instance, have tended to attract short-term, speculative capital, much to 
the detriment of Mexico’s productive structure (Zapata, 2006). While foreign direct 
investment in production facilities increased by 57.6 percent from 1989 to 1993, 
more mobile portfolio investment rose by more than 8,000 percent, or 86.8 percent 
of total foreign investment (Pastor 1999). The rise of credit-led accumulation 
does not imply a separation from the realm of production, however. The import ­
ance of a disciplined labour force is as important as signaling high interest rates 
and guaranteeing the value of money when luring private capital. As the Banco 
de México states, one of the reasons that foreign investment flows are attracted to 
Mexico is because of ‘temporary contracts, low hourly wages and a reduction 
in wage compensation after labour disputes’ (Banco de México, 2013: 10). 
To encourage inflows of credit money from abroad, the Mexican state has 
pursued soft regulatory framings for the financial system, while actively pursuing 
monetarist policies in an attempt to control inflation through the reduction of money 
supply (Correa, 2006; Banco de México, 2013). The monetarist ideology is fuelled 
by the belief that unemployment, regarded as largely voluntary, will be resolved 
when markets achieve an equilibrium, thus bestowing benefits on all members of 
society (see Chapter 3). Closely tied to the dominance of monetarism in Mexico 
was the insistence of pursuing tight fiscality (austerity programmes), which was 
also aimed at limiting inflation (Soederberg, 2010c; Marois, 2012, 2014). Many 
socio-economic and political consequences of monetarism in Mexico impact the 
microfinance industry. Two specific consequences stand out for the analysis here. 
One is that this neoliberal policy direction served to weaken already frail social 
programmes, thereby shifting the reliance of Mexico’s surplus population from state 
subsidies to private lenders. The second is that it ushered in speculative credit money 
primarily, although not exclusively, from the United States (Soederberg, 2004). 
Overall, credit-led accumulation has proven to be detrimental to the Mexican 
economy.11 The 1994–1995 peso crash and the 2008 financial crisis, speculative 
inflows render the economy vulnerable when investors (both Mexican and foreign) 
suddenly exited the country (Grabel, 1999; Williams, 2001; Hart-Landsberg, 2002; 
Soederberg, 2004; Marois, 2014). For approximately half of Mexico’s population, 
the peso crash resulted in swelling rates of poverty and unemployment levels (United 
Nations, 2011). As with the 2008 financial crash, the aftermath of the speculative-
led feeding frenzy of 1994–1995 peso debacle left the surplus population to 
contend with more costly prices on basic subsistence items such as food and rent 
as well as higher levels of unemployment (Puyana, 2010; Cypher and Delgado Wise, 
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2010). What is more, to defend the peso against speculators, the Mexican state, as 
with other countries in the global South, built up a substantial war chest of foreign 
exchange reserves to the detriment of state spending on infrastructure projects and 
social programmes (Ocampo et al., 2007; Soederberg, 2010d; World Bank, 2013a). 
The surplus population in Mexico has not benefitted from credit-led accumu ­
lation, in terms of either job creation or access to formal and affordable banking 
services. Nonetheless, policies pursued in the late 1990s were aimed at further 
liberalising the financial sector, which has led to the expansion and concentration 
of foreign ownership of banks, particularly from the United States, Canada and Spain, 
whose ownership levels topped 85 percent of all banks in Mexico in 2005 (Marois, 
2012). Throughout the 2000s, the large, commercial banks catered to consump ­
tion lending (credit cards, personal loans and durable goods loans) for middle-class 
and wealthy Mexicans. Consumption lending proved to be a lucrative business and 
grew rapidly throughout the new millennium. Credit cards alone represented 51 
percent of consumer banking loans in the early 2000s (World Bank, 2005a). 
To sum up: In contrast to neoliberal postulates that market-led growth delivers 
universal benefits, capital accumulation in Mexico has yielded profits and interest-
generating income for powerful capitalists, both inside and outside of the country, 
to the detriment of over half the population, who are surplus labour toiling in the 
economically precarious and insecure spaces of informality. Aside from revealing 
the roots of impoverishment of the so-called ‘base of the pyramid’, the above analysis 
has sought to shift our gaze away from the narrow and depoliticising boundaries 
of the realm of exchange, where the naturalisation of poverty and much of the 
analyses of the microfinance industry takes place, to the wider dynamics of capital 
accumulation. 
The above framing helps us see that the reliance of the surplus population on 
privately created money (i.e., microfinance credit) is neither a natural feature of 
the market nor the result of voluntary inclusion (market freedom); but instead, a 
constructed act in which debtfarism plays a central role. As I demonstrate below, 
the decision of a surplus worker to choose to enter into a debt relationship with 
a microfinance institution is, in actuality, driven and shaped by the constructed 
silent compulsions and structural violence of neoliberal-led capitalism, including 
the role of the debtfare state, which regularises, individualises and depoliticises the 
microfinance industry. 
Debtfarism and the commercialisation of the 
microfinance industry 
In this section, I explore debtfarism in two ways. First, I examine some of the 
state’s rhetorical interventions aimed at depoliticising the surplus population by 
recreating the assumption that poverty is something natural and voluntary to be 
resolved within the realm of exchange. Second, I analyse the regulative and 
rhetorical roles played by the Mexican debtfare state, as well as global debtfarism 
(see Chapter 7), in facilitating the expansion of formalised microfinance institutions 
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(MFIs) to support capitalist interests while providing a market-led solution to the 
social reproduction of the surplus population. 
Relocating surplus labour in the realm of exchange: the politics 
of rebranding the poor as unbanked/financially excluded 
In the 1990s, MFIs, many of which were reliant on some form of external aid, 
were strongly encouraged to become fully commercialised and privatised by their 
multilateral (e.g., IMF, World Bank) and bilateral (e.g., USAID) donors (Roy, 2010; 
Bateman, 2010). To meet these new objectives, many MFIs began re-orienting 
the social mission that purportedly drove their lending practices to the dictates of 
profit-maximisation by introducing market-based interest rates, cutting subsidies 
and encouraging savings (World Bank, 2001, 2009a; Harper, 2011). The com ­
mercial isation of MFIs was not a natural phenomenon, however. The shift to 
for-profit lending to the surplus population had to be legitimately constructed and 
normalised. 
Debtfarist attempts at regularising for-profit MFIs as a solution to poverty involved 
multiple strategies (see Chapter 7). Here, I identify two important postulates in the 
Mexican context. First, commercialised MFIs are more efficient and effective in 
reducing poverty than their non-profit counterparts. Second, the poor are economic 
actors, who operate on a level playing field (i.e., devoid of power, history and politics) 
and who possess, or can be made to possess, the same rational skills and utility­
maximising calculus as all ‘successful’ (read: ‘non-poor’) economic actors (Rankin, 
2001). The primary rhetorical means to legitimate and actualise these neoliberal 
assumptions was to confine the surplus population to the realm of exchange and to 
leverage the social power of money to provide illusions of democracy, equality and 
freedom. The poor are thereby rebranded as the unbanked, the financially excluded, 
or the base of the pyramid (BOP). The realm of exchange effectively becomes ‘the 
financial’ into which the poor are included to alleviate the conditions of poverty.12 
To deconstruct the rhetorical processes of debtfarism at work here, it is 
useful to centre our investigation on two basic questions: Who are the unbanked 
and financially excluded? And, why have they been drawn into commercial 
microlending? According to CGAP, a leading member of the epistemic community 
committed to financial inclusion, Mexico, like many developing countries, is still 
predominantly an informal, cash-based economy. Only 15 to 25 percent of urban 
households and as few as 6 percent of rural households have accounts with formal 
financial institutions and payment systems (CGAP, 2006). On this view, there is 
room for formalised banking systems, such as mobile banking and retail banking, 
to expand their operations under the rubric of financial inclusion and, by extension, 
to contribute to Mexico’s ‘growth potential’ through ‘innovative’ poverty reduction 
(World Bank, 2006; Banco de México, 2011).13 
The implication here is that the unbanked demographic continues to rely on 
largely inefficient and unregulated informal lending institutions, including Cajas 
de ahorros populares, moneylenders, friends and relatives and pawnshops, such as the 
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longstanding, non-profit institute Monte de Piedad (World Bank, 2005a; Francois, 
2006). Two points are worth mentioning with regard to the efficiency of the formal 
lending sector. First, while some moneylenders and pawnshops may charge interest 
rates up to 300 percent (APR), Cajas de ahorros charge, on average, lower rates 
than the commercialised microfinance lenders discussed below. Second, although 
informal lenders remain unregulated in Mexico, the formalised microfinance indus ­
try is predominately regulated by soft laws and some SOFOMES were designed 
by the state to be free from any regulatory restriction. Given the lax regula tions 
in place governing the microfinance industry in Mexico (e.g., the absence of interest 
rate ceilings, weak consumer protection laws), the further leeway granted to 
SOFOMES is a strategy undertaken by debtfarism to entice capitalists, both inside 
and outside Mexico, to lend to the surplus population. 
To construct legitimate social spaces for commercialised microfinance institu­
tions (MFIs), it is necessary for the debtfare state to delegitimise informal lending. 
According to the official development rhetoric, while informal lending organ­
isations provide a valuable service to the poor, their lack of accountability and 
transparency make them an inefficient means of moving Mexicans out of poverty 
and helping the unbanked strengthen and expand what the World Bank refers 
to as the poor’s ‘asset bases’ (World Bank, 2005a). Following this line of reasoning, 
commercialised MFIs play an essential role in ending poverty insomuch as 
they encourage responsible and rational behaviour among the poor. That is, MFIs 
put everyone on the same page in terms of profit maximisation. The bottom 
line for the poor is that accessing credit from a commercial MFI is a win-win 
situation. According to the World Bank’s study, ‘banked households borrow far 
more than the unbanked and are also more likely to report consumption smoothing 
in the face of negative income shocks, suggesting that the opening of bank accounts 
does not just reallocate financial transactions to the formal sector but also has real 
welfare impacts’ (World Bank, 2008). Consumption smoothing refers to the ability 
to draw on savings or borrow in times of uncertainty caused by, for example, job 
loss, death or illness, or to purchase basic survival items and services (World Bank, 
2001, 2009b). 
The neoliberal assumption driving the financial inclusion agenda is that the 
extension of commercialised credit to poorer segments of the population will create 
‘responsible’, individualised and rational market citizens. The poor will learn to 
save and make regular and timely repayments on their debt. Fostering this 
entrepreneurial spirit among the unbanked allows profitable banking markets to 
thrive alongside growing consumption in durable and non-durable goods. This, 
in turn, helps to stimulate the economy and lead to growth from which everyone 
will benefit – at least in theory (World Bank, 2009).14 It follows from this position 
that providing inclusive financial access is a logical, market-based strategy for ensuring 
the poor can lift themselves out of poverty (World Bank, 2004a, 2007a). The point 
also remains that by labelling the poor ‘unbanked’ debtfarism relegates the surplus 
population, and the causes of poverty, to the realm of exchange (Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion, 2013). Seen from this angle, the rhetoric of debtfarism and its 
202 Debtfarism and the poverty industry in Mexico 
emphasis on the realm of exchange, serves to facilitate the expansion of commercialised 
MFIs by erasing the links between the root causes of poverty and the power relations 
in capital accumulation. 
The debtfarist rhetoric of financial inclusion also serves to homogenise and 
dehumanise the surplus population. According to a World Bank (2008) study entitled 
Who Are the Unbanked?, 60 percent of the unbanked in Mexico belong to a 
‘marginalised’ group, since they work in the informal sector. However, the source 
of this marginalisation is erased by relocating the poor to the realm of exchange; 
that is, as the ‘unbanked’ or the ‘financially excluded’,15 which masks the historical 
forms of structural violence with which workers have to contend under neoliberal­
led accumulation (Hellman, 1988; Francois, 2006; Cypher and Delgado Wise, 2010; 
Morton, 2011; Marois, 2012). The surplus population is represented as a static group 
of poor people, who lack either proper financial education and/or an entrepre­
neurial spirit to overcome impoverishment. This point can best be illustrated by 
the manner in which financial inclusion represents gender. 
According to the World Bank (2006), 80.9 percent of females in Mexico remain 
unbanked and three-quarters of these unbanked households have children or 
economic dependents. The underlying causes of their destitution cannot be 
explained away by lack of access to expensive forms of privately created money. 
Worse still is the fact that women are objectified and dehumanised in the financial 
inclusion rhetoric. In the microfinance industry, women are represented as relatively 
less risky investment choices because of innate gendered characteristics, such as 
the responsibility to nurture and work harder (Grupo Compartamos, 2012). By 
emphasising and thus reproducing, these constructed biological and social attributes 
of gender, the historical context of structural violence and the relations of power 
inherent to capital accumulation in Mexico – the factors that compel women to 
turn to high-priced credit to attempt to nourish, clothe, house and educate their 
families – are erased from the analysis (cf. Mohanty, 1995; Dogra, 2012). Another 
invisible feature of the monetised, as opposed to personalised, relations between 
women of the surplus population and creditors are the coercive tactics employed 
by MFIs (e.g., group pressure, forced savings) designed to ensure that women meet 
their loan payments (Rankin, 2001; Roberts and Soederberg, 2012; Kumar, 2013). 
I pick this theme up again later in the chapter. 
For now, it is important to stress that by masking the connection between the 
surplus population and the processes of capital accumulation, the fundamental causes 
of the making and remaking of marginalisation in Mexico are expunged from 
the dominant financial inclusion rhetoric. Aside from naturalising poverty, the 
rebranding of the surplus population into the unbanked population in the realm 
of exchange also facilitates the proposed solution: financial inclusion. This strategy, 
as discussed in the previous chapters, implies that the removal of barriers to the 
realm of exchange ensures not only that all individuals are active market participants 
(savers and consumers), but also that these individuals, regardless of considerations 
of place, race, class and gender, are on equal footing (level playing field) (World 
Bank, 2005a). This neoliberal representation of the surplus population as economic 
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actors devoid of context with respect to the material basis of power, history and 
inequality is starkly evident in Table 8.2.16 
The typology of the poor prevalent in microfinance lending erases any trace of 
class-based power, inequality and exploitation from the representation of the realm 
of exchange that the poor are beckoned to join. The fact that the historically 
unfolding social structures of neoliberal-led capitalism have been removed from 
TABLE 8.2 Rebranding surplus labour as unbanked: an illustration of a typology of 
poverty in Mexico (in US $) 
Type of 
livelihood 




$12/day $15/day $10/day $4–10/day 
income 
Income Fixed income Variable amount Variable Variable 




























































































Source: CGAP (2012a) ‘A Structured Approach to Understanding the Financial Service Needs of the 
Poor in Mexico’. Washington, DC: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), p. 3. 
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any discussion of poverty and its alleviation in the wider financial inclusion rhetoric 
has meant that the working poor in Mexico are often given no choice but to rely 
on private forms of money to meet basic subsistence needs. This is never 
problematised. As such, the inability or unwillingness of the marginalised (surplus 
population) to join the financial in order to overcome poverty is viewed as an 
individual weakness. 
Opening and legitimising spaces of dispossession in the 
informal economy 
In 2001, the Mexican state introduced a series of banking and financial sector reforms 
aimed at improving transparency to attract more investors. These included the 
Securities Market Law and the Mutual Funds Law (World Bank, 2005a). Against 
this backdrop, the state implemented the Popular Savings and Credit Act in 2001 
(hereafter: 2001 Law) (World Bank, 2004a). The 2001 Law provides for the 
continuing integration of all non-bank savings and credit institutions into a new 
legal and regulatory agenda that aims ‘to massively scale-up access to financial services 
for poor and marginalised people’ (World Bank, 2004a: 6). At the time, this 
amounted to half of the Mexican population. 
Two points are worth highlighting with regard to the 2001 Law. First, one of 
its main aims was to protect the interests of the public (World Bank, 2005a). The 
protection offered by the debtfare state was in the form of consumer protection, 
which, as we discussed in Chapter 7, is couched in soft law. Second, the 2001 
Law did not include commercialised MFIs. A 2010 report issued by the National 
Banking and Securities Commission notes that ‘In Mexico there are no accounting 
records to identify and separate microcredit portfolio from commercial use; the 
definition of microcredit was recently established in regulation of savings and loans 
in January 2008’ (CNBV, 2010: 3). The regulatory institution goes on to suggest 
that outstanding issues that remain in the for-profit microfinance industry are, for 
instance, the need for transparency and credit bureaus and developing best practices 
for giving ‘proper credit’ (CNBV, 2010: 9). 
To undergird the capitalist expansion of credit-led accumulation into the spaces 
of informality, as well as to strengthen the rhetoric of financial inclusion through 
for-profit MFIs, the Mexican debtfare state passed various legal reforms for financial 
services consumers under the rubric of consumer protection. In 1992, for instance, 
the state issued the Law for the Protection and Defence of Financial Services 
Users (hereafter: 1992 Law), which was the precursor to the 2007 Transparency 
Law discussed in Chapter 7. To support the 1992 Law, the Mexican state created 
a de-centralised body with a legal personality: the National Commission for the 
Defense of Financial Services Users, or CONDUSEF. 17 As noted in Chapter 7, 
CONDUSEF was mandated with promoting, advising, protecting and defending 
the rights of individuals who use financial products or buy financial services. 
The 1992 Law was considered by many observers to be a significant advance 
for financial services consumer protection in Mexico, as it established that the 
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rights granted by the act are itself are inalienable (IMF, 2012b). However and 
keeping with the soft law framings for market actors, financial institutions operat­
ing in Mexico are not obliged to abide by CONDUSEF’s recommendations 
(Diaz, 2009). As such and despite the significance accorded to the 1992 Law and 
CONDUSEF, the commission only began functioning seven years later in 1999. 
Since that time, both the conciliatory and dispute resolution functions are still 
de facto ineffective. In the same year the 2007 Transparency Act was decreed, the 
commission solved 29 percent of the conciliation reports. During this same year, 
only three cases were brought to arbitration (CNBV, 2010). As with the case of 
the United States, consumer protection in Mexico is premised on the state’s 
unwillingness to limit predatory lending, that is, the impose a ceiling on interest 
rates (Raccanello and Romero, 2011). 
In addition to the above weaknesses regarding consumer protection, there are 
at least two further regulative gaps pertaining to bankruptcy protection and debt 
collection – both of which reveal the class-based power of the microfinance indus­
try. Mexico’s insolvency system for debtors is still governed by a legal framework 
forged in the nineteenth century, which is based on liquidation-without-discharge 
and fundamentally provides no incentive for distressed debtors to seek a safe haven 
in the bankruptcy courts (World Bank, 2012b). An update to the insolvency law 
in 2000 (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles) was applied to a total of just 305 insolvency 
cases out of 906 insolvency filings over a two-year period. The law was found 
to be ‘so inadequate that in the vast majority of instances, debtors and creditors 
strive to avoid having to involve themselves with it and settle out of court instead’ 
(‘Mexican Law Firm Calls for Creditor Protection’, World Finance, 1 November 
2013). 
The absence of a ‘fresh start’ mechanism in Mexico’s bankruptcy system parallels 
the draconian revisions of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection 
Act (BAPCPA) (see Chapter 4; Coco, 2012). Mirroring the BAPCPA, the Mexican 
bankruptcy system also encourages debtors to stay out of bankruptcy, thereby leaving 
them exposed to the disciplinary features of the market and, in the case of group 
lending, the debtor’s (monetised) community (Rankin, 2001; Taylor, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the Mexican Consumer Protection Law and CONDUSEF, the 
Mexican state has also failed to implement any comprehensive regulation with regard 
to debt collectors. According to a report issued by the Association of Credit and 
Collection Professionals, while debt collection costs can be charged to debtors in 
Mexico, there is no limit placed on these costs, although payment of the collection 
costs are enforced by the state (ACA International, 2010). More importantly, the 
absence of legal oversight of debt collection implies no protection from coercive 
tactics pursued by creditors to collect monies owed. The power of creditors 
(capitalists) over debtors (surplus labour) is clearly visible in these gaps in the 
consumer protection laws. 
One year after the abovementioned 1992 Law was enacted, the Mexican state 
pursued a two-fold strategy. In the wider context of NAFTA negotiations and the 
need for American and Canadian financial institutions to expand into lending 
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activities in Mexico, the state reformed the Law of Credit Institutions to create 
Limited Purpose Financial Companies, or SOFOLS, in 1993.18 On the other hand, 
the creation of SOFOLS was seen by the Mexican state as a way to create financing 
for more low-income workers, who were neglected by mainstream commercial 
banks (World Bank, 2006). SOFOLS, which mostly finance the purchase of 
consumer durables, especially automobiles, may only provide credit services to one 
sector of the economy, such as personal loans, home mortgages, construction 
financing, corporate financing and loans for small and medium sized enterprises 
(World Bank, 2007b). As I discuss in following chapter, SOFOLS played a key 
role in the securitisation of housing finance in the 2000s. Compartamos and 
Financiera Independencia both began the ascent to Wall Street by transforming a 
non-profit organisation into a SOFOL in 2000 (CGAP, 2007a). 
In addition to these regulations, the Mexican debtfare state has also sought to 
expand and ‘modernise’ (read: marketise) what is referred to as the ‘social financial 
sector’, that is, co-operatives and credit unions (World Bank, 2006). In 2008, for 
example, the Mexican government passed a Credit Union Law that would expand 
activities of credit unions and bring them in line with international governance 
standards. Some of the revisions pertinent to our discussion include the removal 
of restrictions on foreign investment, limiting the membership of credit unions to 
parties engaged in business and allowing credit unions to acquire shares in com ­
panies (with the commission’s prior authorisation) (International Law Office, 
2008). Aside from rhetorical insistence on good corporate governance practices 
and transparency, there remains a lack of effective consumer protection schemes. 
This section has demonstrated that the rhetorical and regulative roles of Mexican 
debtfarism served to normalise the commercialisation MFIs as a poverty alleviation 
strategy for the surplus population, as well as facilitate the expansion of for-profit 
micro-financing lending in Mexico. The next section examines how this framing 
has facilitated the expansion and concentration of power and wealth in the 
microfinance industry as well as how this phenomenon has assisted in the social 
reproduction of Mexico’s surplus population. 
The microfinance industry: the expansion of monetised 
power and the social reproduction of surplus workers 
Compartamos 
Since 2000, for-profit MFIs in Mexico have experienced strong growth, as millions 
of (primarily) Mexican women who live in spaces of informality have attempted 
to gain more economic security for themselves and their families by becoming 
small-scale entrepreneurs (Bateman, 2010; Harper, 2011). A key player in this area 
of lending for the purpose of establishing micro-enterprises has been Compartamos 
Banco (translated as, Let’s Share Bank), currently one of the most lucrative MFIs 
in the world and the largest micro-finance lender in Latin America. Operating in 
Mexico, Guatemala and Peru, Compartamos Banco has been registering annualised 
Debtfarism and the microfinance industry 207 
returns of around 43 percent since its transformation into a publicly listed 
corporation in 2007 (Rodriguez and Huerga, 2012). Compartamos began in 1982 
as a youth organisation (Gente Nueva) aimed at improving the quality of life of 
marginalised peoples. Since this time, Compartamos expanded its operations 
throughout Mexico while maintaining its lucrative status. Against the backdrop of 
the push for commercialising MFIs in the 1990s, Compartamos transformed itself 
into a SOFOL to ensure a pool of loans from commercial investors so as to expand 
more rapidly (CGAP, 2007a).19 
As I noted at the start of this chapter, Compartamos completed a landmark initial 
public offering (IPO) of its stock in 2007, thereby becoming the first MFI to 
transform itself into a publicly held corporation. The IPO has been a huge success 
and has generated high returns for shareholders. Compartamos has been dubbed 
‘one of Mexico’s most financially successful banks, providing investors with an 
average annual return on equity of 53 percent from 2000 to 2007’ (‘Compartamos: 
from nonprofit to profit’, Businessweek, 13 December 2007; Rodriguez and Huerga, 
2012). In contrast with the mainstream narratives that the IPO was a natural 
phenomenon of the self-regulating market, Compartamos’s IPO would not have 
been possible were it not for the lax regulatory and rhetorical framings provided 
by debtfarism.20 The IPO was further enabled and legitimated by corporate 
welfarist strategies of global development agencies. The IPO would have not been 
possible, for instance, if key development agencies such as Accion International 
and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, did not provide the 
financial and reputational backing for this move.21 
A key reason for this financial success has been the extremely high interests 
charged by Compartamos. According to its website, the Bank’s effective interest 
rate was 105 percent in 2007; the 2011 rate is estimated, depending on how one 
computes the interest, to be around 195 percent (Roodman, 2011). To put this 
interest rate in perspective, in Andhra Pradesh, the Indian state that has recently 
experienced a crisis of farmer suicides that have been linked, among other things, 
to high rates of indebtedness, the rate of interest was around 30 APR. The interest 
rates offered by Compartamos are well above this rate, e.g., 100 percent (CGAP, 
2007a; Roodman, 2011; Taylor, 2011). Owing to the dominance of Compartamos, 
interest rates in the microfinance industry are believed to average 81 APR in Mexico 
(Bateman, 2010). To put these APRs into an even wider comparative context, 
the US payday lending industry has registered APRs ranging from 364 percent to 
550 percent (see Chapter 6). In raising this observation, I am not suggesting that 
the high APRs in Mexico are insignificant. Instead, I wish to draw attention 
to the fact that even-higher interest rates on small consumer loans are realisable 
and normalised in a ‘developed’ country such as the United States. This does not 
bode well, given that payday lending is becoming a major growth phenomenon 
in the microfinance industry in Mexico (Euromonitor International, 2013). 
As with most MFIs, Compartamos ensures repayment primarily through peer 
pressure mechanisms, ensuring that the bank is repaid, even if the small groups of 
mostly women clients have to make up the difference when a member is unable 
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to meet her payment (Bateman, 2010; Taylor, 2011). Behind the dehistoricised 
and depoliticised claims that its clients ‘are agents of change who are building a 
better country and world’, Compartamos engages in secondary forms of exploitation 
that have made handsome dividends for shareholders (Roodman, 2011). There is 
a less visible and more coercive side to the community of money to which 
Compartamos belongs than that which it wishes to present to potential investors, 
borrowers and critics. Take, for example, Crédito Mujer (‘Women’s Credit’). This 
women’s borrowing collective is not, as the rhetoric of Compartamos suggests, a 
cohesive group of agents of change. Under the pressures of debtfarism, surplus female 
workers must meet payments on a timely basis while desperately trying to cover 
basic subsistence needs. Women who fail to meet regular payments (so-called 
‘dropouts’) are punished by the group and pushed further to the margins of their 
communities (Harper, 2011; Rankin, 2001, 2013). 
Credit cards for surplus labour in the new millennium 
Historically, major commercial banks in Mexico have not been interested in 
servicing the consumption needs of the surplus population through consumer credit 
loans. This began to change in the 2000s when a wave of for-profit banks began 
to arrive on the lending scene. As was the case with Compartamos and MFIs more 
generally, the debtfare state played a key role in facilitating the growth and high 
levels of income-generation in the retail-banking sector. This is readily observable 
with the case of credit cards in Mexico. 
Although credit cards have been the fastest growing component of the financial 
system since 2000, representing 51 percent of consumer banking loans (World Bank, 
2005a), the average per capita of credit cards circulating in Mexico in 2009 (0.6 
cards per person) was nearly three times lower than the Latin American average 
(1.5 cards per person) (Franco, 2010). Visa-branded cards, which represent about 
75 percent of total credit, dominate both the credit card market and ATM (debit) 
card market in Mexico (World Bank, 2005a). One consequence of this market 
domination is that Visa and MasterCard have effectively restricted entry into the 
credit card market. Assisted by the Mexican debtfare state, these card companies 
have influenced certain regulations such as ensuring that non-banks, such as 
retailers, cannot issue credit cards (World Bank, 2005a). An immediate result of 
this market control is that the annual interest rates of bank-based credit cards are 
high. In 2002, for example, the average rate was 39 APR, whereas at the start of 
2011 the average rate was 30.1 APR in Mexico (‘Mexico, interest rate record 
holder’, Mexican Business Web, 8 September 2011). 
Mexican banks have begun issuing credit cards, traditionally issued only to the 
most solvent consumers, to a much wider segment of the population, including 
surplus workers. According to a World Bank report, in the early to mid-2000s, 
card companies were aiming to serve Mexicans earning $180 to $550 per month 
(World Bank, 2005a). Given the power structures of the credit card industry in 
Mexico, credit cards for the poor are offered through different channels. Instead 
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of the traditional commercial bank lender, retail lenders, such as Banco Walmart 
are now issuing a wide-range of credit cards to less solvent customers. I discuss the 
case of Banco Walmart below. For now, it is useful to explore briefly the growing 
integration between so-called fringe banking (commercial MFIs) and mainstream 
banking in Mexico – a phenomenon that is also evident in the poverty industry 
of the United States, as discussed in Part II of this book. 
Banamex, Mexico’s second-largest bank and a wholly owned unit of Citigroup, 
also forayed into the poverty industry by acquiring the MFI Crédito Familiar 
(Family Credit) in 2007. Crédito Familiar was established in 1996 to service 
working-class families. As of 2012, it includes 246 branches and serves 145,000 
customers with an average loan size of just over $1,500 (‘Scotiabank closes 
acquisitions of Credito Familiar’, Canada Newswire 3 December 2012). According 
to data provided by the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV), 
Banamex’s strategy of targeting what it estimates to be 112 million unbanked 
Mexicans (or about 55 to 65 percent of the country’s population) has seen its 
outstanding loans increase by 22 percent over the 2011–2012 period (‘Citigroup’s 
Banamex sees outstanding loan growth in 2012’, Bloomberg, 23 March 2013). 
In 2012, Banamex’s Crédito Familiar program was acquired by a Canadian bank, 
Scotiabank. In its efforts to expand to the lucrative microfinance industry, not only 
in Mexico but also throughout Latin America (particularly Peru, Chile, Colombia, 
Jamaica, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic), Scotiabank stated that it could 
‘easily see a 15 to 20 percent compounded annual growth rate in the [base of the 
pyramid] segment’, which it views as ‘a source of future retail customers for us 
and a profitable business’ (‘Scotiabank to increase Small Loans in Mexico’, 
Bloomberg, 18 January 2013). 
The potential for reaping high-yielding interest from the surplus population has 
not been lost on retailers operating in Mexico. To overcome restrictions regarding 
the ability of non-bank entities to issue credit cards, retailers (e.g. Walmart) simply 
created banks. I discuss this more fully in the next section. Suffice it to say here 
that department stores such as Grupo Elektra and Walmart account for the largest 
source of credit for unbanked Mexicans (48.6 percent), which is considerable when 
compared to other sources of credit, such as friends (8.6 percent), credit unions 
(1.4 percent) and non-governmental organ isations (1.4 percent) (World Bank, 2006). 
With the assistance of debtfarist interventions, large retailers have been able to 
transform and extend their credit operations by establishing themselves as banks 
and charging interest rates that far exceed the high levels of their chartered 
counterparts. In what follows, we explore the cases of Banco Azteca (a subsidiary 
of Grupo Elektra) and Banco Walmart. 
Retail banking for the poor: the cases of Banco Azteca and 
Banco Walmart 
In 2002, Banco Azteca opened over 800 locations focusing on low-income clients. 
Banco Azteca, like its parent, Grupo Elektra, Latin America’s largest electronics 
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and home appliance chain, enjoys the same ubiquitous presence and thus scale, 
that Walmart enjoys in Mexico. Similar to Walmart, Banco Azteca targets lower-
income Mexicans, who account for around over 70 percent of total households 
earning between $5,100 and $33,600 per year and who form part of the informal 
economy. This group also includes small, informal businesses that lack the 
documentation necessary for obtaining bank loans (World Bank, 2009a). Drawing 
on Grupo Elektra’s experience in making small instalment loans for its merchandise 
as well as its information and collection technologies, Banco Azteca charges annual 
percentage rates (APRs) ranging from 86 percent to over 100 percent. The bank 
operates on the same ethos of high-pressure employee quotas and incentives as its 
parent company, Grupo Elektra, particularly when it comes to convincing 
customers to spread payments over the longest possible period, i.e., 104 weeks. In 
2012, Grupo Elektra’s billionaire owner, Ricardo Salinas Pliego, acquired the largest 
payday lender in the United States, Advance America, which, as we saw in 
Chapter 6, charges the US surplus population much higher APRs than Banco Azteca 
(‘Mexican billionaire buys advance America, largest payday lender in US’, Forbes, 
23 April 2012). This move not only reveals the continual trend toward the 
concentration of wealth in the poverty industry, but also the global dimensions of 
debtfarism and credit-led accumulation. 
Banco Azteca has proven to be a lucrative venture, evident in its 22.3 percent 
return on shareholder equity (‘The ugly side of micro-lending’, BusinessWeek, 
13 December 2007). In the absence of any meaningful regulation of debt collec ­
tion by creditors, the well-organised and highly coercive features of Azteca’s 
operations, including 3,000 loan officers and collection agents ( jefes de crédito y 
cobranza) has proven highly effective in recouping delinquent payments. The 
World Bank, which has supported the initiatives of Azteca and similar organisations, 
has suggested that ‘access to credit and savings of low income households has a 
significant impact on the labour market and income levels’ in Mexico. At the same 
time, the World Bank also finds that while income levels for men and women 
increased, they did not improve enough to raise them completely out of poverty 
(World Bank, 2009a: 2). It is not too difficult to grasp that the surplus population, 
who, for the most part, neither earn living wages nor are entitled to social benefits 
(e.g., old age pensions, health care and so forth), have little expendable income 
after paying for basic subsistence needs to save.22 
In the absence of effective consumer protection laws, particularly with regard 
to personal bankruptcy and collection agencies, the Mexican debtfare state has 
facilitated both the coercive and disciplinary techniques used by financial institutions 
like Azteca. With the assistance of its jefes de crédito y cobranza customers who fail 
to meet a payment are dispossessed of their basic and often shared familial, 
possessions in order to cover their debt. Due to its coercive debt-collection 
practices and its equally unregulated accounting practices, Banco Azteca claims a 
default rate on consumer loans of just one percent compared with banks serving 
more affluent clients, which average a 5.3 percent default rate (‘The ugly side of 
micro-lending’, Businessweek, 13 December 2007). In its efforts to ensure that as 
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many unbanked Mexicans as possible are integrated into the web of credit relations, 
the debtfare state has also facilitated Azteca’s ongoing dispossession strategies by 
granting the company exception status with regard to disclosure laws, which require 
banks to inform their customers of the total financing costs being charged. When 
Banco Azteca’s average lending rate is translated into an Annual Percentage Rate 
(APR), used in countries like the United States, it amounts to 110 APR, double 
Azteca’s claim of 55 APR. The primary reason for this is that Azteca charges interest 
on the entire amount borrowed throughout the life of the loan, not on the declining 
balance, as is common practice in the US (‘Mexico toughens consumer credit rules 
for banks’, Reuters, 9 December 2008; CNBV, 2010). 
In November 2006, the Mexican debtfare state approved Walmart’s Mexican 
subsidiary to operate a bank. Tellingly, Walmart failed to secure banking privileges 
in the United States, where banking and retail are still separated (Gelpern, 2007). 
The rhetorical justification behind the Mexican state’s approval of the creation of 
Banco Walmart was to increase competition in the concentrated banking sector, 
to help reach the three-quarters of the surplus population and eventually to aid in 
lowering the cost of consumer borrowing. Walmart is Mexico’s largest retail chain 
with over 997 locations, which include super centres, food and clothing stores and 
restaurants. Lowering the costs of credit is not, however, something Banco Walmart 
has been striving to achieve, with its credit cards hovering around 94.3 APR. 
Banco Walmart is taking full advantage of a market where annual interest 
rates often exceed 100 percent. For example, a low-income Mexican worker 
can obtain a $1,100 Whirlpool refrigerator for 104 weekly payments of $23, which 
more than doubles the cost to $2,392. Banco Walmart is a highly profitable venture, 
which offers customers their first-ever savings accounts, credit cards (Super Crédito 
credit card) and microfinancing (supplier development through its Credimpulsa 
programme) (‘Walmart banks on the “unbanked”’, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 13 
December 2007). In 2011, Banco Walmart celebrated opening its 1 millionth 
account and announced its plans to open 62 new branches, which represents an 
increase of 24 percent over 2010. The primary aim of Walmart, aside from 
generating revenue through its high interest rate policy, is to eventually become 
a key source of credit for low-income Mexicans, so that they can buy Walmart 
products (‘Walmart’s Mexico bank aims at first-time savers’, Reuters, 18 June 2010). 
The Mexican debtfare state reinforced these efforts by altering banking regulations 
to allow authorised retailers to use their cash registers as virtual bank branches, so 
that customers can make deposits and withdrawals from their accounts (Mas and 
Almazán, 2011). 
Sofomes 
The last example of for-profit actors in the microfinance industry that we will attend 
to in this chapter is the Multiple Purpose Financial Companies (Sociedad Financiera 
de Objeto Mutiple, or SOFOMES). SOFOMES are completely unregulated (CNBV, 
2010). They were created by the debtfare state in 2006 in order to facilitate the 
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expansion of SOFOLS and increase lending to the surplus population. In contrast 
to SOFOLS, SOFOMES are permitted to provide financing – for example, direct 
loans, financial leasing, or factoring – to more than one economic sector, e.g., 
mortgages and car loans (World Bank, 2012c). The Mexican debtfare state ensured 
that SOFOMES would be free from virtually all governmental regulation and 
oversight, unless a minimum of 20 percent of their stock is owned by a regulated, 
commercial bank.23 As an added perk, SOFOMES have no limitations on foreign 
ownership. While SOFOMES may not accept deposits or provide saving services, 
they can receive funds through capital market transactions, government funds, self-
financing (e.g., asset-backed securitisation) and lines of credit from development 
or private banks. 
It is little wonder that since the mid-2000s, major financial institutions have 
been attracted to the high interest on MFIs. Hedge funds, venture capital firms 
and other big players such as pension funds are jostling to get in on the action. 
According to Scott Budde, a managing director at the US pension colossus, TIAA­
CREF, which aims to invest $100 million in micro-financing, MFIs are ‘not a 
charitable activity [. . .] We’re looking to produce competitive returns’ (‘Micro ­
finance draws mega players’, Businessweek, 9 July 2007). As of 2011, the number 
of unregulated SOFOMES officially registered with the CONDUSEF was 2,843, 
compared with 1,622 in 2010 (Banco de México, 2011). 
In what follows, I briefly examine two unregulated SOFOMES: Financiera 
Independencia24 and Crédito Real.25 Both institutions lend to the low-income 
segment of the population, targeting primarily individuals in the adult working 
population who earn a household monthly income between $230 and $1,000). 
According to a US-based institutional investor, this represents 66.2 percent of the 
approximately 21.9 million Mexican households (BCP Securities, 2010). Founded 
as a SOFOL in 1993, Financiera Independencia provided loans to surplus workers 
in Mexico, drawing its financing primarily from state funds and international 
donors. It expanded rapidly in the 2000s. The banking behemoth, HSBC, acquired 
20 percent of Financiera’s shares only to resell 18.68 percent for $145 million to 
JP Morgan in 2008 (‘HSBC sells 18.68 percent stake in Financiera Independencia 
for $145 million’, Wall Street Journal, 19 September 2008). As with Compartamos, 
Financiera Independencia sold 20 percent of its shares in an initial public offering 
(IPO) in 2007. Since its IPO, Financiera Independencia has been one of the most 
lucrative and largest MFIs in Latin America (Multilateral Investment Fund, 2012). 
In February 2010, Financiera Independencia acquired the second-largest 
microfinance institution in Mexico after Compartamos, Financiera Finsol, thereby 
further concentrating power in the for-profit microfinance industry (BCP 
Securities, 2010). 
Crédito Real is a privately held SOFOM, which is owned by Nexxus Capital 
and three powerful Mexican families, who also control Mabe, a Mexican-based 
conglomerate that designs, produces and distributes appliances.26 Crédito Real is 
a leading payroll lending (the Mexican version of payday lending27), durable goods 
financing and micro-credit finance company, targeting the low- and middle-income 
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segments of the population. The company offers various forms of direct and indirect 
financing in amounts ranging from $250 to $2,500. Payroll lending accounts for 
79 percent of Crédito Real’s total loan portfolio. Originated by independent 
distributors, these loans are not made to the poorest segments of the surplus 
population, but rather to low-income workers in the formal economy (BCP 
Securities, 2010). The rapid rise of payroll loans – a type of payday loan – has 
alarmed the Mexican state and investors alike, as loans are believed to be growing 
at a faster rate than the number of borrowers, which signals an increasing rate of 
indebtedness and a corresponding rise in the likelihood of delinquencies and defaults 
(EuroMonitor International, 2013: 1). In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a 
worrying and unusual trend identified by the Banco de México is compounding 
this issue: private capital inflows have been increasing since 2010 in the area of 
non-bank lending, that is, financial institutions not considered full-scale banks, which 
are authorised to engage in other lending services, such as the above discussed MFIs 
(Banco de México, 2013). 
These concerns have prompted discussions and debates about the need to 
regulate the SOFOMES, given that these entities raise funds in the capital 
markets and, therefore, present systemic risk (Castañeda et al., 2011). In 2013, the 
Mexican debtfare state sought to bring the unregulated SOFOMES within the wider 
regulatory regime of other SOFOMES, if they have economic ties with popular 
savings and credit cooperatives as well as savings and loans entities. According 
to the International Financial Law Review (IFLR), the reforms would also 
benefit commercial banks, as it will reduce competition from 3,000 unregulated 
SOFOMES (‘Exclusive: Mexico’s imminent financial overhaul dissected’, IFLR, 
8 May 2013). Regardless of these proposed reforms regarding the SOFOMES, it 
must be kept in mind that in the neoliberal era, these new regulations continue 
to be characterised largely by soft law and voluntary regulation. It should come as 
no surprise that SOFOMES have continued to increase in number and lending 
capacity up until the time of this writing (‘Número de sofomes crece en el 2013’, 
El Economista, 29 May 2013). 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter had two primary aims. The first objective was to draw connections 
between, on the one hand, the global debtfarism pursued by international 
development institutions such as the World Bank and G20 (Chapter 7) in the name 
of financial inclusion and the historical specifics of debtfarism in Mexico, on the 
other. To this end, I discussed ways in which this form of state intervention has 
facilitated the expansions and deepening of the micro-finance industry vis-à-vis 
the surplus population. The second and related objective of this chapter was to 
deconstruct key features of the Mexican microfinance industry and reveal its inherent 
relations of power and paradoxes. To accomplish this second goal, I contextualised 
historically the microfinance industry within the wider dynamics of capital 
accumulation. This analytical step allowed me to reveal and explain how and why 
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the silent compulsions and structural violence inherent to the dynamics of credit-
led accumulation have led to the dependency of the surplus population on privately 
created money as it relates to microfinance in Mexico. In doing so, I suggested 
that the constructed reliance on and relations of power involved in, high-priced 
microfinance loans – from which the key commericialised MFIs such as Banco 
Walmart, Banco Azteca, Compartamos and SOFOMES greatly benefit – is masked 
by the seemingly apolitical and democratic appeal of financial inclusion. 
Aside from the legal and extra-legal powers of the Mexican debtfare state, the 
power of this appeal to deflect criticism lies in financial inclusion lies in the 
revolutionary power of money itself: the masking of the exploitative and unequal 
relations in the wider illusions of a community of money. Another source of this 
power lies in the ability of debtfare states to continually frame financial inclusion 
in the realm of exchange. Drawing on a historical materialist approach that allowed 
us to move beyond the realm of exchange and thus grasp the social power of money 
as well as the rhetorical and regulative roles of the Mexican debtfare state, this 
chapter sought to interrupt and deconstruct the economic fictions that the 
microfinance industry alleviates poverty exemplifies how states and capitalists work 
hand-in-glove to dehistoricise, individualise, depoliticise and normalise the site 
where poverty alleviation is believed to occur, namely: the market (Bourdieu, 2005; 
cf. World Bank, 2013b). 
In the next and final chapter, I explore how capitalists and the Mexican debtfare 
state have drawn on the social power of money to promote the expansion and 
reproduction of another key facet of the poverty industry: financing for low-income 
housing. 
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DEBTFARISM AND THE 
HOUSING INDUSTRY 
The right to adequate housing and shelter has long been recognised by states through 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many national constitutions, 
including Mexico.1 Despite these protections under the rule of law, adequate housing 
continues to be out of reach for about 1 billion people in the global South (UN­
HABITAT, 2010b). According to the dictates of neoliberalism, which has guided 
global development since the early 1980s, the only effective way to deal with the 
housing shortfall is by providing the poor with efficient (private) housing finance, 
or what I refer to as the marketisation of housing rights (World Bank, 2009b; 
CIDOC, 2011; Herbert et al., 2012; Charnock et al., 2014). As a UN-HABITAT 
study notes, when properly implemented and executed, market-driven housing 
finance can play an important role in developing lower-cost housing through 
investment in social and affordable housing construction and investment in 
microfinance housing programmes that support progressive, self-help construction 
(UN-HABITAT, 2006, 2010: 2b; cf. Gruffydd Jones, 2012). 
In its efforts to reduce the housing deficit of about 6 million units, the Mexican 
government has turned to mortgage securitisation (Standard and Poor’s, 2006). 
Mortgage securitisation has become a significant feature of housing finance in global 
development as it is seen as a market-based solution to raise new funds for housing, 
while decreasing the risk/gamble for investors (Barry et al., 1994; Jordan, 2008; 
World Bank, 2009c; Sanchez, 2010). Mortgage securitisation – which was also 
employed in the United States to bring subprime borrowers into the housing market 
– describes a type of asset-backed security that transforms illiquid assets, such as 
residential mortgages, into tradeable securities, which are then sold to investors 
(Elul, 2005). Since its first issuance in 2003, mortgage securitisation has been growing 
rapidly in Mexico and represents, at the time of writing, the largest market in Latin 
America (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011). Despite its significance to 
the wider debates on global development, mortgage securitisation in Mexico 
218 Debtfarism and the poverty industry in Mexico 
remains understudied.2 Mortgage securitisation provides a useful window through 
which we can glimpse the capitalist nature of housing finance and, by extension, 
the wider processes of the marketisation of housing rights and the role of the 
Mexican debtfare state therein. 
This final chapter has two overlapping objectives. First, it critically evaluates the 
claims that market-led solutions can provide adequate and affordable homes for the 
poor in Mexico. In so doing, it must be kept in mind that market-based solutions 
are not the only solutions to deal with the housing shortfall for the poor. Alternative 
options might include, for example, public housing and co-operative dwellings. The 
point is that we should strive to politicise and problematise the marketisation of 
housing by grasping it as a preferred ‘fix’ that benefits certain powerful interests 
over other less powerful interests. The neoliberal assertions underpinning the 
marketisation of housing rights, however, cannot be fully assessed and deconstructed 
by remaining within the realm of exchange, where both the housing problem and 
its solution have been formulated. This brings us to the second objective of this 
chapter, which is to historically contextualise and analyse mortgage securitisation 
in the processes of capital accumulation in Mexico and the class relations therein. 
There are two analytical advantages in taking the above perspective. On the 
one hand, stepping outside the realm of exchange reveals another noteworthy reason 
for the lack of adequate housing: the absence of a living wage for a large majority 
of Mexico’s population (Cypher and Delgado Wise, 2010). On the other hand, 
we can begin to deconstruct a commonly held assumption and one championed 
by the financial inclusion paradigm, that credit is a neutral object that is used by 
rational market actors to efficiently deliver a basic social need. Seen from a Marxian 
under standing, this representation of credit is an illusion that is continually 
constructed by the state and capitalists. Housing finance, including mortgage 
securitisation, are not ‘things’ but privately created (credit) money. As I have argued 
in this book, credit money is not an innocuous and neutral object on which actors 
bestow cultural meanings and infuse with power externally. Instead, credit money, 
which lies at the heart of mortgage securitisation, is a social relation of power that 
is employed by capitalists and facilitated by states, to overcome (spatial and 
temporal) barriers to capital accumulation. This is not a one-off solution, however, 
as the credit system is a product of capital’s own endeavours to deal with the internal 
contradictions of capitalism and thus solutions pursued by capitalists end up 
compounding rather than reducing the paradoxes (Harvey, 1999). 
As I attempt to meet the above two goals, I argue that mortgage securitisation 
is a capitalist strategy that has been supported by the rhetorical and regulative roles 
of the Mexican debtfare state. Debtfarism, for instance, plays a central role in housing 
finance by continually naturalising securitisation and facilitating its expansion. 
Mortgage securitisation is an attempt by the debtfare state to resolve, albeit in a 
reactive and contradictory manner, a particular tension inherent to capital accumula­
tion, namely: providing a social basis for the reproduction of the surplus population, 
on the one hand and facilitating the expansion of the poverty industry that has 
been dominated by the housing finance and construction sectors, on the other. 
Debtfarism and the housing industry 219 
Mortgage securitisation and the principle of 
proportionality: benefits and risks/gambles for whom? 
As with the other forms of securitisation discussed in the book, residential mortgage 
securitisation has often been represented as a win-win strategy that allows the seller 
of debt to rapidly recover working capital and then recycle it to issue new loans 
to borrowers. ‘This is how institutions that are not normally interested in the little 
guy’ are making more credit available, generating liquidity through the purchasing 
of securitised mortgages (Emmond, 2005: 36). Mortgage securitisation, as noted 
earlier, has been widely viewed by economic pundits, policymakers and develop ­
ment practitioners as highly beneficial for developing countries, where extreme 
housing shortages continue to exist (World Bank, 2004b). 
As with all asset-backed securities this involves the construction of a pool or 
portfolio of loans used to support the issuance of one or more types of securities 
in secondary mortgage markets (Kothari, 2006). In the case of mortgages, a 
government-sponsored enterprise such as the Mexican Federal Mortgage Company 
(SHF3), places these mortgages in a trust (also known as a special-purpose vehicle) 
and then insures the pool against default. This state-backed guarantee is known as 
a form of credit enhancement in that it makes the securitisation more attractive to 
potential investors, given that the state is backing up the transaction 100 percent 
(Elul, 2005; SHF, 2014). The sale of these securities to institutional investors such 
as pension and equity funds generates cash flow back to the originator of the pool, 
which can then use the funds to create additional loans. 
I problematise this technical understanding of mortgage-backed securitisation 
promoted by the global and Mexican debtfarist rhetoric later in this section. For 
now, it is helpful to highlight at least two alleged benefits of mortgage securitisation. 
First, it is believed to reduce the risk to lenders while increasing the flow of funds 
into the mortgage finance sector. By reducing transaction costs it increases the scope 
of lending to the poor (Pickering, 2000; World Bank, 2009b). This was particu­
larly important in terms of attracting foreign capital inflows to Mexico, especially 
in the wake of the 1994–1995 currency crisis (Barry et al., 1994; Pickering, 
2000; Soederberg, 2004; Jordan, 2008; Marois, 2012). This position mirrors the 
Pro portionality Principle, which readers will recall represents one of the G20 
Principles on Innovative Financial Inclusion discussed in Chapter 7. To recap, the 
Propor tionality Principle assumes and thus reinforces, a central truth in the financial 
inclusion initiative, namely that financial inclusion results in benefits: ‘economic 
growth, efficiency and increased welfare’ – all of which offset and mitigate the 
risks of financial exclusion (CGAP, 2011: 2). 
Second, a well-constructed mortgage securitisation market can offer profitability 
to market participants and allow the low-income population access to formal credit 
to purchase a home and thus avoid further financial marginalisation (World Bank, 
2004c; Arrieta, 2005). Securitisation provides a significant, market-based innovation 
in the resolution between the high cost of housing supply, on the one hand and 
the limited purchasing capacity of the near majority of the population, on the other 
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(Graffam, 2000; World Bank, 2002b). The Financial Stability Board (FSB), which 
is an international organisation that works alongside the G20 to coordinate national 
financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies, has championed the 
development of mortgage securitisation as a ‘fundamental step towards further 
developing housing finance in Mexico and encouraging private sector entry into 
the market’ (Bank for International Settlements, 2010: 29). 
An underlying paradox of the marketisation of housing rights 
The social reality in Mexico clashes with the conventional wisdom about mortgage 
securitisation. Despite the promises that all market participants are believed to benefit 
from the marketisation of housing rights, the following paradox continues to 
underpin the housing sector ensuing the issuance of the first mortgage securitisation 
in 2003. On the one hand, the construction industry and housing finance sectors 
continue to flourish with heavy state support (corporate welfare) that prioritises 
new homes over repairing existing stock and permits private companies to build 
on speculation and finance through mortgages guaranteed by the state (CIDOC, 
2008, 2012; Monkonnen, 2011a). 
On the other hand and despite the state’s rhetorical commitment to housing 
rights for all, a substantial and growing number of low-income Mexicans continue 
to be excluded from accessing formal financing channels in order to obtain 
adequate and affordable housing (UN-HABITAT, 2011). For example, the least 
expensive homes in the urban Mexico market cost $13,000. The ability of lower 
income families to purchase homes on credit barely covers half of those families 
currently in need (UN-HABITAT, 2011: 4). In 2011, for example, 503,000 new 
homes were constructed but only 51 percent of the population was eligible to apply 
for a mortgage (SHF, 2011). On some estimates only 32 percent of Mexicans are 
‘mortgage-eligible’ (UN-HABITAT, 2011). Despite the fact that the number of 
households receiving financing through state efforts has increased from 50,000 in 
2000 to nearly 400,000 in 2010, low-income households have been systematically 
excluded from these opportunities (Herbert et al., 2012: 9). According to the 
Mexican state, the greatest demand for housing in 2012 came from families, who 
earned 3.4 times the minimum wage representing 59.7 percent total demand 
(CIDOC, 2012). 
While other income groups in Mexico have also been bypassed by the 
efficiencies of the market-based housing system, the low-income bracket, which 
is the focus of my investigation here, represents the largest segment of population 
without adequate housing.4 According to a Harvard study, ‘Among the nation’s 
28.5 million occupied housing units in 2010, 17.3 million, or roughly 60 percent, 
were owned without the use of financing’ (Herbert et al., 2012: 10). While some 
of these houses were purchased through savings, the vast majority are informal, 
self-built homes ranging from make-shift housing to homes that families spend, 
on average, up to 10 years constructing (GlobalLens, 2012). Many of these informal 
dwellings are also situated on ‘irregular’ land, e.g., communally owned ejidal land 
Debtfarism and the housing industry 221 
(Herbert et al., 2012; van Gelder, 2013). I touch on the issue of irregular land 
below. It is worth noting here that the upfront costs of acquiring informal housing 
are five to eight times lower than formal housing (SEDESOL, 2009). The Harvard 
study goes on to note that ‘A slight majority of these households without a housing 
loan (9.2 million) earned less than four times the minimum monthly wage’ 
(Herbert et al., 2012: 10). 
There appears to be another paradox inherent to the broader tensions described 
above that helps shed further light on why the construction and housing finance 
sectors have disproportionately benefited from debtfarist policies. Despite the fact 
that 20 million households face a housing shortage, construction of new housing 
has taken precedent over repairing existing homes (CIDOC, 2008, 2011). Over 
the past decade, there has been an increase in unoccupied and temporary-use 
dwellings, which stood at 5 million units in 2010 (CIDOC, 2011). The primary 
reason for abandoning these dwellings is due to the distances of these homes from 
places of employment, schools and family (UN-HABITAT, 2011). Many of the 
new homes have been constructed on urban fringes where land is relatively less 
expensive and can support new housing development for modest-income workers 
and on non-communally owned ejidal land, which is less costly to acquire (Herbert 
et al., 2012). 
Before turning to the central analysis of this chapter, two caveats are in order. 
First, the exclusion of the surplus population from access to formal and affordable 
housing finance is not an exclusively neoliberal phenomenon. What is different in 
the neoliberal era is the turn to market-based solutions, such as mortgage securitisa ­
tion backed heavily by state funding. That said, the dual housing sector, along 
informal and formal lines, is a construct that was reproduced in Mexican capitalism 
well before the advent of neoliberalism in the early 1980s (Ball and Connolly, 1987; 
UN-HABITAT, 2011; cf., Breman, 2012). 
Second, in the context of this chapter, the surplus population refers to those 
families earning zero to four times the minimum wage (MMW), that is, families 
that have been in most need of decent and affordable dwellings, although, as we 
will see, other income brackets have had problems accessing housing finance, too 
(UN-HABITAT, 2011). The zero to four times MMW is generally taken as the 
cut-off for the level of income below which it is difficult to afford a home in the 
formal market (Herbert et al., 2012). The UN-HABITAT, the Mexican state and 
the Inter-American Development Bank use a lower income cut-off for this 
category of workers (i.e., zero to three MMW). It is important to draw attention 
to several aspects of this measure. The minimum wage in Mexico, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, is not only far from a living wage, but also is not adjusted 
to the rate of inflation, which for a country like Mexico, can substantially impact 
purchasing power for the poor. Moreover, families earning within this range are 
primarily based in the informal economy, where they may lack legal and social 
protections (e.g., pension coverage) and are often in precarious positions not only 
in terms of health and safety conditions but also in terms of job certainty (ILO, 
2003). This means that an illness or unexpected external shock to the family 
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household could entail a dramatic decline in the ability to save for a home or to 
meet regular mortgage payments. 
Having said that, the above paradox upon which mortgage securitisation pivots 
compels us to ask not only what the sources of change are regarding the emergence 
of mortgage securitisation but also to investigate the machinations involved in socially 
reproducing large margins of exclusion vis-à-vis formal access to affordable hous­
ing finance. Specific questions that concern us here are not only why housing 
deficiencies have continued to affect a substantial and growing number of poor 
households in Mexico more than a decade after the first mortgage securitisation 
in 2003, but also who benefits from the social reproduction of relatively high-cost 
housing and the limited purchasing capacity of a large segment of the population? 
Transcending the realm of exchange: situating mortgage 
securitisation in the processes of capital accumulation 
The right to housing serves two fundamental purposes for the expansion and repro ­
duction of capital accumulation. First, as has been well documented by economists, 
housing finance and construction represents a crucial driver of national economic 
growth, given its role, for instance, in spurring job creation and consumer spending 
(World Bank, 1993, 2004; UN-HABITAT, 2010b; cf., Bourdieu, 2005).5 Second, 
housing provides a social basis for the reproduction of labour power. Like other 
forms of social expenditures and investments geared toward the same goal, e.g., 
education and health spending, providing workers with housing and shelter is not 
motivated by altruism but rather is directed at co-opting, integrating and repressing 
workers through ideological and coercive means (Harvey, 1989: 65–6). 
Capitalist states often need to make such investments in order to create an 
adequate social basis for further accumulation (Hirsch, 1978; Harvey, 1989). The 
type and amount of money that the state will dedicate to these social expenditures 
are strongly affected by the historical nature of struggle and configuration of power 
within the wider dynamics of capital accumulation (Harvey, 1989: 66). As discussed 
later in the chapter, the Mexican state has historically favoured formal workers 
over informal workers with regard to housing policy. This is because the formal 
workers are relatively more powerful than their informal counterparts. As such, 
the state’s first priority with regard to the development of mortgage securitisation 
was to target lower-income, formal workers through its Housing Provident Funds 
(HPFs). Private mortgage companies, such as SOFOLS, were introduced in the 
early 1990s to deal with the informal surplus population through market-based 
mechanisms. As I demonstrate below, the particular historical formation of power 
in Mexican capitalism has meant that the state has favoured formal, unionised 
workers and has also forged a close and dependent relationship with the construction 
and housing finance sectors. 
Mortgage securitisation is a form of fictitious capital. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
fictitious capital refers to a flow of money not backed by any commodity trans ­
action (Harvey, 1999: 265ff). It is central to the credit system and thus to a deeper 
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understanding of the power relations involved in the construction and 
reconstruction of mortgage securitisation. Fictitious capital is implied whenever 
credit is extended in advance, in anticipation of future labour as a counter-value, 
e.g., government bonds and mortgage securitisation. As a synthetic form of 
money based on future income streams, mortgage securitisation anticipates that 
the worker will be able to earn wages to continue making orderly payments on 
their mortgage. Mortgage securitisation, like all forms of fictitious capital, is thus 
based on a future gamble. 
To interrupt the economistic and rationalised representation of risk securitisation 
in Chapter 7, I problematised the one-dimensional, technical understanding of 
risk by referring to it as a ‘risk/gamble’. Mortgage securitisation is distinct from 
traditional lending in that it uses only financial assets (e.g., mortgages) as collateral 
(Elul, 2005). Mortgage securitisation is thus not based on tangible property; but 
rather on the income stream this property is projected to produce in the future. 
As with the US experience with housing finance, the Mexican state plays a central 
role in backing these promises (e.g., offering ‘credit enhancement’) in secondary 
mortgage markets (Gotham, 2009; Schwartz, 2009). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the creation of fictitious values ahead of actual 
commodity production and realisation is a risky business. The credit system 
becomes both the cutting edge of accumulation and a key feature in dealing 
with the overaccumulation of capital and excess labour, with all the associated 
dangers of such exposure (Harvey, 1999). This becomes evident in our narra­
tive, as fictitious capital play a central role in mediating the manifestation of 
capitalist crises in Mexico from the 1970s to the global financial meltdown of 2008. 
The credit system is thus a product of capital’s own endeavours to deal with the 
internal contradictions of capitalism. What Marx shows us is how capitalism’s 
solution ends up heightening rather than diminishing the contradictions (Harvey, 
1999: 237). 
Mexican debtfarism plays an integral role in smoothing, absorbing and 
depoliticising the contradictions emerging from the credit system and struggles 
therein. The state undertakes this task in a partially contradictory and ex post facto 
manner (see Chapter 7). As a historical social relation rooted in, albeit not 
determined by, the processes of capital accumulation and the power therein, the 
Mexican debtfare state also internalises and is, at times, also constrained by, these 
tensions. A fundamental reason why the state is limited by the above tensions lies 
in the nature of the marketisation of housing rights and its emphasis on solving 
problems in the realm of exchange. Paradoxically, this tends to heighten, as 
opposed to diminish, contradictions. 
Framing the concrete discussion within this abstract lens allows us to see that 
mortgage securitisation has its roots in a wide crisis-restructuring continuum that has 
shaped and been shaped by, the collective nerve centre (i.e., the credit system) and 
the capitalist state, which governs and mediates the tensions therein (Chapter 3). 
This continuum may be understood as an interconnected and ongoing series of 
reconstructions and representations that constitute the contradictory and class-led 
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evolution of neoliberal practice, which pivots on the inability of the credit system 
to reduce the underlying contradictions of capital accumulation (Harvey, 1999). 
Historical materialist understanding of low-income 
housing finance: managing the right to housing in 
the Mexican ‘Miracle’ 
As discussed in Chapter 8, capital accumulation in Mexico has continued to be 
marked by a large relative surplus population. As we will see below, the historical 
integration of the Mexican economy into the world market and the United States 
in particular, has continually relied heavily on the abundance of cheap and well-
disciplined labour as a core feature in luring and maintaining foreign capital flows 
into the country. Reproducing this great mass of underemployed and unemployed 
workers required social expenditures that would co-opt, integrate and repress various 
segments of labour power. With regard to housing, these efforts can be traced to 
Mexico’s Constitution, which states that all private enterprises are obliged to provide 
comfortable and hygienic housing for workers.6 These legal measures were designed 
to protect workers, primarily powerful, unionised workers, in the formal sector. 
Public housing agencies for social housing, which began to emerge in 1925 with 
the rise of industrialisation in Mexico and thus rising levels of urbanisation, also 
reflected the state of class struggle in the country. For instance, the Housing 
Assistance Bank7, which was created in 1943, catered primarily to salaried workers 
employed by the government and therefore did not represent a national housing 
policy (UN-HABITAT, 2011). 
An important facet of the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation that marked 
the so-called Mexican ‘Miracle’ (1940–1970) was the construction industry. Ball 
and Connolly’s study demonstrates that the construction sector, which represented 
one of the largest employers in Mexico during this time, was facilitated by active 
state expenditure on necessary physical structures, such as housing (Ball and 
Connolly, 1987). This employment of fictitious capital by the state also facilitated 
a financial dependence between state funds and the construction industry, which 
has continued to the time of writing. According to Ball and Connolly (1987: 156), 
Public agencies forward substantial advance payments [fictitious capital], which 
virtually cover the entire production costs, before work commences. 
Contractors are thus able to operate with a minimum of capital on their own, 
while dispensing with the need for credit from financial institutions except 
for short-term bridging loans. 
The state’s investment in construction also permitted the social reproduction 
of formal and informal labour, as discussed above. Aside from the role of the state 
in shaping and facilitating the construction industry through its various housing 
policies, two points elaborated on in Ball and Connolly’s study are important for 
our discussion as they not only mark the housing landscape in Mexico to this day, 
but also relate directly to the above paradox underpinning mortgage securitisation. 
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First, the construction industry’s continued reliance on a cheap, passive and almost 
endless pool of construction labour, largely based in the informal sector (Connolly, 
2007). Second and related, housing in Mexico has and continues to be characterised 
by self-construction, or what Mexicans refer to as auto-construcción (the so-called 
do-it-yourself home building business) (Ball and Connolly, 1987). 
Self-construction continues to make up 40 percent of all housing construction 
in Mexico and while some middle-class families engage in this activity, most are 
from the low-income bracket (GlobalLens, 2012; CIDOC, 2012). Self-construction 
dominates both Mexico’s rural areas, where farming no longer yields subsistence 
incomes and ad hoc neighbourhoods around the fringes of Mexico’s cities (colonias 
populares) (Sandoval, 2005; UN-HABITAT, 2011). Owing to its prominence in 
the housing landscape for the poor, it is important to consider the historical roots 
of self-construction, so that we can grasp how and why debtfare state has continued 
to facilitate this practice in the neoliberal era, i.e., within the marketisation of housing 
rights paradigm. 
First and foremost, we need to begin our discussion by recognising that self-
construction has been shaped and facilitated by a particular legal environment in 
Mexico regarding residential housing among the poor. This, in turn, is rooted 
in the particular mode of accumulation and the configuration of power in Mexico 
(Haenn, 2006). Briefly and broadly, Mexico has three basic schemes of land 
owner ship: private property, which accounts for 37 percent of the land and social 
property, which accounts for 53 percent of the land. The remaining 10 percent 
falls into the category of federal land8 (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011). 
Prior to 1992, Mexicans had the right to use social property, largely for subsistence 
farming, but did not have full ownership and could thus not sell the land (Inter-
American Development Bank, 2011). 
The large tracts of social property, much of which are near sprawling urban 
centres, facilitate a common practice among would-be homebuyers in the low-
income brackets: the ‘pay and build as you can’ plan (Monkonnen, 2011a). As Barry 
et al. note, ‘In the informal sector, individuals may merely “invade” a site, occupying 
it illegally and constructing a home on it. A person who occupies a site long enough 
is ultimately granted the right to stay’ (Barry et al., 1994: 187).9 This explains, in 
part, both the high levels of self-construction projects in Mexico and the high level 
of homeownership, which some estimate to be around 80 percent (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2011: 9). Although these homeownership levels are the 
highest in Latin America, the quality of these informal homes is considered below 
the living standards set by the Mexican government (UN-HABITAT, 2011). These 
houses, however shoddily built, are still a form of shelter and in some way help to 
provide the social basis for the reproduction of the surplus population. Thus, the 
Mexican landownership system and its legal framing permitted informal housing 
for the majority of its informal workforce, largely through legal negligence. 
In 1963, the state sought to facilitate the industrialisation process, which also 
involved the rapid urbanisation of the rural population, by creating a second-tier 
development bank, the Fund for Housing Operation and Finance (FOVI). FOVI, 
which would later be replaced by the Mexican Federal Mortgage Company, was 
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designed to provide low-interest mortgage financing to low-income and middle-
income households, i.e., between three and six times the monthly minimum wage 
(Barry et al., 1994). FOVI, with the financial assistance of the central bank (Banco 
de Mexico) and the World Bank, attempted to entice banks to lend to this income 
bracket by providing funds to the commercial banks. FOVI also engaged in risk 
sharing in case of default. Workers did not apply directly to FOVI for funds. Instead, 
builders and developers bid for FOVI funds through an auction process. One effect 
of this plan has been to favour new housing finance, which still shapes the housing 
sector today. FOVI largely failed to encourage commercial banks to lend to the 
poor. Mortgage finance in Mexico continues to be concentrated among a few large, 
foreign-owned, commercial banks that lend primarily to the upper-income brackets 
(World Bank, 2009b; CIDOC, 2011; Herbert et al., 2012). 
In response to the economic turmoil in the late 1960s, the Mexican state 
established two Housing Provident Funds (hereafter: HPFs or Housing Funds) in 
the housing sector in 1972: the Institute of the National Housing Fund for 
Workers (hereafter: INFONAVIT) and the Housing Fund of the Social Security 
and Services Institute for State Workers (hereafter: FOVISSSTE). According to 
labour law, private sector employers must make deposits to their workers’ account 
at INFONAVIT equal to 5 percent of the workers’ wages or salaries (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2011). INFONAVIT holds this payroll deduction as a pension 
fund and uses it to create subsidies for housing loans at below-market interest rates 
for its members. FOVISSSTE operates in a similar manner to INFONAVIT, but 
targets public service workers (World Bank, 2009b). 
The immediate effect of the creation of the HPFs was that government-
sponsored affordable housing excluded informal sector workers from receiving any 
type of assistance (World Bank, 2002b). The HPFs play a major role in residential 
housing markets, ranging from 70 percent market share at the end of 2005 to more 
than 80 percent at end of 2009 – most of which has involved moderate-income 
households (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011). Given their central role 
in the industry, HPFs also facilitated the expansion of the housing market through 
active management of housing development and the issuing of mortgages and 
continued financing of the powerful construction industry (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2011). 
The rise of debtfarism and marketised housing solutions 
Moving toward a market-oriented economy after the 1982 debt crisis, the Mexican 
state tried to walk the fine line between appealing to international investors 
while practising brokerage politics at home by expanding domestic debt through 
government-issued, peso-denominated bonds, or CETES (Mexican Federal 
Treasury Certificates).10 Credit money in the form of fictitious capital allowed the 
state to continue to finance popular and politically necessary, yet debt-financed, 
programmes, such as INFONAVIT. Prior to 2000, for instance, both HPFs 
recorded default rates on mortgage loans in the excessive range of 20 to 40 percent. 
Debtfarism and the housing industry 227 
INFONAVIT paid negative real rates of return on savings during much of 
the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank, 2009). This policy may have temporarily 
appeased some groups, such as powerful unions and the construction industry, 
but it came at the cost of increased inflation and high interest rates to attract 
investment.11 
To placate the social dislocations brought about by the debt crisis and subsequent 
neoliberal restructuring and in an attempt to protect the value of the peso, the 
state nationalised the banking system in 1982 (Marois, 2014). This move allowed 
the state to use, in part, commercial banks as part of their strategy to provide a 
social basis for reproducing labour power with regard to low-income housing policy. 
Commercial banks, for instance, were required to preserve a fixed percentage, 
ranging from 3 to 6 percent, of their outstanding mortgage portfolio in so-called 
‘social interest loans’. These loans, which were partly funded by FOVI, served 
as a second-tier bank, channeling government funding to commercial banks for 
low-income housing finance (Pickering, 2000). The Mexican state continued with 
its brokerage politics regarding housing policy. With the social interest fund in 
place, the government modified, in 1983, Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution 
so that it read that all families have the right to a respectful and dignified home. 
In 1984, the country’s first Federal Housing Law was established to secure this 
constitutional mandate. Given that these housing policies were highly influenced 
by the pressures that were brought about by large unions (formal workers), how ­
ever, the reforms excluded workers in the informal sector (UN-HABITAT, 
2011: 14). 
In 1993, the World Bank released an influential report, Housing: Enabling 
Markets to Work, which would have important ramifications for the housing 
market in Mexico. In the report, the bank suggested that states should play a 
facilitating – as opposed to leading – role in housing finance. As the World 
Bank emphasises (1993:3) ‘Policies which constrain market efficiency and the 
responsiveness of the housing supply system result in reduced investment, hous­
ing which is less affordable and of lower quality and a lower-quality residential 
environment’. Coinciding with the World Bank report and forged under the 
ambit of the NAFTA negotiations in December 1993, the Mexican state sought 
to deal with heightening contradictions in its housing policy by forging a new 
financial intermediary to focus on the mortgage market targeting middle- and 
low-income workers in the informal sector. These private, non-bank mortgage 
finance companies are known by their Spanish acronym as SOFOLS (Sociedades 
Financieras de Objeto Limitado). Ten years after their creation, the SOFOLS would 
issue Mexico’s first securitisation in 2003. It is therefore important to look more 
closely at this market-based mechanism to deal with the housing shortfall for informal 
workers. 
A SOFOLS is a limited-purpose financial organisation or ‘niche lender’. 
SOFOLS differ from commercial banks because they can acquire assets through 
deposits and can grant loans only for the housing sector (World Bank, 2009b).12 
SOFOLS were established to serve workers who did not qualify for loans from 
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the HPFs, i.e., ‘unaffiliated’ (informal) waged labour, such as migrant workers, taxi 
drivers, waiters, domestic workers and so forth. SOFOLS serve the middle and 
lower market with more than 50 percent of clients having incomes between three 
to eight monthly minimum wages (MMW) (World Bank, 2009b; Herbert et al., 
2012). According to Mexico’s Federal Mortgage Company, SOFOLS have 
strengthened their financial conditions, either through capital injections or through 
mergers and acquisitions with large commercial banks (Pickering, 2000). The 
Mexican government, development institutions and other industry insiders, are 
expected to play a more significant role in funding affordable housing production 
and mortgages by channeling credit into mortgage lending for low-income, 
unaffiliated workers and development financing for home builders (SHF, 2011: 9; 
Business Monitor International, 2011; Herbert et al., 2012). 
In creating SOFOLS, the Mexican state was also hoping to spur greater 
competition and specialisation in the financial sector to assist in funding the built 
environment for the swelling numbers of informal workers (SHF, 2011). The 
privately owned SOFOLS, which were heavily funded at a reduced rate of interest 
by the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the Mexican government (FOVI), were to fill the lending 
gap left by the social interest loans by providing a new means for originating and 
servicing FOVI-financed loans. During the early 1990s, Mexico’s HPFs also 
underwent major reforms (IDB, 2011). One important change was the shift away 
from constructing homes to financing mortgages, which affected FOVISSSTE in 
1991 and INFONAVIT in 1993 (UN-HABITAT, 2011). How ever, as one urban 
scholar suggests, the relatively low-cost housing involved was not geared to lower-
income Mexicans but instead to middle- and upper-middle-class households, i.e., 
those beyond the four times MMW (Monkkonen, 2011b). 
In the wake of the devastating peso crisis of 1994–1995, the state, through 
its debtfarist roles, sought to jump-start private housing finance by moving funds 
from FOVI to finance the SOFOLS. In the late 1990s, for instance, 14 SOFOLS 
were licensed to lend with FOVI funds (Pickering, 2000). The target borrowers 
of these SOFOLS were workers in the informal sector who did not have access 
to bank and government funding, e.g., the HPFs. Given that SOFOLS were the 
first lending institution permitted to issue securitised mortgages, it is useful to 
understand how this funding worked. 
FOVI distributes its mortgage funds to the SOFOLS through auctions by housing 
developers. If the developer wins the bid, the developer is then obliged to cover 
the promised amount for each mortgage that is issued at the time the final buyer 
receives their mortgage from the SOFOL and takes possession of the home 
(Pickering, 2000: 8; Herbert et al., 2012). This dependent relationship between 
the state and the housing sector echoes the earlier description by Ball and Connolly, 
but with at least two key differences. First, the state is no longer directly involved 
in the construction of housing. Second, the dependent relationship involves 
SOFOLS and construction companies, with the state (FOVI) assuming an indirect 
though essential role as the guarantor of fictitious capital. As a result some 
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developers have started SOFOLS in order to obtain financing from FOVI, or have 
merely established a working affiliation with one. Once a developer has won the 
right to attain mortgage funds from FOVI, for instance, the company is also able 
to apply for FOVI construction financing. FOVI will finance construction loans 
for up to 65 percent of the finished home sale value. SOFOLS originate and service 
these loans as well (Pickering, 2000: 8–9). 
This transformation in lending relations has affected the way in which low-
income housing is constructed and acquired. As an urban scholar notes, ‘a majority 
of houses are now built by private companies on speculation and purchased with 
mortgages, rather than through the incremental process that previously governed 
urban development’ (Monkkonnen, 2011b: 406). This change is, however, neither 
a natural evolution of the market nor an efficient alternative in which everyone is 
better off. Instead, I suggest that it must be understood as part and parcel of a tension-
ridden, class-based strategy. As the next section will clarify, debtfarism plays a central 
role in mediating these tensions, particularly in the form of the Mexican Federal 
Mortgage Company and the securitisation of the SOFOLS and HPFs. 
Debtfarism and the construction of mortgage 
securitisation 
Aside from the passage of several key reforms, including the Amendments to the 
General Law on Securities and Credit in 2000 and the Law on Guaranteed 
Credit in 2002, several state-led changes in the housing sector occurred during 
the early 2000s that helped facilitate the first mortgage-backed securitisation in 
2003. In 2000, GMAC Financiera (hereafter: GMAC) was established in Mexico 
(IFC, 2005; Standard & Poor’s, 2006). GMAC, which would be involved in the 
first mortgage securitisation in the country, is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
US-based Ally Financial, which is one of the world’s largest financial services 
companies. Since its arrival in Mexico, GMAC has become an important source 
of funding for the SOFOLS. In 2001, INFONAVIT underwent comprehensive 
changes, which were aimed, among other things, at preparing it to move toward 
the mortgage securitisation issuance programme (IMF, 2008). INFONAVIT was 
also under pressure domestically and globally to increase its lending to lower-income 
Mexicans, thereby addressing a past trend of granting loans to higher-income affiliates 
(World Bank, 2002b). 
Since the early 2000s, both HPFs have greatly expanded their lending volumes 
with particular emphasis on workers making between two and four times MMW. 
However, given the limits of resolving the housing problem in the realm of exchange 
without addressing structural issues, such as the absence of a living wage, there 
remain many ‘affiliated’ workers, who cannot afford homes in the formal sector 
(CIDOC, 2011; FOVISSSTE, 2012; Herbert et al., 2012). Formal (affiliated) 
workers in the public sector are covered by the Institute for Social Security and 
Services for State Workers, or, in Spanish, Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales 
de los Trabajadores del Estado, or ISSSTE. Formal (affiliated) workers in the private 
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sector are covered by the Mexican Social Security Institute, or, in Spanish, Instituto 
Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS). 
With recommendations and funding from major international development 
organisations (including World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, China 
Development Bank and the Financial Stability Board), the Mexican debtfare state 
established the Federal Mortgage Company (SHF) in 2001. The SHF, which 
replaced FOVI, was mandated to promote mortgage securitisation and increase 
private funding for the housing sector. SHF was created with the main objective 
of fostering a secondary mortgage market through its role as guarantor and liquidity 
provider. The main functions of the SHF are to provide long-term financing to 
SOFOLS and to act as collateral in securitisation issuances of SOFOLS. The SHF 
was initially established with an expiration date in 2009 but, as we will see below, 
this was subsequently repealed and extended to 2013 due to ongoing issues 
resulting from the paradoxes of capital accumulation in Mexico (IMF, 2008: 11). 
The credit enhancement by the debtfare state through the Federal Mortgage 
Company for the securitisations of both the SOFOLS and the HPFs is fairly high, 
as investors view this as a risky investment. One of the risk-reduction strategies 
put in place by the SOFOLS involves the creation of investment units (UDIs), 
which are not denominated in pesos but US dollars, thereby offering shelter 
from inflation fluctuations (IMF, 2008).13 Thus, the Mexican Federal Mortgage 
Company puts the ‘full faith and credit’ of the Mexican state (and fictitious capital) 
behind the mortgages (SHF, 2008). As in the case of FOVI, the SHF does not 
lend directly to those in need of a home, but instead guarantees the timely 
payment of mortgages. Thus, if a mortgage payment is six months behind, the 
‘SHF pays to the lender between 25 and 75 percent of the outstanding balance of 
the mortgage loan, plus interest, as well as insurance fees and any unpaid services’ 
( Jordan, 2008). As I noted earlier, the SHF’s credit enhancement is believed 
to generate extra money for lending institutions, which will, in turn, encour­
age them to issue more mortgages, preferably to lower-income workers in the 
informal sector. 
With the legal, regulatory and ideological moorings in place, the first mortgage 
securitisation took place in 2003 and involved GMAC and two large SOFOLS – 
Hipotecaria Nacional and Hipotecaria Su Casita (Standard & Poor’s, 2006; IFC, 2009). 
IFC was said to have played a major role in securing the deal by giving it credibility 
as well as ‘bringing discipline to the table’ in order to win over the scepticism of 
investors, particularly in the recessionary fallout of the dot-com crisis in the United 
States (IMF, 2008). The International Finance Corporation (IFC), for example, 
assisted the establishment and growth of residential mortgage backed securities 
(RMBS) in Mexico by offering the same ‘risk/gamble’ management techniques, 
funding instruments and ratings strategies that contributed to the US subprime 
debacle. In 2004, IFC shifted $718 million to support the issuance of more than 
$4 billion in mortgage securities, the majority of which included backed loans to 
middle-income households seeking new housing and excluding those in dire need 
of adequate housing, namely, those in the zero to three times MMW category 
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(see Table 9.1; IFC, 2005). The IFC thus facilitated the expansion of subprime 
mort gages (i.e., making loans to risky, low-income workers). Mexico would thus 
follow the ‘troublesome development path’ in which securitised mortgages act as 
another mechanism of extracting value from low-income individuals and aid in 
the overall financial deepening (Sassen, 2008: 188). 
With the introduction of RMBS, the Mexican state continued to introduce 
reforms to encourage more private sector participation in housing finance by, for 
example, allowing members of the HPFs to simultaneously originate the purchase 
of a house with a credit from an HPF and from a private lender (SOFOLS). The 
state also loosened the regulatory nets by allowing HPF members to use their 
savings as a down payment for a loan originated by another lender (World Bank, 
2009b). In April 2005, the second largest SOFOL in Mexico, Hipotecaria Su Casita 
and INFONAVIT, closed a $100 million variable funding note program (Hipotecaria 
Su Casita Construction Loan Trust) ( Jobst, 2006). To help generate funds, the Mexican 
state also initiated a securitisation programme for both of the housing funds (World 
Bank, 2009b). 
Notwithstanding mortgage securitisation and its alleged win-win benefits for 
the poor, the paradox underpinning housing in Mexico would only be temporarily 
resolved through the credit system. Despite these financial innovations and low 
interest rates, the lower-income population, in both the formal and informal sectors, 
remained lightly served by SOFOLS and HPFs (World Bank, 2009b; Inter-
American Development Bank, 2011). The housing market, however, experienced 
a boom from 2000 to 2008, which was led, in part, by a significant expansion of 
INFONAVIT’S mortgage issuance and, in part, by commercial banks and SOFOLS 
increasing their mortgage lending as well. In fact, the number of mortgages issued 
by commercial banks, which were aggressively re-entering the mortgage lending 
market and SOFOLS during 2007 almost doubled the previous 1992 peak (Inter-
American Development Bank, 2011: 16). Total issues of mortgage securities 
reached over $6 billion in 2006 – tripling in volume since 2004 and making Mexico 
the largest RMBS market in Latin America (World Bank, 2009b). 
Enticed by the profitability and ability of SOFOLS to target workers in the 
informal economy, as well as their growth rates, which led these non-bank entities 
to manage billions of dollars in home loans, Mexico’s largest commercial bank, 
BBVA Bancomer, acquired Mexico’s largest SOFOL, Hipotecaria Nacional, in 2004 
(IMF, 2006). Unlike commercial banks, SOFOLS offer more flexibility in terms 
of minimum amounts required for applying for a bank mortgage, are able to pro­
vide loans in dollars and offer more flexibility in terms of repayment than banks 
(Knoweldge@Wharton, 2006; IMF, 2010). 
In 2005, the construction sector was the most profitable in Mexico, with 
construction firms enjoying a 44 percent increase over previous annual returns 
( Jordan, 2008). Underpinning this growth in the housing sector is the fact that 
there has been a substantial reliance on new housing as the most appropriate way 
to satisfy demand in Mexico, as opposed to repairing the large number of existing 
homes (IDB, 2011). As such, in 2005, housing stock had more than tripled relative 
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to the 1970s. To put this into perspective, in 2007, the housing stock replacement 
cost is estimated to have been 86 percent of GDP (UN-HABITAT, 2011). 
Interestingly, 70 percent of existing housing stock is estimated to be affordable 
housing, or in the ‘economic’ category, i.e., coinciding with five to 10 times MMW, 
whereas, as we saw earlier, the greatest demand is needed in basic homes (zero to 
three times MMW) and social homes (three to five times MMW) (UN-HABITAT, 
2011; Inter-American Development Bank, 2011: 9). While there are around 2,600 
construction companies operating in Mexico, the sector is dominated by six large 
companies, the first four of which are publicly traded: Geo, Homex, Urbi, Ara, 
Sare and Consorcio Hogar (CIDOC, 2011; Inter-American Development Bank, 
2011). Geo and Homex, Mexico’s two largest construction companies by market 
value, both specialise in affordable housing. Yet, as we will see below, the definition 
of affordable housing does not coincide with the purchasing capacity of the 
majority of lower-income families, e.g., three to four times MMW (CIDOC, 2012). 
In 2006, mortgage securitisation became the largest structured asset class, 
representing over 25 percent of total local structured issues. In this same year, 
housing construction represented almost 3 percent of the country’s GDP, which 
is nearly on a par with Mexico’s manufacturing leader, namely: the auto industry 
(IDB, 2011). In this same year, the debtfare state introduced regulatory changes 
to the insurance sector to facilitate greater competition in the housing financial 
market, thereby allowing the entrance of private sector financial guarantee 
providers for mortgage securities, such as the International Financial Corporation 
(IMF, 2008). This move had significant effects on the housing industry. As of 
October 2007, there were over $6.4 billion in outstanding mortgage securities 
issuances in the Mexican bond market by seven different SOFOLS, INFONAVIT 
and two commercial banks (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011). Alongside 
the spread of mortgage securitisation in both SOFOLS and HPFs, the construction 
industry, continued to grow, registering 6.8 percent of GDP in 2008 (CIDOC, 
2008). Several years after the global financial crisis, construction continues to play 
a major role in the Mexican economy, although it has fallen to 6 percent of Mexico’s 
GDP (BBVA Bancomer, 2013). 
Despite the construction and financing boom in the housing market, low-income 
workers remained locked out of affordable homes. To address this tension, the 
Mexican state created the New Housing Law in 2006 (UN-HABITAT, 2011). 
Unlike the previous Housing Law of 1983, the New Housing Law recognised, at 
least in rhetoric, the central role of self-construction in providing shelter for the vast 
majority of Mexicans: the surplus population (GlobalLens, 2012).14 In 2006, 
coinciding with the introduction of the Housing Law, the Mexican state set an all-
time-high annual target of granting 750,000 new residential mortgage loans (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2006). Although the 2006 Housing Law did not alter the direction of 
market-led forms of housing rights in Mexico, it did contain a revealing insight into 
the highly unequal nature of housing in light of the growing shortage of decent 
dwellings for the poor. The 2006 Housing Law, for instance, stated that housing is 
not only a basic human right but it is also a crucial factor in creating social order. 
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As such, it reflected an attempt by the state to create a social basis for further 
accumulation, as well as to appease the growing mass of unaffiliated workers. 
Debtfarism and the marketisation of housing rights in the 
wake of 2008 crisis 
The 2007–2008 sub-prime housing crisis in the US and its global recessionary fallout 
had a significant impact on Mexico, as it did on other countries. Hit particularly 
hard were those workers without savings and job security to cushion the blow of 
higher food and fuel costs, who were, once again, offered no social protection 
from financial speculation (Marois, 2014). With the advent of the 2008 global 
recession, Mexican real minimum wages (i.e., adjusted for inflation) fell below 1994 
levels (Puyana, 2010: 14). This placed a strain on the demand for new housing 
from low-income workers, especially from the informal sector. Indeed, many 
SOFOLS began to encounter financial problems, as workers were unable to meet 
mortgage payments. By 2008, some mortgage SOFOLS were experiencing high 
delinquency rates (Knowledge@Wharton, 2011) and their overall market share 
dropped considerably from 2008 to 2009 (see Table 9.1). According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), SOFOLS’ non-performing loans have more 
than tripled since the 2008 crisis, which is rather worrying owing to the fact that 
the SOFOLS have become integrated into the rest of the financial system over the 
past several years (IMF, 2010). The strains of the recession would prove too much 
for the SOFOLS and these institutions, which were created as a market-based 
solution to the housing problem for low- and middle-income, unaffiliated workers, 
began ‘to rely exclusively on the public sector for financial support, greatly dimin ­
ish ing their role in the market, leaving a significant void in lending to unaffiliated 
workers and homebuilders’ (Herbert et al., 2012: 4). 
At the same time, government officials and industry insiders were lamenting 
the fact that the low-income population, in both the formal and informal housing 
sectors, was still underserved (World Bank, 2009b). According to the Mexican Federal 
TABLE 9.1 Share in new housing mortgage loans* 













Source: BBVA Bancomer, October 2009 in Inter-American Development Bank (2011) Housing Finance 
in Mexico: Current State and Future Sustainability, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 
p. 16. 
* Figures corrected for co-financed loans, i.e., granted by more than one institution, for instance by 
INFONAVIT and a commercial bank. 
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Mortgage Company, ‘The financing schemes focus on the acquisition of new 
housing, which represents a costly and hardly accessible solution for the population 
with lower incomes, or salaries below or equivalent to four [monthly] minimum 
wages’ (CIDOC, 2008: 37, 2012; SHF, 2011). Despite these tensions, the proffered 
solution remained framed ahistorically in the realm of exchange, as opposed to 
understanding the roots of impoverishment in past policy decisions and in the 
processes of capital accumulation. 
This fail forward neoliberal strategy was to remain faithful to the solution of 
mortgage securitisation, thereby seeking to lock in the marketisation of housing 
rights in the post-2008 recessionary environment and subsequent restructuring 
phase of Mexican capitalism. According to its mandate in the post-2008 crisis 
environment, the SHF still ‘considers the securitisation of mortgages as the most 
efficient mechanism of housing financing (SHF, 2014, my emphasis). With the 
proper market-friendly regulatory reforms15, including the privatisation of the 
Housing Provident Funds, many economic pundits believed that the housing 
markets would be able to take advantage of what has become the new growth area 
in the post-2008 environment: affordable housing (BBVA Bancomer, 2011; 
Business Monitor International, 2011). According to industry observers, low-cost 
housing construction represents a thriving market that is expected to outperform 
the overall sector (Business Monitor International, 2011). 
Efforts were undertaken to expand, accelerate and improve the efficiency of 
mortgage securitisation in Mexico, ostensibly in order to reach the poorest segment 
of the population (IMF, 2010). If we look more closely at some of these policies, 
however, it becomes clear that the construction and financial sectors benefitted 
greatly from state-led reforms to marketise housing rights. The Mexican state for 
its part has been actively seeking to depoliticise and activate the housing sector in 
the aftermath of the US subprime crisis by reinforcing the 2006 Housing Law. In 
addition, the state has maintained an emphasis on social order through such 
rhetorical devices as the Housing Sector Program 2007–2012: Toward a sustainable 
housing development, issued by Mexico’s National Housing Commission (UN­
HABITAT, 2011). The main thrust of this policy was to ‘[i]ncrease the amount 
of housing financing available to citizens, particularly low-income families’ (UN­
HABITAT, 2011). As I demonstrate below, the preference for building new houses 
over improving existing housing units benefits the construction and finance 
corporations. To put this demand for repairing existing homes in perspective around 
9 million housing units were in need for improvement in 2012 (CIDOC, 2012). 
To assist the Mexican government in creating a more efficient and independent 
mortgage securities market, in 2008, the World Bank provided a substantial loan 
of $1.01 billion to the SHF to help refinance its short-term debt. The idea behind 
this loan was to allow the SHF to support mortgage growth through the SOFOLS. 
The World Bank, however, made clear that the SHF and SOFOLS should expand 
its housing finance from its middle-income base include low-income households 
(those that make less than six times the MMW) (World Bank, 2008). According 
to the Financial Stability Board, ‘This decision . . . proved crucial for maintaining 
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liquidity to SOFOLS, which [have] relied on domestic wholesale financing [from 
the SHF] and experienced several liquidity pressures during the crisis’ (Financial 
Stability Board, 2010: 29). 
To regain investor confidence, the Mexican state issued new regulations 
requiring SOFOLS to meet similar accounting and transparency standards as banks, 
raise more capital and comply with new loan-loss provisioning rules (Inter-
American Development Bank, 2011). These reforms would, in turn, assist the 
SOFOLS in diversifying their lending as well as help them partner with other lending 
institutions, such as commercial banks. The SHF has been working closely with 
SOFOLS to create new lending products geared toward the lower-income and 
informal sectors (Knowledge@Wharton, 2011; Herbert et al., 2012). 
At the time of writing, the technical and financial support from the SHF seems 
to be taking effect, as several SOFOLS have been creating new lending products 
for lower-income families. Some SOFOLS, for example, have created innovative 
products for street vendors and taxi drivers, who work in the huge informal economy 
and do not possess either documented salaries or credit histories (Knowledge@ 
Wharton, 2011). Various SOFOLS are examining spending habits to establish 
applicant income and offering trial payment periods to prove borrowers can afford 
payments on entry-level homes that range from $17,000 to $37,000, i.e., within 
the scope of basic and social homes, respectively (UN-HABITAT, 2011; 
GlobalLens, 2012). It is worth repeating that these homes cost more than what 
many of the lower-income households are believed to be able to afford, e.g., $13,000 
(UN-HABITAT, 2011). SOFOLS have continued to target the estimated 11 million 
Mexicans working largely as undocumented, migrant labour in the US with ‘cross­
border’ mortgages to pay off homes in Mexico, giving them more control over 
the earnings they send relatives and cutting the time they need to work in the US 
to build a future in Mexico (Knowledge@Wharton, 2011). 
It bears repeating here that despite and in contrast to, the neoliberal rhetorical 
about market-based solutions to housing finance, all these programmes are backed 
by the Mexican state, e.g., the Federal Mortgage Company. These reforms, 
coupled with the persistent economic downturn in the rest of the world, have 
made Mexico’s thriving affordable housing market an attractive investment for a 
number of private equity funds keen to capitalise on the long-term growth 
potential and stable returns associated with the affordable housing sector (Business 
Monitor International, 2011). 
Market-based ‘affordable’ housing: an efficient and effective 
solution for the poor? 
The class-led advancement of neoliberalisation in the housing market has resulted 
in several characteristics that not only stand out after several years of mortgage 
securitisation but also will act as the starting point for renewed paradoxes to be 
resolved, once again, by the credit system – with the assistance of the Mexican 
debtfare state. According to the Mexican Federal Mortgage Company (SHF), the 
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attempts to expand the mortgage securities market reveal comparatively higher levels 
of securitisation with regard to the Housing Funds than private issuances through 
Hipotecaria Total (or, HiTO), which is funded by – among other actors – the SHF, 
Soros Foundation and Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO) 
(CIDOC, 2008; ‘A Danish Model in Aztec Dress’, The Economist, 4 January 2007). 
As Figure 9.1 shows, the largest issuer of mortgage securitisation continues to 
be INFONAVIT, with 35 percent of the market (IDB, 2011). This implies that, 
contrary to the rhetoric of market-led efficiency, the state is not only playing a 
key role in the marketisation of housing finance, but also that the highest 
concentration of money raised for alleged redistribution to the surplus population 
will remain within the formal sector as opposed to the informal sector workers, 
who require decent and affordable housing. As of 2009, for instance, INFONAVIT 
and FOVISSSTE held 82 percent of the market for new mortgages, whereas 
SOFOLS held 2.7 percent (down from 7.6 percent in 2008) and commercial banks 
weighed in at 15.3 percent (down from 6.4 percent in 2008) (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2011: 16). 
The tight and dependent relationship between the Mexican state, construction 
firms and private housing finance companies such as SOFOLS, has not only 
continued to consolidate, but also has yielded a concentration of market power as 
opposed to increased competition as espoused by neoclassical economics. In 2008, 
four SOFOLS dominated 68 percent of the market share in construction bridge 
loans (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011: 24). In 2009, 60 percent of new 
house mortgages issued by INFONAVIT were built by 25 construction companies 
(IDB, 2011: 14–15; CIDOC, 2011). In 2010, 88 percent of mortgage financing 
FIGURE 9.1 Primary issues of Mexican residential mortgage securities, 2003–2012 (in %) 
Source: Infonavit cited in CIDOC (2012) The Current State of Housing in Mexico 2012, Mexico City, 
Mexico: CIDOC, p.35. 
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by INFONAVIT was built by Mexico’s largest construction company, Homex 
(Business Monitor International, 2011). 
The largest construction companies in Mexico continue to rely heavily on the 
debtfare state (e.g., Federal Mortgage Company and Housing Funds) to provide 
mortgage financing to low-income groups in the private and public (formal or 
affiliated) sectors (CONAVI, 2009; Business Monitor International, 2011). The 
close relationships between the Mexican state and major construction companies 
were also made evident, for example, in 2011 when delays in the ‘2×1’ subsidy 
program, whereby the Mexican government offers one peso in subsidies for every 
two pesos that local governments pledge to help low-income families become 
homeowners, had an immediate and detrimental impact on six major construction 
companies, including Homex (‘Mexico Builders Fall to Lowest Since 2009 on 
Subsidy Delays’, Bloomberg, 1 November 2011). 
Despite these synergies between state and capital, however, the tensions in the 
housing market continue to sharpen. In 2012, the year-over-year home reposses­
sions more than doubled to a record 43,853 (Inter-American Development Bank, 
2011; SHF, 2011). This, in turn, has also affected Mexico’s large construction 
companies. Urbi and Geo both defaulted on bond payments in 2013 and are 
considering restructuring debt, including filing for bankruptcy (‘In Mexico, 
Troubling Times’, Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2013). Homex has sold its stakes in 
two prisons in an attempt to avoid following its peers into default. The company’s 
currency reserves plummeted 86 percent to 322.7 million pesos as of 31 March 
from the end of 2012 (‘Mexico’s Record Foreclosures Impeding Home Ownership: 
Mortgages’, Bloomberg, 1 May 2013). 
Despite the renewed focus on providing affordable housing to the poor, the 
customer base of the SOFOLS did not expand to include the low-income segment 
of the population (UN-HABITAT, 2011). It is estimated that at least 40 percent 
of all existing homes have been constructed directly by the homeowners without 
either public or private help. Most of these homes belong to individuals in the 
low-income, informal sector (UN-HABITAT, 2011: 14; GlobalLens, 2012). 
Interestingly, the number of self-constructed, informal homes remains similar to 
the period prior to the introduction of mortgage securitisation in 2003, reflecting 
the importance of self-constructed homes in the built environment prior to the 
introduction of the marketisation of housing rights in Mexico (Ball and Connolly, 
1987; GlobalLens, 2012). 
The global corporate behemoth CEMEX, a Mexican-based building materials 
supplier and cement producer, has long-exploited this large and persistent market 
of self-constructed, informal dwellings through its micro-credit programme, 
Patrimonio Hoy, which roughly translates into ‘Personal Property Today’. Patrimonio 
Hoy was created in 1998 in the wake of the recessionary environment of the post-
peso crisis. CEMEX used this micro-finance strategy to boost sales in the face of 
rising unemployment and a drastically devalued Mexican peso to target its largest 
customer segment: the self-construction market (Sandoval, 2005; GlobalLens, 
2006). Similar to the retail financing discussed in Chapter 8, the CEMEX lending 
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programme is aimed at providing those shut out of the housing finance system 
with credit to purchase goods and services from CEMEX ( CEMEX, 2010). Surplus 
workers, who earn less than four times the MMW, pay about $14 on a weekly 
basis for 70 weeks to CEMEX. This in turn purchases consultations and inspections 
by CEMEX staff and scheduled deliveries of materials divided into building phases 
spanning more than a year ( CEMEX, 2010). For workers based in the informal 
economy, this commitment is steep. In the best-case scenario, the weekly payment 
of $14 translates into slightly less than three days of a worker’s wages (e.g., the 
minimum wage, which it bears repeating is far from a living wage, was set at 65 
pesos ($5.10) per day in 2013) (see Chapter 8). This assumes the worker is able 
both to earn the minimum wage and to find steady employment for the week. 
Patrimonio Hoy is highly lucrative. In 2011, for instance, it generated a profit 
of $3.5 million from $45 million in revenues (GlobalLens, 2012). The micro-credit 
programme is championed as one of Latin America’s most successful ‘social 
enterprises’ and has been expanded to several Latin American countries, including 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.16 In 2011 and 
mirroring the global debtfarist strategies covered in Chapter 7, the Inter-American 
Development Bank facilitated the further expansion of Patrimonio Hoy by providing 
the corporation with a partial credit guarantee of up to $10 million (GlobalLens, 
2012). Reflecting the market-based ethos of housing for low-income Mexicans, 
it is interesting to note that Cemex, through its lending programme, Patrimonio 
Hoy, continues to benefit from the inability of the marketisation of housing 
rights to reach the poor. Despite Cemex’s success, however, mortgage securitisation 
and its enabling debtfarist framings and interventions have not resulted in easing 
the housing deficit for low-income Mexicans. Instead, it has developed into a 
significant subsidy to the housing financial sector and construction industry, which 
stands in contrast to the rhetoric that it has been undertaken in the name of the 
poor. 
Conclusion 
Building on the insights from Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, this chapter sought to 
meet two objectives. First, through the example of mortgage securitisation, it 
evaluated the neoliberal claims that marketisation of housing rights is an efficient 
and effective solution to providing adequate housing for the surplus population in 
Mexico. Second, it sought to historicise and politicise mortgage securitisation by 
situating this class strategy in the wider dynamics of capital accumulation. 
My research has demonstrated that the democratised access to credit money 
(fictitious capital) and the win-win narratives of mortgage securitisation that 
underpin the marketisation of housing rights remain mythical features of neoliberal 
narratives of market efficiency (see also Sassen, 2008; Wyly et al., 2009). In this 
chapter, I have revealed that the primary beneficiaries of mortgage securitisation 
in Mexico have not been the poor, whom securitisation is allegedly designed to 
serve, but instead large construction companies and the housing finance market 
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comprised of state-subsidised Housing Funds and SOFOLS. This also includes the 
increasing number of foreign-owned commercial banks and institutional investors 
(e.g., equity funds, pension funds) that have been entering the field, particularly 
since the US sub-prime housing crisis of 2007–2008. Seen through a historical 
materialist approach, I have shown that mortgage securitisation is neither a natural 
evolutionary feature of the market nor has it produced a win-win scenario. Indeed, 
with the assistance of debtfarist intervention, primarily through the Federal 
Mortgage Company (SHF), the main beneficiaries of mortgage securitisation in 
Mexico continue to be middle-income workers in the formal sector earning more 
than six times the minimum monthly wage, the construction industry and the 
housing financial sector. 
In closing, the historical materialist framework applied in this book has allowed 
us to move outside the realm of exchange – where both the housing problem (deficit 
for the poor) and its solution (mortgage securitisation) have been formulated by 
debtfarism. In this way, it has allowed us to trace the emergence and meaning of 
mortgage securitisation to the dominant neoliberal development paradigm, which 
emphasises the importance of financial inclusion as a central means to deal 
with the basic subsistence needs of the surplus population (e.g., housing and, by 
extension, the reliance on private and formal lenders to deal with housing needs). 
What emerges is a picture of the disconnect between neoliberal promises of 
financial inclusion and the harsh social realities for the working poor in Mexico. 
Mortgage securitisation is not a neutral financial instrument that has emerged 
from a naturally evolving market, but rather a social phenomenon that has been 
heavily subsidised and normalised by the Mexican state and its debtfarist forms 
of intervention. If, when and at what social cost the ongoing processes of neo ­
liberalisation will result in housing gains for low-income families in Mexico 
remains an open question. What is certain is that the answer will be marked as 
much by the past contingencies and struggles inherent to credit-led accumulation 
as the ones that lie ahead. 
Notes 
1 Adequate shelter as defined by the UN-HABITAT refers to 
more than a roof over one’s head. It also means adequate privacy; adequate space; 
physical accessibility; adequate security; security of tenure; structural stability and 
durability; adequate lighting, heating and ventilation; adequate basic infrastructure, 
such as water-supply, sanitation and waste-management facilities; suitable environ ­
mental quality and health related factors; and adequate and accessible location with 
regard to work and basic facilities: all of which should be available at an affordable 
cost. Adequacy should be determined together with the people concerned, bearing 
in mind the prospect for gradual development. 
(UN-HABITAT, 2010b: 6) 
2 The scholarly literature on mortgage securitisation in Mexico has been sparse, particularly 
with regard to inquiries about questions of power. Where discussion has taken place, it 
has been dominated by economistic (Barry et al., 1994; Sanchez, 2010) and legal 
(Haddad, 1999; Poindexter and Vargas-Cartaya, 2003) analyses that were largely written 
240 Debtfarism and the poverty industry in Mexico 
prior to the introduction of mortgage securitisation, meaning they tend to be devoid of 
historical and social context. These debates have yielded empirically rich and informative 
discussions about the legal and regulatory considerations involved in the shifting terrain 
of the housing finance system and its impact on mitigating risk with regard to the low-
income segments of the population. However, due to the treatment of mortgage 
securitisation as a technical and ahistorical instrument, debates that have touched upon 
mortgage securitisation in Mexico have failed to provide an explanatory analysis of the 
types of questions posed above ( Jordan, 2008). 
3 The Spanish name for the Mexican Housing Corporation is Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal 
or SHF. For more information, see: www.shf.gob.mx/Paginas/default.aspx (accessed 
13 August 2013). 
4 The study also notes that ‘8.1 million earned above this cut-off, with a quarter of this 
group in the top two income deciles, suggesting that a lack of access to mortgage financing 
is also evident among higher income groups’ (Herbert et al., 2012: 10). This is an important 
aspect of study, but remains outside the scope of this analysis. 
5 According to the UN-HABITAT, Housing’s ‘backward and forward linkages with other 
parts of the economy closely bond people’s needs, demands and social processes with 
the supply of land, infrastructure, building materials, technology, labour, and housing 
finance. These linkages allow housing to act as an important engine for sustainable 
development and poverty reduction in both society and the economy’ (UN-HABITAT, 
2010a: 5). 
6 Every enterprise, including agricultural, mining, industrial or other, is obliged to provide 
comfortable and hygienic housing for its workers. To meet this obligation, enterprises 
must pay the National Worker Housing Fund an amount equal to five percent of the 
amount paid in worker salaries. (Art. l36). The National Worker Housing Fund is intended 
to create financing systems that enable workers to obtain credit at low cost to acquire 
property or to construct, repair, or improve their housing (FLL Art. 137). The resources 
of the Fund shall be administered by a tripartite committee composed of representatives 
of the labour force, employers and the government (FLL Art. 138). United States 
Department of Labor. Minimum Employment Standards in Mexico. Available at: 
www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/minemployment.htm#xxvii (accessed 3 March 
2013). 
7 This bank is referred to as the Banco Nacional de Fomento de la Vivienda y la 
Producción in Spanish. 
8 Most of the social property can be further divided into two types: ejidos, which 
make up 83 percent of this form of property, and communidades agrarias, which comprise 
17 percent (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011). 
9 Given the expenses required to create legal ownership of land, and the pressing need for 
housing for the poor, the federal and municipal governments have turned a blind eye 
to this situation. Moreover, the benefits from holding formal or informal home ownership 
are somewhat unclear in many parts of Mexico. For instance, ‘While a little more than 
half of homes without a title have water and sewage services in the home, it is also true 
that only about three quarters of homes with a title have these services’ (Herbert et al., 
2012: 18). 
10 In Spanish, CETES stands for Certificados de la Tesorería. More information is available 
at: www.banxico.org.mx/ayuda/temas-mas-consultados/cetes—mexican-federal-treasu. 
html (accessed 12 August 2013). 
11 See Chapter 3 for the importance of monetarism to the neoliberal management of money 
and credit. 
12 A SOFOL is limited purpose in that it may only lend to one sector only, such as housing, 
agri-industry, or manufacturing. The fastest growing and largest SOFOLS are those that 
specialise in mortgages (Emmond, 2005). 
13 The Spanish name of this financial instrument is: unidades de inversión, or, UDIs, for short. 
For more information, see: www.banxico.org.mx/ayuda/temas-mas-consultados/udis-­
mexico_s-investment-uni.html (accessed 14 August 2013). 
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14 Habitat International Coalition (2006) ‘State Support for Social Production of Housing?: 
Mexico’s new Housing Law Exposes Planning Contradictions and Challenges’. Available 
at: www.gloobal.net/iepala/gloobal/fichas/ficha.php?entidad=Textos&id=5300&opcion= 
documento (accessed 9 August 2013). 
15 The Mexican Federal Mortgage Company (SHF) was also to remove its 100 percent 
guarantee for funding mortgage securities in 2009. This was subsequently extended to 
2013. As of January 2014, it is unclear if the SHF is actually implementing this decision, 
however (SHF, 2014). Available: www.pencom.gov.ng/download/.../Mortgage_Market_ 
in_Mexico.ppt_ (accessed 15 January 2014). 
16 ‘IDB to support expansion of CEMEX microfinance program for low-income families’, 
News Release, 28 June 2011. Available: www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2011-06­
28/cemex-housing-microfinance,9413.html (accessed 28 June 2013). 
CONCLUSION
 
In many ways, this book is a contribution to our understanding of the processes 
and paradoxes of neoliberalisation and its social reproduction. Drawing on a 
historical materialist lens, I examined the roles played by neoliberal states in 
deepening its class-based agenda through the social power of money. I also sought 
to explain how and why this configuration of class-led power has extended the 
privatisation of the commons, intensified the commodification of basic social services 
and normalised an overarching policy preference for hyper-individualised and 
marketised forms of self-help (responsibilisation) for the weak and corporate 
welfarism for the strong (Gill, 1995; Wacquant, 2009). I have also demonstrated 
how such strategies, framed by neoliberal states – and debtfarism in particular – 
have paved the way for the construction of the poverty industry in the United 
States and Mexico. 
In so doing, the book sought to challenge conventional ways of thinking about 
the extension of privately created money in the form of consumer credit to the 
surplus population; that is, the poor who constitute an increasing segment of 
the world’s population. In more specific terms, I wanted to contribute to the debates 
on neoliberalisation in a way that will facilitate a more rigorous and complete 
explanation regarding the origins of power, transformation and the social 
reproduction of the monetised relations of debt in the poverty industry. 
I avoided using the fashionable, yet – as is often the case of trendy terms 
in academia – vacuous concept of ‘financialisation’. Instead, I began my analysis 
where most debates about financialisation unfortunately end: taking seriously 
the social power of money as it relates to the wider dynamics and social relations 
of capital accumulation. In taking this step, I move beyond post-structuralist 
approaches that employ an economist’s view of money and credit in capitalist 
society. These approaches, I argue, can only construct complementary fetishised 
under standings of the cultural and social dimensions of capitalism. As a corrective, 
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I suggest that we employ a historical materialist framework to locate the origins 
of the social power of money in the wider context of the dynamics of credit-led 
accumulation. 
To understand the processes involved in the social reproduction of debtors, 
I have drawn analytical and concrete attention to the surplus population (under­
employed and unemployed workers). This Marxian category of labour power 
is often portrayed as a dynamic, spatially specific and heterogeneous group of 
workers that are marginal to, but do not exist outside, the processes of capital accum ­
ulation. The surplus population, I argue, represents an integral feature of the 
expression of global capitalism since the early 1980s: namely, credit-led accumula ­
tion – or, accumulation via privately created money. The surplus population’s 
significance to the processes of accumulation in neoliberalisation is two-fold. On 
the one hand, the low wages paid to surplus workers provides a competitive 
advantage for capitalists. To illustrate, the UN-HABITAT notes that slums facilitate 
the existence of a country’s competitive advantage because they house the lowest-
income worker. ‘[T]he lowest income worker becomes the “gold dust of the 
urban economy”. And the place where they can afford to live becomes the “gold 
mine of the city economy”’ (UN-HABITAT, 2006: 5). On the other hand, the 
surplus population has also come to represent a site for capitalists seeking to expand 
their interest-, fee- and commission-generating services (“the gold mine”) to an 
increasing number of the surplus population. The latter have been sanitised in 
business language as the ‘bottom of the pyramid’, made victims of the dispossessive 
strategies of mainstream finance institutions that are veiled by the seemingly 
progressive, yet ambiguous, façade of financial inclusion strategies. 
The dominance, power and contradictory nature of privately created money 
coupled with state retrenchment regarding social programmes in the face of the 
rise of the surplus population has fomented an institutional (legal and regulatory) 
and ideological (rhetorical) feature of state intervention: debtfarism. Sitting alongside 
other core modes of governance, such as workfare, monetarism, corporate welfare, 
the concept of debtfare promises to offer an important contribution to the debates 
of neoliberalisation. This new form of governance has facilitated the expansion of 
privately created money in the form of poverty industry and therewith has assisted 
in the social reproduction of the surplus population. At their base, the processes 
of social reproduction under debtfarism are aimed at constructing, both legally and 
ideologically, a dependence of the working poor on privately created money. 
Through the application of the social power of money and its attendant illusions 
of the community of money, debtfarism has assisted in underwriting a new social 
pact between corporations and surplus workers in which the former are entitled 
to state protection (e.g., private property) and welfare benefits (e.g., subsidisations, 
bailouts) while the latter are entitled to access formal credit channels to meet their 
basic subsistence needs in the name of financial inclusion and the democratisation 
of credit. 
The illusions of democracy, equality and freedom underpinning the community 
of money are not only bolstered by the construction of the surplus population as 
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a source of consumer citizens and/or clients. The distortion of the exploitative and 
disciplinary nature of the community of money is continually undergirded by those 
who insist on representing money and credit as economic categories that reside 
almost exclusively in the realm of exchange. As I have demonstrated, money has 
inherent social power. In capitalism, this expresses itself as a universal equivalent, 
a thing that has the capacity to expand abstract wealth independently of exploitation. 
Money also serves to destroy personal bonds of dependency and replace them with 
relations of objective dependency through which individuals relate to each other 
through ‘things’ (abstractions) such as interest rates, credit ratings, fees, consumer-
lender relations and so forth. 
The illusionary powers of the community of money, including its ability to mask 
exploitation and individualise and commodify relations between people, is further 
amplified by the particular attributes of privately created money and its capacity to 
spatially and temporally displace contradictions – albeit only temporarily and only 
with the assistance of states and, in some cases, international organisations (e.g., G20). 
Extending privately created money to subprime borrowers in the United States and 
in Mexico, for example, represents a spatial fix in capitalists’ interests of pursuing 
increasingly more lucrative outlets. The temporal displacement of these loans through 
sophisticated derivative-based instruments tied to asset-backed securitisation (i.e., 
the commodification of debt) cannot escape a fundamental tension of credit: no 
matter how far afield a privately contracted bill of exchange may circulate, it must 
always return to its place of origin for redemption (Harvey, 1999: 245–6). 
The myriad of financial crises based on the paradoxes of privately created money 
– that is the expansion of credit beyond its monetary basis – has not meant the 
weakening of neoliberalisation. Instead, in many cases, neoliberalisation has been 
strengthened and deepened through these processes. From a Marxian perspective, 
crises are unpredictable but inevitable, providing moments in which the legitimacy 
of neoliberal-led capitalism can be questioned and contested across a wide variety 
of interests, constituencies and classes. Nonetheless, since the 1980s, the advent of 
each major financial crisis has been used to reimpose the power and discipline 
of money (e.g., fresh waves of fiscal austerity, especially for public sector workers 
and soft laws for corporations) by invoking and recreating the illusions of the 
community of money (Harvey, 1999). 
Instead of guaranteeing living wages and public provisioning for basic social 
needs, the neoliberal pact in the new millennium is all about safeguarding market 
freedoms and equality to ensure that all consumers may benefit from standards of 
fairness, competition, transparency and accountability. These market freedoms 
guaranteed by debtfarism are continually framed in the illusions of the community 
of money and bolstered by the seeming neutrality of the legal obligation of debt 
and consumer protection. In this way, debtfarism mirrors new systems of govern ­
ance in neoliberalism that has integrated states and corporate interests. A key feature 
of these new systems of neoliberal governance involves the social power of money. 
As David Harvey (2008: 38) observes, ‘through the application of money power, 
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[neoliberal states have] ensured that the disbursement of the surplus through the 
state apparatus favours corporate capital and the upper classes’. 
My concept of debtfarism is designed to capture new modes of neoliberal 
governance in credit-led accumulation, specifically with regard to the personal 
indebtedness of impoverished workers. Implicit to these new modes of govern­
ance are an unwritten, dynamic and informal compromise or pact that provides a 
foundational basis upon which neoliberalisation has come to rest. This pact, which 
I refer to here, out of convenience, as the ‘corporate responsibilisation compact’ 
is unique from previous compromises in that it is has emerged on an ad hoc basis 
since the early 1980s. I should also note that this compromise assumes different, 
differentiated, multi-scalar articulations and meanings over time and space. 
Unlike the majority of compromises forged in the aftermath of World War II, 
the corporate responsibilisation pact does not involve either a tripartite agree­
ment or a Keynesianist-inspired material basis, e.g., welfare protection. Instead, 
it involves an implicit, top-down relation between corporations and workers, 
which is undergirded by the rhetorical and regulatory powers of capitalist states. 
The compromise underpinning the corporate responsibilisation compact reflects 
some features of the Third Way solution, which was popularised by the Clinton 
Administration (1993–2001) in the United States and Tony Blair in the United 
Kingdom (1997–2007) and which also found itself reformulated in the Washington 
Consensus and the post-Washington Consensus (Giddens, 2000; Stiglitz, 2003). 
As many authors have rightfully argued, these features were largely rhetorical in 
nature and served to strengthen the foundations of neoliberalisation, prioritising 
individualised self-help as opposed to affect any meaningful form of social justice 
(Peck and Tickell, 2002; Wacquant, 2009). The connection between the Third 
Way and what might be referred to as the corporate responsibilisation compact is 
indeed an attempt to achieve economic growth through entrepreneurialism, 
market-led wealth creation and private consumption alongside greater social justice, 
which involves a major role for the state. However, the new system of neoliberal 
governance that has integrated state and corporate interests involves strategies that 
are not framed in legal or regulatory code; but instead remain less legible and very 
much top-down creations. 
As Peck and Tickell (2002) argue, the continually changing forms of interven­
tion of capitalist states and the deepening of the social power of money serves to 
deflect and even delegitimise alternatives to neoliberalisation – not least a return 
to public consumption and control over essential services, the protection of 
the weakest through basic safety standards and living wages and, more funda ­
mentally, the redistribution of wealth through progressive taxation, including 
corporations. The great irony and tragedy of our times is that, after several decades 
of continual neoliberal assaults, the meaning of the Third Way’s insistence of a 
greater role for the state in achieving justice has translated into the institu ­
tionalisation and normalisation of corporations as both perpetrators against and 
providers of, protection against the social and environmental destruction of 
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free-market growth. In this sense, the new pact driven by states and corporations 
has meant that all social and environmental concerns have been reconfigured into 
metrics that grant primacy to profit maximisation, individual responsibilisation and 
economic efficiency. 
Debtfarism and its illusory powers of the community of money, manifest the 
corporate responsibilisation compact. There are many more articulations of this 
across the globe. The UN-HABITAT, as I noted in Chapter 9, has been actively 
seeking ways of implementing the corporate compact between capitalists and slum-
dwellers through, for instance, its Slum Upgrading Housing Facility Programme 
(UN-HABITAT, 2006). This is an attempt to ensure that the surplus population 
(‘the gold dust’), many members of which live in slum dwellings across the globe, 
are able to reproduce themselves through access to affordable housing. The solution 
to this dire social and environmental problem is not a turn to public housing and/or 
rent control. Instead, the role of the state and international organisations such 
as the UN-HABITAT, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and so 
forth is to connect global financial markets to slum dwellers, thereby creating a 
gold mine. 
The state subsidised Patrimonio Hoy programme, financed by one of the world’s 
largest cement corporations, Cemex, is a case in point. The former Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) offers another example of a corporate 
responsibilisation compact.1 Before its demise and takeover by the Canadian 
government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, CIDA was 
engaging in providing public funds to finance corporate social responsibility 
partner ships between development NGOs (e.g., World University Service of 
Canada and Plan Canada) and Canadian mining companies operating in the global 
South (MiningWatch Canada, 2012). In effect, the Canadian neoliberal state was 
not only engaging in corporate welfare for Canadian mining corporations; but also 
underwriting a compact between societal interests harmed by its extractive strategies. 
In other words, the Canadian state, along with large development NGOs – which 
are notoriously dependent on state and corporate financing – provide legitimacy 
to Canadian mining corporations to ensure the connection between the gold mine 
and the gold dust could be maintained in a free-market environment devoid of 
taxation, expensive reparations and or legal constraints. 
This emerging corporate responsibilisation compact forces us to reflect critically 
on how we conceptualise new articulations of governance that undemocratically 
integrate state and corporate interests, while excluding all other voices and non-
market based values. More work needs to be done in terms of thinking through 
and examining these new forms of governance, including debtfarism. In particular, 
we need to consider debtfarism against the backdrop of other debt relations – most 
notably sovereign debt and environmental debt – and across local, national and 
global scales of capitalism. 
In closing, my contribution has not been to provide blueprints and roadmaps 
of how struggles should proceed. Instead, my aim has been to raise pertinent 
1 
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questions about how to radically re-think the meanings of the uncontested 
revolutionary power of money, the continued impoverishment of workers and 
neo-liberal modes of governance. In so doing, I have attempted to examine and 
theorise how these three sets of social relations are inextricably linked to the 
hegemony of credit-led accumulation – a form of accumulation that is charac ­
terised, as Marx warns, by unlimited forms of social power. 
Note 
CIDA was terminated in name and existing bureaucratic structure in 2013. Aid spending, 
however, continues through the Canadian government, but under the purview of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. For more information see, 
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/home (accessed 1 October 2013). 
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